W. E. HENTHORN

KOREA

THE MONGOL INVASIONS

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BY

W. E. HENTHORN

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PREFACE

Events of the past decade have once again placed the Korean peninsula in the position of a buffer state where the wars of greater powers are focused. Historians will recall that Korea has had this role thrust upon her many times before. In recent times the peninsula was the battleground for the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 while the opening battle of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, a naval action, took place off the present port of Inch'ŏn. As a result, a number of studies of the various aspects of modern Korean society, particularly in its contacts with the West, have been undertaken but little attention has been given to the evolution of that society. Yet it is only when this is studied for each period in Korean history that studies of contemporary Korean society can be approached in other than a limited sense.

The Koryŏ 高麗 period (918-1392) during which the Mongol invasions occurred was a great formative period in the history of the development of Korean society. The period encompassing the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century and the subsequent establishment of Mongol military-administrative organs on the Korean peninsula was one of the important phases of transition in Korean history.

The development of any society is, of course, continuous, but for the purposes of study I have found it convenient to treat the subject at hand in two natural divisions. The Mongol invasions of Korea in the thirteenth century *as a development in Korean history* form the subject of the present study. It is my intention to treat, in a separate work, the full extension of Mongol control in Korea which followed the period of conquest and with which I have dealt only summarily if at all in these pages. For the period covered I have, however, considered the question of the form and nature of Mongol demands upon Koryŏ as well as the implementation of these demands as an illustration of Mongol methods of establishing control in and extracting wealth from conquered nations. The reciprocal of this was the Koryŏ response to Mongol demands and pressures which was obviously limited and guided by her internal situation as well as her external relations.

The Mongol conquest and subsequent occupation of Koryŏ represent but one phase in the development of the Mongol empire and in many respects the least known phase. The Mongols, initially, did not set out to conquer Koryŏ

but were at the time fighting the Chin in North China. When a drive across South Manchuria led them into northern Koryŏ, they obtained Koryŏ's submission without fighting a battle against Koryŏ forces. There were many factors which contributed to Koryŏ's initial peaceful submission but the key factor was that the Mongols represented, or appeared to represent, the new power in Manchuria. And Koryŏ had always been tributary to the power which held North China and Manchuria. When it became apparent that the Mongols were not at the time strong enough to hold South Manchuria, Koryŏ severed the relationship. This led to a period of sporadic warfare lasting almost thirty years. When Koryŏ finally submitted to the Mongols it was due more to internal events than as a result of the conflict. It has been one of the purposes of this study to examine these events and, if possible, to discover some of the reasons behind what were often apparently contradictory actions by the Koryŏ authorities. My approach has been primarily philological and in this respect I have, in general, endeavored to 'let the records speak for themselves'.

Unfortunately studies of pre-modern Korean history by Western scholars have been extremely limited to say the least, while studies by Korean, Chinese, and Japanese scholars are often difficult to obtain. In consideration thereof, I have divided the present study into two parts. The first part is in the form of a descriptive and chronological narrative; the second part deals primarily with considerations and consequences of events described in the first part and is more analytical in nature. Thus, a 'feed-back' methodology is projected. The narrative of events places them in perspective so that an analysis of component parts may be undertaken without distortion; the analysis of component parts in turn allows modification of the narrative of events.

Since Homer Hulbert's two volume *History of Korea,* first published in 1905 has recently been reprinted, a word should be said about earlier accounts of Korean history which include J.Ross' *History of Corea,* first printed in 1880, W.E.Griffis', *Corea, the Hermit Nation,* first printed in 1882, and J.S.Gale's, *A History of the Korean People,* which appeared serially in the *Korean Mission Field* in the years 1925-1927. It would be too easy to subject the pertinent sections of these works to criticism but since I can see no purpose which would be served by so doing, I have refrained from commenting on what I consider to have been valiant pioneer efforts.

For the convenience of the non-specialist, I have added an introductory chapter which provides a brief background and I have endeavored, particularly in the narrative, to relegate technical matters to footnotes. However, for convenience, whenever a reference consists merely of the abbreviated

title of the work plus *chüan* and page numbers, I have simply placed such information in parentheses in the appropriate location.

In the romanization of Chinese (except for 哥 which I have romanized *ke*) I have followed the Wade-Giles system with the usual modifications; for Japanese the Hepburn system, again with the usual modifications. In the romanization of Korean I have followed the McCune-Reischauer system with the following exceptions:

1) utilized names or terms commonly known in another form, e.g., Seoul, *li* 里, etc.
2) spaced rather than linked both particles and auxiliary verbs; rendered 의 as *ŭi* in all cases; and omitted the diaeresis over *e* 어 when so called for by the MR system.

In the reconstruction of Mongolian names and terms, I have followed the works of Pelliot, Hambis, Shiratori, and Cleaves and, excluding the well-known term daruγači or resident commissioner, references have been provided in footnotes. Where no reference is provided the reconstruction is my own. Since my knowledge of thirteenth century Mongolian is very limited, I have left the majority of these names in Chinese transcription, providing orthographic variants when such were encountered, excluding variations resulting from the well-known Ch'ien-lung language reforms of the mid-eighteenth century.

When the name of a location differs from its current designation, I have endeavored to identify or locate it by placing in parentheses following it the modern name it is known by or the area in which it is located; more detailed references are given in footnotes.

All bibliographical abbreviations are in capital letters and may be found in the bibliography; non-bibliographical abbreviations are listed separately preceding the bibliography.

All dates are lunar except where the western name of the month is given in which case they are solar.

In indicating the reign dates of monarchs, I have commenced with the *wŏnnyŏn* 元年 and ended with the year preceding the *wŏnnyŏn* of the next monarch; when a monarch reigned only during the year of his accession, I have accorded the monarch that year as his 'reign-year'. In indicating the birth dates of individuals when the age at death was known I have arrived at the birth date by subtracting the age plus two years since, as is well-known, in Korea like in China, a child is assumed to be one-year old upon his birth and adds one year to his age each successive (lunar) new year's day. It should be observed that even this method does not always produce the correct year of birth.

Translations of the titles of works in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese are provided in brackets following the title in the original language; when the author of such a work has himself supplied either a translation or an alternate title in a western language, it is so indicated by quotation marks.

A word of caution must be given regarding large numbers occurring in the text. The majority of figures of 10 000 or more should be viewed with some skepticism while the number three should always be suspect.

I gratefully acknowledge the aid given to me by The Rockefeller Foundation and The Ford Foundation whose generous assistance made it possible for me to work at Leiden which resulted in this study, the publication of which was aided by a grant from the Netherlands Ministerie van Onderwijs, Kunsten en Wetenschappen. Needless to say, the views expressed in this study are entirely my own. I wish particularly to thank Mr. and Mrs. Schepel-Verschoor of Leiden for their many kindnesses. Indeed, my indebtedness to all my Dutch friends can be only insufficiently expressed here; I owe a similar debt to Mr. Boyd Compton of New York City whose personal encouragement and warm friendship gave me the courage to continue. For their generous assistance in locating relevant materials I express my deep appreciation to Dr. Li Ogg (Yi Ok) 李玉 of the Université de Paris and Madame Meuvert of the Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes, Paris. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the cooperation and efforts of the firm of Brill & Co., Leiden, and Mr. F. B. Krips and Mr. J. F. Krips of Rijswijk (Z.H.) in the final printing and publication of this study.

To my wife T'aesun Henthorn, née Yi T'aesun 李泰順, more than to anyone else do I owe the undertaking and completion of this study. With gentle patience she endured endless toil leaving me free to continue this work, encouraged me through difficult periods when I would have given up, and set by her own efforts an example for perseverance which I have endeavored to follow. She typed the manuscript in all its drafts, offered me the guidance of her excellent knowledge of Korean, Sino-Korean, and Japanese, and it is, finally, her calligraphy which graces the pages of this work.

W. E. Henthorn
Leiden, August, 1963

INTRODUCTION

The state of Koryŏ which rose upon the fragments of a shattered Silla (Late Period 668-918), was influenced by early contacts with China's Five Dynasties and became in its formative years a haven for thousands of refugees from the Manchurian state of P'ohai 渤海 [1] (713-926) which had been crushed by the Ch'i-tan 契丹 who swept across Manchuria on their way to establishing the Liao 遼 Dynasty (907-1125). Powerful conquerors continued to appear in the north as the cauldron of Manchuria repeatedly boiled over into Koryŏ until the peninsula was innundated in a deluge of Mongol invasions in the first half of the thirteenth century. Koryŏ, its coastal areas favorite targets of Japanese freebooters since time immemorial, found its territories repeatedly invaded by the Ch'i-tan [2], the Jürčen 女眞 masters of the Chin 金 Dynasty (1115-1234) [3], and the Mongol founders of the Yüan 元 (in the extended sense ca. 1215-1368) empire. Acknowledged vassal [4] of the Sung 宋 (960-1126), Liao, Chin, Yüan, and, finally, after a shifting initial relationship, of the Ming 明 (1368-1644), Koryŏ received a steady stream of external pressures which altered and guided Korean society as it evolved.

The repeated invasions have led Yi Pyŏngdo 李丙燾, the dean of modern Korean historians, to write that "the history of the Koryŏ dynasty was, it may be said, chiefly a history of engagements with the peoples beyond the northern borders." [5] While neither foreign invasions, a highly developed maritime trade, nor the gradual Koryŏ expansion northward into the upper reaches of the Yalu and the Tuman River valleys relate the entire history of Koryŏ, they did provide backdrop and stimulus for internal developments.

Within the limitations of such criteria, the history of the Koryŏ dynasty may be divided into three broad periods:

1) from 918 to 1170, the power of the government remained fairly centralized in the person of the monarch;
2) from 1170 to 1270, Koryŏ was under the control of the military government and the monarchs became figureheads;
3) from 1270 onward, power was restored to the monarch while events in Koryŏ tended to reflect, in pro- and anti-Mongol factions alike, the vicissitudes of the Yüan and the rise of the Ming until the end of the Koryŏ Dynasty in 1392.

At the time of the Mongol invasions, Koryŏ was under the firm control of a military government as indeed it had been for over fifty years. While there appears to have been no great socio-political and hence economic distinction between the civil and the military officials at the beginning of the Koryŏ Dynasty [6], by the reign of Ŭijong (r. 1147-1170) [7], a rigid class distinction existed between the civil and the military officials. The ranks of the literati, who held the government posts of importance, were closed to the military and their descendants and reserved for those of royal lineage or the descendants of the civil officials. It was not long before the dissipations of Ŭijong – if the records be believed – placed the actual control of the state in the hands of the literati and the eunuchs [8] who then endeavored to further strengthen their own power by making the military as a group as weak as possible while abusing them individually [9]. This culminated in a *coup d'état* by Chŏng Chungbu [10] in 1170, and the military then began to compete among themselves for power [11]. Chŏng deposed Ŭijong and placed Myŏngjong (r. 1171-1197) [12] on the throne after a wholesale purge of the civil officials. This was followed by many abortive attempts by members of Chŏng's own followers to wrest power from him and there were also several unsuccessful attempts to topple Chŏng by other military leaders [13] until, finally, he was overthrown and killed by General [14] Kyŏng Taešung [15] in 1179 [16]. The competition for power among the military had given rise to strong house armies and so, when General Kyŏng died suddenly in 1183, Yi Ŭimin [17] became the new military ruler on the strength of his house army. Then in 1196, Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn 崔忠獻 established himself as the ruling power by assassinating Yi. In each case the house armies made up of household retainers were the deciding factor in the power struggle and it was on the strength of these private forces that power was retained [18].

The century of rule by military overlords [19] may be set forth in brief chronology as follows:

1170 - 1179 Chŏng Chungbu
1179 - 1183 Kyŏng Taesŭng
1183 - 1196 Yi Ŭimin
1196 - 1258 Ch'oe clan
- 1196 - 1218 Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn
- 1219 - 1249 Ch'oe U 瑀
- 1250 - 1256 Ch'oe Hang 沆
- 1257 - 1258 Ch'oe Ŭi 竩
- 1258 - 1268 Kim Chun 金俊 (= Kim Injun)
- 1268 - 1270 Im clan
  - 1268 - 1270 Im Yŏn 林衍
  - - 1270 - Im Yumu 林惟茂

Map of Korea and adjacent areas (ca. 1217)



During the period of the military government the monarchs were largely in the position of figureheads. There were, of course, attempts by the monarchs to alter this situation which normally led to their removal and exile or, upon occasion, their murder [20]. Kojong (r. 1214-1259) [21], the monarch during whose long reign many of the events related in the subsequent pages occurred, immersed himself in Buddhist devotions and activities. Ceremonial activities accounted for the remainder of his time while the practical affairs of government were handled by the various government bureaus which were modeled, to a large extent, after Chinese counterparts. Distinct from, yet in actual operational control of all government organs, were the various organs organized and developed by the military rulers. Through this latter structure the military rulers guided the affairs of state [22].

Koryŏ's first recorded contact with the Mongols occurred in 1211, i.e., the seventh year of the reign of Koryŏ Hŭijong (r. 1205-1211) [23] when a Koryŏ envoy to the Chin court was killed by Mongol soldiers (*KS* 21. 25b). Although this was in time to prove a prophetic encounter, Koryŏ's first contacts with Mongol forces on a large scale began upon a much different note. The 'Record of Yüan-Koryŏ Affairs', *Yüan Kao-li chi-shih* 元高麗記事 opens with a concise statement of the initial phase of Yüan-Koryŏ relations:

> "In the thirteenth year (1218) of T'ai-tsu 太祖 (Činggis, 1155 -1227), the troops of heaven (Mongol) reached Koryŏ. Their monarch submitted and [agreed to] the interchange of envoys and annual tribute. In the nineteenth year (1224) bandits killed our envoy and thereafter [envoys] did not come at all" (*YKC* 1a).

As succinct as these few lines are they underscore the salient features of Koryŏ's initial relations with the Mongols. To begin with, the Mongol offensive which swept across the Yalu in 1218, was directed against the Ch'i-tan and not against Koryŏ, nor was there any particular penetration of other than the northern border region. Second, Koryŏ submitted to the extent of attempting to purchase autonomy by the submission of tribute. And, finally, relations were severed following the murder of a Mongol envoy in the first month of 1225 [24], and were not resumed until 1231, when they were forcefully reopened by Mongol arms.

There were in the years that followed, three major turning points in Mongol-Koryŏ relations on the Koryŏ side:

a. the Koryŏ decision to transfer the seat of government from the central capital of Kaegyŏng 開京 (mod. Kaesŏng; see Chapter I note 43) to Kanghwa Island in 1232;
b. the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan in 1258, and
c. the deposition and subsequent restoration of the monarch Wŏnjong (r. 1260-1274) [25] in 1269.

These may be briefly characterized as ushering in periods of resistance, begrudged cooperation, and active alliance.

On the Yüan side, the turning point began with the reign of Qubilai (Shih-tsung 世宗, r. 1260-1294) which can be described as the commencement of the organized enforcement of Mongol demands through the Mongol military-administrative organs established in Koryŏ.

When the Mongols commenced their drive in 1209 against the Chin empire which held sway over North China and Manchuria, and to which Koryŏ was tributary, it produced some unsettling effects. There were the expected revolts among the Ch'i-tan who had been conquered by the Chin and there were also deserters among the Jürčen themselves. Two cases are of particular interest to us here.

In 1211, the Ch'i-tan prince Yeh-lü Liu-ke 耶律留哥, who had been serving the Chin as chiliarch (i.e., Chief of One Thousand) *ch'ien-hu* 千戶, rebelled against the Chin and seized control of a portion of the Liaotung area. The following year, he submitted to Mongol forces pressing eastward across Liaotung and, in 1213, he proclaimed himself ruler of the Liao. This, like the establishment of the Qarā-Khitāy state in Central Asia following the fall of the Liao Dynasty in 1125 [26], was an attempt to revive the old Liao empire. Liu-ke was soon ousted from power by a certain Yeh-ssu-pu 耶厮不 and he requested support from Činggis against the usurper.

In 1214, the Chin moved their capital south to Feng-ching 汴京 and appointed P'u-hsien Wan-nu 蒲鮮萬奴, a Jürčen, to be Pacification Commissioner, *hsien-fu-shih* 宣撫使, of the Hsien-p'ing-lu [27] area where the revolt centered. Wan-nu, with some forty thousand men under his command, was to check the rebellion initiated by Yeh-lü Liu-ke, but he was himself defeated in late 1214, and, using the opportunity provided by an attack directed against the Chin under the Mongol General Muqali [28] which resulted in the fall of Peking to the Mongol forces, Wan-nu rebelled against the Chin in the spring of 1215 (*YS* 1. 19a). Basing himself in the Chin Eastern Capital, *Tung-ching* 東京 (Liaoyang), he established himself at the head of a state which he designated *Ta-chen* 大眞 or Great Jürčen.

In the spring of 1216, the Ch'i-tan rebels fled south from Hsien-p'ing 咸平 before a Chin army mustered against them and overran the southern borders of Wan-nu's territory, seizing Teng-chou 澄州. Yeh-ssu-pu was murdered at this time by one of his ministers, a certain Ch'i-nu 乞奴, who then assumed the leadership. At this point the Ch'i-tan rebels held the area from Teng-chou (mod. Hai-chou 海州) to Poju 保州 (= Ŭiju 義州) just across the Yalu River. In the autumn and winter of 1216, Mongol forces had been engaged in the Liaotung Peninsula and, accompanied by Yeh-lü

Liu-ke, had chased the Ch'i-tan rebels from Teng-chou to the Koryŏ borders. Then the Mongols launched an attack on the Ch'i-tan forces at Ta-fu-ying 大夫營 (located on an island in the lower course of the Yalu River, near mod. Ŭiju). Hard-pressed, the Ch'i-tan requested land and supplies from Koryŏ to continue the fight; when it was refused they crossed the Yalu with an estimated ninety thousand men and overran the Koryŏ frontier region (*YS* 154. 1a; *IC* 9A. 6b).

P'u-hsien Wan-nu had endeavored to retain his independence but was defeated by the Mongol forces pressing eastward and, submitting to Muqali, he sent his son T'ieh-ke 帖哥* as a hostage (*YS* 1. 19a). When the Mongol forces withdrew following the defeat of the Ch'i-tan rebels late in 1216, Wan-nu took his own forces further east toward the Yalu and, in early 1217, redesignated his nation the Tung-hsia 東夏 or Eastern Hsia in 1217 (YS 1. 19a-b). The name of this state is probably better known as Tung-chen (-kuo) or (Land of) the Eastern Jürčen and for simplicity I will refer to them simply as the Eastern Jürčen [29].

The Ch'i-tan rebels had spent the year 1217 pillaging southward down the Korean peninsula, menacing the Koryŏ capital. Then, after a long drive to the southeast culminated in several defeats, they turned toward the land of the Eastern Jürčen in the northeast.

The Chin, in the meantime, had attempted to strengthen their hold on the Liaotung area where they still had strong garrisons and, at this time, controlled the P'o-su-lu 婆速路 administrative area which lay just west of the lower reaches of the Yalu. P'u-hsien Wan-nu, pressed by these Chin forces in Liaotung, moved further eastward into the Chin Ho-lan-lu 曷懶路 administrative area and based himself along the lower reaches of the Tuman River. It was into this area that the Ch'i-tan rebels had fled from Koryŏ in the autumn of 1217, and here they were able to recruit reinforcements. The Ch'i-tan resumed their attack on Koryŏ in a drive directed toward Koryŏ's Western Capital, *Sŏgyŏng* 西京 (mod. P'yŏngyang), which overran Koryŏ's Northeast Frontier-District but fell short of the objective at the near-by walled-city of Kangdong 江東 [30]. Koryŏ forces managed to contain them in this area and were slowly gaining the upper hand when, in the winter of 1218, unexpected allies appeared.

* Teke

Notes to the Introduction

1. For a general article on P'o-hai, see W.E. Henthorn, 'Some notes on Parhae (P'ohai)', *TKBRAS* XXXVII (1961), pp. 65-82. Also see Ikeuchi Hiroshi

池内宏, *Mansen-shi kenkyū* 滿鮮史研究 [Studies on the History of Manchuria and Korea], published in 2 vols., Tōkyō, 1933 and 1937.

2. For Koryŏ attempts to gain Sung support when pressed by the Ch'i-tan earlier, see M.C.Rogers, 'Factionalism and Koryŏ Policy under the Northern Sung', *JAOS* 79 (1959), pp. 16-25, and M.C.Rogers, 'Sung-Koryŏ Relations; Some Inhibiting Factors', *Oriens* 11 (1958), pp. 194-202.

3. Nü-chen 女眞 or Jürčen; later written Nü-chih 女直 due to the taboo name of Liao Hsing-tsung 興宗 (r. 1031-1054), cf. YS 59.5b. After throwing off the suzerainty of the Ch'i-tan, the Jürčen overran the northern part of the peninsula in the course of establishing the Chin Dynasty. For an account of the Jürčen conquest of northern Koryŏ see Ikeuchi Hiroshi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū*, Vol. 2, pp. 199-264 and H.D.Martin, *The Rise of Chingis Khan and His Conquest of North China*, Baltimore, 1950, pp. 55-56; for the disasterous defeat of the Koryŏ army in the Jürčen incursions of 1104, see the biography of Yun Kwan 尹瓘 (d. 1111) in *KS* 96.11b ff. Following this defeat Yun reorganized the Koryŏ army and erected nine walled-cities, *sŏng* 城, in the present North Hamgyŏng Province, during the reign of Yejong 睿宗 (r. 1106-1122). While the 'walled-cities' secured the eastern littoral, the reorganization of the army was apparently only a temporary expedient and it appears that no effort was made to retain an effective national army at this time. For the role of the walled-cities build by Yun see Yun Mubyŏng 尹武炳 Koju-sŏng kwa Konghŏm-chin 古州城과 公嶮鎭 ["Koju Fortress and Konghŏm Garrison"], *YH* 1958, pp. 58-98; Tsuda Sōkichi 津田左右吉, *Chōsen rekishi chiri* 朝鮮歷史地理, Vol. 2, pp. 103-158, (2) vols., Tōkyō, 1918, and the following archaeological reports: *Koseki chōsa hōkoku* 古蹟調査報告 [Report on Investigation of Ancient Sites], and *Koseki chōsa tokubetsu hōkoku* 古蹟調査特別報告 [Special Report on Investigation of Ancient Sites], published in 1919 and 1929 respectively by the Chōsen koseki kenkyūkai 朝鮮古蹟研究會 Tōkyō.

4. I use the word 'vassal' here merely to indicate an acknowledged subordinate status. Koryŏ's relations with Sung, Liao and Chin have been the subject of several articles by M.C.Rogers and are cited in full in the bibliography. The Confucian-based relationship which existed between Koryŏ and Sung and Ming has been described by F.Nelson, *Korea and the Old Orders in East Asia*, Baton Rouge, La., 1946, while Koryŏ-Yüan relations are unique in Korean history. An excellent study for the period 962-1174 is Marugame Kinsaku 丸龜金作, Kōrai to Sō to no tsūkō mondai 高麗と宋との通交問題 ["Problems of Goryeo's Intercourse with Sung"], I, *CG* 17 (1960), pp. 1-50; II, *CG* 18 (1961), pp. 58-82.

5. Yi Pyŏngdo, *Kuksa taegwan* 國史大觀 [A General History of Korea], Seoul, rev. ed., 1958, p. 169.
6. Cf. Pyŏn T'aesŏp 邊太燮, Koryŏ-jo ŭi munban kwa muban 高麗朝의文班과武班 [Civil and Military Officials of the Koryŏ Dynasty], *SY* 2 (1961), pp. 1-92.
7. Wang Ch'ŏl 王徹, the 18th monarch, was born in 1127, ascended the throne in 1146, was deposed on the 13th of October 1170, died in 1173, and was canonized Ŭijong 毅宗. He also had the adult *hwi* 諱 or taboo name of Hyŏn 現. For biographical information see *KS* 17. 19a, *KS* 19. 10a; see also *BTKP* 113. 1057.
   The majority of Koryŏ monarchs had several *hwi* or taboo names which are detailed in the works of Courant, Hambis and Rogers, for which see the bibliography. I have listed only the taboo name used in the records during the period under consideration which is, in most cases, the adult taboo name. In those cases where two taboo names were used by the same individual during this period it has been so noted.
8. Although the subject has been generally overlooked, a short study of the eunuchs has been done by Yi Uch'ŏl 李愚喆, Koryŏ sidae ŭi hwan' gwan e taehayŏ 高麗時代의宦官에對하여 [A Consideration of the Eunuch in the Koryŏ Dynasty'], *SY* 1 (1958), pp. 18-45. With the rise of the military overlords in 1170, and their subsequent purge from positions of power, the eunuchs appear to have played only a minor role until the reign of King Ch'ungnyŏl 忠烈王 (r. 1275-1308) when they again assumed a powerful role in the affairs of State. Cf. *KS* 122. 9b-27b.
9. Yi Pyŏngdo, *Kuksa taegwan,* p. 239.
10. Chŏng Chungbu 鄭仲夫 (fl. 1169-1179); for biographical information see *KS* 128. 1a-15a; *BTKP* 13. 127.
11. Cf. *KS* 86. 9b. Chŏng Chungbu exiled Ŭijong to Kŏje Island 巨濟島 (S. Kyŏngsang Province), killed the crown prince and put the king's younger brother, the Duke of Igyang 翼陽公, on the throne, viz., Myŏngjong 明宗 (*KS* 86. 29b). For a brief study of the rebellion see Yun Yonggyun 尹瑢均, Kōrai Kisō-cho ni okeru Tei Chū-fu ran no soin to sono eikyō 高麗毅宗朝に於ける鄭仲夫亂の素因とその影響 [The Cause and Effect of the Rebellion of Chŏng Chungbu in the Reign of Koryŏ Ŭijong], *SG* 2 (1930), pp. 91-96. Pyŏn has made an excellent and detailed study of the socio-economic distinctions which gradually arose between the civil and military officials and which was an important factor in the coup d'état of 1170, for which see Pyŏn T'aesŏp, op. cit., pp. 1-92.

12. Wang Hŭn 王昕 , the nineteenth monarch, was born in 1131, ascended the throne in 1171, was deposed in 1192, died in 1202, and was canonized Myŏngjong 明宗 . For biographical information see *KS* 19. 11a-b and *KS* 20. 38a-b; also see *BTKP* 85. 794.

13. For example, the rebellion of Cho Wich'ong 趙位寵 (d. 1176; bio. *KS* 100. 7-11) which centered around the Western Capital, Sŏgyŏng (mod. P'yŏngyang), and which lasted from 1174 to 1176. Also, at the urging of Kim Podang 金甫當 (d. 1173), Ŭijong returned to Kyerim (Kyŏngju) from exile on Kŏje Island but this attempt was crushed by Chŏng's follower Yi Ŭimin 李義旼 (fl. 1170-1196; bio. *KS* 128) who murdered the deposed monarch at Kyŏngju in 1173. cf. M.C. Rogers, 'Studies in Korean History', *TP* LCVII (1959) 1 & 2, pp. 30-62.

14. A study of Koryŏ civil and military titles is seriously needed. Needless to say the subject is a complex one. T'ang titles adopted in Silla times were retained in many cases and these were supplemented by the adoption of Yüan titles in the 13th century, not to mention previous influences from Liao, Chin, and Sung. To this must be added those titles and offices which were distinctly Korean in origin. Determining the function of the holders of these titles is, of course, the difficulty. In this paper I have given merely *suggestive* translations for titles, unless otherwise indicated. In his *Han'guk-sa* Vol. II (projected six vols. of which three have appeared, viz., Vol. I, by Yi Pyŏngdo and Kim Chaewŏn 金載源 , Vol. 2, by Yi Pyŏngdo, and Vol. 5, Chronological Tables, by Yun Mubyŏng 尹武炳 ; published by the Chindan Society, Seoul, 1959), Yi Pyŏngdo has appended as Table 4, 'A Table of the Central Bureaucratic Structure of the Koryŏ Period' (hereinafter cited *Yi, Table* 4), and has appended as Table 6, 'A Table of Stipends' (hereinafter cited *Yi, Table* 6), compiled, we are told in the 'Introduction', p. 1, by Yi Kibaek 李基白 and An Kyehyŏn 安啓賢 respectively; appended as Table 7 are charts of the amounts of paddy fields and forest land allotted (hereinafter cited, *Yi, Table* 7). Since these tables refer to the bureaucratic and military structure during the reign of Munjong 文宗 (r. 1047-1082), the information taken from them is given with that qualification in mind. In addition, to their annual rice stipends, Koryŏ officials received land allowances. Each official was granted the privilege of the use of paddy fields and forest lands, the latter particularly important considering the large amounts of firewood consumed in the Korean *ondol* 溫堗 system of radiant heating which, as it dates to neolithic times on the peninsula (cf. Kim Chaewŏn's 金載元 synopsis of Korean prehistory in *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. I, pp. 8-64), was certainly in use during this period.

And, in theory, the land was supposed to revert to the state. For some rather general remarks on the Korean *ondol* system and comparisons with Roman methods of radiant heating, see Viesman, Warren, 'Ondol - Radiant Heat in Korea', *TKBRAS* XXXI (1948-9), pp. 9-22. For Silla (as well as Paekche, Koguryŏ) titles and the use of T'ang titles in Silla see: F.Vos, 'Kim Yusin, Persönlichkeit und Mythos - Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der altkoreanischen Geschichte', *Oriens Extremus* I (1954) 1, pp. 29-70, and II 1, pp. 210-236 and the works cited therein.

In the Koryŏ army a General, *changgun* 將軍 , had the official grade of Fourth Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) which carried an annual stipend of 200 bushels (*sok* 石) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 75 *kyŏl* 結 of paddy fields and 39 *kyŏl* of forest land (Yi, Table 7).

15. Kyŏng Taesŭng 慶大升 was born in 1154 and died in 1183. He controlled the military government from 1179 to 1183. For biographical information see *KS* 100. 16a 3-20b7; also see *BTKP* 79. 747.
16. Cf. *KS* 87. 2a 3. It is interesting to note that following the death of General Kyŏng, his private guard unit, the *tobang* 都房 , did not disband and was finally exiled to an island. Cf. bio. of Kyŏng Taesŭng *KS* 100.
17. Yi Ŭimin 李義旼 (fl. 1170-1196); for biographical information see *KS* 128. 19a-25b; also see *BTKP* 144. 1323.
18. House armies *kabyŏng* 家兵 of the military rulers were formed of their household retainers *mun'gaek* 門客 . Upon at least one occasion cash inducements were offered for recruitment but this appears to have been a temporary measure in time of crisis and to what extent it characterized these private forces in general is unknown, cf. *KS* 129. The house army of Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn increased to the extent that it was as strong as the national army. In the 1st month of the third year of Kojong (1216), Ch'oe sent his house army to aid the Koryŏ army then fighting the Ch'i-tan invaders and we read that "when they sent [troops] to ward off the Ch'i-tan, the skillful and brave soldiers were all the retainers *mun'gaek* 門客 of the Ch'oe's, [while] the government army was weak and unable to be used" (*KS* 129). In the 11th month of the same year, Ch'oe inspected his house army which stretched twenty-three *li* 里 while his son U also controlled a considerable force of his own (*KS* 129). By the 20th year of the reign of Kojong, the size of the Ch'oe clan's private army was still such that Ch'oe U could send his house force in lieu of the government army to attempt to crush the Koryŏ rebel Hong Pogwŏn 洪福源 at the Western Capital (*TT* 31, 50. 16).

The private character of Ch'oe's forces is well illustrated by two examples:

1. In the 7th year of the reign of Hŭijong 熙宗 (r. 1205-1211), the King plotted to assassinate Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn, but Ch'oe was saved by his guard unit the *tobang* 都房
2. When armies of monks being used against the Ch'i-tan forces then nearing Kaegyŏng plotted to overthrow Ch'oe, he dispatched his house army to crush them (*KS* 129).

For a survey article see W.E.Henthorn, 'Some Notes on Koryŏ Military Units', *TKBRAS* XXXV (1959), pp. 66-75.

19. The biographies of the members of the Ch'oe and Im clans as well as that of Kim Chun are referred to in detail later in the text.
20. Since the Koryŏ monarchs received their patents of investiture from the rulers of China — more specifically from the state which controlled North China and Manchuria — this was often responsible for Koryŏ skullduggery in reporting the succession of monarchs for investiture by China, especially during the period of the military government (1170-1270). See M.C.Rogers, 'Some Kings of Koryŏ as Registered in Chinese Works', *JAOS* 81 (1961) 4, pp. 415-422 for an early example of this; also see the other works by Rogers which are cited in full in the bibliography.
21. Wang Ch'ŏl 王徹 (r. 1214-1259), the twenty-third monarch, was born in 1192, ascended the throne in 1213, died in 1259, and was canonized Kojong 高宗 . For biographical information see *KS* 22a. 4-9 and *KS* 24. 44b-45a. *BTKP* 73. 701 has, I note, given Kojong's reign dates incorrectly as 1216-1259.
22. The extent to which the function of many departments in the central government was taken over by the offices created by the military is largely unknown and warrants a special study.
23. Wang Tŏk 王悳 , the twenty-first monarch, was born in 1181, ascended the throne in 1204, was deposed and exiled in 1211, died in 1237, and was canonized Hŭijong 熙宗 . For biographical information see *KS* 21. 26a-b and *KS* 23. 33; also see *BTKP* 38. 357.
24. There are the expected discrepancies in dates between the Yüan and Koryŏ records reflecting different records of departure and arrivals, as well as receipt of reports of events. In this case, the envoy in question was killed in the first month of 1225, but, perhaps because he was the envoy for the tribute of 1224, or possibly because he was dispatched in 1224, *YKC* renders 1224. In referring back to the event some years later, Koryŏ also refers to him as the envoy of *chia-shen* 甲申 year, i.e., 1224 (*KS* 23. 19b). However, the envoy did not leave Koryŏ until the first month of 1225 (cf. *KS* 22. 27a). For consistency, I have followed the *KS* in all dates unless otherwise indicated, and have noted discrepancies in dates when I have felt it to be germane.

25. Wang Chŏn 王倎 (adult taboo name *Sik* 禔 a.w.植), the twenty-fourth monarch, was born in 1219, ascended the throne in 1259, died in 1274, and was canonized Wŏnjong 元宗. For biographical information see *KS* 25. 1a 5-8 and *KS* 27. 48b 8-49b 2. Also see *BTKP* 122. 1146. The entry under *f*(ather) in *BTKP* is erroneously given as *Hŭijong*; it should be corrected to read *Kojong*.

26. Cf. K. A. Wittfogel and C. S. Feng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao* (907-1125), 'Qarā-Khitāy', undated reprint from the Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 36.

27. Hsien-p'ing-lu 咸平路 is the present Kai-yüan-hsien 開原縣; see *Chung-kuo ku-chin ti-ming ta-tz'u-tien* 中國古今地名大辭典 Commercial Press, Shanghai, 2nd ed., 1933, p. 603. Also see *YS* 59. 6a.

28. Muqali had been appointed viceroy of the Chin Empire, Korea, and the Liao by Činggis. Cf. M. Prawdin, *The Mongol Empire*, N.Y., 1953, p. 141.

29. Yanai Watari 箭内亘, *Yüan-tai ching-lüeh tung-pei k'ao* 元代經略東北考 (being the Chinese translation of three studies which originally appeared in Japanese), Commercial Press, 1944, pp. 85-91, maintains that the designation *Tung-hsia* 東夏 is a scribal error for *Tung-chen* 東眞. Ikeuchi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū*, p. 581 note 1 and pp. 643-649, opposes this view. Yanai's view is based chiefly on the fact that the designation *Tung-hsia* does not appear in the Koryŏ records. However, as Ikeuchi points out, it does appear in the *Tongmun-sŏn* 東文選 compiled by Yu Sŭngdan 兪升旦 (1170-1232; bio. *KS* 102. 6a ff; *BTKP* 153. 1402) — regrettably unavailable to me — although its appearance there is in the heading of a letter and is admittedly controversial for it is the type of explanatory title which could well have been added at a later date. Yet, Yanai's argument is not totally convincing. The application *Tung-hsia* was probably coined after *Hsi-hsia* 西夏 (Tanqut). However, it is generally referred to in the Korean records (as pointed out by Yanai, loc. cit.) as the *Tung-chen-kuo* (Kor. *Tongjin'guk*) 東眞國 since the peoples of the area in which Wan-nu settled had, at least as early as 1021, i.e., the twelfth year of the reign of Koryŏ Hyŏnjong 顯宗 (r. 1010-1031), been known in Korean records as the Eastern Jürčen *Tong yŏjin* (C. *Tung nü-chen*) 東女眞, cf. *KS* 4. 35-36. These designations and the area to which they pertained are clarified in *ch'ien-pien* 前編 44a of the *Ming-Yüan-Ch'ing hsi-t'ung-chi* 明元清系通記, Commercial Press edition, 1934. I have retained the designation Eastern Jürčen in all references to these peoples for the sake of lucidity.

30. The leadership of the Ch'i-tan rebels changed several times during their stay in Koryŏ; according to the records as follows: Ch'i-nu was killed by a certain Chin-shan 金山 who was killed by a certain Chin-shih 金始 who was killed by a certain T'ung-ku-yü 統古與 and he was, in turn, killed by a certain Han-she 喊捨 who commanded the Ch'i-tan forces at the time of the Kangdong battle. Ikeuchi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū,* Vol. 1, p. 602, says that Ch'i-nu may have been killed in battle and he maintains that Chin-shih is an error for Chin-shan and that no such person as Chin-shan existed. While I shall not attempt to give a complete bibiliography for the events described in the Introduction, I have drawn material from the following sources: *YKC* 1b; *KS* 22; *KS* 103; *HY* 22. 8a-9a; *CHSL* 4. 22; *YS* 1. 19a-20a; *YS* 149. 1a-5b; Yanai, loc. cit., Ikeuchi, loc. cit., and the succinct accounts contained in Yi Pyŏngdo, *Han'guk-sa,* Vol. 2, pp. 538-540, and *Tōyō rekishi daijiten* 東洋歷史大辭典 , published by the Heibonsha 平凡社 , Tōkyō, 1937-39, Vol. 2, p. 273. Additional information is also contained in the *Koryŏ-sa* biographies contained in *KS* 102, and *KS* 129. For a description of events in North China at this time see H.D.Martin, *The Rise of Chingis Khan ...,* O.Franke, *Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches,* Berlin, 1952, Bd IV and V; and R.Grousset, *L'Empire mongol,* Paris. 1941, T. I.

Chapter I

THE INITIAL PHASE

In the winter of 1218 [1], ten thousand Mongol troops under the command of Marshal [2] Ha-chen [3] (?Qačin) and Deputy Marshal Cha-la [4] (?* Jala) supported by a force of twenty thousand Eastern Jürčen troops sent by P'u-hsien Wan-nu (cf. *KS* 23. 19b-20b) and commanded by Wan-yen Tzu-yüan 完顏子淵 swept unto Koryŏ (*KS* 103. 4b; *KS* 22. 16a) from the northeast [5]. Quickly crushing the Ch'i-tan occupied cities of Hwaju, Maengju, Sunju, and Tŏkchu [6], they were making directly [7] for the walled-city *sŏng* [8], of Kangdong [9], the last major Ch'i-tan strongpoint in Koryŏ, when a heavy snowfall rendered the roads impassable. The Ch'i-tan were holding out in an attempt to exhaust their pursuers and with their supply route cut, the Mongol commanders turned to Koryŏ for assistance [10]. Ha-chen sent Interpreter [11] Chao Chung-hsiang 趙仲祥 leading a party of twelve persons (cf. *IC* 6. 13b) to the headquarters [12] of Cho Ch'ung [13], Marshal of the Northwest Frontier-District [14] and senior Koryŏ commander, with a severely worded dispatch which proclaimed that they had been sent by Činggis to subdue the Ch'i-tan who had been ravaging Koryŏ for the past three years. Requesting troops and provisions, the dispatch also stated that the Emperor had commanded them to pledge the two nations in a Elder (Mongols) - Younger (Koryŏ) Brother relationship following the subjugation of the Ch'i-tan (*KS* 103. 4b) [15].

Marshal Cho kept the Koryŏ Court informed of the situation by endless dispatches and was one of the few to favor meeting the Mongol demands (*KS* 103. 5a). Although Ha-chen repeatedly charged them to bring reinforcements (*IC* 6. 13b), Cho's generals were hesitant to act on the Mongol demands and only Commissioner of Men and Horse [16] Kim Ch'wiryŏ [17] spoke out: "Precisely on this day will the nation gain or lose. If we disregard them, I believe we will regret it later." "This is my own opinion," Marshal Cho agreed (*KS* 103. 16b). But the Koryŏ Court was alarmed by the appearance of the Mongol forces and highly suspect of their motives — "The Mongols are the most inhuman of the northern barbarians. Moreover, they have never previously been on good terms with us," it was pointed out. Lost in discussions of


MT. PAEKTU
CHIN
P'U-HSIEN
WAN-NU
TO LIAO-YANG
P'O-SO-LU
YALU RIVER
Yalu River
Jürčen
KORYŎ LONG WALL
NANGNIM RANGE
HAMHŬNG MT. RANGE
Eastern Jürčen
ŬIJU
CHŎNGJU
INJU
YONGJU
CH'ŎLCHU
SŎNJU
KUJU
YŎNJU
CH'ŎNGCHŎN RIVER
VIIJU
ANSŎNG
TŎKCHU
MAENGJU
HWAJU
KOJU
ŬNJU
WESTERN CAPITAL
KANGDONG
HWANGJU
TAEBAEK MT. RANGE
TŎNGJU
CH'ŎL-KWAN (PASS)
MONGOL ENTRY INTO KORYŎ 1218-1219
Yellow Sea
Eastern Sea

whether to meet the Mongol demands or not, the Court delayed which merely angered the Mongols. Finally, in a dispatch prepared by the Secretariat [18] they agreed to fulfil all the instructions proposed, chiefly it would appear, at the urging of Marshal Cho (*KS* 103. 4b-5a).

As a military man, Marshal Cho wanted to choose someone to transport the provisions and reinforcements to the Mongols who would be able to spy on them as well, but was having difficulty choosing the right man. Kim In'gyŏng [19], a subordinate official begged to be allowed to go.

> "Your plans," Cho told him curtly, "[are] simply those which your superiors direct. You are not accustomed to go spying recklessly. How can you presume to ask to do so [now]?"
>
> "I have heard," Kim said, "that the Mongols have taken up battle positions; [we should] take example from [the ancient militarists] Sun 孫 and Wu [20] 吳 [When] I was young I read the Six Books [21] and am well acquainted with them. Thus do I presume to ask."

When the Court allowed it, Cho sent Kim with one thousand picked troops [22] and one thousand bushels [23] of rice to assist the Mongols (*KS* 102. 7b).

In'gyŏng arrived at the Mongol camp just in time to take his men to watch the Mongol-Jŭrčen troops attack the Ch'i-tan in the walled-city of Taeju 岱州 [24]. Ha-chen and Tzu-yüan welcomed Kim with a feast and music at their camp at Tŏk Mountain 禿山 to the west of the city. Then both commanders had their soldiers provide some entertainment. In'gyŏng formed his men into a military square outside the west gate of the Ch'i-tan held city, and the two Marshals climbed a height to watch while the Ch'i-tan themselves looked on from the city walls. Forty-six Mongols dressed in armor and with swords belted on opposed each other (in mock combat). Kim had some of his men perform various tricks with a great clamor in front of the army and then, selecting twenty skilled archers, he had them discharge their arrows into the city in a single volley. The Ch'i-tan spectators deserted the walls hurriedly. The two Marshals, not to be outdone, invited Kim to a second feast and gave him the seat of honor (*KS* 102. 7b-8a). At the feast he was told by Ha-chen:

> "[Our] nations [should] join to be Elder-Younger Brothers. If you inform [your] King and return with a letter [of agreement], then I will also return and present it to the Emperor" (*KS* 103. 5a).

In early 1219 [25], preparations were made to take the last Ch'i-tan stronghold at Kangdong. Kim Ch'wiryŏ and Director of Affairs for the Commissioner of Men and Horse [26], Han Kwangyŏn 韓光衍, in command of a large force which included cavalry *sin'gi*, a crossbow unit *taegak*, and a unit identified as *naesang* [27] went to join the Mongol-Jŭrčen forces for the assault on Kangdong (*KS* 103.17a).

In the group marching toward Kangdong was young Kim Chidae [28] a conscript from Ch'ŏngdo [29], who had filled his father's place in the levy of men made for the Kangdong campaign in 1217. He would later rise in the Koryŏ military but the only thing that distinguished him from his fellow soldiers at the moment was his shield decoration. While all the other soldiers of his unit had strange beasts decorating the top of their shields, Chidae had written a simple poem on his shield expressing the idea that loyalty to the nation and filial piety could both be cultivated by an action such as his own (*KS* 102. 21a-b). Also in the Koryŏ forces converging on Kangdong was a cavalry unit under Commissioner of Men and Horse Yi Chŏk [30] who had already distinguished himself in battles against the Ch'i-tan during the two preceeding years (*KS* 103. 21b-22b).

During a welcoming feast, Ha-chen had the interpreter Chao Chung-hsiang tell Kim Ch'iryŏ,

> "[If] you would be joined in friendship with us then you must first revere *ye* 禮 the Mongol Emperor and then revere Emperor Manno."

Ch'iryŏ replied,

> "The heavens do not have two suns and the people do not have two rulers How can there be two Emperors under Heaven? I salute *pae* 拜 only the Mongol Emperor [31]."

When Ha-chen first saw Ch'iryŏ he was impressed by his appearance. Ch'iryŏ was six feet five inches (Koryŏ measure) tall and had a long flowing beard — it is said that when he put on full dress that two maid servants would lift up his beard so he could don his girdle. Ha-chen had Ch'iryŏ seated with him and asked:

> "How old are you?"
>
> "I'm approaching sixty," Ch'iryŏ replied.
>
> "I am not yet fifty," Ha-chen said. "Since we are already of one house, you are the elder brother and I am the younger brother."

Then he made Ch'iryŏ take the seat (of honor) facing east.

The next day when Ch'iryŏ again visited Ha-chen's garrison, Ha-chen informed him,

> "I have attacked six nations which has given me much experience with noble men. [Then] I saw your appearance. How is it so remarkable? [This is] the reason I trust you. I look at the troops under [your] command and they too are like [members] of the same house [as my men]."

Then, taking Ch'iryŏ's hand, Ha-chen led him out of the gate and helped him on his horse.

Several days later, when Marshal Cho arrived, Ha-chen asked Ch'iryŏ,

> "Is the Marshal older than [you], Elder Brother?"

"He is older," Ch'wiryŏ lied — Cho was 49 at the time. Marshal Cho was then given the upper seat at the feast which followed. It was now time for the Koreans to be surprised. Cho and Kim discovered, as was John of Plano Carpini (Pian de Carpine) to note later [32], that according to the Mongol custom, the meat was stabbed with a sharp knife and then swiftly passed back and forth between the diners each taking a bit then passing it back. Of the Koryŏ soldiers, it is related, there were none who were not reluctant to eat in this fashion (*KS* 103. 17a-18a). It was probably at this time that the Mongol and Koryŏ commanders "Cha-la and [Cho] Ch'ung agreed to be Elder and Younger Brothers. [Cho] inquired of annual remission of levies and taxes. Cha-la said, "As the way to your country is distant and it is difficult to come and go, each year we will send ten envoys [33] to bring [back] tribute" (*YS* 208. 2b) [34].



Battle Positions at Kangdong

In the morning the commanders rode to a meeting outside of the walled-city of Kangdong. Dismounting they walked to within three hundred paces of the walls and stopped. Ha-chen then had a trench ten 'feet' *ch'ŏk* 尺 wide and ten 'feet' deep dug from the south gate of the city to the east gate. The section northward from the west gate was controlled by Tzu-yüan and the section from the east gate to the north was given to Ch'wiryŏ. They used the ditch that had been dug to prevent escape. No mention is made of the Mongol troops which participated in the battle; undoubtedly they covered the southwest sec-

tor which otherwise would have been unguarded and they probably also backed up the ditch in the southeast sector.

As the end grew near, forty Ch'i-tan came over the walls to submit and their chiefs pleaded in front of the Mongol army. Abandoned, their leader Han-she 喊捨 hung himself. Then the functionaries, soldiers, and women — an estimated fifty thousand — opened the city gates and came out and submitted. Ha-chen and Cho Ch'ung went to watch the submission. Hsi 息 , the wife of the prince, as well as one hundred of the Ch'i-tan officials were beheaded immediately. The remainder of the prisoners were given to the army to keep.

Ha-chen then told the Koryŏ commanders:

"We have come 10 000 *li* and combined our strength with you to smash the bandits. This is the fortune of a thousand years. Ceremony warrants going to salute the King [but] my army is rather large and it is difficult to travel a long way. Therefore I shall simply send an envoy to offer my thanks."

After the battle, the Mongol commanders pledged:

"[Our] two nations shall eternally be brothers and the descendants of 10 000 generations will not forget this day" (*KS* 103. 18a-19a) [35].

A feast to reward the army was given by Marshal Cho. Ha-chen gave the Koryŏ forces seven hundred women and young boys and returned some 200 Koreans who had been captives of the Ch'i-tan. Then Ha-chen selected girls who were about fifteen years of age and gave Cho and Kim each nine; he also gave them each nine fine horses [36]. The remainder of the prisoners he had accompany him (*KS* 103. 19a) [37]. We are told that "[Cho] Ch'ung took [Koryŏ's] Ch'i-tan prisoners and distributed them in the *chu* 州 and *hyŏn* 縣 districts [where] they selected unoccupied wasteland, settled it, and engaged in agriculture. It became the custom of the people to call them 'Ch'i-tan sites' " (*HY* 27. 10a-b; also see *KS* 103. 19a; *CHSL* 4. 23a).

Following the fall of Kangdong, a Koryŏ delegation was sent to Cha-la's Mobile Garrison [38] with a proposal for peace [39].

Koryŏ also sent gifts to the Mongol field commanders and a missive, of interest as the first recorded communication with the Mongols, which makes the claim that Koryŏ had already beaten the Ch'i-tan, undoubtedly a diplomatic tactic to play down the importance of the Mongol military action [40].

"[At this time of] Early Spring, We beg to consider how you are, looking eagerly forward. Our nation has since long been invaded by the Ch'i-tan, and this sickness in our very midst we were unable to drive out ourselves. How would we have expected that Your Excellency the Marshal would clear out the filth for the benefit of our insignificant state, coming from afar with righteous

troops, exposing yourself to sun and dew in the open field! As regards our small nation, it behooves us as quickly as possible to bring presents to reward the troops, as a small consolation for their hardships.

Initially, we did not know the day that [Your] Great Army would enter the borders; moreover, the [Ch'i-tan] bandits were blocking the roads. So we delayed and did not in time inquire in the neighbourhood. We beg to consider this most obnoxious and we are therefore tremblingly ashamed, and hope that you will magnanimously forgive us.

We had only just heard that the [Ch'i-tan] bandits had moved into the walled-city of Kangdong to defend themselves and so we believed that they were merely people already in jail, not worth worrying about. Then we sent people to bring thanks and at the same time inquire about your health. These emissaries had not yet been able to start on their journey when again there were emergency reports, and so we actually heard that the band had left the fort and submitted, all being executed or made prisoner [41], to the joy of the whole nation who clap their hands in unison. This is truly [an example of] the righteous [behaviour] of a large State helping a weak one and having pity on its neighbor, whereas for [our] small state it is the good fortune one encounters but once in 10 000 generations! We are moved by your great kindness and do not know how to require this. Now, in obedience to the King's decree, we have roughly prepared some meagre wine and fruit and other gifts, and especially dispatched certain officials to bring them to you under escort; their quantities are fully entered on a separate list. Please do not refuse them as being [too] negligible nor punish us for being too late.

In fear and trembling [we submit this petition]."

An immediate reply for the sake of courtesy was sent to Koryŏ (*YKC* 2a) but not until some days later was a full reply made when the Mongol commander sent P'u-li-tai-yeh [42] with a dispatch to the Koryŏ capital of Kaegyŏng [43] (*YKC* 2a; *YS* 208. 2a). This was undoubtedly in the way of official confirmation of the agreement made by the Koryŏ and Mongol commanders earlier. The reception given the Mongol delegation provides an interesting view of the times and of the Mongol disregard for formal ceremony which the Koreans found distasteful.

"Ha-chen sent P'u-li-tai-wan 孛 (i.e., P'u-li-tai-yeh) and others to present a missive. They came seeking to discuss peace. The King sent Attendant Censor [44] Pak Siyun 朴時允 (fl. 1220's) to welcome them, and ordered the civil and military officials to array themselves in their hats and girdles and stand separately to the right and left [of the road] from Sonŭi Gate [45] to the crossroad. [When] P'u-li-tai-wan and the others arrived outside the hostel, they slowed, stopped and [dismounting] did not enter. They

said, 'The King must come out to welcome us.' Thereupon, an interpreter was made to appeal to them two or three times. At last, they mounted their horses and entered the hostel gate" (*KS* 22. 16b). Finally, the moment of presentation arrived:

"[When] the King had appeared in the Taegwan Hall [46] [the Mongols] all in fur clothing, hats and girdles, and with bows and arrows, marched straight into the hall. [One] took a document from his bosom and, seizing the King's hand, gave it to him. The King changed color. Those in attendance were shocked, but they did not dare approach. The attending official, Ch'oe Sŏndan 崔先旦 (fl. 1220's), said tearfully, 'How can we allow this bunch of barbarians to approach the Most Venerable? Suppose there should be the calamity of an assassin? We surely would not be able to prevent it.' Then he suggested that P'u-li-tai-wan be taken outside to change into Korean clothing [47]. They were taken into the palace hall for private homage, only bowing [with raised hands clasped] but without prostrating themselves. They were given utensils of gold and silver, silks, and otter pelts, [according to] their difference [in rank]" (*KS* 22. 16b-17a).

Marshal Cho Ch'ung accompanied the Mongol and Jŭrčen commanders northward [48] as far as the border city of Ŭiju [49] on the Yalu. As they prepared to leave, the Mongol army seized many Koryŏ army horses. Protesting, Marshal Cho told them: "These are all government horses. Even if they die we must bring in the hides; they must not be taken." The Mongols believed Cho until one Koryŏ general accepted some silver in exchange for horses. Then, believing Cho had lied, they seized many horses and left (*KS* 103. 5a-b).

Despite the surface appearance of tranquil relations, Koryŏ's outward amity was a gesture designed to gain time. In the autumn of 1219, the Koryŏ authorities, "sent the Vice-Minister of the Bureau of Finance [50] Ch'oe Chŏngbun 崔正芬 (fl. 1220's) et al., eight persons, on an inspection trip of all the walled-cities of the Hŭnghwa [postal relay] circuit [51] to inspect the arms and to accumulate military supplies. Moreover, [the people of] all the minor walled-cities entered the major walled-cities for protection. At that time, spies reported that the Mongols would use the autumn to return. Therefore, preparations were made" (*KS* 22. 17b).

This action reflected the Koryŏ awareness that they could not purchase their autonomy with tribute and minor military contributions. Within two years the King himself was advocating resistance and cessation of the payment of annual tribute but he was cautioned against it by his ministers (*KS* 22. 20b). An indication of Mongol intentions was manifested when Ha-chen and his delegation, at the time of their departure from Koryŏ left 41 subordinates at

the border city of Ŭiju instructing them to "practice the language of Koryŏ and wait for our return" (*KS* 22. 17a) [52].

The first mission sent to receive Koryŏ's annual tribute was not long in coming. In the eighth month (September 11 - October 9) of 1219, "the Northeast Commissioner of Men and Horse sent a report saying, 'Troops sent by the Mongols and the Eastern Jŭrčen nation have come and camped outside Chinmyŏng-sŏng [53] to supervise the receipt of annual tribute" (*KS* 22. 17b 6-7). Their arrival in the Koryŏ capital is noted in the next month (*KS* 22. 17b) but other than the general statement that regional products, *pangmul*, were presented (*YS* 208. 2a; *YKC* 2a), no enumeration is given of the first annual tribute nor for the annual tribute which was presented until 1224.

Koryŏ's relations with the Mongols were but one of many concerns. Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn [54] the military strongman who ruled Koryŏ, was growing old. He passed his sixty-ninth birthday in the dark days of 1217 when the Ch'i-tan reached the gates of the capital (*KS* 129. 25a) and, although both he and his son Ch'oe U [55] commanded considerable house armies (*KS* 129. 23a-b) which they used to reinforce their position, there was an increase in assassination attempts (e.g., *KS* 129. 24a-24b) which continued until Ch'oe U managed to consolidate the transfer of power following his father's retirement in 1218 (*KS* 129. 25b). Some eight hundred Buddhist monks [56] who had been pressed into the army were killed by Ch'oe's house troops when they stormed the capital in an attempt to overthrow the Ch'oe clan in 1217 (*KS* 129. 24a-b). There was also a great deal of unrest in the army following the victory at Kangdong due to a general absence of rewards for merit. Even the welcoming celebration for Marshal Cho was cancelled by Ch'oe — out of jealousy we are told but it is also probable that Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn was feeling vulnerable in his old age and was afraid of anyone becoming too popular. Marshal Cho wanted to remain in the Western Capital after that but Ch'oe summoned him to the capital where he gave a private feast for the commanders of the northern expedition in the palace — paying for it by making a levy of silver on all the officials (*KSC* 15. 20a).

One group of Junior officers were foolhardy enough to voice their complaints while on a drinking spree in the market place, an act which led to the arrest of over a hundred persons who were beheaded by Ch'oe's house forces (*KS* 129. 26a-b). While the disorders of the times were probably responsible to some extent [57], general unrest among those in positions of power and especially among army officers, was without doubt stimulated from within the Ch'oe clan itself and related directly to the question of Ch'unghŏn's successor. A brief glance at the composition of the Ch'oe clan at this time makes this apparent.

Ch'unghŏn had taken three wives, viz., the daughter of Supreme General [58] Song Ch'ŏng 宋淸 , who bore U瑀 and Hyang珦 ; a girl of the Im 任 clan [59] who bore Sŏng珹 ; and a girl of the Wang 王 clan who bore Ku球 (*KS* 129. 26b-27a) [60]. He also had a son, Ch'oe Chun俊 , by his slave girl Tonghwa桐花 (*KS* 129. 27b). Hyang married the daughter of Hang沆 the Marquis [61] of Such'un壽春 and was made Count [62] of Posŏng [63] (*KS* 129. 27a). Chun, who had been given a position in the army as subordinate officer by his father and who had risen to Grand General [64] was killed by Ch'oe U, as was his half-brother Mun Tae 文對 , for plotting to seize power as Ch'unghŏn was dying (*KS* 129. 28a). Ch'oe U then exiled a host of people who had formerly served Ch'unghŏn — notably commanders and officials, many in important posts in the provinces (*KSC* 15. 22b-23a) — including his younger brother Hyang, Hyang's wife's father Hang the Marquis of Such'un; the latter's son Chong琮 ; the minister Sin Sŏnwi 申宣胃 , and several of Ch'unghŏns household retainers, including the slave girl Tonghwa, to various islands. The Marquis of Such'un and his son were allowed to return later. Hyang was moved to Hongju 洪州 where he led an unsuccessful rebellion in 1230 which required 10 000 troops, *simnyŏng* 十領 [65], to quell (*KS* 129. 28a-30a).

Little is known of Ch'oe Ku球 except that he was given a patent of nobility as *su-sagong* and the honorary title of *chuguk* [66]. Ch'oe Sŏng, however, honored Princess Tŏkch'ang 德昌 , one of the five daughters of the exiled Hŭijong [67] in marriage and was made Earl — later Marquis — of Yŏngga 永嘉 (*KS* 91. 26a; *KS* 129. 26b-27a). Kojong, the reigning monarch, also married one of Hŭijong's daughters in 1218, who became Queen Anhye, *Anhye T'aehu* 安惠太后 (*KS* 22. 15a; *KS* 88. 35b). This linked the Ch'oe clan to the royal family in marriage.

Just at this time — in the autumn of 1219 — a revolt under the Ŭiju Junior Colonel [68] Han Sun [69] and Colonel [70] Ta Chi swept like wildfire through the cities of the Northern Frontier-District with only the Northern Defense Command [71], Kuju [72], Yŏnju, and Sŏngju [73] holding out (*KS* 22. 18a). The rebel leaders marked their boundary at the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River 淸川 and submitted to P'u-hsien Wan-nu who gave them 10 000 Eastern Jürčen troops for their assault on Koryŏ border cities [74]. They then attempted to secure their northwestern flank by allying with the Chin Marshal Yü-ke-hsia 于哥下 [75]. Yü-ke-hsia, however, invited them to a feast where he ambushed them. Their heads were then boxed and forwarded to Kaegyŏng in early 1220 (*KS* 130. 1-3; *KSC* 15. 24a-b). This action was greatly appreciated by the Koryŏ authorities who, we can be sure, were looking toward the future when they rewarded Yü-ke-hsia with a goblet, a bowl, and

a basin of silver, two silver wine-cups, fifty bolts (*p'il* 匹) of fine grass cloth [76], fifty bolts of fine silk cloth, five hundred bolts of Kuang-p'ing cloth 廣平布 [77], and one thousand bushels (*sŏk*) of rice (*KS* 22. 18b), for the Chin garrisons across the Yalu were the last bolts on the door to the Koryŏ northwest.

The northwest was in poor condition following the Ch'i-tan raids and the revolt (cf. *KSC* 15. 24b). Army officers sent to restore peace in the Ŭiju area following the revolt slaughtered so many that the revolt arose anew in the fourth month (May 4 - June 2) of 1220, requiring 5 000 troops to put down (*KSC* 15. 25a-b). To this were added the foraging of bands of Ch'i-tan remnants who had fled into the mountains and formed bandit groups (*KSC* 15. 25b) raiding Koryŏ garrisons (*KS* 22. 18b). The revolt in the northwest was finally quelled in the third month (March 26 - April 23) of 1221 when the rebel leaders were captured and, after several days display in cangues in the marketplace, were beheaded (*KSC* 15. 26b) [78].

Following the Koryŏ submission to the Mongols, delegations of Mongols and Eastern Jürčen became frequent visitors in the Koryŏ capital during the next few years as the following simplified chart covering the years 1221-1224 indicates:

Year	Month	Mongols	Eastern Jürčen	Source
1221	7	1 or more	4	*YKC* 2b
1221	8	13	8	*KS* 22. 19b-20a; *YKC* 2b
1221	9	23	-	*KS* 22. 20b-21a
1221	10	7	-	*KS* 22. 21a; *YKC* 2b
1221	12	3	17	*KS* 22. 21a-b
1222	8	21	-	*KS* 22. 22b
1222	10	12	-	*YKC* 2b
1223	5	-	8	*KS* 22. 23b
1223	8	1 or more	12	*YKC* 2b
1224	1 - 2	10	-	*KS* 22. 25a; *YKC* 2b
1224	1	-	1 or more	*KS* 22. 25a
1224	3	-	1 or more	*KS* 22. 25b
1224	11 - 12	10	-	*KS* 22. 26b; *YKC* 2b

A delegation led by Chu-ku-yü [79] which arrived in the eighth month (August 19 - September 17) of 1221 brought a lengthy list of demands (see Part II) from Temüge-otčigin [80] the youngest brother of Činggis, Cha-la and P'u-li-tai-yeh (*KS* 22. 20b). This delegation was still in the capital (cf. *KSC*

KSC 15. 27a-b) when the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northeastern Frontier-District reported that a party led by the Mongol envoy Che-k'o 遮可 which had been sent by the Mongol Queen An-chih [81] 安只 had arrived outside of the Defense Command *toho-pu* (*KS* 22. 20b; *KS* 129. 30b; *KSC* 15. 27a). Angered by the frequence of the envoys Ch'oe U exclaimed:

> "We have still not had time to attend to the envoys who came before. If we attend to [these] how many will come later! We should have the Commissioner of Men and Horse comfort them and send them back" (*KS* 129. 30b) [82].

In a matter of days the Ŭiju District Commandant, *pundo changgun*, sent a report that six to seven thousand Mongol troops had arrived and camped near Shih-cheng, in P'o-su-lu [83] (*KS* 22. 20b). Subsequently, the second group of Mongol envoys arrived to supervise the national gifts (*KS* 22. 20b-21a).

Let us turn for a moment to examine Koryŏ's relations with other countries and their bearing, if any, on Mongol-Koryŏ relations. At this time, Koryŏ's relations with the Chin were coming to an end. The Chin court had attempted to send an envoy in early 1219, but he failed to get through as the roads were blocked (*Chin-shih* 15. 19a; *Chin-shih* 135. 8a-b) [84], however, Koryŏ did not stop using the Chin year periods, *nien-hao*, 年号 until 1224, when Chin power had collapsed in Manchuria (*KS* 87. 7a). One of the Chin's final contacts with Koryŏ was an order to subjugate the Chin rebel Wan-chia-nu 萬家奴 in mid-1226 (*Chin-shih* 17. 5a) [85], while the Mongol had earlier ordered Koryŏ to subjugate the Jürčen (i.e., Chin) in 1221! (*YKC* 2b). Yet, despite the fact that the Chin court had moved south to Kai-feng, Chin power was still formidable in the Liaotung area until it was swept away by the Mongol drive eastward across Liaotung in 1230. A last attempt was made by Koryŏ to contact the Chin court in the spring of 1233, but the envoy was unable to get through and returned with the missive undelivered (*TYSC* 28. 23a-24a; *KSC* 16. 18a).

Sung Merchant Vessels Arriving in Koryŏ 1011-1278 [86]



An occasional merchant ship arrived from the Southern Sung but, as the chart shows, this was the dying trickle of such trade. The great era of Sung-Koryŏ maritime trade was past [87] and, like some of the trade between Koryŏ and Japan, especially the island of T'amna [88] 耽羅 was partially a consequence of Koryŏ ports serving as way-stations between Japan and the Southern Sung [89]. Official Koryŏ-Japan trade at this time was a direct outgrowth of the raids of Japanese freebooters, *wakō* 倭寇 , who recommenced their raids on Korean coastal settlements in 1223 after a century of silence [90]. The *Koryŏ-sa* references show this clearly:

1) Raids of Japanese freebooters:
   1223 (*KS* 22. 23b), 1224 (*KS* 22. 27a-b), 1226 (*KS* 22. 29a-b), and in the fourth (April 18 - May 16) and fifth month (May 17 - June 15) of 1227 (*KS* 22. 30a-b) then;
2) 1227, fifth month: A Korean delegation was sent to Japan to request that the raids be stopped (*KS* 22. 33a; *TT* 31. 39) [91] and Japan sent a letter apologizing for the raids on the Korean coast and requested that trade relations, *hu-shih* [92] 互市 , be established (*KS* 22. 30b).

The raids of the Japanese freebooters recommenced, however, and it was not until 1263, following a Koryŏ mission to Japan to request that the raids cease that a trade agreement was reached. Japan was allowed to send one ship, but never more than two ships, annually (*CHSL* 4. 36a-b; *TK* 11B. 228). This also clearly shows that the impetus to establish trade relations was on the Japanese, not the Koryŏ side [93].

On the northwest border, there was a continuous struggle with the Chin Marshal Yü-ke-hsia whose forces repeatedly sacked Koryŏ border cities. The District Commandant, *pundo changgun*, of Ŭiju at this time was Kim Hŭije [94]. In 1223, he led a raiding party across the Yalu against Yü-ke-hsia 乣哥 whose forces had been hitting Koryŏ border cities in sneak attacks. It was probably this daring which led to his abrupt appointment as Deputy Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwest Frontier-District. Later, in 1226, Kim led another small raiding party across the Yalu against Yü-ke-hsia after the latter's forces had made attacks on Koryŏ border cities. Not content with this, Kim evidently decided to bring the matter to an end by defeating Yü-ke-hsia's main forces. With other officials of his district, Kim raised a force of 10 000 men and with twenty days supply of food crossed the Yalu to attack Yü-ke-hsia's stronghold of Shih-cheng. Although Yü-ke-hsia sent a force of troops to reinforce the garrison, Kim's attack carried the city. Upon his return, in the true tradition of the Koryŏ military, he wrote a lengthy poem expressing his belief that the general's halberts had not yet wiped out the shame inflicted by Yü-ke-hsia. Although Kim had secretly informed Ch'oe U of his intention

to go after Yü-ke-hsia, his action in levying such a large force of men on his own authority, brought official charges against him. Ch'oe U stopped the charges from being put into effect but considered that, under the circumstances, a reward for merit was out of the question.

Yet, by and large, Koryŏ's greatest concern now that relations with the Mongols had been momentarily stabilized, were the Eastern Jŭrčen who held sway over portions of eastern Manchuria and northeastern Korea. Through repeated military encounters, notably through the campaigns of Yun Kwan 尹瓘 (d. 1111) a century earlier, Koryŏ had pushed her eastern borders northward toward the Tuman River at the expense of the Eastern Jŭrčen whose holdings were often incorporated into Koryŏ's domains (*KS* 96. 11-25). Equally as ancient as the Koryŏ-Jŭrčen enmity in the mountainous uplands of the northeast were their trade relations, especially those which centered in the eastern seaboard cities [95].

Koryŏ on her own part had pursued a policy of placating the Mongols until an opportunity presented itself to throw off the Mongol yoke. In 1220, Ch'oe U had assembled the Chief Ministers [96] at his residence, and suggested that a levy be made on the *chŏngyong* and *posŭng* (militia?) units [97] of the *chu* and *kun* administrations of the southern provinces to wall Ŭiju, Hwaju, Ch'ŏl-kwan 鐵關 (a fortified pass) [98], and similar places in the northeast which were certain to be attacked if the Mongols invaded. One officials, a certain Kim Chung-gu 金仲龜, objected and reminded Ch'oe that "in recent years the *chu* and *kun* administrations have suffered from the pillaging incursions of the Ch'i-tan and all the people have fled. Now, if we suddenly make another levy on their labor without warning, then the primary [agricultural] pursuits, *pon* [99], of the state will not be maintained." Ch'oe, however, did not take his advice (*KS* 129. 30b-31a) and the walling was begun, being completed in 1228 (*KS* 82. 35a).

The following year (1221), when Ch'oe U boldly suggested turning back the delegation of Mongols led by Che-k'o 這可 (*KS* 129. 30b), the King assembled the officials of the fourth rank and above to ask their opinions on whether or not to receive the second Mongol delegation and we are told that "the King wanted to make preparations to resist and not present [the annual tribute]. The ministers unanimously said: 'They are many and we are few. If you do not welcome these, they will surely come to invade. Can we withstand many with few; withstand strength with weakness?" (*KS* 22. 20b). And, "because the demands of the Mongols were endless, the King wanted to give them those things which they were obstinately determined to have. [It became] therefore [a matter of] slaking their thirst for valuables or of making bloody sacrifice of the living." Discussions left the matter unsettled even after a

prognostication had been taken at the Great Shrine, *taemyo* 大廟 , where the ancestral tablets of the Koryŏ monarchs were as yet enshrined (*KS* 103 32a-b) [100]. This stiffening of Koryŏ's attitude toward the Mongols was no doubt accelerated as much by the conduct of the Mongol envoys as by their ubiquity. In 1221, a delegation led by Chu-ku-yü — whose murder in 1225 led to the severance of Koryŏ-Mongol relations — had shot up the hostel where they were lodged until they were locked inside by the hostel officer. A later delegation led by Che-k'o had also proved troublesome. After being delayed at the frontier they found a cold reception awaiting them in the Koryŏ capital. "We have never heard of this before! Queen An-chih sends envoys and they are not entertained!" Che-k'o exclaimed, "What is the reason?" The Koryŏ officer in charge of the group, Kim Hŭije, answered, "In past years the Great Nation of the Mongols [has been] gracious. Now, the envoys are useless men who abuse their prerogatives if we welcome and entertain them. As regards the ceremonies, national gifts, and other matters, we certainly cannot put forth our best efforts. [When] you Sir, were in the Defense Command, *toho-pu,* you yourself shot a man. Whether he is alive or dead we have not yet ascertained. If he lives then it will be a blessing for you Sir [but], if he dies then your party must be detained" (*KS* 103. 32b-33a).

However, it was not until the death, in early 1223, of Muqali (*YS* 1. 22a), the Mongol commander that Činggis had placed in charge of the east, that both Koryŏ and the Eastern Jürčen again gave serious thought to throwing off the Mongol yoke. With Muqali dead and Činggis occupied in the west, there was presented an opportunity which might never reoccur. P'u-hsien Wan-nu realized this and promptly declared his own independence and, in early 1224 [101], sent envoys to Koryŏ. An interesting problem in protocol was presented when they arrived with urgent dispatches while Mongol envoys were being entertained in the Koryŏ capital (*KS* 22. 25a). The dispatches made the point briefly:

"The armies of Činggis are always in distant lands [102]. We do not know where they are. Temüge-otčigin *E-ch'ih-hsin* 訛赤忻 is grasping and cruel and they have already dissolved our old friendship."

The second dispatch offered an incentive for the alliance, suggesting:

"Let us each establish as before monopoly markets, *chio-ch'ang* [103] 榷場, our nation at Ch'ŏngju 靑州 and your nation at Chŏngju [104] 定州, to buy and sell" (*KS* 22. 25a). Measures to resist the Mongols had not been lacking on the Koryŏ side. In 1223, Ch'oe had used his own house troops in the corvée to put the moats and walls of the capital in order and doled out 300 silver *pyŏng* [105] 甁 coins and over 2 000 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice to meet the expenses of the undertaking. He also appealed to the gods by

donating 200 *kŭn* [106] of yellow-gold [107] for the construction of a 13-story stupa and a kuṇḍikā [108] at Hŭngwang Temple (*KS* 129. 30-31a). Despite these preparations Koryŏ had no intention of joining with the Eastern Jŭrčen at this point. Eastern Jŭrčen raids on Koryŏ's northern border from Sakchu [109] to Hwaju recommenced in 1225 and lasted over the next four years (*KS* 22. 31a-b; *KS* 22. 31b-32a; *KS* 22. 34a-b).

In the spring of 1229, an Eastern Jŭrčen delegation arrived at Hamju [110] on Koryŏ's northeastern frontier requesting a treaty of peace and friendship (*KS* 22. 36a). The first Koryŏ envoy sent to conclude the treaty was unsuccessful — for which he was imprisoned by Ch'oe U — and a second envoy, a certain Chin Yŏnggap 陳龍甲 was then dispatched to effect a treaty of peace (*KS* 22. 36b). Although he was instrumental in regaining people and livestock captured by the Eastern Jŭrčen in a raid on Hwaju (*KS* 22. 36b), a treaty of peace was never made. So once again the officials of the civil and military offices, *yangbu* [111], met at Ch'oe U's residence to discuss a strategy to beat the mounted raiders (*KS* 22. 37a) [112].

As these events were transpiring, Koryŏ-Mongol relations were suddenly ruptured. In the fall of 1224, a Mongol delegation led by Chu-ku-yü arrived to supervise the annual tribute and then "in the first month [of 1225 = Februarv 9 - March 10], the Mongol envoys left [our] Western Capital and crossed the Yalu. Of the national gifts which had been presented, they kept only the otter pelts and, as regards the remainder, viz., the silks, etc., [this] they abandoned in the fields [113]. On the way they were killed by bandits. The Mongols suspected us. Therefore, relations were severed" (*KS* 22. 27a) [114].

Due to this incident all relations between Koryŏ and the Mongols stopped in early 1225.

The Mongols were preoccupied with campaigns elsewhere, notably in Central Asia, and troubled by succession disputes so that Koryŏ momentarily escaped their attention. They turned their attention once more eastward only to suffer setbacks in 1228 in North China. Then, after his accession, Ögödei (T'ai-tsung 太宗, r. 1229-1241), made an agreement with the Sung, who were to get the Honan area, for a joint attack against the Chin. The campaign, which was to last until the final fall of the Chin to a joint Mongol-Sung force in 1234, was led by Tului (Jui-Tsung 睿宗; regent 1228) who had assumed the regency following the death of Činggis in 1227 during the Tanqut campaign and the election of Ögödei by the Quriltai of 1229. When the Mongol forces advanced across Manchuria with the intention of subjugating P'u-hsien Wan-nu, they ordered Koryŏ to field an army against Wan-nu [115], probably envisaging a pincer attack with Mongol forces pressing down north of the lofty Paektu-san range and Korea pressing upward from the south of the range toward the

Tuman River. Koryŏ, at any rate, did not comply and it is precisely at this time that, as we have seen, Koryŏ finally endeavored to make a peace treaty with the Eastern Jürčen [116]. The Korean records are unusually silent on these events, but they took no action attempting as it were to watch from the sidelines. Whatever their reasons, their inaction had disastrous consequences, for the Mongols postponed their attack on Wan-nu (who was finally defeated in 1233) to deal with Koryŏ. And, in the winter of 1231, a large Mongol force crossed the Yalu (*KS* 23. 1a) to begin what was to be an on-again off-again conflict lasting some thirty years.

Notes to Chapter I

1. Contradictory dates for the events surrounding the entry of Mongol-Jürčen forces into Koryŏ and their subsequent alliance against the Ch'i-tan at Kangdong render other than general dating impossible. This, plus the number of undated passages which begin vaguely with 'formerly' 初 have made it difficult to place some events in other than probable sequence. The main sources for these events, *YKC, KS, KSC,* and the *Kim-gong haenggun'gi* 金公行軍記 in *IC* 6. 7b-17b agree in general and date the arrival of the first envoy from the Mongols on the first or second day of the twelfth month of 1218. They also agree that the Mongol forces left Koryŏ in the second month of 1219. The dating of events between these two dates differs between the rather detailed *Kim-gong haenggun'gi* and the *KS, KSC* versions; the *YKC* account is unfortunately too brief to be of value in this respect. An example of these discrepancies is found in dating the fall of Kangdong: *KS* 22. 16b has the fourteenth day of the first month (Jan. 31) of 1219; *KS* 87. 6b gives the third month of 1219; *KSC* 15. 16b dates this in the first month of 1219, while *IC* 6. 15a places it on the *chi-mao* 己卯 day of the second month of 1219, which is impossible as there was no *chi-mao* day in the second lunar month of 1219. The *YS* 1. 20a account is a simple statement and follows the *YKC* account. The useful reference work *CS*, vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 549-551 places this event in the first month of 1219. Martin, *The Rise of Chingis ...*, p. 217 note 54, gives "February 1219" for the fall of Kangdong, citing the biography of Yeh-lü Liu-ke in T'u Chi's *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi,* a work which is regrettably unavailable to me. Martin also states that "Yanai Wateru, *Ken dai kyo ryako tohoko*" (sic), "is at pains to show that it really took place in February, 1218". Let me correct this error. Yanai Watari, op. cit., p. 96 ff, clearly discusses the dating of these events and he places the fall of Kangdong on the 14th day of the first month of 1219 (= Jan. 31), thus following the *KS* account. The argument is rather involved, but Yanai does not argue for "February 1218" by any means. The *IC* 6. 14a-15a account contains several dates but they are irreconcilable with the *KS* account. Ikeuchi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū,* p. 607 note 1, suggests that the *IC* entry 二月己卯 (day) be amended to read 正月己卯 (12th day = January 29). This is probably as close as we'll get, i.e., Kangdong fell between January 29 and January 31, 1219. In general, I have not attempted precise dating in reconstructing these events, but merely to arrange the events in proper sequence in so far as that was at all possible.

There are one or two other points which can be mentioned at this time,

rather than discussed piecemeal later. Martin says that Yeh-lü Liu-ke was the principal commander of the Mongol forces which entered Koryŏ at this time. This is in accord with the biography of Yeh-lü Liu-ke in *YS* 149. 1a-5b. The errors in this biography and other errors involving Yeh-lü Liu-ke at this time have been discussed at length by both Ikeuchi, loc. cit., and Yanai, loc. cit., and I will not here repeat arguments to problems which have been solved decades ago, but simply point out that:

1) Yeh-lü Liu-ke was not outside Kangdong with the attacking forces as his biography erroneously states.
2) Yeh-lü Liu-ke was not inside Kangdong with the defending Ch'i-tan forces as is erroneously stated in *YKC*, *YS*, *YSCSPM*, *HYS*, etc. This, incidentally, is a wide-spread error and appears to have originated in the *Ching-shih ta-tien*.
3) Koryŏ did not supply 400 000 troops at this time as the biography of Yeh-lü Liu-ke (*YS* 149. 3b) erroneously states.
4) Yeh-lü Liu-ke had apparently remained behind at Huang-ning-fu 廣寧府 . Cf. Ikeuchi, op. cit., p. 573.

2. *yüan-shuai* 元帥 or Marshal; for this title see P. Ratchnevsky, *Un Code des Yuan*, Paris, 1937, pp. 140, 238.
3. Ha-chen 哈眞 . The name also occurs in the orthographic variants: *Ha-chih-chi* 哈只吉 (*YS* 208. 1b-2a; *YKC* 1b); *Ha-chih-chi* 哈赤吉 (*YS* 154. 1a); *Ho-ch'en* 合臣 (*YKC* 2a); *Ho-ch'e* 合車 (*YKC* 8b; *YKC* 6b), and *Ho-ch'eng* 河稱 (*TYSC* 28. 4a-5a; *TYSC* 28. 14b-17b). H. H. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, 3 vols., London, 1876, Vol. 1, p. 711, says that Činggis sent his general *Kha jen dza la* against Koryŏ, but two persons were involved. Cf. *YKC* 8b and *YKC* 6. 13b. *YKC* 2a clarifies their ranks: Ho-ch'en was Marshal, *yüan-shuai*, and Cha-la was Deputy Marshal, *fu yüan-shuai*. L. Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che*, Leiden, 1945, p. 16 note 11, discusses the name Qačin 哈臣 and on p. 33 he discusses the name Qači'un 合赤溫 , both of which are suggestive. Yanai, op. cit., p. 144, has suggested that the *chi* 吉 of the variant *Ha-chih-chi* is a superfluous character *yen-tsu* 衍字 ; if Yanai is correct, then the reconstruction Qačin would seem to be suggested.
4. Cha-la 札剌 . Throughout the text (*KS* & *YKC*) *tz'u* 剌 occurs; I have emended it to read *la* 剌 . The orthographic variations *Cha-la* 劄剌 (*YKC* 2a; *YS* 208. 2b) and Cha-la 扎曬 (*KS* 23. 16 ff; *TYSC* 28. 14b-17b) also occur. In his *Hsin Yüan Shih* K'o shao-min 柯劭忞 writes *Cha-la-i-erh-tai* 扎剌亦兒台 , i.e., J̌alairtai (cf. *HYS* 249. 1b). Cha-la would suggest a name based on the J̌alair tribe and the name J̌alairtai was quite common. However, I hesitate to follow K'o for two reasons: 1) the

general confusion which is evident throughout *HYS* 249 which is the *Kao-li chhuan* of the *Hsin Yüan Shih*, cf. e.g., *HYS* 249. 4b, and 2) I have found the name written only as Cha-la. Yanai, op. cit., pp. 139-144, has noted much of the confusion surrounding J̌alairtai which I have discussed at length at a later point. Yanai has suggested the reconstruction ?J̌ala.

5. In the biographies of Hong Pogwŏn 洪福源, it is related that Hong's father, Hong Taesun 洪大純, a commander, *toryŏng* 都領, of Inju (35 *li* 里 south of the old Ŭiju 義州 cf. *TYS* 53. 13b-14a) in Koryŏ's northwest near the mouth of the Yalu River, submitted to the Mongol forces and joined them in the attack on Kangdong (cf. *KS* 130. 3 and *YS* 154. 1a; also cf. *YKC* 1b – the latter writes Hong Taesŏn 宣). This would put the Mongol-J̌ürčen advance into Koryŏ in the northwest rather than the northeast. Martin, op. cit., pp. 216-217, postulated a crossing near Ŭiju in the northeast.

   Yet, this appears to be in error and the Mongol forces seem to have come down to the Tuman River area where they obtained reinforcements from P'u-hsien Wan-nu and then, this joint force entered Koryŏ from the northeast. The cities of Hwaju, Maengju, Sunju, and Tŏkchu are, moreover, all located in the northeast. I believe that it is simply a confusion of father and son, for Hong Pogwŏn, the son of Hong Taesun, did submit to Mongol forces at Inju in 1231 (see Chapter II). Yanai, op. cit., p. 99 note 1, believes that Hong Taesun was with the Koryŏ forces at Kangdong and submitted to them there. For a similar opinion see Ikeuchi, op. cit., p. 610 and p. 611 note 2; also see Yi Pyŏngdo, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, pp. 546-547.
6. Hwaju 和州, Maengju 猛州, Sunju 順州, and Tŏkchu 德州 are identified respectively by *HY* 27. 8a, as the present (i.e., Yi Dynasty) Yŏnghŭng 永興 in S. Hamgyŏng Province and Maengsan 孟山, Sunch'ŏn 順川, and Tŏkch'ŏn 德川 all located in S. P'yŏngan Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 48. 16b ff, *TYS* 55. 9b ff, *TYS* 55. 1a ff, and *TYS* 54. 21a ff for Hwaju, Maengju, Sunju, and Tŏkchu, respectively. Precise locations are given in the maps appended to Tsuda Sōkichi 津田左右吉, *Chōsen rekishi chiri* 朝鮮歷史地理, Vol. 2, published (in 2 vols.) by the former South Manchurian Railway Corp., Tōkyō, 1918.
7. The text reads 直指江東; in lieu of 指 read 詣.
8. Some caution is necessary in rendering the term *sŏng* 城. In Korea there were *sansŏng* 山城 or mountain citadels of refuge located near every major settlement, including the walled-cities. There was also at this time a *changsŏng* 長城 or long-wall which extended in an undulating arch across northern Koryŏ, beginning in the west near the mouth of

the Yalu, bisecting the peninsula, with its eastern terminus near the present Chŏngp'yŏng 定平 . In general, when *sŏng* clearly refers to a place of permanent settlement I have translated 'walled-city'; when it refers to a temporary refuge, I have rendered 'citadel of refuge' and where I have been in doubt I have rendered 'stronghold' or simply said *sŏng*. For a survey of the remnants of the various *sŏng* of the present Kyŏnggi Province which includes some utilized during this period, see W.D. Bacon, 'Fortresses of Kyŏnggi-do', *TKBRAS* XXXVII (1961), pp. 1-64. For the location of the walled-cities in the northwest and the identification of the garrisons *chin* 鎮 in the area as well as a description of the Koryŏ long-wall behind which they were located, see Yun Mubyŏng 尹武炳, Koryŏ pukkye chiri-go 高麗北界地理考 [Geographical Notes on Koryŏ's Northern Frontier], part I, *YH* 1 (1953) 4, pp. 37-70, and part II, *YH* 2 (1953) 1, pp. 37-89. For a general survey of the subject, see T. Shidehara 幣原坦 , Chōsen no sanjō 朝鮮の山城 [Korea's Mountain Citadels], *Rekishi chiri* 歷史地理, Vol. 15, No. 5 (1910), pp. 483-486 and Vol. 15, No. 6 (1910), pp. 601-606.

9. The walled-city of Kangdong 江東城 was not large. The city walls were of earthen construction (as opposed to stone) and the circumference was 5 759 feet (*ch'ok*). Inside the city were only two wells. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 55. 11a ff, from which the above information has been taken.
10. *YKC* 2a dates this on the second day of the second month of 1219.
11. *t'ung-shih* (Kor. *t'ong-sa*) 通史 . The Sino-Korean Dictionary *Sinjawŏn* 新字源 , Sasŏ ch'ulp'an-sa 辭書出版社 , Seoul, 1950, 854. 3 cites the *Kuei-hsin tsa-chih* 癸辛雜志 : "In the northern regions an interpreter is called *t'ung-shih*." As the person concerned does not appear to have been Korean, I have romanized his name in Chinese, however, his identity is not established.
12. While it is not stated that the headquarters *wŏnsu-pu* 元帥府 was that of Cho Ch'ung, it could have been none other. *KS* 103. 5a calls Cho a Deputy *pu* 副 Marshal but this is in error. He had been promoted to Marshal in the seventh month of 1218, cf. *KS* 22. 15b. At this time he was the senior Koryŏ commander in the field. The operational commanders beneath him were the Commissioners of Men and Horse *pyŏngmasa* 兵馬使 Kim Ch'iryŏ in the northwest (cf. *KS* 103. 16a-b) and Yi Chŏk in the northeast (cf. *KS* 103. 21b-22b). I note that *CS* Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 546 interprets this in the same sense and would place Cho in the Koryŏ Western Capital (P'yŏngyang) at this time, which seems reasonable.
13. Cho Ch'ung 趙沖 (1172-1220) was a man of Hoengch'ŏn 橫川 , his

style *cha* 字 was Tamyak 湛若 . He was the son of *sijung* 侍中 Cho Yŏngin 趙永仁 (1133-1202) and he was given a position in government service, *pogwan* 補官 (i.e., without resort to exams), by means of the Yin 蔭 privilege. He entered the academy and passed the exams in the reign of Myŏngjong 明宗 (r. 1171-1197). In the reign of Hŭijong 熙宗 (r. 1205-1211) he was appointed to the National Academy, *kukchagam* 國子監 , due to his literary skills in drafting institutions, *chŏn* 典 . He was taken out of the academy to serve as Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northeast Frontier District but later returned to civil office in the Department of Rites, *yebu* 禮部 . In 1216, he was advanced to Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affiars, *ch'umir(wŏn)pusa* 樞密（院）副使 , and simultaneously held the rank of Supreme General, *sangjanggun* 上將軍 . He first saw action as Deputy, *pu* 副, to Marshal Chong Sukch'ŏm 鄭叔瞻 against the Ch'i-tan invasion of 1216-1217. The Koryŏ government army at this time was extremely weak and even monks were drafted to fill up the ranks. Only the retainers, *mun'gaek* 門客 , of the ruling Ch'oe clan showed any valor. This resulted in the terrible defeats of 1216-1217 when the Ch'i-tan forces reached the capital and occasioned the Censorate, *ŏsadae* 御史臺, to call for Cho's dismissal. He was recalled shortly after being relieved and appointed Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwestern Frontier District. A subsequent promotion to the post of Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs was opposed by the Department of Civil Officials, *ibu* 吏部 , and he was retained in his original position.

After several victories against the Jürčen Yellow Banner troops that had crossed the Yalu in 1217, Cho was given back his full official duties and, in 1218, he was made Marshal of the Northwest Frontier District. His success in the campaign at Kangdong angered Koryŏ's military ruler Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn and he was given no welcoming return to the capital nor other rewards — the general lack of rewards to the soldiers occasioned great resentment resulting in at least one attempt on Ch'oe's life (*KSC* 15. 20a-b) — although he was entertained privately by the Ch'oe clan. He was awarded the posthumous appellation Munjŏng 文正 (cf. *KSC* 15. 26a). He had two sons: Sukch'ang 淑昌 (d. 1234) whose biography is contained in *KS* 130. 9 ff and Kyesun 季珣 . Cho Ch'ung died on the third day of the ninth month of 1220 at the age of fifty due, it is said, to illness caused by grief, probably over his failure to advance after a successful campaign. For biographical information see *KS* 103. 1a-6b and the eulogy by Yi Kyubo 李奎報 (1168-1241) contained in *TYSC* 36. 14a-17b from which the in-

formation given above has been taken except as indicated; also see *BTKP* 7. 69.

14. The Koryŏ administrative system at this time contained eight *to* 道 or provinces, which included the Northwestern Frontier-District, *sŏbukkye* 西北界, also referred to as *puukye* 北界 and as *sŏbumyŏn* 西北面. It comprised, at this time, the present South P'yŏngan Province and the northwestern portion of North P'yŏngan Province. This is clarified by *TYS* 51. 1b which relates that in the fourteenth year of the reign of Koryŏ Sŏngjong 成宗 (995), the nation was divided into ten provinces *to* 道. The area under the jurisdiction of the Western Capital was made P'aesŏ-do 浿西道. Later it was called *pukkye* 北界. In the seventh year of the reign of Koryŏ Sukjong 肅宗 (1102), they called it *pugmyŏn* 北面. The Northwestern Frontier-District at this time contained: 1 capital, *kyŏng* 京, 1 Defense Command, *toho-pu* 都護府, 25 *pangŏ-chu* 防禦州 administrations, 12 garrisons, *chin* 鎭, 10 *hyŏn* 縣 administrative areas. Cf. Tsuda Sōkichi, *Chōsen rekishi chiri,* Vol. 2, p. 182.

15. What is meant in this case is Koryŏ acceptance of Mongol suzerainty phrased in the traditional reference to the obedience of the younger brother (Koryŏ) to the elder brother (Mongols) as represented by their respective commanders. *HY* 27. 8a-9a inserts a pertinent character and reads "pledged their *nations* to be Elder Brother and Younger Brother" (italics mine). For a discussion of fraternal terms used in Korea's international relations see F. Nelson, *Korea* ..., and Pow-key Sohn (Son Pogi) 孫寶基, 'The Opening of Korea; A Conflict of Traditions,' *TKBRAS* XXXVI (1960), pp. 101-128. Sohn takes issue with Nelson's use of 'Confucian order' and 'Confucian internationalism' to describe relations between China, Korea, and Japan. Sohn (p. 103, note 5) says, "The word 'Pan-Confucianistic' better explains the situation in the East Asiatic order, as the philosophy was more or less Confucianistic."

16. In the Koryŏ system there were two *pyŏngmasa* 兵馬使 or Commissioners of Men and Horse, one in the Northeast Frontier-District and one in the Northwest Frontier-District. The post called for one of the Third Grade in rank and thus was filled by at least a Grand General. Symbols of the post were a jade (ornamented) girdle and purple collar, while the King himself presented the battle-axe and halbert in dispatching the Commissioner to his post. The post was first established in 989, i.e., the eighth year of the reign of Koryŏ Sŏngjong 成宗 (r. 982-997). Cf. *KS* 77. 33b.

17. Kim Ch'wiryŏ 金就礪 (d. 1234) was of Ŏnyang 彦陽; his father

was a ranking official in the Department of Rites. Appointed without resort to the exams, *po* 補 , via the *Yin* privilege to a post as a subordinate officer in the army, he rose to the rank of Grand General, *taejanggun*, and was for a time garrisoned in the Northwest Frontier-District. In the reorganization of the Koryŏ army which followed their defeats by the Ch'i-tan, he was appointed Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwest Frontier-District under Marshal Cho Ch'ung. His army career after that was exemplary with victories against the Ch'i-tan and against various Koryŏ rebels. He died in 1234 and while his exact age is not given, he must have been about seventy-five since he remarked in 1218 that he was approaching sixty. He was given the posthumous appelation of Wiryŏl 威烈 . For biographical information see *KS* 103. 7a-20b and the *Kim-gong haenggun'gi* 金公行軍記 in *IC* 6. 7b-16b; also see *Kuk Ch'unghŏn Wang Sega* 國忠憲王世家 in *IC* 9A. 1a-20a, and *BTKP* 56. 540.

18. *sangsŏ sŏng* 尚書省 = *sangsŏ tosŏng* 尚書都省 . Koryŏ T'aejo had established in the system of the state of T'aebong 泰封 (later redesignated Koryŏ), the *Kwangp'yŏngsŏng* 廣評省 which was completely in charge of all officials. In 982, i.e., the first year of the reign of Koryŏ Sŏngjong 成宗 (r. 982-997) it was redesignated *ŏsa tosŏng* 御事都省 ; in 995 it was redesignated *sangsŏ tosŏng*. In the reign of Koryŏ Munjong 文宗 (r. 1047-1082) the number of posts in the Secretariat was increased considerably. Cf. *KS* 76. 9a-b.

19. Kim In'gyŏng 金仁鏡 (d. 1235), whose former name was Yanggyŏng 良鏡 , was of Kyŏngju 慶州 . A descendant in the fourth generation of Kim Ŭijin 金義珍 (d. 1070), he had a precarious childhood when his father Kim Yŏnggo 金永固 the Commissioner of Hostels and Post Stations of the Hŭnggyo circuit, *hŭnggyo-do kwanyŏksa* 興交道館驛使, fell into disgrace and was jailed during the rebellion of Kim Podang 金甫當 (d. 1173) when forces under his command were defeated. Yŏnggo had been sentenced to death despite the pleas of the people of the area. Sent to the capital for execution he obtained his release thru the intervention of a government minister. His residence had already been confiscated by the government and his wife and children were starving when the officials of the Hŭnggyo circuit levied rice and silks and gave it to them. Yŏnggo was subsequently taken back into government service. His son, Kim In'gyŏng, passed the second grade exams in second place during the reign of Myŏngjong and was placed in the Historiographical Bureau, *sagwan* 史館 . He rose to prominence during the reign of Kojong for his role at Kangdong. Transferred to the Depart-

ment of Rites, he was subsequently promoted to Councillor of the Right of the Bureau of Military Affairs, *ch'umirwŏn usŭngsŏn* 樞密院右承宣, for his merit at Kangdong. Defeated in 1227 in a battle with Eastern Jŭrčen raiders on the northeast coast, he was slandered and subsequently demoted to Governor of Sangju, *sangju moksa* 尙州牧使. As he left the capital for his post at Sangju, ignored by his friends, some of his pupils accompanied him to the outskirts of the city. Kim composed the following poem to meet the occation:

"Can a single whip be expected to sweep away the Tartar dust completely?
The southern wastes of 10 000 *li* [await] an ousted servant.
[My] students with elegant hands have come to bid farewell.
Moved, it is difficult to stop the tears from wetting my handkerchief."

Later at Sangju he composed a poem concerning his demotion which he put on the city wall. He was recalled to the capital after a short while and went on to become President, *sangsŏ* 尙書, of the Department of Justice, *hyŏngbu* 刑部, and later, of the Department of Civil Officials, *ibu* 吏部. He died in 1235 and was given the posthumous appellation of Chŏngsuk 貞肅. For biographical information see *KS* 102. 7a-9a from which the above information has been drawn; also see *BTKP* 59. 562.

20. Reference is being made to Sun Wu 孫武 and Wu Ch'i 吳起, great military strategists of China's Ch'un-Ch'iu period, and their works, known as *Sun-tzu* 孫子 and *Wu-tzu* 吳子. There are several western language translations, e.g., L. Nachin, *Sun Tze et les Anciens Chinois Ou Tse et Se Ma Fa,* Paris, 1948.
21. While the term *yuksŏ* 六書 usually refers to the six styles of writing or to the six categories into which Chinese characters are divided by form, here it could only refer to the Six Classics more commonly referred to as *yukkyŏng* 六經, viz., The Book of Changes 易經, The Book of History 書經, The Book of Poetry 詩經, The Spring and Autumn Annals 春秋, The Record of Rites 禮記, and The Record of Music 樂記. It is usual to refer to the Five Classics since the remains of The Record of Music form one of the sections of The Record of Rites, however, it is sometimes counted separately to make the Six Classics. For a discussion and explanation see Vol. 6, p. 2 of the Prolegomena, J. Legge, *The Chinese Classics,* 7 vols., Hongkong, 1861.
22. *KS* 102. 7b calls them *chŏngbyŏng* 精兵; *IC* 6. 13b calls them *chinyang kapchŏl* 晉鍚押卒. Perhaps by the latter, assuming 鍚 to be an error for 陽, we can identify them as the retainers of the Duke of Chinyang 晉陽, viz., the private forces of the Ch'oe clan.

23. I have used the term 'bushel' to indicate the large bags of rice identified as *sŏk* 石 or 碩 or *kok* 斛 .
1 *kok* = 10 *tu* 斗 (colq. *mal*)
1 *tu* = 10 *sŭng* 升 (colq. *toe*)
1 *sŭng* = 10 *hap* 合 (colq. *hŭp*)
I am not certain of the capacity of a Koryŏ *kok* but I note that according to a gloss in the *Jih-pen ch'uan* 日本傳 of *HY* that one Japanese *koku* 斛 was equal to 25 korean *tu* 斗 , that is, the Japanese *koku* was 2.5 times as large as the corresponding Koryŏ measure (cf. *HY* 48. 7a). The reference work *Keizaigaku jiten* 經濟學辭典 published by Iwanami shoten 岩波書店 in six volumes, Tōkyō, 1931, Vol. IV, entry 1964 ff pertaining to Japanese weights and measures and their historical basis mentions some Kōrai (Koryŏ) measures, e.g., a *Kōrai shaku* 尺 , etc. However, I hesitate to accept their account as pertaining to Koryŏ measures and weights since the ancient Korean state of Koguryŏ was often called simply Koryŏ in historical accounts and it is possible these "Kōrai" measures entered Japan from that state. I also hesitate to accept the *HY* account since I believe it pertains not to a Koryŏ measure but to the measure in use in Korea during the Yi Dynasty when *HY* was compiled. A study of Korean weights and measures would be most welcome. An unsigned article dealing with late Yi period measures appeared under the title 'Korean Weights and Measures', *The Korea Review,* Seoul, 1901, pp. 304-306.

24. *CS* Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 547 postulates an identification of Taeju 泰州 with T'aeju 泰州 ; the latter is the present T'aech'ŏn 泰川 in North P'yŏngan Province.

25. *IC* 6. 14a dates this in the second month (Feb. 17 - March 17) of 1219. *CS* interprets all preceding events as occurring between the first and sixteenth day of the twelfth month of 1218 (Dec. 30, 1218 - Jan. 14, 1219).

26. The office of Director of Affairs for the Commissioner of Men and Horse, *chibyŏngmasa* 知兵馬使 , was established in 989, the eighth year of the reign of Sŏngjong. There was one such office in each of the two northern frontier-districts and as its holder was to be of the third grade in rank, he was at least a Grand General, *taejanggun*. His immediate superior was the Commissioner of Men and Horse. Cf. *KS* 77. 33b.

27. *singi* 神騎 was a general term used to designate the Koryŏ cavalry; the *taegak* 大角 was a crossbow unit (cf. *KS* 129); I do not know what type of unit is meant by *naesang* 內廂 (guards?).

28. Kim Chidae 金之岱 (1191 - 1266) was of Ch'ŏngdo 淸道 ; his former name was Chungyong 仲龍 . Marshal Cho, surprised by the poem

on his shield, had him put in the *naesang* 內廂 (guards?) to test his capabilities. Proving himself, Kim was given a position without resort to the exams, *po* 補, as Office Recorders, *sarok* 司錄, of Chŏnju 全州 He rose to be Chŏlla Province Circuit Inspector, *anch'alsa* 按察使, and gained fame as a suppresser of bandit groups in the area. Ch'oe Hang, the son of the military ruler Ch'oe U, was then living at a Buddhist temple on Chin Island 珍島 as the priest Manjŏn 萬全 and Chidae, in apprehending one of his unruly disciples, forced Manjŏn to send the fellow – a certain Chit'ong 知通 – to him. Chidae "ordered him bound, enumerated his illegal [actions] and threw him in the river." Prudence and the lack of other than minor excesses protected him in later days when Ch'oe Hang succeeded to power as military ruler. In the beginning of the reign of Wŏnjong 元宗 (r. 1260-1274) he was promoted to President of the Department of Civil Officials, *ibu sangsŏ* 吏部尙書, and shortly thereafter he retired from government service because of age. He died in 1266 at the age of seventy-seven and was given the posthumous appellation of Yŏnghŏn 英憲. For biographical information see *KS* 102. 21a-22b from which the above information has been taken; also see *BTKP* 53. 507.

29. Ch'ŏngdo 淸道 is in the southern part of the modern N. Kyŏngsang Province. For historical information see *Han'guk-sa sajŏn*, 韓國史辭典, Seoul, 1959, p. 368.
30. Yi Chŏk 李勣 (1163-1225) of Chip'yŏng-hyŏn 砥平縣 was the son of Grand General Yi Chun 李俊. He gradually worked his way up to Councillor, *nangjung* 郎中, in the Department of War, *pyŏngbu* 兵部, and there rose to prominence fighting the Ch'i-tan invaders in 1216-1217. Appointed Commissioner of Men and Horse after the Ch'i-tan forces had entered Kangdong, he was offered a selected infantry force *chŏngye* 精銳 (called *yŏnye* 鍊銳 in his grave record). A veteran of two years fighting against the mounted Ch'i-tan, he refused the infantry soldiers and took only a cavalry force. Following the battle at Kangdong he remained in the north as Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northeast Frontier-District and, following this, he entered the Bureau of Military Affairs. He died in 1225 at the age of 64 and left no sons. For biographical information see *KS* 103. 21b-22b and his grave record contained in *TYSC* 36. 9b-12a. In the latter his name is given as Chŏk 績. Also see the *Yi Ch'umil Chŏk Yanggwanp'yo* 李樞密勣讓官表 contained in *TYSC* 29. 18b-19a.
31. In lieu of 'Mongol Emperor' *IC* 6. 14a has *Sheng-wu* 聖武 (both of which refer to Činggis) and adds the line "I will not salute Wan-nu."

32. My interest here is not so much with Mongol customs as it is with the Korean reaction to them. For Mongol customs mentioned, see the accounts of William of Rubruck, John of Pian de Carpine, Odoric, et al., translated and annotated by W. W. Rockhill, H. H. Yule, P. Pelliot, C. Dawson et al., which are listed in the bibliography.
33. The terms of the agreement are verified in a Koryŏ letter sent to the Mongols in 1232; envoys were not to exceed ten persons annually in the Koryŏ interpretation. Cf. *KS* 23. 19a-b. This particular agreement was often cited by the Koryŏ authorities as one of the foundation stones of Yüan-Koryŏ relations in later days, especially when it was useful to counter Yüan demands. See, for example, the petitions submitted to the Yüan authorities by Yi Chehyŏn in 1323. (*IC* 6. 1b-2a)
34. *YKC* 2 and *YS* 208 place this agreement as occurring prior to the dispatch of provisions and soldiers. However, the detailed record in *IC* 6. 1b ff and in the biography of Cho Ch'ung relate the sequence. Subsequent events confirm that this was a binding agreement between the two nations of which the Koryŏ authorities were well aware. Also see *YC* Vol. 2, pp. 112-113 for the sequence of events.
35. *IC* 6. 15a dates this on the twentieth day of the second month (March 8) of 1219.
36. The number nine since ancient times had mystic connotations to the peoples of North Asia.
37. *YS* 149. 3b relates that Ha-chen's Ch'i-tan prisoners were taken to Ssu-lou 西樓, which is identified by *CS* Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 551, as Pa-lin 巴林 in Inner Mongolia. Martin, op. cit., p. 217, remarks that "... they were moved to the country immediately west of Lin-huang." Lin-huang-fu, to the northeast of the present Pa-lin, and Ssu-lou to the southeast of Lin-huang, was the area of the old Liao capital. The Ch'i-tan captives were re-settled there under Yeh-lü Liu-ke. Following Liu-ke's death in 1220, this area and the people there were inherited by Liu-ke's eldest son Hsieh-tu 薛闍. In 1230, Hsieh-tu, after considerable merit in the field against the Chin in the south, was ordered by Ögödei to accompany Sartaq on the campaign eastward across Liaotung. He then moved these people to Huang-ning-fu 廣寧府 where he was active in the administration of Huang-ning-lu 廣寧路. Hsieh-tu participated in the 1231-1232, and 1235 campaigns in Korea and in the 1234 campaign against P'u-hsien Wan-nu. See *YS* 149. 3b-5b and Ikeuchi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū*, Vol. 1, pp. 611, 627, and 629.
38. The Mobile Garrison *hsing-ying* 行營 was the field headquarters of the Mongol commander.

39. Cf. *YKC* 2a which dates this on the 13th day of the first month (Jan. 30) of 1219.

40. The missive which is contained in *TYSC* 28. 1a-b, contains the heading "Letter Accompanying Ceremonial Gifts (lit. fruit and wine) Sent to the Tent (i.e., Hq.) of the Mongol Marshal of Men and Horse" and a notation indicates that it represents correspondence of the *tosŏng* which is an abridgement of *sangsŏ tosŏng* 尙書都省 , the Koryŏ Secretariat.

41. The text reads *hsiao-fu* 梟俘 which I have rendered "executed or made prisoner." *Hsiao* should probably be understood in the sense of 梟首 "to behead and hang the head in a tree as a warning to others."

42. P'u-li-tai-yeh 滿里帶也 . In *KS* 22. 16b the name occurs in the form P'u-li-tai-wan 滿里帶完 ; in *KS* 22. 20b it occurs as P'u-hei-tai 滿黑帶 ; *hei* being a common replacement or misrendering for *li* in Mongol names transcribed in Chinese.

43. The Koryŏ administrative system had as many as four capitals, *kyŏng* 京 , viz., the main capital at Kaegyŏng 開京 , the present Kaesŏng; the Western Capital, Sŏgyŏng 西京 , the present P'yŏngyang; the Eastern Capital, Tonggyŏng 東京 , the present Kyŏngju; and the Southern Capital, Namgyŏng 南京 , the present Seoul. Kaegyŏng and Sŏgyŏng date from the reign of Koryŏ T'aejo 太祖 (r. 918-943); Tonggyŏng dates from the reign of Sŏngjong 成宗 (r. 982-997); and Namgyŏng dates from the reign of Munjŏng 文宗 (r. 1047-1082). This is, of course, vastly oversimplified. The designation Tonggyŏng had been used for the former Silla capital even during the Later Silla period (668-917). The history of the Southern Capital is particularly interesting, involving the interpretation of several prophecies, based upon which its site was occasionally changed. These are discussed at length by Yi Pyŏngdo, *Han'guk-sa* Vol. 2, passim. The general context of the various predictions involving the Southern Capital was the extension or elimination of the ruling dynasty by the construction of a Southern Capital which is well illustrated by the prediction of a monk who, in the seventh month of 1224, prophecied: "Asadal 阿思達 was in antiquity on the site of Yangju 楊州 . If palaces are constructed on this site and protected, then the nation's span will last 800 years.' Therefore, it was so ordered" (*TT* 32. 52). And, indeed, a new palace was completed there in the spring of 1235. Cf. *KS* 23. 28b-29a. Asadal 阿思達～阿斯達 is, of course, the 'capital' found by the legendary Tan'gun 檀君 , for which see *Samguk yusa* 三國遺史 33. 9, Ch'oe Namsŏn 崔南善 ed., Keijō (Seoul), 1946. Also see F.Vos, 'La letteratura coreana,' La Civiltà dell' Oriente I, Rome, 1957, pp. 1025-1042, esp. pp. 1030 ff.

The Koryŏ main capital of Kaegyŏng was divided into five districts *pu* 部, viz., northern, southern, eastern, western, and central. The northern district contained ten wards, *pang* 坊, with forty-seven residential-blocks, *li* 里; the southern district contained five wards with seventy-one residential-blocks; the eastern district contained seven wards with seventy residential-blocks; the western district contained five wards with eighty-one residential-blocks; the central district contained the Royal palaces, etc. Cf. T. Shigeda 重田定一, Kōrai no kotō 高麗の舊都, *Rekishi chiri*, Vol. 16, No. 6 (1910), p. 615 ff. Also se T. Sekino 關野貞, Kōrai no kotō (kaijō) oyobi Okyū ishi (Mangetsu-dai) 高麗の舊都（開城）及王宮遺趾, *Rekishi shiri*, Vol. 6, No. 6 (1904), pp. 585-591. The most detailed study is that by the late Maema Kyōsaku 前間恭作, Kaikyō kyūden-bo 開京宮殿簿 ["A Study on Gaegyong Palaces of Goryeo"], *CG* 26 (1963), pp. 1-55.

44. There were two *siŏsa* 侍御史 or Attendant Censors in the Censorate, *ŏsadae*, at this time, both posts carrying the official grade of Fifth Class, secondary. Cf. *KS* 76. 21b.

45. Sŏnŭi Gate 宣義門 was the principal outer gate of the Koryŏ capital of Kaegyŏng. It was located in the southwest of the city and was often used figuratively to indicate the capital. Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, carries a sketch map of the Koryŏ capital. The Sŏnŭi Gate was one of the twenty-five gates in the city. Cf. T. Shigeda, op. cit., p. 617.

46. The Taegwan Hall 大觀殿 was the main audience chamber at this time and so remained until the transfer of the capital to Kanghwa Island in 1232; it was here that the King received all envoys. Cf. *KS* 22 and *KS* 23.

47. The type of clothing was undoubtedly that described for a Mongol delegation from the camp of Sartaq in the winter of 1231. Similarly attired in fur clothing and hats, and with their bows and swords, they too shocked the Korean court attendants who "... presented [them] *tzu-lo-shan* 紫羅衫 (a not-full-length, unlined uppergarment made of purple silk gauze) and girdles and ordered them to change clothing. The Mongol envoys did not obey but simply put them on over [their own clothing]" (*KS* 23. 4a). For another example of such behavior see *KS* 103. 32a-36a. The *shan* was worn as the official costume by the highest Koryŏ officials and various colors were assigned according to rank (*KS* 72. 9b-14b).
Friar William of Rubruck has described the dress and head-dress of

envoys from Solanga (Korea) he saw at the court of Möngke in 1253: "... they wear tunics like the chasuble (*supertunicale*) of a deacon, except with narrower sleeves. On their heads ... a mitre like a bishop's ... in front it is slightly lower than behind ... square on top ... of stiff buckram, and so polished that it shines ... like a mirror. ... And at the temples are long strips of the same stuff ... fastened to the mitre ... which stand out in the wind like two horns ... When the wind strikes it too violently, they fold them up across the mitre over the head; and a right handsome ornament it is." Cf. Rockhill, *William of Rubruck* ..., p. 153; in an explanatory note, Rockhill says the cap was described as of *stamina rigidata per coloram nigram*. Rockhill mentions the black, polished horsehair hats of the Koreans and that the 'wings' project from in front, not behind. Yet in the portraits of Yi Saek 李穡 (1328-1396) and of Yi Chehyŏn 李齊賢 (1287-1367) of unknown date contained in Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, following p. 644, the caps worn are exactly as described by Rubruck and differ from the late Yi Dynasty headgear described by Rockhill. For Korean costumes of the Koryŏ period see *KS* 72.

48. According to *IC* 6. 15b, Kim Ch'wiryŏ went with Cha-la as far as Choyang 朝陽 but as there were sacrifices in the Western Capital at that time, Kim was replaced by O Sugi 吳壽祺 who accompanied Cha-la. *KS* and *KSC* have nothing like this. A *KS* entry dated the tenth month of 1219 merely lists O as being substituted for Kim Kunsu 金君綏 (fl. 1216-1220; *BTKP* 60. 574) to be Northwest Commissioner of Men and Horse; *KSC* 15. 22 reads the same. It would appear that Ch'wiryŏ was replaced by Kunsu who was, in turn, replaced by Sugi. The sacrifices referred to would have been the Buddhist Festival of Lanterns, *yŏndŭng* 燃燈, celebrated in Koryŏ at this time on the fourteenth day (the day before the full moon) of the second lunar month; since it was a festival with feasting, singing, and dancing, we cannot blame Kim for going.

49. The old city of Ŭiju was located somewhat southwest of the present city of Ŭiju. Like its modern namesake, it too warranted the description, "die berühmte alte Eingangsforte Koreas". H. Lautensach, *Korea, Eine Landeskunde auf Grund eigener Reisen und der Literatur*, Leipzig, 1945. For historical and topographical information on the border city of Ŭiju 義州 see *TYS* 53. 1a ff.

50. *hobu sirang* 戶部侍郎 or Vice-Minister of the Bureau of Finance; there were two such posts, each carrying the official grade of Fourth Class, primary. Cf. *KS* 76. 15b-17b.

51. The Hŭnghwa postal relay circuit *Hŭnghwa-do* 興化道 had twenty-nine stations and serviced an area between the capital of Kaegyŏng and

the Western Capital. There were in the Koryŏ system twenty-two postal relay circuits with a total of 525 post stations. Cf. *KS* 82.

52. In the early period there were undoubtedly many difficulties in communication between the Mongols and peoples they conquered, which made interpreters and translators especially valued. One of the Mongol demands upon Koryŏ in the period 1219-1224 had been for men with a knowledge of the Chinese written and spoken language (cf. *TYSC* 28. 1b-3a) while in later days a Korean, one Cho I 趙彝, became one of Qubilai's chief interpreters (*KS* 130). The atrocious Chinese of many Yüan edicts may have also occasioned misunderstanding. Mongolian written in the Uiɣur script was also used, playing an important part in Yüan-Koryŏ relations and we read that "in many of the letters which were exchanged, the Uiɣur script was used" (*KS* 89. 13b; also see *KS* 125. 15a; *KS* 121. 7a ff). In 1225, the Koreans began the study of a script described only as a 'smaller script' *soja* 小字 when a certain Chou-han 周韓 submitted to a Koryŏ border garrison. When it was discovered that he knew the smaller script he was forthwith sent to the capital and studies commenced (*KS* 22. 26b). I note that *CS* Vol. 4, p. 14 interprets this to be the 'smaller' Jŭrčen script, a script which had been introduced in 1138 (cf. K. Wittfogel and Chia-sheng Feng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao* (907-1127), 'General Introduction', undated reprint from the Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 36, pp. 1-35). This script was widely used (cf. pp. 344 and 347, Yi Kimun 李基文, Chungse yŏjin-ŏ unnon yŏn'gu, 中世女眞語韻論研究, *Nonmun-chip* (Seoul University Journal, Humanities and Social Sciences), 7 (1958), pp. 343-395. In fact, we find, as late as 1403, the opening days of the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), that a Jŭrčen script was used in instructions sent to the Yi Court [cf. Wada Sei 和田清, *Tōashi kenkyū* (Manshu-hen) 東亜史研究(滿洲篇) ["Studies on the History of the Far East" (Manchuria)], *Tōyō bunko ronsō* 東洋文庫論叢, Series A, No. 37, p. 384]. Yet it seems improbable that the Koreans who had been in close contact with the Jŭrčen for centuries would have been unaware of their script. While events of the times may have given the Jŭrčen script an importance, I would suggest that the 'smaller script' was not the Jŭrčen script at all but the Uiɣur script.

53. For topographical and historical information on Chinmyŏng-sŏng 鎭冥城 which was located near the modern Wŏnsan 元山 in S. Hamgyŏng Province, see *TYS* 49. 13a.

54. Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn 崔忠獻 (1149-1219) of Ubong 牛峯 entered military service at an early age. He rose to power in the struggles which

erupted in the military government in the later 12th century and seized the power of the military government in 1196 by assassinating Yi Ŭimin 李義旼 (d. 1196). The military government in Koryŏ commenced with the rebellion of Chŏng Chungbu 鄭仲夫 (d. 1179) in 1170, but not until the Ch'oe clan assumed power - which it held for four generations until 1258 - did the military government manage to gather the full administrative regalia of government, although the earlier efforts of General Kyŏng Taesŭng 慶大升 (1154-1183) had already pointed the way. M. C. Rogers has dealt with Ch'oe at some length in his 'Studies in Korean History', *TP* XLVII (1959), pp. 30-62. For biographical information see *KS* 129. A thorough biographical résumé is contained in *Chōsen jimmei jisho* 朝鮮人名辭書, Chōsen Sōtokufu 朝鮮總督府, Keijō (Seoul), 1937-39, 1379A ff; also see *BTKP* 23. 226.

55. Ch'oe U 崔瑀 (d. 1249), who later changed his name to I 怡, was the eldest son of Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn the military ruler. His mother, Ch'unghŏn's first wife, was the daughter of Supreme General Song Chŏng 宋清. He assumed control of the government following his father's death but was compelled to fight to retain his power which he did by exiling or killing his opposition, including his younger brother Hyang 珦. Like most of the Koryŏ aristocracy, he favored Buddhism - although he did not hesitate to ruthlessly eliminate priests when they opposed him. He encouraged and financially aided learning as had his father Ch'unghŏn, yet he was not above confiscating the dwellings of commoners in the city and razing them to build a private polo field.

He was enfeoffed as the Marquis of Chinyang 晉陽侯 in 1234 (after declining the title in 1221; the patent of investiture which is contained in *TYSC* 33. 17b-19a mentions his merit in protecting the altars of earth and grain (i.e., the fatherland), and crushing the rebellious and the refractory) and in 1242 was made Duke of Chinyang. He had two sons - neither by his first wife - who entered the Buddhist priesthood with the Buddhist names of Manjŏn 萬全 and Manjŏng 萬宗; the former he recalled to secular life to succeed him, viz., Ch'oe Hang 崔沆. The judgement of his contemporaries provides a criterion by which to appraise his life: following the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan, Ch'oe U was made a Meritorious Minister, *kongsin* 功臣, posthumously (cf. *KS* 25. 26a). He died in 1249 and was awarded the posthumous appellation of Kwangnyŏl 匡烈. His biography is contained in *KS* 129 following that of his father Ch'unghŏn and valuable information on his life and times is contained in *TYSC*; *BTKP* 25. 242, I note, fails to mention his second son Manjŏng.

56. The monks were from temples in and near the capital and included monks from the temples Hŭngwang 興王 , Kyŏngbok 景福 , Wangnyun 王輪 , and Hongwŏn 弘圓 in the Kaegyŏng area and the near-by temples of Anyang 安養 and Suri 修理 (*KS* 129. 24a-b). The latter two are identified by *CS* Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 519 as being in the present Kyŏnggi Province at Sihŭng 始興 and Kwangju respectively. The construction of the most famous of these, Hŭngwangsa, commenced in the tenth year of the reign of Koryŏ Munjong 文宗 (r. 1047-1082) and took some 12 years; its site remains at Hŭngwangni 興旺里 , Kaep'ung-kun 開豊郡 , Kyŏnggi Province. It was here that 'National Preceptor' *taegak kuksa* 大覺國師 Ŭich'ŏn 義天 , the brother of Kŏryo Sŏnjong 宣宗 (r. 1084-1094) supervised the first carving and printing of the Tripiṭaka or Buddhist Canon, following his return from Sung China; it was this work that was destroyed in the Mongol invasions of 1232. Yi, *Han'guk-sa,* Vol. 2, p. 548 and p. 549, note 2, traces the uprising of monks to Ch'oe's disregard of government forces and retention of his private soldiers for his own use which resulted in the need to levy monks into the army.

57. Yi, *Han'guk-sa,* Vol. 2, pp. 552-553, in pointing out the rash of uprisings - he lists seven in the period 1219 to 1230 - remarks that they were attributable as much to a quest for power on the part of the leaders as to chaotic conditions. Of the seven revolts that Yi lists, two were direct attempts to overthrow the Ch'oe clan, two were revolts of provincial officials, one a revolt by a bandit chief, and two revolts arose in the Western Capital which had been a hotbed of rebellion since the revolt of Myoch'ŏng 妙淸 (d. 1135; *BTKP* 84. 791) in the reign of Injong 仁宗 (r. 1123-1146).

58. The rank of Supreme General, *sangjanggun* 上將軍 , had the official grade of Third Class, primary (Yi Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of 300 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 85 *kyŏl* of paddy fields and 40 *kyŏl* of forest (Yi, Table 7).

59. She had been the wife of General Son Hongyun 孫洪胤 whom Ch'oe had killed; hearing of her beauty, Ch'oe took her himself and put her in a house in the capital. Cf. *KSC* 15. 20b.

60. There were two popular methods of selecting generation-names in Koryŏ. All clan members of the same generation would use the same radical in their given names. The 'jade' radical, *okpu* 玉部 , was undoubtedly popular, because in radical form it resembles the character Wang 王 , meaning 'king' and which was also the surname of the Koryŏ royal family. A second method, which prevails widely today, was to choose a generation

character. An example of this may be seen in the first generation of the descendants of Kim Kyŏngson 金慶孫, who used the generation character *cha* 子 and bore the names Chahŭng 子興, Chach'ang 子昌, and Chayŏn 子延. Kim's descendants in the 2nd generation (sons of Chahŭng) combined the two methods and bore the names Sanggi 上琦, Sangyo 上瑤, Sangyŏng 上瑛, and Sangnin 上璘 (*KS* 103. 30b). *BTKP* carries many such examples.

61. The title of Marquis, *hu* 侯, was an honorary title which carried an annual stipend of 400 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice (Yi, Table 6).
62. The title of Count, *paek* 伯, was an honorary title which carried an annual stipend of 240 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice (Yi, Table 6).
63. Posŏng 寶城 was a *kun* 郡 in Chŏlla 全羅 Province with four subordinate *hyŏn* 縣. Cf. *Han'guk-sa sajŏn,* 138A.
64. The rank of Grand General, *taejanggun* 大將軍, had the official grade of Third Class, secondary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of 233 bushels (*sŏk*) 5 *tu* 斗 of rice (Yi, Table 6) and an allotment of 80 *kyŏl* of paddy fields and 35 *kyŏl* of forest land (Yi, Table 7).
65. The term *yŏng* 領 is clarified in *KS* 81. 1a where we read, "Each *yŏng* had about 1 000 men ..."
66. The honorary title of *sagong* 司空 was the third (and lowest) of the Three Dukes, *samgong* 三公, honorary titles bestowed on members of the royal household (*KS* 76. 2b) and carried an annual stipend of 240 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice (Yi, Table 6). The honorary title of *chuguk* 柱國 was the second of two such titles bestowed for merit and carried the grade of Second Class, primary (cf. Yi, *Han'guk-sa,* Vol. 2, p. 133). The prefix *su* 守 'guardian', 'protector', was apparently used to differentiate this title from the titles of nobility *sado* 司徒 and *sagong* 司空 which were bestowed upon the male children of the royal relatives (cf. *HY* 20. 24b).
67. Hŭijong 熙宗 (r. 1205-1211) was deposed by Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn and died in exile in 1237. Cf. *CHSL* 4. 28.
68. The rank of *pyŏlchang* 別將 or Junior Colonel, had the official grade of Seventh Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of 46 bushels (*sŏk*) 10 *tu* of rice (Yi, Table 6) and an allotment of 45 *kyŏl* of paddy fields and 12 *kyŏl* of forest land (Yi, Table 7).
69. The biographies of Han Sun 韓恂 and Ta Chi 多智 which are found together in *KS* 130. 1-3 relate chiefly the details of the rebellion without giving any further particulars of their lives.
70. The rank of *nangjang* 郎將 or Senior Colonel, had the official grade of Sixth Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of 86

bushels (*sŏk*) 10 *tu* of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 60 *kyŏl* of paddy fields and 21 *kyŏl* of forest land (Yi, Table 7).

71. The term *toho* (C. *tu-hu*) 都護 , usually rendered 'protector general', occurs in Chinese history as early as Han times (cf. *Hou Han-shu* 118. 14b). The *toho* was in charge of the *toho-pu* 都護府 . In Korean history the usage of the term dates to Silla times and traces to T'ang. After crushing the Koguryŏ capital of P'yŏngyang in 668, T'ang established the *An-tung tu-hu-fu* 安東都護府 in P'yŏngyang with Hsieh Jen-kuei 薛仁貴 as Protector General; in 676 they were forced out of the peninsula and the *tu-hu-fu* was moved to Liaoyang; it was finally abolished in 758 (cf. *Han'guk-sa sajŏn*, p. 218).

I have chosen to render the term *toho-pu* as Defense Command. The Yüan 'Monography on Geography', in describing the Koryŏ *toho-pu*, remarks that the term was taken from T'ang and that "Koryŏ established [as] *pu* 府 , *chu* 州 , *hyŏn* 縣 , and *chin* 鎭 , some sixty walled-cities. This was the *toho-pu*." And it notes that although Koryŏ retained the old T'ang designation, nevertheless, they were without a real *toho-pu* (*YS* 59. 4a-b). The YS account correctly traces the introduction of the *toho-pu* to T'ang but describes, not the Koryŏ *toho-pu* but rather the Northwestern Defense Command plus Sŏhae Province, i.e., the area submitted by the Koryŏ rebel Ch'oe Tan 崔坦 (which is discussed in detail later). A clearer picture is given by *TYS* 52. 16a which relates that the designation of Chungban-kun 重盤郡 of late Silla times was changed by Koryŏ T'aejo to P'aengwŏn-kun 彭原郡 and in his fourteenth year (931), T'aejo established there the *Anbuk-pu* 安北府 . In the reign of Sŏngjong it was called *Yŏngju anbuk taedoho-pu* 寧州安北大都護府 ; in the reign of Hyŏnjong it was called *Anbuk taedoho-pu*.

The Koryŏ *toho-pu* or Defense Command, then referred primarily to a city, i.e., the city in which it was located and subordinate administrative units. Thus, the Northern Defense Command, *anbuk toho-pu* 安北都護府 , while it was responsible for the peace in the northwest portion of Korea, as a term, referred to the city in which it was located, viz., the walled-city of Ansŏng 安城 (also called Anbuk; the modern Anju 安州) on the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River. There were in the Koryŏ system the following Defense Commands.

Northern (*anbuk* 安北) Defense Command;

Southern (*annam* 安南) Defense Command; the location shifted to various cities throughout the southwest;

Eastern (*anbyŏn* 安邊) Defense Command; the location shifted in the modern S. Hamgyŏng Province ending at Anbyŏn, the city which presently bears its name.

Western (*ansŏ* 安西) Defense Command; it was located at the modern Haeju 海州

For the various locations see Yi, *Han'guk-sa,* Vol. 2, map 7. For the usage of the term *tu-hu-fu* in T'ang times see R. des Rotours, *Traité des Functionnaires et Traité de l'Armée,* 2 vols., Leiden, 1947, Vol. 2, pp. 718-720, and E.G. Pulleyblank, *The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan,* London, 1955, p. 223; P. Ratchnevsky, *Un Code des Yuan,* does not list them for Yüan times.

72. The city of Kuju 龜州 , the present Kusŏng 龜域 in N. P'yŏngan Province, had walls of stone construction seven feet (*ch'ŏk* 尺) in height and a circumference of 12 335 feet (*ch'ŏk*); inside the city were fifty wells and springs. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 53. 31a ff.

73. For topographical and historical information on the city of Yŏnju 延州 which is in the modern N. P'yŏngan Province, see *TYS* 54. 1a ff; for such information on the city of Sŏngju 成州 , the present Sŏngch'ŏn in S. P'yŏngan Province, see *TYS* 54. 16a ff.

74. Cf. Ikeuchi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū,* Vol. 1, pp. 634-635.

75. Yü-ke-hsia 于哥下 was a Chin Marshal who garrisoned Ta-fu-ying 大夫營 (which was located on an island in the Yalu River). In the fourth month of 1217, he had fought an unsuccessful night battle with the Jŭrčen Yellow Banner forces of P'u-hsien Wan-nu and then with ninety men, had slipped across the Yalu to Ŭiju where they were held by the Koryŏ District Commandant, *pundo changgun.* At the time *Yü-ke-hsia* was in possession of a tiger-head gold plaque *chin-p'ai* 金牌 as symbol of his authority. Cf. Ikeuchi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū,* Vol. 1, p. 581.

76. *Chu* 4) 苧 interchangeable with *chu* 4) 紵 . A grass cloth produced from the fibres of the ramie [*Boeheria nivea,* cf. E.H. Schafer and B.E. Wallacker, 'Local Tribute Products of the T'ang Dynasty', *Tung-fan wen-hua* (Journal of Oriental Studies of Hongkong University), 4 (1957-58) 1 & 2, p. 236], called *mosi* 모시 in Korean and often written *mosi* 毛施 . It was a regular tribute product of T'amna Island to the Koryŏ Court, cf. p. 141 note 2, Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Gen Seiso to Tanra-to 元世祖と耽羅島 , [Yüan Shih-tsu and T'amna Island], *TG* 16 (1926), pp. 136-142. The term *mosi* was in use in Koryŏ times, cf. F. Hirth and W.W. Rockhill, *Chau Ju-kua* (趙汝适): *His work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, entitled Chu-fan-chī* (諸蕃志), St Petersburg, 1911, p. 168 and p. 169 note 9; they have stated that *mau-shī* (i.e., *mosi*) is usually rendered "serge". There is no doubt that ramie cloth is meant. Serge is usually called *kal* 褐 .

77. Kuang-p'ing is the name of a prefecture in modern Hopei; it is also the name of a location in Korea. The Kuang-p'ing cloth may have derived its name from one of these locations (i.e., from the site of manufacture).

78. Information on the revolt is also contained in the biography of Kim Ch'wi-ryŏ KS 103 and it is summarized in *CHSL* 4. 23b.

79. *Chu-ku-yü* 著古與. In *YS* 208 and *YKC* the name occurs as *Chu-ku-yü* 著古歟; it occurs as *Cha-ku-yeh* 扎古也 in *KS* 22. 25a. In *KS* 23. 4a-5b it is found in the form *Kua-ku-yü* 瓜古與, *kua* 瓜 being a mistake for *chao* 爪 which is also seen in *Kua-wa* 瓜哇 for *Chao-wa* 爪哇 (= Java).

80. *KS* 22. 29b reads 皇大弟; *YKC* 2 & 2b read 皇大弟國王. In an answer to other demands, a Koryŏ missive in *TYSC* 28. 1b-3a refers to him as 皇大弟大王. *Kuo-wang* 國王 or Viceroy was a title of nobility instituted by Činggis in 1217 and bestowed as a special mark of respect; it held the official grade of First Class, primary. Cf. Ratchnevsky, *Un Code* ..., p. 186, note 2. The individual concerned was Temüge-otčigin, the fourth brother of Činggis. P. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo,* Paris 1959, p. 307, citing T'u Chi (i.e., *Meng-wu-erh chi-shih*) 75. 1a, says that prior to the downfall of P'u-hsien Wan-nu, Činggis had allotted the whole of his territory as a part of the appandage of his youngest brother Temüge-otčigin. This was inherited by his direct descendants reaching his great-great-grandson Nayan as stated by Marco Polo.

81. The text reads 安只女大王, however, I cannot but wonder if 女 is not a scribal error for 歹; if so then in lieu of *Queen An-chih* we would read *Grand Prince Alčitai* (or Elčidei). Juvaini remarks that after the death of Činggis in 1227, there was an assembly convoked and "from the east came Otegin, Belgütei Noyan, Elchitei Noyan, Yekü, and Yesüngei." Boyle identifies Elchitei Noyan as the son of Činggis' brother Qach'iun. See Vol. I, p. 185, J. A. Boyle (translator), *The History of the World-Conqueror* of 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvaini, 2 vols., London, 1958.

82. The records inform us that "at the time, the people believed that the quarrel with the Mongols began with this [incident]" (*KS* 129. 30b).

83. P'o-su-lu 婆速路 was the *lu* 路 administration in Liaotung which bordered Koryŏ on the Yalu; it was the *Liao-yang-lu* 遼陽路 of the Yüan. There is a *shih-cheng* 石城 mentioned in *Chung-kuo ku-chien ti-ming ta-tz'u-tien* 中國古今地名大辭典, pp. 269-270, which was located in Liao-yang-hsien 縣 on top of Mt. Shih-cheng 石城山 and which is identified as the old Koryŏ (read Koguryŏ)

Paegŭi-sŏng 白崖城 (read Paegam-sŏng 白岩城). Cf. *KS* 103. 32a-36a. Ikeuchi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū,* pp. 624-625 note 2, says that Yanai Watari would locate it 18 Chinese *li* north of the present *Chiu-lien-sheng* 九連城

84. According to Chŏng Tagyong 丁若鏞 (1762-1836), the Chin established mutual trade relations, *hu-shih,* with Koryŏ in 1218. Chŏng also notes that prior to that, the majority of trade had been via the sealanes rather than by overland routes or the establishment of markets on the border. See *chip* 集 1, *kwŏn* 卷 15. 9a-b, *Chŏng Tasan chŏnjip* 丁茶山全集, 3 vols., Seoul, 1960.

85. In the sixth month of 1226, the Chin court had sent orders to Ke-pu-ai 葛不靄 the head of their Liaotung Mobile Bureau, and to Koryŏ to subjugate the Chin rebel Wan-chia-nu who had been appointed by the Chin as military commander of the P'o-su-lu administration under Wan-yen A-li-pu-sun 完顏阿里不孫 . Wan-chia-nu subsequently killed A-li-pu-sun (which led to the appointment of Ke-pu-ai in 1217), rebelled against the Chin, crossed the Koryŏ borders and apparently based himself along the upper reaches of the Yalu. See *Chin-shih* 103. 17a-b. He then submitted to the Mongols for, as Ikeuchi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū,* p. 621 has noted, according to *YS* 4, in 1261 he was appointed as daruɣači to govern Koryŏ in the post created by the Yüan that year in Shen-yang-lu (see *YS* 59).

86. This chart is based upon material contained in Kim Sanggi's excellent study, Yŏ-song muyŏk-ko [Résumé of Sung-Koryŏ Trade], 麗宋貿易考 incorporated in *Tongbang munhwa kyoryu-sa non'go* 東方文化交流史論攷 No. 8 of Han'guk munhwa ch'ongsŏ 韓國文化叢書, Seoul, 2nd ed., 1954, pp. 47-88.

87. Merchant vessels were often a source of intelligence and it is possible that some such motive lay behind the visits of the Sung vessels. However, at least one of the vessels arrived (at Cheju Island) after being blown off course by a storm. The *Koryŏ-sa* references to the Sung trade at this time are *KS* 22. 21a, *KS* 23. 36a, *KS* 25. 20a, and *KS* 28. 45a corresponding to the years 1221, 1229, 1260, and 1278 respectively. The most detailed study is that by Kim Sanggi, loc. cit.; a more recent but less thorough work is Mori Katsumi 森克己, Nissō to Kōrai to no shiken bōeki 日宋と高麗との私獻貿易 ["Private Tributary Trade of Japan and Koryŏ with Sung"], *CG* 14 (1956) pp. 545-556. Mori expresses some interesting opinions among which is that Koryŏ and Japan were outlets for surplus goods the Sung Chinese obtained in S.E. Asia and the Arab trade, an opinion he reiterates in his 'Interna-

tional Relations between the 10th and the 16th century and the Development of the Japanese International Consciousness', Acta Asiatica (of the Tōhō Gakkai, Tōkyō) 2 (1961), p. 84 ff.

88. By T'amna 耽羅 is meant the present Cheju Island 濟州島 . At this time Cheju referred only to the present Cheju City. The distinction may be seen clearly in a passage in *YS* 7. 17a when an attack was ordered on "... T'amna as well as Cheju ...", i.e., to take the entire island as well as the city. The island was formerly an independent Kingdom but by this time it had been effectively incorporated into the Koryŏ administrative structure. For a study of the names of the island see Takahashi Tōru 高橋享 , Saishu-tō meiko 濟州島名考 , *CG* 9 (1950), pp. 393-412. For a general history of the island see Kim Ponghyŏn 金奉鉉, *Cheju-do yŏksa-ji* 濟州島歷史誌 , Seoul, 1960. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 38. 1a ff.

89. See Mori Katsumi, Nissō-tsū to Tanra, 日宋通と耽羅 ["Quelpart Island and Marine Transportation between Japan and Sung China"], *CG* 21 & 22 (1961), pp. 522-531; pp. 528-531 pertain to this period. As Mori has pointed out in his '*International Relations* ...', op. cit., p. 85, the reason for the decline in the direct trade between Japan and Koryŏ was that in the 12th century Japanese merchant ships began going directly to Sung China.

90. The raids of the Wakō or Japanese freebooters who had plagued Korea since Silla times, recommenced in 1223 after over a century of silence. During the late 13th and early 14th centuries they were a major disaster and they raided absolutely every major city and town in Koryŏ. Cf. Yi, *Han'guk-sa,* Vol. 2, p. 602 ff. The Wakō raids continued until the Hideyoshi invasions in the late 16th century. (Actually the cessation resulted from Hideyoshi's conquest of Kyūshu, the chief Wakō base, cf. Brown, p. 31). Brown says that "Wakō is most commonly translated as 'Japanese pirates' but that translation leads to considerable misunderstanding for Wakō did not always limit their activities to piracy and not all Wakō were Japanese. They carried on a considerable amount of peaceful trade. ... Contemporary Chinese accounts reveal that many Wakō bands contained as many as twenty, or even thirty per cent Chinese." Cf. D.M. Brown, *Money Economy in Mediaeval Japan,* Far Eastern Association, New Haven, Conn., 1951. The Wakō raids on Koryŏ for the period 1375-1388 are tabulated in Brown, op. cit., pp. 18-19; the total of 378 raids during the period on Koryŏ alone is an indication of the intensity of their sorties. For an account of Wakō activities during the period see Sin

Kisŏk 申碏頊, Koryŏ malgi ŭi tae-Il kwan'gye 高麗末期의對日關係 [Relations with Japan at the End of the Koryŏ Dynasty], *SK* 1 (1957), pp. 3-31; English résumé pp. 168-173. For their disruptive effect on the Koryŏ fishing industry see pp. 226-227 of K. Yoshida 吉田敬市, Chōsen suisangyō no kaihatsu katei 朝鮮水産業の開發過程 ["The Process of the Development of Fisheries in Corea in the Middle of the Li Dynasty"], *Tōhō gakuhō* of Kyōtō Univ., 10 (1951), pp. 223-246. For Korean prisoners taken to Japan and their ultimate repatriation see M. Ishihara 石原道博, Wakō to Chōsenjin furyo no sōkan mondai, 倭寇と朝鮮人俘虜の送還問題 ["Woegu, Japanese Marauders and the Problem of Repatriation of Korean Captives"], *CG* 9 (1955) and 10 (1956), pp. 47-82. A recent study of the Wakō which I have been unable to see is the unpublished M.A. thesis of B. H. Hazard Jr., *Japanese Marauders and Medieval Korea: A Study of the Genesis of the Wakō,* University of California at Berkeley, June 1958; this should be a rather definitive study of the subject. Also see Y. Takegoshi, *The Story of the Wako, Japanese Pioneers in the Southern Regions* (translated by H. Watanabe), Tōkyō, 1940, and Y. S. Kuno, *Japanese Expension on the Asiatic Mainland,* 2 vols., Berkeley, 1937 and 1940; and Vol. 2, pp. 387-393, Tsuda Sōkichi, *Chōsen rekishi chiri.* O. Karow of the Universität Frankfurt is currently preparing a comprehensive study of the Wakō and their activities.

91. Their arrival in Japan is noted in the *Azuma kagami* 吾妻鏡, incorporated in Vol. 4 and Vol. 5 of the 15 volume *Zokukokushi taikei* 續國史大系, published by the Keizai zasshi-sha 經濟雜誌社, Tōkyō, 1902-1904; see Vol. 4, p. 882. For bibliographical information on the *Azuma kagami,* see Vol. I, pp. 31-32 of the *Kokusho kaidai* 國書解題, published in 2 vols. by the Kuni-kan 久合館, Tōkyō, 3rd printing, 1926.
92. The term *hu-shih* 互市 is said by the *Tzu-hai* 字海 to mean reciprocal trade with other nations; the *Hou Han-shu* section pertaining to the Wu Huan 烏桓 people is cited as a precedent. Cf. *Tzu-hai* 辭海, Chung-hua shu-chü yin-hang 中華書局印行 ed., p. 64 A.
93. Sansom, Vol. I, p. 438, notes the requests by the Koreans to the Hōjō Regents to stop the Wakō raids, and says that the Regent Yasutoki put the pirates to death because he wanted to avoid envolvement with Korea over such a trifling affair at this point. See G. Sansom, *A History of Japan to* 1334, 2 vols., London, 1958. My own interpretation is that the Hōjō Regents were anxious for trade with Koryŏ, so much so that they would undertake a punitive expedition to quell the Kyūshu freebooters (if the

prisoners executed were really freebooters). Yet the recommencement of the Wakō raids shows their repressive measures were only partially successful. Which is to say that the Hōjō Regents used the raids of the freebooters over whom they could have had only partial control, as a means to establish trade relations with Koryŏ. The Koryŏ envoy of 1227 was a certain Pak In 朴寅 (*KSC* 15. 41b). According to the *Hyakurensō* 百錬鈔, incorporated in Vol. 14 of the 17 vol. *Kokushi taikei* 國史大系, Tōkyō, 1906 (Vol. 14, p. 216), ninety men of a band operating from Tsushima 對馬國 which had raided Chŏlla Province, had been captured by the Japanese authorities and were beheaded due to the Koryŏ request. Pak remained in Japan about a year, returning to Koryŏ in the eleventh month of 1228, and was richly rewarded by Ch'oe U (*KSC* 15. 43b). For bibliographical information on the *Hyakurensō*, see *Kokusho kaidai*, Vol. 2, 1703A.

94. Kim Hŭije 金希磾 (d. 1227) was of Kunsan Island 郡山島 and followed the merchant vessels which brought him to Kaegyŏng where he left the sea and made his home. He entered the army and gradually rose to the rank of general. He was appointed to handle the frequent Mongol and Eastern Jŭrčen envoys who arrived in the Koryŏ capital due to his acquaintance with poetry and rites. Serving with the resourcefulness and bravery which led to his appointment, he was subsequently made District Commandant, *pundo changgun* 分道將軍, of Ŭiju 義州. After his raid against Yü-ke-hsia in 1226, Hŭije was relieved of his post and made Civil Governor, *sunmunsa* 巡問使, of Chŏlla Province and in this post misfortune overtook him. At a time when Ch'oe U was ill, Hŭije believed that Ch'oe would not recover and was rash enough to forecast the death of Ch'oe to a Buddhist priest, one Yŏnji 演之 who promptly informed Ch'oe U that Kim was plotting against him. When the officers came to Naju 羅州 to arrest him, Kim met them without fear. Then, asking for permission to speak - "I wish only a word and then I will die" - he lamented in verse fashion:

"I beg to say that the clear river has 100 streams of benevolence,
And east, west, north, and south forget themselves.
What shall I do,
Now that I have suddenly encountered Heaven's ire?
Thus, a man of the Imperial Path
Becomes a man of the blue-green sea."

And he threw himself into the sea. At the same time, his son Hong Sa 弘巳 et al., three persons, also perished. The tragedy is summed up by two lines which occur in his biography and which would make a fitting

epitaph: Kim Hŭije was wise and brave and given to books and histories. Those who were envious vilified him and he died.

His biography is contained in *KS* 103. 32a-36a from which the above information has been taken. *BTKP* 57. 546 gives his name as Kim Hide which is unfortunately impossible as there is no character in Sino-Korean with the reading *te - de* 더 . It should be mentioned that modern Korean (initial) *ch-j* ㅈ = middle Korean *t-d* ㄷ but although such a reconstruction is linguistically sound, it is a questionable practice in this case; perhaps the *BTKP* entry is merely a typographical error. I have found the final character of Kim's name in three variants, viz., in *KS* 103. 32a, etc. 磾 Ch. *ti* Kor. *che-je* following Yen Shih-ku's 顏師古 (581-645) well-known explanatory comment on the name of general Chin Jih-ti 金日磾 in *Han-shu* 68. 20b (磾音丁奚反); *KS* 103. 34a gives 禪 *Hwi*; *KS* 103. 35a gives 殫 *T'an*. I have found only one example of each of the latter two variants and so consider them simply scribal errors.

95. Rogers in an illuminating article remarks (p. 56) that although Koryŏ joined with the Jŭrčen against the Ch'i-tan when the latter invaded Koryŏ in 1010-1011, that Koryŏ regarded the Jŭrčen as culturally inferior. He also notes (p. 56 note 27) that with the rise of Chin, Koryŏ urged Sung not to ally with them against Liao but insisted that Chin was the real threat and (p. 57 note 28) that the Chinese accused Koryŏ of desiring to monopolize trade with Jŭrčen as the reason behind the Koryŏ suggestion to support Liao; one issue was Koryŏ's refusal to grant the Jŭrčen permission to cross Koryŏ with horses for Sung. Cf. M.C.Rogers, 'The Regularization of Koryŏ-Chin Relations (1116-1131)', *CAJ* 6 (1961), pp. 51 ff. The Jŭrčen who accompanied the Mongol missions to Koryŏ were as rapacious as their Mongol overlords but were in no position to enforce their desire for goods. One such Jŭrčen who desired rewards, approached the matter in diplomatic fashion and informed General Kim Hŭije 金希磾 of his desires in a line of verse:

"The Lord of the East (Koryŏ) has formerly indicated his warmth."

Hŭije countered with:

"The Emperor of the North (Činggis) has already dispelled the cold."

Although the implications were plain, the envoy persisted:

"What was I thinking of to have composed this line "

Hŭije, feigning ignorance, replied,

"Sir, you were thinking of spring [when] you recited. And, because it is spring, I rhymed it"

(*KS* 103. 32a-36a; *KSC* 15. 28b-29a).

96. *chaech'u* 宰樞 was a term which referred to the civil and military officials of the First and Second grades (cf. *KS* 79. 22) in the Royal Chancellory, *munhasŏng* 門下省 , and the Bureau of Military Affairs, *ch'umirwŏn* 樞密院 (the latter is confirmed by *KS* 26. 36b), that is, Chief Ministers. They were also known as *yangbu* 兩府 or the Two Ministeries.

97. The Koryŏ military forces have been calculated at from forty-two to forty-eight thousand which included twenty-two thousand *posŭng* 保勝 and sixteen thousand *chŏngyong* 精勇 . They provided in brief, the bulk of the Koryŏ army. It is only in recent years that attention has been directed to the study of the Koryŏ military system and the subject is still far from being clarified. Perhaps the clearest outline is that presented by Yi Pyŏngdo, *Han'guk-sa*,Vol. 2, pp. 123 ff, although I note that in the appended Chart 5B contained in Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, different figures are given, viz., *posŭng* 8 601 and *chŏngyong* 19 754 than in the text p. 127, which gives 22 000 and 16 000 respectively. Y. Suematsu 末松保和 Kōrai yonjyūni tofu kōryaku, 高麗四十二都府考略 [A Brief Note on the Forty-two *tobu* of Koryŏ], *CG* 14 (1959), pp. 577-585 suggests that the recruiting of these forces was done through the *tobu*, each being responsible for recruiting 1000 men. The subject is much too involved to pursue at any length here and those interested are referred to Suematsu, loc. cit., who gives most of the pertinent references including the important studies done by Yi Kibaek 李基白 .

98. Ŭiju 宜州 is the present Tŏgwŏn 德源 in S. Hamgyŏng Province; for topographical and historical information see *TYS* 49. 10b ff. There are several mountain passes with defensive structures which are called Ch'ŏl-kwan. The one referred to here was in the northeast at Ch'ŏllyŏng 鐵嶺 on the border of the modern Kangwŏn and S. Hamgyŏng Provinces. See *TYS* 49. 3a ff under the entry Ch'ŏllyŏng.

99. The term *pen* 本 primary pursuits, i.e., agriculture, was already contrasted with *mo* 末 , secondary pursuits, i.e., manufacturing and trade, in the Book of Lord Shang 商君書 , cf. J. J. L. Duyvendak, *The Book of Lord Shang*, London, 1928, p. 193 note 3. For a discussion of the term see E. M. Gale, *Discourses on Salt and Iron*, Leiden, 1931, p. 3 note 2, and N. L. Swann, *Food and Money in Ancient China*, Princeton, 1950, p. 145 note 118.

100. The ancestral tablets of the deceased Koryŏ monarchs which were decorated with white gold and which were kept in the seven chambers of the Koryŏ Great Shrine *taemyo*, were stolen by thieves who broke into the sanctuary in the fifth month of 1230. Cf. *KSC* 16. 2a.

101. Eight Eastern Jürčen envoys are recorded in the Koryŏ capital in 1223, but few details are given (*KS* 22. 23b).

102. For the Mongol campaigns in Central Asia at this time see W. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasions* (H.A.R.Gibbs, translator), 2nd ed., London, 1958, pp. 441 ff.

103. The term *chio-ch'ang* 榷場 as used in the Sung and Chin periods denoted government controlled commerce with other states in North Asia. Cf. Vol. 5, p. 300b-c, *Tōyō rekishi daijiten*. *Chio* in the sense of monopoly occurs as early as Han times; for this usage see N. L. Swann, op. cit., p. 20 and pp. 61-64. *TMP* 164. 2a adds the words "it was not permitted". *Chin-shih* 50. 1a gives the definition: "Monopoly markets are sites where reciprocal trade, *hu-shih*, is conducted with bordering states."

104. The city of Ch'ŏngju 靑州 was on the southeastern border of the land of the Eastern Jürčen and thus in the northwest; for a discussion of its possible location see Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, pp. 368-369; also see Tsuda Sōkichi, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 196-197. The city of Chŏngju 定州 is the modern Chŏngp'yŏng 定平 in S. Hamgyŏng Province; for topographical and historical information see *TYS* 48. 23b ff; it had marked Koryŏ's northeastern boundary since the reign of Koryŏ Yejong (r. 1106-1122). Cf. Tsuda Sōkichi, op. cit., p. 199.

105. Silver had long been in comparatively wide circulation in Koryŏ. Iron coins were first cast in 996, i.e., the 15th year of the reign of Koryŏ Sŏngjong 成宗 (r. 982-997) (cf. *KS* 3. 29b), but not until the reign of Koryŏ Sukchŏng 肅宗 (r. 1096-1105) was a mint established and coins cast on a large scale. The silver *pyŏng* coins were first cast in the 12th month of 1102. They were made of one *kŭn* 斤 (160 grams) of silver and we are told in *KS* 79. 11 that they were "fashioned in the shape of the nation" (??). They were cast to combat counterfeiting of copper coinage and to this end were stamped with a seal. In the colloquial they were referred to as *hwalgu* 闊口 or 'rich ones'. The silver *pyŏng* coins were the last important issue of currency to circulate in Koryŏ until the Yüan paper notes *chih-yüan pao-ch'ao* 至元寶鈔 and *chung-t'ung pao-ch'ao* 中統寶鈔 came into circulation in Koryŏ in the 1260's. The *pyŏng* coins were prohibited in 1331, i.e., the first year of the initial reign of King Ch'unghye 忠惠王 (r. 1331-1332 and 1340-1344) when a new issue of small *pyŏng* coins were issued (cf. *KS* 79. 11). Ming coins also circulated in Koryŏ with the rise of that dynasty. Specimens of Koryŏ coinage, including the *pyŏng* coins, are said to be in the possession of The Bank of Korea and The National Museum in Seoul, and

the Research Department of the Bank of Korea has done a study *Money of Korea* while a lengthy article with illustrations appeared in *TKBRAS*, and an article 'The Coinage of Corea', by C.T.Gardner appeared in *JNBRAS* Vol. XXVII, pp. 71 ff; but these works are unavailable to me and I have never seen them.

106. The Koryŏ *kŭn* 斤 was 157.5 grams although it is usual to calculate it at 160 grams for convenience. This was ascertained through an inscription on a Koryŏ bell which stated that the bell contained 40 *kŭn* of metal; the bell was found to weigh 6 kilos 330 grams. See p. 220, Fujita Ryōsaku 藤田亮策 ["Inscriptions on Koryŏ Bells"], Kōrai kane no meibun 高麗鍾の銘文, *CG* 14 (1959) 187-232.

107. In the Koryŏ period they distinguished the quality and type of gold and silver. Terminologies included gold *kŭm* 金, yellow-gold *hwanggŭm* 黃金 and white-gold *paekkŭm* 白金; silver *ŭn* 銀 and white-silver 白銀.

108. *hwabyŏng* 花瓶～華瓶; literally 'flower-vase', designates the narrow-necked vase called a kuṇḍikā - similar to a kalaśa, an open-necked vase - holding water or any number of other things and associated with Avalokiteśvara who is often depicted holding one in the left hand. See S. Mochizuki 望月信亨, *Bukkyō daijiten* 佛教大辭典, 7 vols., Tōkyō, 1931, entry 4356B-C. Kalaśa are not common in Korean museums today but I have seen many excellent kuṇḍikā, some of them listed as National Treasures.

109. The northwest border city of Sakchu 朔州 is in the modern N. P'yŏngan province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 53. 28 ff.

110. The northeast border city of Hamju 咸州 is the present Hamhŭng 咸興 in S. Hamgyŏng Probince. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 48. 5a ff.

111. *yangbu* 兩府; see note 96 above.

112. This is an interesting illustration of the remark of the philosopher George Santayana (b. 1863) to the effect that people who do not learn from the past will be forever condemned to repeat it. Koryŏ had been plagued by mounted raiders for centuries, each exhibiting what Wittfogel (p. 669) describes as "machine-like organization plus high mobility", cf. K.A.Wittfogel and Chia-sheng Feng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao* (907-1125), Appendix V, 'Qarā-Khitāy', undated reprint from the Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 36, pp. 619-674.

113. This story of discarding the gifts parallels that of Chu-ku-yü's visit the

previous spring. Cf. *KS* 22. 25a. Yet according to *YKC* he *was* sent twice and thus no duplication of the entries is involved.

114. Also see *YS* 208. 2b. Koryŏ denied all implication and blamed P'u-hsien Wan-nu and Yü-ke-hsia. Cf. *KS* 23. 20a-21a.

115. The *KS* is silent on when the demand was made and we learn of the matter via later Yüan edicts and subsequent Koryŏ answers regarding Koryŏ's failure to comply (*YKC* 3b-5a; *TYSC* 28; both incorporated in *KS* 23). The Mongols did order Koryŏ to subjugate the J̌ürčen in 1221 (*YKC* 2b) but this antedates Wan-nu's break with the Mongols and refers to aid requested against Chin forces in Manchuria. One Mongol request to attack Wan-nu was made in 1232, cf. *YKC* 8b.

116. The Eastern J̌ürčen raids on Koryŏ's Northeast Frontier-District had continued as noted in the text. Koryŏ had failed completely to cope with them and the Koryŏ forces had suffered a severe defeat at Ŭiju 宜州 in the northeast in 1227 (*KS* 102. 7a-9a). At any rate, they did not field an army against P'u-hsien Wan-nu.

Chapter II

THE INVASIONS OF SARTAQ

On the 29th day of the eighth month (August 26) of 1231, a large Mongol force under the command of Marshal Sartaq [1] (d. 1232) crossed the Yalu and surrounded Hamsin-chin 咸新鎮 = Ŭiju 義州 (*KS* 23. 1a) which quickly surrendered under the Mongol threats to slaughter the inhabitants if they did not speedily submit (*KS* 130. 9b; *KSC* 16. 4a). Instrumental in the surrender of Hamsin-chin was Defense General, *pangsu changgun* 防守將軍, Cho Sukch'ang [2], the son of Cho Ch'ung, who reminded the Mongols of the previous pledge of his father. Sukch'ang with a certain Chŏn Kan 全僩 (d. 1231. 10), the Deputy Commissioner, *pusa*, of Hamsin-chin, opened the granary for the Mongol troops and then wrote letters instructing Sakchu and Sŏndŏk-chin [3] 宣德鎮 to submit to the Mongols (*KS* 130. 9b; *KSC* 16. 4a-b). Sukch'ang subsequently served Sartaq and brought his demands to the Koryŏ authorities (*KSC* 16. 10a).

The Mongol forces seem to have divided. One group apparently going north to attack Sakchu and the other following the course of the Yalu downstream [4]. When the first detachments of this second force arrived at Chŏngju [5], the District Commandant [6] Kim Kyŏngson [7] led a twelve-man dare-death squad out to meet them. But as fresh Mongol troops continued to pour in, the people abandoned the city and scattered to hide. When Kyŏngson and his men returned, they found the city completely deserted. Taking his men into the mountains, Kyŏngson struck out for the centrally located stronghold of Kuju where forces from Sakchu, Wiju, and T'aeju [8] were later to rendezvous. Travelling at night and eating without a fire, they managed to reach Kuju in seven days (*KS* 130. 23a-26a).

From Chŏngju the Mongol forces appear to have proceeded to Inju where the commander, *toryŏng* [9], Hong Pogwŏn [10], submitted the area (*KS* 130. 3b; *YKC* 3a) with 1 500 registered households (*YKC* 5a). Pogwŏn, one of the more infamous of Koryŏ's many deserters, joined the Mongol forces and acted as a guide for subsequent Mongol attacks (*KS* 130. 4a-b). Arriving at Ch'ŏlchu [11], the Mongols took Mun Tae [12] a military officer of the rank of Colonel, *nanjang*, who was captured in Sŏch'ang-hyŏn 瑞昌縣, and led him beneath

the city walls where he was instructed to call out to the people that genuine Mongol forces [13] had arrived and that the city should speedily submit. Mun defiantly shouted: "[They are] not really Mongol troops." The Mongols were going to behead him but as the city did not submit, they tried again, and once more Mun shouted that they were not really Mongol troops, for which he was beheaded. The Mongols quickly launched an attack on the city but it was to prove an empty victory. As the provisions ran out and the city appeared doomed, the Administrator [14], a certain Yi Huijŏk 李希績, assembled all the women and children of the city, put them in the granary and then set fire to it. Then he led the male adults in cutting their own throats (*KS* 23. 1a; *KS* 121. 11b-12a; *KS* 130. 10a; *KSC* 16. 4b).

Appraised of events, the ministers of the second rank and above, *chaesang* [15], met at Ch'oe U's residence four days later to call up Koryŏ's Three Armies [16] and to make levies on the provinces for troops (*KS* 23. 1a-b), although they were uncertain whether or not the invaders were really Mongol soldiers or simply Jürčen forces disguised in Mongolian clothing.

One Mongol force remained in the northwest, making an initial and unsuccessful attempt to take the walled-city of Kuju (*KS* 23. 1b) and then turning on cities they had by-passed like Yongju which fell on the 20th day (October 17) and Sonju and Kwakchu [17] both of which fell on (October 29) the 29th day of the ninth month (*KS* 23. 1b; *KSC* 16. 6b; *KSC* 16. 7a). A second force advanced rapidly down the peninsula attacking, then bypassing Chaju [18] (*KS* 103. 30a) and the Western Capital (*KS* 23. 1b) after encountering stiff resistance. Continuing southward they easily overran Hwangju 黃州 and Pongju [19] whose inhabitants fled to coastal islands (*KS* 23. 1b). At Pongju they had arrived at the first of the great natural barriers, namely, Chabi Pass 慈悲嶺 east of Pongju, the gateway to central Korea, to Kaegyŏng and the valley of the Han.

In calling out her own forces, Koryŏ had received some unexpected assistance from Yü-ke-hsia, whom they referred to as the 'petty brigand of Masan 馬山 ' (cf. *KS* 103. 32a-36a; Masan was in the Yalu River area, near Ŭiju). He offered Ch'oe U five thousand picked soldiers (*KS* 129. 37a; *KSC* 16. 6a-b) and these were incorporated into the Koryŏ army (cf. *KS* 103. 36a-b). Encouraged, Ch'oe U even sent men to a bandit camp at Mt. Kwanak 冠岳山 near Kwangju 廣州 for men. Five bandit leaders came forward with fifty picked men who were also put into the Koryŏ army (*KS* 129. 37a-b). In brief, the forces being sent against the Mongols included Chin and Koryŏ soldiers; P'u-hsien Wan-nu's forces were also fighting the Mongols but I have found no evidence that he lent a hand at this time.

Koryŏ's Three Armies, under the command of General Yi Chasŏng [20],

departed the Koryŏ capital on the ninth day of the ninth month (October 6, 1231) (*KS* 23. 1b). Their progress was slow and after twelve days, they had arrived at the Tongsŏn poststation [21] (*KS* 103. 36a-39a). At sunset a dispatch bearer arrived and reported no signs of the enemy and so Chasŏng allowed his men to relax. They removed their saddles and were resting when some men who had climbed a height shouted: "The Mongols are arriving!" A force of some eight thousand Mongol soldiers suddenly appeared. Chasŏng with a certain General No T'an 盧坦 and a few others fought valiantly to save the situation. Chasŏng was hit by an arrow and General No was plucked from his horse by a long lance in the fighting and both barely managed to escape with the aid of some of their men. Slowly the Koryŏ forces assembled and began to repulse the surprise attack. When the Mongols launched an attack on the right flank, they met stubborn resistance. Two crack archers of the petty brigand of Masan (= Yü-ke-hsia) proved their worth — at each pull of the bowstring a Mongol soldier fell. The Mongol forces then withdrew (*KS* 103. 36a-39a).

As the Koryŏ army continued northward toward the walled-city of Anbuk 安北 where the Northern Defense Command was headquartered, the Mongol advance force sent two envoys with a dispatch to P'yŏngju 平州 (*KS* 23. 1b-2a), a city about equi-distant from the Koryŏ capital of Kaegyŏng and Chabi Pass. The envoys were imprisoned at P'yŏngju and then forwarded to the capital. One was a Mongol and the other a Jürčen, and from this, the Koryŏ records inform us, "our nation first believed that they were Mongol forces" (*KS* 23. 2a).

The missive delivered by the envoys informed the Koryŏ authorities: "Of those who submitted when we arrived at Hamsin-chin, none were slain. If your nation does not submit we will, in the end, not go back. If you submit then we will turn and go toward the Eastern Jürčen" (*KS* 23. 1b-2a; *KSC* 16. 7a).

In the northwest, a second assault with catapults was made on Kuju and although, we are told, the city walls were smashed in over two hundred places, they were speedily repaired and the attack did not carry (*KS* 23. 2a). A week later as a third assault on Kuju was in progress, the Koryŏ army arrived to camp at the walled-city of Anbuk where a pitched battle ended in the complete defeat of the Koryŏ forces (*KS* 23. 2a-b; *KSC* 16. 7b-8a) who then sent Min Hŭi [22], an officer of the Regional Censorate, *pundae ŏsa* [23], of the North(western) Frontier-District to the Mongol camp (cf. *KS* 23. 3a; *KSC* 16. 8a). Sartaq received him, seated in a felt tent decorated with multi-colored silk damask and embroidery and with women lined up on each side and told him the Mongol attitude precisely and bluntly: "If your country is going to

fight defensively, then defend yourselves; if you are going to submit, then submit; if you are going to face us in battle, then face us in battle. Let it be decided quickly!" (*KS* 23. 3a; also see *YKC* 3a. 7).

Min returned to the Koryŏ capital on the fifth day of the eleventh month (Nov. 30) with Sartaq's message. The Koryŏ answer was to increase their forces (*KS* 23. 3a). With this, the Mongols opened their second drive south by taking the city of P'yŏngju whose inhabitants were slaughtered and the city razed in revenge for imprisoning the Mongol envoys sent previously (*KS* 23. 3a-b). Then they advanced on Kaegyŏng. On the 29th day of the eleventh month (Dec. 23) the capital feared the worst. Marshal P'u-t'ao 蒲桃 was encamped at Kŭmgyo 金郊, Marshal Ti-chü 迪巨 had camped at Osan 吾山 and Marshal Tanqut 唐古 had camped at P'ori [24] 蒲里, while the Mongol advance force had reached the Yesŏng River 禮成江 a few miles from the capital, burning dwellings and slaughtering the people in the surrounding country-side (*KS* 23. 3a-b; *YKC* 3a). Ch'oe U immediately gathered his house troops for his own protection, leaving the defense of the capital to the old and weak, it is said (*KS* 129. 37a-b; *KSC* 16. 9a). But the onslaught of the preceding months had been too much. Now, in the last of the eleventh month (late December) of 1231, the capital itself was surrounded and defeat was too near. A respite was desperately needed and so a second mission led by Min Hŭi and Senior Palace Attendant [25], Song Kukch'ŏm [26] were sent to sue for peace and console the Mongol troops with gifts (*KS* 23. 3b-4a; *KS* 129. 37a-b; *KSC* 16. 9a-b). Sartaq, who was then garrisoned at the Northern Defense Command's headquarters in the walled-city of Anbuk, also sent messengers to the Koryŏ capital with a dispatch which upbraided Koryŏ and reminded them that following the defeat of the Black Ch'i-tan [27] who invaded Koryŏ in the Year of the Rat (1216), Koryŏ had submitted. The basic charges set forth were the killing of the Mongol envoy Chu-ku-yü in 1225 [28] and the treatment meted out to the envoy A-t'u 阿土 who had been imprisoned at P'yŏngju. Submission was demanded under threat of seizing the capital and with a promise to spare those who submitted and slay those who did not (*KS* 23. 3b-5b; *TYSC* 28. 4a-5a).

As an opening move, Koryŏ sent gifts to the three Mongol Marshals camped near the capital (*KS* 23. 5b). Sartaq had sent Hong Pogwŏn to the Koryŏ capital with instructions for the King (*YKC* 3a) and Koryŏ, in turn, sent Chŏng [29], the Duke [30] of Hoean, to effect the peace and convey gitfs to Sartaq (*KS* 23. 5b; *YKC* 3a). This was to be the official submission and marked the *de jure* surrender of Koryŏ's Three Armies as well (cf. *KS* 103. 30a-b).

The opening of negotiations in the last month of 1231 (Dec. 25, 1231 - Jan. 23, 1232), however, did not mean an end to the fighting. The Mongol forces again turned to cities they had by-passed and successively attacked

Kwangju, Ch'ungju 忠州, and Ch'ŏngju 淸州 (*KS* 23. 5b; *KSC* 16. 9b). In the northwest, Chŏn Kan, the Deputy Commissioner of Hamsin-chin, had hatched a plot to kill a certain Hsiao-wei-sheng 小尾生 and other Mongols who had been left in charge of the city, and then to flee in boats to the capital. The plan miscarried and Hsiao-wei-sheng fled, but the other Mongols in the city were killed. Then Chŏn led the functionaries and people of the city to Sin Island 薪島 (*KSC* 16. 7a-b). Although Chaju also held out, the fiercest fighting took place at Ch'ungju in the south (*KS* 103. 36a-39a) and Kuju in the northwest. The story of the defense of Kuju, which has become a classic in Korean histories, is told in the biographies of Pak Sŏ [31] and Kim Kyŏngson.

The city of Kuju was under the command of Pak Sŏ, the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwest Frontier-District. Forces from many of the surrounding cities had fled to Kuju to make a stand, possibly remembering the city as the location where a decisive victory had been won over the Liao armies in 1018 [32]. These forces were quickly employed in the defense of the city. A certain Kim Chungon 金仲溫, the District Commandant [33] of Sakchu, who had abandoned his city and gone to Kuju, was given the task of defending the eastern and western walls of the city and Kim Kyŏngson was to defend the southern section. The Defense Command patrol, *pyŏlch'o* [34], Wiju patrol, and the T'aeju patrol provided an additional 250 men who were divided to help defend three sides of the city [35].

"[When] the Mongols arrived [with a] large [force] at the south gate of the city, Kyŏngson leading [his] twelve soldiers as well as the patrols of all the cities, ordered the soldiers as they were going out of the city gate: 'Do not think of your own lives; if fate decrees, die, but do not fall back'. The patrols all threw themselves on the ground and [would] not obey. Kyŏngson ordered them all to go back into the city and [then] with only his twelve soldiers he advanced into battle. [Kim] himself shot an arrow and knocked down one mounted soldier [who rode] with a black flag in the vanguard [of the Mongol force]. Consequently, [Kim's] twelve soldiers [were encouraged] and fought strenuously. Hit by an arrow, Kyŏngson's arm was dripping wet with blood. Still he pressed his men forward without stopping. [Battle] was joined four or five times and the Mongols [finally] withdrew. Kyŏngson then formed his lines and called his small group to return [36]. [Pak] Sŏ met him and saluted, crying. Kyŏngson also saluted with tears in his eyes. From this [episode], [Pak] Sŏ commissioned Kyŏngson [to handle] matters [pertaining to] the defense of the city" (*KS* 103. 26a-29a).

"The Mongol forces surrounded the city attacking the west, south, and north gates of the city repeatedly and heavily. The [defending] Army of the

Center suddenly went out and attacked them. The Mongol soldiers captured Pak Munch'ang 朴文昌 , the Deputy Commissioner, *pusa*, of Wiju, and ordered him to go [back] into the city and instruct them to submit. [Pak] Sŏ beheaded him. [Then] the Mongols selected three hundred of their finest cavalry and attacked the north gate. [Pak] Sŏ [counter]attacked and drove them off. The Mongols besieged the city, attacking day and night. They loaded carts with grass and wood to turn over [by the gates] as they advanced to the attack. Kyŏngson used catapults [hurling] molten iron to get rid of them. The Mongols [next] constructed towers as well as a great platform which they wrapped with cowhide and hid soldiers inside to undermine the base of the city walls by excavating a tunnel. [Pak] Sŏ bored [thru] the city wall and poured molten iron [on them] to set fire to the tower. The ground also collapsed, crushing more than thirty of the Mongol soldiers to death. [Pak] Sŏ also burnt useless [bundles] of thatch in order to set fire to the wooden platform. The Mongols were bewildered and scattered" (*KS* 103. 23a-26a).

"The Mongols then attacked the south wall of the city with fifteen large catapults very quickly. [Pak] Sŏ also constructed platforms on the city walls and mounting catapults [on them] he hurled stones and drove [the attackers] off. The Mongols soaked faggots with human fat [37], accumulated many of them, [then] attacked the city with fire. [When Pak] Sŏ [tried] to put them out with water, the fire burned more [fiercely]. He had [his men] mix mud of earth and water and throwing it [on the fires] extinguished them. The Mongols also set fire to carts loaded with grass and attacked the towers over the city gates. [Pak] Sŏ had stored water on top of the towers beforehand and [they] poured it on [the fire-carts]. The flames were then extinguished" (*KS* 103. 23a-26a).

"[After] firing accumulated brush [near the wooden gates], the Mongol troops retired, [then] returned to the assault. Kyŏngson leaned against a 'light chair', *husang* 胡床 (lit. 'foreign bed'), to direct the fighting. A [Mongol] catapult [slung a missile] across [the wall] and it hit directly behind Kyŏngson, smashing and breaking the heads and bodies of the guards, *ajol* 衙卒 . Everyone begged [Kyŏngson] to move the chair. Kyŏngson told them: 'That would not be proper. If I am moving, then the hearts of all the soldiers will move [also]'. The expression on his face was quite normal and, in the end, he did not move" (*KS* 103. 26a-29a).

"For thirty days [38] the Mongols besieged the city, attacking it hundreds of times. [But] whenever [they attacked], [Pak] Sŏ would adapt himself to the occasion in order to defend the city. Unsuccessful, the Mongols withdrew [but] bringing soldiers from the cities of the Northern Frontier-District, they returned to the assault. They set up thirty catapults in a line and attacked,

breaching the wall in fifty places. [Pak] Sŏ, as soon as [the walls] were smashed, chained iron bands [across the holes] and repaired them. The Mongols did not dare renew the assault. [Pak] Sŏ came out to do battle and won a great victory.

"[In the twelfth month], the Mongols attacked with large catapults again. [Pak] Sŏ also fired catapults, flinging rocks and killing them in endless numbers. The Mongols withdrew and camped in a wooden pallisade in order to defend [themselves]. Sartaq sent the Koryŏ interpreter Chi Ŭisim 池義深 and the Recorder of the Academy, *hangnok* [39], Kang Uch'ang 姜遇昌 with a dispatch from Chŏng, the Duke of Hoean, to instruct them to submit. [Pak] persevered and did not submit.

"The Mongols then built scaling ladders, *unje* 雲梯, and assaulted the city. [Pak] Sŏ met and attacked them with 'large implements for slashing', *tae up'o* [40] 大于浦. There were none which were not smashed and the ladders could not approach. During the siege, an old Mongol general of seventy years of age toured beneath the city walls to look over the city ramparts and equipment. He sighed and said: 'I have followed the army since I bound my hair [into plaits as a youth] and so I am accustomed to seeing the cities of the earth attacked and fought over. Still I have never seen [a city] undergo an attack like this which did not, in the end, submit' " (*KS* 103. 23a-26a).

"The Mongols said: 'This city has withstood many with few. Heaven protects it, not the strength of men.' Then they lifted the siege and left" (*KS* 103. 26a-29a).

Although Koryŏ had formally submitted, the garrisons at Kuju and Chaju still held out. Song Kukch'ŏm had been sent to instruct the garrison at Chaju, which was commanded by the Deputy Commissioner, *pusa,* of Chaju, Ch'oe Ch'unmyŏng [41], to surrender but Ch'unmyŏng simply closed the city gates in his face. Kukch'ŏm could only curse him and return to the capital. In 1232, following the submission of Koryŏ's Three Armies, Sartaq brought this to the attention of Chŏng, the Duke of Hoean, who sent General Tae Chipsŏng [42] with a Mongol official to bring about the submission of the city. Arriving beneath the city-walls they informed them that "The Court as well as the Three Armies have already submitted. You should speedily come out and submit." Ch'unmyŏng, sitting in the gate-tower, had men answer them saying, "[Since] an edict from the Court has not yet arrived, how can we trust you and submit?" Chipsŏng replied, "The Duke of Hoean has already come to request that you submit. Since the Three Armies have also submitted is this [order] unbelievable?"

Ch'unmyŏng's men answered, "The people in the city do not [even] know that a Duke of Hoean exists!"

The Mongol functionary then charged Chipsŏng to enter the city but they were driven off by a hail of arrows (*KS* 103. 30a-32a).

At about this same time, Min Hŭi was sent with some Mongol functionaries to bring about the submission of Kuju. This group also stopped outside the city and informed the defenders that Koryŏ's Three Armies had already submitted and that the Duke of Hoean had been sent to negotiate peace. Despite endless argument, Pak Sŏ, the commander of Kuju, refused to submit. Min Hŭi became so exasperated that he wanted to draw his sword and kill Pak himself. Finally, after he was convinced that further resistance would be going contrary to the King's commands, Pak gave in and the city submitted (*KS* 103. 23a-26a).

While Kuju and Chaju finally submitted following the surrender of the Koryŏ authorities, their defenders, Pak Sŏ and Ch'oe Ch'unmyŏng were almost executed for their stubborn resistance as both the Court and Ch'oe U feared the Mongols' anger. Yet they were spared by the Mongols who admired their courage and subsequently, they were lauded by both Mongols and the Koryŏ authorities. The Mongol attitude was stated eloquently by a Mongol functionary at the Western Capital where Ch'oe Ch'unmyŏng was being held for execution. "Although he went contrary to our orders," the Mongol functionary said, "he is a loyal subject of yours. We are not going to kill him now that you have already pledged peace with us. Would it be proper [for you] to kill the loyal subjects of all [your] cities?" (*KS* 103. 30a-32a; also see *KS* 103. 23a-26a).

Despite the isolated fighting, Koryŏ had in fact submitted. Sartaq had sent Koryŏ General Cho Sukch'ang with nine Mongols to transmit a missive to Koryŏ which demanded enormous amounts of goods. Alluding to goods previously sent by Ch'oe U whom they referred to as *yŏnggong* 令公 or Great Minister [43], they demanded good gold and silver, pearls, and otter skins. Then, telling Koryŏ that their army was many days from home, they demanded 10 000 small horses, 10 000 large horses, 10 000 bolts (*p'il*) of purple gauze, 20 000 otter skins and clothing for an army of one million men! As hostages, they demanded the King's sons and grandsons, his daughters, and the offspring of the provincial lords; five hundred boys and five hundred girls were demanded for presentation to the emperor. In addition, each high official was to present a daughter, a thousand girls and a thousand boys were demanded. The Koryŏ Crown Prince was ordered to lead this retinue (*KS* 23. 5b-7b).

Koryŏ then presented an enormous amount of tribute, including gifts to the Mongol field commanders, but had no intention of sending hostages at this point (*KS* 23. 7b-8a). Cho Sukch'ang, the Koryŏ rebel, was appointed Grand General to head the tribute mission and given a petition to present to the Em-

Mongol Invasions of Koryŏ
1231 - 1232
TUMAN RIVER
P'U-HSIEN
WAN-NU
YALU
RIVER
JÜRČEN
ÜIJU
SAKCHU
CHONGJU
INJU
KUJU
YONGJU
CHŎLCHU
ANBUK
ÜNJU
HWAJU
AREA UNDER
MONGOL CONTROL
1231-12
CHANJU
WESTERN CAPITAL
HWANGJU
PONGJU
CHAJU PASS
PYŎNGJU
CH'ŎLKWAN
KAEGYŎNG
HANYANG
KANGHWA IS.
ULLŬNG IS.
WŎNJU
CH'UNGJU
SAATAR KIŎED HERE
CHŎNJU
EASTERN CAPITAL
KYŎNJU
NAJU
TSUSHIMA
JAPAN
CHEJU
T'AMNA

peror, in which Koryŏ disclaimed responsibility for the slaying of the Mongol envoy in 1225, blaming it instead on the Chin commanders in Liaotung whom they said had often dressed their men in Mongolian clothing and raided the Koryŏ border towns. The manacling of the Mongol envoy A-t'u at P'yŏngju was explained as resulting from ignorance; they could not believe that Mongol forces would attack them since the two nations had been on good terms (*KS* 23. 8b-9b).

While the Duke of Hoean continued his diplomatic manoeuvers and Mongol delegations continued to appear at the capital (*KS* 23. 9b-10a; *YKC* 3b), the Koryŏ ministers were meeting under Ch'oe U's direction and the first mention of moving the capital was made (*KS* 23. 10b). At this point, the course to take was still undecided and negotiations continued (*KS* 23. 11a-b).

During the previous year (i.e., 1231), Ch'oe U had been advised to transfer the capital to Kanghwa Island by a certain Yun In 尹鱗 , the Deputy Commissioner of Sŭngch'ŏn-pu 升天府 , who had, with a colleague, secretly sent his family and servants to the island when the Mongol forces threatened the capital. Ch'oe sent men to inspect the island but enroute they were seized by the Mongols (*KS* 129. 37a-b). Ch'oe however retained the idea; he even considered the feasibility of going to distant Ullŭng Island in the Sea of Japan (*KS* 129. 40a). In the fifth month (May 22 - June 19) of 1232, a meeting of the chief ministers, *chaech'u,* to discuss resistance to the Mongols was held [44] and shortly thereafter, Ch'oe assembled all the officials of the fourth rank and above (*KS* 23. 13b) at his residence to suggest that the capital be transferred to Kanghwa (*KS* 129. 37a-b). While many of the officials favored defending the capital (*KS* 23. 13b), suggesting that refuge on Kanghwa was not feasible as a long-range plan (*KS* 102. 6a ff), "... yet they were afraid of [Ch'oe] U and no one dared utter a word [in opposition] ... Commander, *chiyu* [45], Kim Sech'ung [46] of the Night Patrol, *ya pyŏlch'o* [47], pushed open the door [to the council meeting] and entering, told U sharply, 'The successive generations have held Songgyŏng 松京 (i.e., Kaegyŏng) since T'aejo [48] for all of two hundred years (sic). The walls of the city are strong and the soldiers' provisions are sufficient. Assuredly we should combine [all] our forces and defend it in order to protect the fatherland, *sajik* 社稷 (lit. altars of the earth and grain). How can we abandon the capital?' " (*KSC* 16. 15a-b; also see *KS* 129. 37a-b; *TT* 31. 48. 15-49. 3) Ch'oe then asked Kim for his plans to defend the city but Kim, who had apparently spoken in a moment of rash bravado, was unable to reply. General Tae Chipsŏng, Ch'oe U's father-in-law [49], told Ch'oe that Kim's advice was the prattle of a young girl and he wanted to take Kim out and behead him. Others at the council meeting supported the idea and Kim was executed (*KSC* 16. 15b-16a).

Supported by General Tae, who also favored moving the capital (*KSC* 16. 15a), Ch'oe U was able to push through his plan to transfer the capital to Kanghwa Island (*KS* 23. 13b-14a) [50]. Ch'oe U then advised the King to leave the palace quickly and go to Kanghwa. Hundreds of carts and wagons were seized to transport Ch'oe's household goods to Kanghwa. Notices were posted in the city setting the date for the people of the city's five wards to move to the island and threatening those who did not meet the schedule with judgement by military law [51]. Commissioners were then sent to each province to evacuate the people to mountain citadels of refuge, *sansŏng,* and coastal islands. An army of two thousand men, *iryŏnggun,* was levied to begin construction of palaces on Kanghwa (*KSC* 16. 16a) [52].

In the spring of 1232, the bulk of the Mongol troops had departed (*KS* 23. 9b) [53]. Martial law was lifted in the Koryŏ capital (*KS* 23. 10a) and, excluding a quickly quelled slave rebellion at Ch'ungju [54] (*KSC* 16. 11a-12a), a measure of peace was seen on the peninsula.

While by the third month (March 24 - April 21) of 1232, the Mongol army had withdrawn – a small detachment returned to get provisions from the Sŏnju granary (*KS* 23. 11b-12a) – the Mongols did not simply abandon their gains but endeavored to put them on a more permanent basis by establishing daruγači or residence commissioners, chiefly in the northwest (*YKC* 3a; *YS* 154. 1b).

Care was maintained during this time to remain on good terms with the Mongols while meeting as few of their demands as possible. Cho Sukch'ang had been sent in the fourth month (April 22 - May 19) of 1232 with a petition pledging Koryŏ's vassalage and with a variety of gifts for the throne, for Sartaq and for the sixteen functionaries under Sartaq's command. The petition stated, in brief, that they were able to present only 977 otter skins (of the 1 000 demanded), since they had previously had no experienced trappers. Unfortunately, the petition declared, hostages could not, for a variety of reasons, be produced (*KS* 23. 12a-13b; *TYSC* 26. 7b-9a).

Although Koryŏ was familiar enough with the ancient system of tribute and hostages, the Mongols were a new experience and their demands were of a different character then Koryŏ had previously encountered. For the Mongols regarded everything and everyone in a conquered nation as absolute chattels, a concept which differs considerably from the Chinese-oriented system with which Koryŏ was accustomed. The demands seemed endless: goods, hostages, 'transplanting' of farming families, armies of men, ships, etc. (*KS* 23; *TYSC* 28) [55]. The hand-writing was on the wall, but preparations had been made.

On the first day of the seventh month (July 20) of 1232, Kim In'gyŏng was appointed to garrison and defend Kaegyŏng with 8 000 soldiers, *p'allyŏng,* un-

der his command (*KS* 23. 14a-b). The transfer was then implemented; the King proceeded to Sŭngch'ŏn-pu, a major departure point on the mainland opposite Kanghwa, and then to the island where he was lodged in a hostel, *kaekkwan* 客館, mute testimony to the abruptness with which the decision to move was implemented [56].

With the move to Kanghwa, an attempt to eliminate Mongol control on the mainland was made; the daruγači or resident commissioners set up by the Mongols were killed (*YKC* 3b; *YS* 208. 3a; *KS* 23. 14b-15a).

A particular pertinent matter at this point is the question of the establishment of Mongol control on the peninsula and the attempts by Koryŏ to eliminate this control. The *Yüan Kao-li chi-shih* remarks briefly: "In the third year of T'ai-tsung 太宗 (= 1231) we conquered them and Wang Ch'ŏl (= Kojong) again submitted. Seventy-two daruγači or resident commissioners were placed in the *hyŏn* of the capital prefecture to supervise them and the army was withdrawn. The following year they killed all [of the officials] of the offices which the Court had established and rebelled [seeking] refuge on islands in the sea" (*YKC* 1a; see also *YS* 154. 1b; *YS* 59. 5a). In another entry dated in late 1231, we read that following Sartaq's first attack and the Koryŏ submission, "subsequently, they established seventy-two daruγači or resident commissioners in the capital as well as all the *chu* and *hyŏn* administrations to remain and govern [them], then they withdrew the army" (*YKC* 3a). A further entry reads, "In the sixth month (June 20 - July 19, 1232), the nation (= Koryŏ) rebelled, killed the daruγači of each *hyŏn* and led the people of the capital as well as all the *chu* and *hyŏn* administrations and fled to the islands of the sea to offer resistance" (*YKC* 3b; also see *YS* 2. 3a; *YS* 154. 1b).

There has been some hesitation in accepting this account due to a brief commentary written by the Koryŏ historian-statesman-poet Yi Chehyŏn 李齊賢 (1288-1367) [57] on the *Kao-li* section of the 880 + 14 *chüan Ching-shih ta-tien* 經世大典 of 1329-31. Now, according to the notice by Wang Kuo-wei 王國維 (1877-1927), the *Yüan Kao-li chi-shih* was extracted by Wen Yen-shih 文廷式 (1856-1904) [58] from the *Yung-lo ta-tien* 永樂大典 of 1403-07, into which it had been copied from the *Ching-shih ta-tien*. It should also be mentioned that, as has already been pointed out by H. Franke [59], the *Kao-li ch'uan* 高麗傳 of the *Yüan shih* (*YS* 208) is little more than a summary of the material contained in the *Yüan Kao-li chi-shih*, which is to say that both were based on the *Kao-li* section of the *Ching-shih ta-tien*. Thus, Yi Chehyŏn's critical remarks apply equally to all pertinent portions of the three works. The major points Yi makes may be briefly set forth as follows: Were these daruγači established in their posts by order of the Yüan Court or were they established by the military commanders? The

area concerned, viz., the capital prefecture, is small for such a large number of officials. And, as the daruγači are not unimportant persons why were their names not recorded? Further, no details are given of the establishment of these posts nor of the subsequent slaying of the officials. The national history of Koryŏ does not mention them and so, Yi informs us, he asked surviving elders about the matter but there were none who knew. Yi's belief is that it was a false accusation used as a pretext for an invasion, i.e., they were not established and they were, consequently, not slain (*IC sŏlchŏn* 說前 1. 6b-8a) [60].

Unfortunately, the evidence, drawn from the *Koryŏ-sa* itself goes against Yi Chehyŏn's views. The Korean historian Yi Pyŏngdo has drawn the conclusion that "... while there is no doubt that daruγači were stationed in the Western Capital and its subordinate districts, it is unclear whether the number was seventy-two" [61]. It is known that in the fifth month (May 22 - June 19) of 1232, four daruγači were stationed in the Koryŏ northwest (*KS* 23. 13b-14a). And, at the time of the transfer of the capital, the Koryŏ authorities sent a man to seize the weapons of the daruγači in the various cities of the Northern Frontier-District (*KS* 23. 14b). It is also known that there was a daruγači stationed in the Western Capital in the eighth month (August 18 - Sept. 15) of 1232, and that an attempt was made to kill him (*KS* 23. 14b-15a). Further, a Koryŏ missive dated the second month (Feb. 23 - March 23) of 1232 refers to daruγači being stationed 留置 (= 留屯) in the border cities and in the capital where they were being well treated (*TYSC* 28. 5b-6a). Again, another Koryŏ missive answers the Mongol charge of killing and detaining them in the ninth month (Sept. 16 - Oct. 15) of 1232 (*TYSC* 28. 10b-12a). Further, in the second month (Feb. 23 - March 23) of 1232, the Mongol envoy Tu-tan 都旦 , a Ch'i-tan who had been with the Mongol forces at Kangdong in 1218, himself told the Koryŏ monarch that he was in complete charge of Koryŏ's affairs (*KS* 23. 10b). It is also known that in the last months of 1231, the people of the following cities fled to islands to escape the Mongol attack in the northwest: Sŏnju (*TYS* 53. 34a-b), Ch'angju (*TYS* 53. 25a), Unju (*TYS* 54. 8a), Pakchu (*TYS* 54. 12a), Kaju (*TYS* 52. 32b), Kwakchu (*TYS* 53. 37b), Maengju (*TYS* 55. 9b), T'aeju (*TYS* 54. 14a), and Ŭnju (*TYS* 55. 13b), all cities located in the northwest. There were, further, at least two Koreans of importance serving the Mongols, namely, Hong Pogwŏn (who submitted the city of Inju) and Cho Sukch'ang (who submitted the city of Hamsin-chin = Ŭiju) as has already been pointed out. The evidence from the Koryŏ records alone is overwhelming and we must reject Yi Chehyŏn's view.

There is one other consideration which seems to support the *Ching-shih ta-tien* account. During the late Koryŏ period, as a result of a demand from

the Yüan to submit an account of each reign, abbreviated chronological accounts of the history of Koryŏ were compiled. For example, the *Ponjo p'yŏnnyŏn kangmok* 本朝編年綱目 in 42 *kwŏn* compiled by Min Chi 閔漬 (1248-1326; *BTKP* 80. 755) and the *Sedae p'yŏnnyŏn chŏryo* 世代編年節要 in 7 *kwŏn* compiled by Min Chi and Kwŏn Pu 權溥 (1262-1346; *BTKP* 77. 732). The original demand dates to 1278 (*KS* 29. 36b) and, in 1307, the entire Koryŏ Veritable Records, *sillok* 實錄, in 185 *kwŏn* were sent to the Yüan court in Ta-tu 大都 (*KS* 32. 32b-33a); five years later, in 1312, they were returned. It would certainly seem then, that the Yüan historiographical bureau was well informed on matters pertaining to Koryŏ just prior to the compilation of the *Ching-shih ta-tien* while Yi Chehyŏn would not have had access to the Yüan records [62].

Thus, I believe we may not only accept the account of the *Ching-shih ta-tien* (viz., as incorporated in the *Yüan Kao-li chi-shih*) but may further clarify the area which these officials controlled, namely, from the Western Capital north to the Yalu comprising all of the present North P'yŏngan Province and a large portion of the present South P'yŏngan Province.

The establishment of officials by the Mongols in the cities of the northwest was not to go without opposition by Koryŏ. The Koryŏ rebels serving the Mongols whom the Koryŏ authorities had been forced to accept and often to reward were not to be ignored either. The most important Koryŏ city the Mongols held was the Western Capital which had been left under the control of Hong Pogwŏn with the withdrawal of the Mongol army in late 1232. Shortly after the transfer of the capital from Kaegyŏng to Kanghwa Island, in the eighth month (Aug. 18 - Sept. 15) of 1232, the Civil Governor, *sunmusa* 巡撫使, Grand General Min Hŭi and Office Recorder, *sarok* 司錄, Ch'oe Chaon 崔滋溫 and others intrigued to kill the daruɣači. The people of the Western Capital learned of this and said: "If they do so, then [the people of] our Capital will certainly be exterminated by the Mongols like P'yŏngju." Thereupon, they revolted. Ch'oe Chaon was seized and imprisoned while the members of all other government offices in the Western Capital fled to Chŏ Island 楮島 (*KS* 23. 14b-15a).

With this, Hong Pogwŏn, the Koryŏ rebel serving the Mongols, assembled the lost and scattered people of some forty *chu* and *hyŏn* districts and awaited the arrival of Mongol forces (*YKS* 3b; *YS* 154. 1b). The Koryŏ authorities had, in accordance with the theories in which natural phenomena were linked with the destinies of the nation (i.e., *ohaeng* 五行 or the theory of the five elements), made careful note of unusual natural phenomena. Among the more foreboding signs, in the fourth month of 1232, it was reported from the northern districts, that many of the bears were leaving the mountains and fleeing to the coastal islands! (*KS* 54. 36a)

Sartaq's second attack which opened in the eighth month (Aug. 18 - Sept. 15) of 1232 (*YKC* 3b; *YS* 154. 1b), swept southward into the valley of the Han with comparative ease. Then a *deus ex machina* solution was provided. In an attack on Ch'ŏin-sŏng [63], Sartaq was struck and killed by a chance arrow from the bow of Kim Yunhu [64], a Buddhist monk who had fled to the stronghold and who, if we may believe his own story, was unarmed when the fighting began (*KS* 23. 25b; *KS* 103. 39b-40a) [65]. With the death of Sartaq, T'ieh-ke huo-erh-ch'ih[+] 鉄哥火里赤 led the army in withdrawing from Koryŏ, leaving Hong Pogwŏn at the Western Capital (*KS* 130. 3-4) to supervise those locations whose submission had already been obtained (*YKC* 3b; *YS* 208. 3a; *YS* 154. 1b).

The first Koryŏ effort to eliminate Mongol control in the northwest had failed.

While the Mongol forces rode over the peninsula in 1231-32, a steady stream of correspondence was maintained, and continued even after the flight of the Koryŏ authorities to the safety of Kanghwa island. The documents (*YKC*; *KS* 23; *YSC* 28; *KSC* 16) are too lengthy and too repetitive to be given in full, yet a brief summary of the main points is in order.

An early Mongol charge was the slaying of the envoy Chu-ku-yü (*KS* 23. 4a-5b); in a reply dated the 29th day of the twelfth month of 1231 (= 29 Jan., 1232), Koryŏ blamed this on the raids of neighboring peoples, saying that Ke-pu-ai [66] 哥不愛 had been disguising men in Mongolian clothing and raiding Koryŏ border cities and implying that they suspected him of killing the Mongol (*TYSC* 28. 4a-5a = *KS* 23. 8b-9b). In a later reply dated the eleventh month (Nov. 21 - Dec. 20) of 1232, Koryŏ explained that the envoy had come by way of P'o-su-lu 婆速路 and not through the territory controlled by P'u-hsien Wan-nu [67]; on the return trip he was slain by Yü-chia-hsia 于加下 (= Yü-ke-hsia). Yü-chia-hsia, they said, had his men dress in Mongolian clothing and smashed three cities on the Koryŏ northern border (*TYSC* 28. 14b-17b = *KS* 23. 18b-22b).

To this charge the Mongols were in the tenth month of 1232, to add the shooting of the *tung-lu-shih* 東路使 or 'commissioner of the eastern *lu*-administration' (*KS* 23. 20b). Koryŏ accused P'u-hsien Wan-nu of dressing men in Koryŏ clothing, arming them with Koryŏ bows and arrows and of then ambushing a second group of Mongol envoys sent to Koryŏ in the mountains between the two nations. A certain Wang Hao-fei 王好非, they said, had fled from Wan-nu to Koryŏ and told of the incident in detail. Wan-nu, Koryŏ said, had also smashed two Koryŏ cities in the northeast. The Mongols, Koryŏ maintained, were laying the crimes of Yü-ke-hsia and Wan-nu on Koryŏ's doorstep (*TYSC* 28. 14b-17b = *KS* 23. 18b-22b).

[+] *Teke-qorči*

The Mongols also demanded that Koryŏ explain the sudden 'about-face', the killing and detention of Mongol resident commissioners, and the transfer of the Koryŏ capital to Kanghwa. Among the reasons Koryŏ gave for transferring the capital was that a certain Song Ipchang [68] 宋立章 had fled from the party of Chi Ŭisim and returned with the news that the Mongols were raising a large force to attack Koryŏ cities. When the people heard this they were alarmed and fled from the cities. This in turn caused Koryŏ to fear that they could not produce the annual tribute since the cities were being deserted (*TYSC* 28.10b-12a = *KS* 23.15a-16b; *TYSC* 28.14b-17b = *KS* 23.18b-22b). Song had been exiled to a distant island for his false statements, they explained (*TYSC* 28.12a-13a = *KS* 23.16b-17b) and although they had sent for him following a Mongol demand that he be produced, it was feared that he was lost at sea on the return journey for nothing had been heard of the party (*TYSC* 28. 19a-20b = *KS* 23. 23b-24b).

The Koryŏ general Cho Sukch'ang who had submitted to the Mongols at Ŭiju in 1231, had been detained by the Koryŏ authorities and to Mongol demands to produce him, they explained that, unfortunately, General Cho had fallen ill after returning from the Mongols and was still sick in bed (*TYSC* 28. 12a-13a = *KS* 23. 16b-17b; *TYSC* 28. 19a-20b = *KS* 23. 23b-24b).

A census had also been demanded, as well as fielding an army against P'u-hsien Wan-nu, neither of which was done by Koryŏ (*TYSC* 28. 13b-14b = *KS* 23. 17b-18b) although Koryŏ had furnished ships and seamen (*KS* 23. 11b; *KSC* 16. 13b) in response to Mongol requests to aid in the pacification of Liaotung (*TYSC* 28. 9a) but no action was taken to send either troops or settlers (farming families) into the Liaotung area (*TYSC* 28. 7a-b = *KS* 23. 11a-b) [69].

Nor were hostages forthcoming (*TYSC* 28. 7b-9a = *KS* 23. 12a-b). Mongol instructions for the King, the high officials, and Ch'oe U to come out were ignored (*TYSC* 28.12a-13a = *KS* 23.16b-17b) as were demands for a list of the names and positions of civil and military officials (*TYSC* 28. 9a-10a). Koryŏ did produce some tribute and, just prior to the killing of Sartaq, begged that the Mongol army be withdrawn with the promise to forever after submit tribute (*TYSC* 28. 14b-17b = *KS* 23. 18b-22b).

Yet in a reply (dated the twelfth month of 1232 = Jan. 12 - Feb. 11, 1233) to an Eastern Jürčen letter, which in effect drew the two nations together in cooperating against the Mongols, Koryŏ pointed out that they didn't trust the Mongols and that it had not been their original intention to have close relations with the Mongols. Perhaps Koryŏ was encouraged by the killing of Sartaq, for the letter points out that many Mongol prisoners had been taken at that time (*TYSC* 28.21b-22b = *KS* 23.25b-26b). Early in 1233, an effort had also been made to send an envoy to the Chin court, but the envoy was unsuc-

cessful as the roads were blocked and he returned (*TYSC* 28. 23a-24a; *KSC* 16. 18a).

This, at any rate, was the general situation when, in the spring of 1233, a Mongol envoy arrived with an edict listing Koryŏ's 'crimes', and we read that:

"On the twenty-fourth day of the fourth month (June 3) of the *kuei-ssu* 癸巳, fifth, year (of the reign of T'ai-tsung 太宗 = Ögödei, r. 1229-1245), instructions were given to Wang Ch'ŏl 王暾 (i.e., Koryŏ Kojong) to repent his transgressions and come to Court, in an Imperial Edict which said:

Your memorial reporting the facts involved was drawn up entirely in false statements and phrases of excuse. How difficult it is to know one from the other. If you were not false, you would come for an audience. From the previous pacification of the Ch'i-tan until the slaying of Cha-la [70] 劄剌 you have not sent a single soul to [Our] gates [71]. You have never acted in compliance with the laws and statues of [Our] Great Nation. This is your first offense. And when those who were sent to offer the precepts and instructions of Immortal Heaven summoned you, then you dared to kill [them] [72]. This is your second offense. Moreover, with regard to Chu-ku-yü, you plotted to harm him and claimed Wan-nu's people killed him. If you had seized [and turned over to us] the man (Wang Hao-fei) who made the original report, then it would be clear. If Wan-nu had really tried to cause the downfall of your country, [then when] we ordered you to attack Wan-nu, why did you hang back without advancing? This is your third offense. We commanded you [73] to raise an army and, as before, we ordered you to present yourself at Court, but these clear instructions you dared to resist. You did not appear at Court [but] sneaked away to the islands of the sea. This is your fourth offense. Furthermore, [when] we ordered your households to come together and be counted [74], you claimed that if the people left the cities to be counted, they would fear being killed and flee to [the islands of] the sea and that, when you once cooperated in an expedition with the troops of Heaven, your people were enticed to leave the cities under the pretense of being counted and then were wantonly slain [75]. Now, you dare to submit false statements to this effect. This is your fifth offense [76]. In addition to these offenses, you have been deceitful and evil innummerable times. When we sent you the precepts and instructions of Immortal Heaven, you were not attentive and wished to do battle. But when we, trusting to the powers of Supreme Heaven, attack and smash your cities and villages, there are cases that those who are blind and will not submit are exterminated; yet there are also those who submit and work hard and, whether man or woman, they have never been wantonly slain ..."

The edict continued in pointing out that the officials of ten Koryŏ cities [77],

including the Western Capital, had already taken a census of their households and were remitting taxes and that all were living peacefully as before. The edict called upon Koryŏ to field an army against P'u-hsien Wan-nu [78] or suffer the consequences, and it called upon the Koryŏ Court to obey the 'precepts and instructions of Immortal Heaven'.

The Koryŏ answer was to be a renewed offensive aimed particularly at ousting Hong Pogwŏn from the Western Capital which, as the edict quoted above indicates, was still under Mongol control in the fourth month (May 11 - June 9) of 1233 (*YKC* 4a).

The following month [79], what the Koryŏ records term a 'revolt' broke out in the Western Capital. P'il Hyŏnbo [80], Hong Pogwŏn and others killed the Pacification Commissioners [81], Grand Generals Chŏng Ŭi [82] and Pak Nokchŏn [83] and rebelled with the whole city (*KS* 23. 27a; *KS* 121. 11; *KSC* 16. 19a-b; *CHSL* 4. 27b). As the Koryŏ army was in the southeast quelling a revolt in the Eastern Capital, Ch'oe U in the twelfth month of 1233 (= Jan. 2 - Jan. 30, 1234), sent three thousand [84] of his house troops with Min Hŭi who was now Commissioner of Men and Horse of the North(western) Frontier-District to subjugate them. They captured P'il Hyŏnbo and escorted him to the capital where he was cut in two at the waist in the market place. Hong Pogwŏn escaped but they managed to capture his father Hong Taesun, his younger brother Hong Paeksu 洪白壽 as well as his children. The remaining people of the Western Capital were then moved to islands and subsequently, it is related, the Western Capital became a desolate site (*KS* 23. 27a-b; *KSC* 16. 19a-b; *YS* 154. 1b). Two months preceding this attack, Hong Pogwŏn had petitioned the Mongol authorities requesting permission to bring his people into Liaoyang because of attacks first by Koryŏ and later by Jürčen and Ch'i-tan forces (*YKC* 5a). In the spring of 1234, rewards were passed out to the Koryŏ soldiers who had retaken the Western Capital and one Hong Kyun 洪鈞, a Vice-Minister of the Department of War, was sent to govern the city (*KS* 23. 27b). The Koryŏ rebel Cho Sukch'ang was beheaded in the marketplace (*KS* 23. 28a) because, we are told, of something P'il Hyŏnbo had said (*KSC* 16. 20a), but in reality, he had been held by the Koryŏ authorities since late 1232 on the pretext of illness (cf. *TYSC* 28. 12a-13a; *TYSC* 28. 19a-20b).

Hong Pogwŏn had fled northward to Liaotung where he and his people were settled between Liaoyang 遼陽 and Shenyang 瀋陽. In 1234, he was placed in command of the army and people of Koryŏ and ordered to subjugate those of Koryŏ who had not yet submitted (*KS* 130. 3b-5a; *YS* 154. 2a).

After settling at Tung-ching, Hong Pogwŏn was given control of the northwestern portion of Koryŏ (*KS* 130. 3b-5a; *CHSL* 4. 27b) [85]. At this time a Mongol edict came down instructing the people of Koryŏ that anyone who would

capture and bring to court the Koryŏ monarch and the instigators of the resistance (i.e., Ch'oe U, et al.), would be placed on an equal footing with Hong Pogwŏn and settled in the Tung-ching area. Those who resist will die; those who submit will live, the edict warned (*YS* 154. 2a; *YKC* 5b).

This situation concerned the Koryŏ authorities who, as we have seen, were holding Hong's relatives whom they had captured in the Western Capital earlier. Ch'oe U, in an apparent attempt to placate Hong and win him over, elevated his father to the rank of Grand General and his younger brother to the rank of Colonel, *nangjang* (*KSC* 16. 19b), however, they were still held as hostages and were not to obtain their freedom for many years.

1. The name occurs in several orthographic variants including: *sa-li-t'a* 撒禮塔 (*KS* 23. 1a; *KS* 23. 5b; *YS* 208. 2b); *sa-li-ta* 撒禮答 (*YS* 208); *sa-li-ta* 撒禮打 (*KS* 23. 4a; *TYSC* 33. 17b-19a); *sa-erh-t'a* 撒兒塔 (*YKC* 8b); *sha-ta* 沙打 (*KS* 23. 16b). In *YKC* 3a, *KS* 23. 4a, and *YS* 120. 15a we find *sa-li-t'a huo-li-ch'ih* 火里赤 (*YKC* writes *huo-erh-ch'ih* 火兒赤).

Yanai Watari 箭内亘, *Yüan-tai ching-lüeh tung-pei k'ao*, p. 139, suggests *Sartai*, *Sarita*, or *Saritai*. *BTKP* 99. 935 suggests ?Sarta. I suggest Sarta[q]-qorči. How many persons of note bore the name Sartaq, I do not know. Probably the most famous bearer of the name was Sartaq, the son of Batu. For the reconstruction of his name see L. Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che*, with supplementary notes by P. Pelliot, issued as a supplement to *TP* XXXVIII, 1945, p. 52 and p. 53 note 2. Also see Huang Ta-hua 黃大華, *Yüan fen-fan chu-wang shih-piao* 元分藩諸王世表, incorporated in Vol. 6, pp. 8243-8250 of the *Erh-shih-wu-shih pu-pien*. As W. Barthold, *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia* (translated by V. and T. Minorsky), 2 vols., Leiden, 1956, Vol. 1, p. 31, has already noted, in Mongolian the word Sartaqtai refers to a "representative of Muslim culture"; *-tai* is, of course, simply an adjectival ending. The word *qorči* means 'archer, quiver-bearer' in Mongolian.

Yet, in the so-called 'Secret History' perhaps better known under its Chinese title *Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih* 元朝祕史, it is said that Ogödei sent *Cha-la-i-erh-t'ai huo-erh-ch'ih* 札剌亦兒台豁兒赤 (J̌alairtai-qorči) to conquer the J̌ürčen and the Solongɣud. Then a certain *Yeh-su-tieh-erh huo-erh-ch'ih* 也速迭兒豁兒赤 (Yesüder-qorči) was sent to assist him. See (1) 2. 28a-b, Shiratori Kurakichi 白鳥庫吉 *Onyaku mōbun genchō hishi* 音譯蒙文元朝祕史, Tōyō Bunko, Series C, Vol. VIII, Tōkyō, 1942; for a translation of this brief passage, also see E. Haenisch, *Die geheime Geschichte der Mongolen*, Leipzig, 1948, p. 139. The Solongɣud refer to the Koreans; it is usually said to refer to parts of Manchuria and northern Korea.

A discussion of the word Solongɣud is contained on p. 68 of Pavel Poucha, *Die geheime Geschichte der Mongolen*, Supplement to the Archiv Oriéntální, Vol. IV, Prague, 1956. Also see W. W. Rockhill, *The Journey of William ...*, p. 152 note 5 and P. Pelliot and L. Hambis, *Histoire des campagnes de Gengis Khan*, Leiden, 1951, Vol. 1, p. 175 ff.

Further, *CS* Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 69, identifies the son of *Sa-li-ta* as *T'a-ch'u* 塔出 (Taču), while *HYS* 249. 2b writes J̌alairtai 札剌亦兒台

in lieu of Sa-li-ta. The Ch'ing scholar Ch'ien Ta-hsien (1728-1804; see A. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese* ..., Vol. 1, pp. 152-4) mentions J̌alairtai as "[A man] of the reigns of T'ai-tsu (Činggis) [through] Hsien-tsung 憲宗 (Möngka); he was a Marshal who conquered Koryŏ (lit. a conquering-Koryŏ-marshal)". Cf. Ch'ien Ta-hsin, *Yüan-shih shih-tsu-piao* 元史氏族表 (completed in 3 *chüan* in 1791), incorporated in Vol. 6, pp. 8297-8392, of the *Erh-shih-wu-shih pu-pien* 二十五史補編, a work in six volumes, K'ai-ming shu-tien 開明書店 ed., 1935; reference is to p. 8301. Ch'ien correctly recorded the brief notice which appears in *YS* 133. 1a, the biography of Taču, J̌alairtai's son. There it is related that J̌alairtai served T'ai-tsu. In the *chia-yin* 甲寅 year of the reign of Möngke (1254) he was sent to conquer Koryŏ. This is supported by *YKC* 9b where his name is given as Cha-la-ta 劄剌解 (I have emended the *tzu* 剌 of the text to read *la*). The Koryŏ records where his name is usually rendered Ch'e-lo-ta 車羅大, also confirm this and his appearance in Koryŏ is dealt with at length later.

Juvaini mentions that Ögödei sent an army against the Solongγos (Koreans) twice, but does not mention their commander. Cf. J. A. Boyle, *The History of the World-Conquerer,* Vol. 1, p. 194, and p. 195-196; Boyle also calls attention to the passage from the Secret History cited above and suggests that perhaps it is the expedition to which Juvaini refers.

The account given by the Secret History is then in conflict with the other Yüan and the Koryŏ records. William Hung, 'The Transmission of the Book Known as *The Secret History of the Mongols*', *HJAS* 14 (1951), pp. 433-492, has noted (p. 450 note 43) that the compilers of the *Ching-shih ta-tien* were not permitted access to the Secret History and, consequently, *YKC* which was drawn from the former could incorporate nothing from the latter. Yanai, op. cit., pp. 139-144 has discussed at some length the confusion in T'u Chi's 屠寄 *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi* 蒙兀兒史記 biography of J̌alairtai and has pointed out that T'u Chi erred because he followed Shen Tseng-chih's 沈曾植 (1850-1922) explanation in the *Ch'in-cheng-lu-chu* 親征錄註 to the effect that J̌alairtai and Sartaq were the same. The *CS* identification of Taču as Sartaq's son is a similar confusion. Yanai, op. cit., p. 141, further suggests that the J̌alairtai-qorči mentioned in the Secret History is an error for Sartaq; Yanai also maintains that the Yesüder-qorči mentioned in the Secret History is not mentioned in the Yüan or Koryŏ records dealing with events in Koryŏ. In this latter point Yanai is in error and I also disagree with him on the point that for *J̌alairtai* in the Secret History, we should read *Sartaq*.

The matter of the account in the Secret History is more important than

Yanai suspected. The two events mentioned are related and do not refer to two isolated events separated in time. They refer specifically to events which occurred in Koryŏ in the reign of *Möngke* and not of *Ögödei*. The error in the Secret History is in the 'dating' of the passage, not in the events themselves nor in scribal error in writing a name.

In 1254, the *chia-yin* 甲寅 year of the reign of Möngke, J̌alairtai-qorči was sent to conquer Koryŏ. He was murdered (lit. 'died violently) in 1259 (cf. *KS* 24. 42b). In 1259, shortly after this, a certain Yesüder, *Yeh-su-ta* 也速達 was in charge of affairs in Koryŏ. Cf. *KS* 25. 3a-b. He was previously J̌alairtai's deputy, viz., *Yü-ch'ou-ta* 余愁達. Cf. *KS* 24. 35b.

Before returning to the matter of the Secret History, let me summarize concerning the several individuals who have been confused with each other:

1) in 1218-19, an unidentified Mongol named Cha-la was Deputy Commander of Mongol forces in Koryŏ and he died sometime prior to 1233;
2) in 1231-32, Sartaq-qorči commanded the Mongol forces in Koryŏ and he was hit by an arrow in battle and died in the twelfth month of 1232;
3) J̌alairtai-qorči commanded the Mongol forces in Koryŏ in the invasions of the mid-1250's and he was murdered in 1259;
4) Yesüder-qorči was ordered to replace the last named.

With regard to the Secret History, while it is generally believed to have been compiled in 1240, Hung, loc. cit., has suggested that it was compiled in 1264. If we follow Hung's assumption that the Rat year dating of the Secret History applies to the entire ms. (10 + *hsü-chi* 續集 2 *chüan*), then the next Rat year following Möngke's 甲寅 year is indeed 1264 and precisely the date Hung postulated. At any rate, one thing is certain, and that is the passage cited above cannot have been written prior to 1254, and was almost certainly written after that date.

After completing this, I learned that Gari Ledyard of Berkeley has also studied the problem and reached the same general conclusions; a bit later I discovered A. Waley's 'Notes on the *Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih*', B.S.O.S. 23 (1960) which deals with the same problem and reaches a similar conclusion. Both Waley and Ledyard would date the *Secret History* after 1258.

2. Cho Sukch'ang 趙叔昌 (d. 1234) was the eldest son of Marshal Cho Ch'ung 趙沖 (cf. *KS* 103. 6b). He submitted to the Mongols in 1231 and subsequently served their forces. Although the Koryŏ authorities promoted him, clearly as a result of his position with the Mongols, they regarded him as a rebel. Consequently, when Koryŏ opened a drive to retake their northwest area in 1233, Sukch'ang was taken along with P'il Hyŏnbo 畢賢甫 and, the following year he was beheaded in the market-place (*KS*

23. 28a). His biography is contained in *KS* 130. 9b-10a from which the above information has been taken except as indicated. Also see *BTKP* 9. 39 which, I note, gives his 'highest office' as Grand General, *taejanggun*, while his biography says that in official office he reached the rank of Supreme General, *sangjanggun*. Despite this, I believe that *BTKP* is correct in giving his rank as Grand General. *YKC* 3b which notes his dispatch to the Mongol court and which gives his name as Cho Sukchang 趙叔璋, gives his rank as General, *changgun*. Yet *KS* 23. 28a – which *BTKP* appears to have followed – says simply that in the third month of 1234, Grand General Cho Sukch'ang was beheaded in the market-place. The *KSC* 16. 10b; 16. 14b; and 16. 20a accounts follow the corresponding *KS* accounts. It appears that *KS* 23. 12a is a scribal error which was transmitted to his biography in *KS* 130. 9b-10a and perpetuated in *KSC* 16. 14b.

3. Sŏndŏk-chin 宣德鎭, also known as Koju 高州, is the present Kowŏn 高原 in S. Hamgyŏng Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 48. 27a-29a.
4. There may have been two forces advancing separately into Korea, one at Ŭiju and one at Sakchu, but this is conjectural. We know that the Mongol forces attacked Hamsin-chin (= Ŭiju) (*KS* 23. 1a); Sakchu, Wiju, T'aeju, and Chŏngju (*KS* 103. 23a-26a); Inju (*KS* 130. 3b); Ch'ŏlchu (*KS* 23. 1a; *KS* 121. 11b-12a) and we know by *KS* 103. 23a-26b, etc., that Mongol forces were still fighting at various border cities while the attack on Kuju was in progress. The evidence suggests the reconstruction I have outlined in this chapter.
5. The city of Chŏngju 靜州 was located 25 *li* south of Ŭiju, 10 *li* north of Inju and was in the modern N. P'yŏngan Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 53. 13b.
6. *Pundo changgun* 分道將軍 or District Commandants were stationed in the northern border cities, but I am unsure of their function.
7. Kim Kyŏngson 金慶孫 (d. 1251), whose name was formerly Unnae 雲來, was the son of Kim Taesŏ 金台瑞 (d. 1257; bio. *KS* 104; *BTKP* 67. 651). He entered government service by means of the Yin privilege and rose to prominence in the defense of Kuju with Pak Sŏ. Promoted to the rank of Grand General with the post of Director of Affairs of the Censorate, *chi-ŏsadae-sa* 知御史臺事, following the siege of Kuju, he was subsequently, in 1237, appointed to the post of Special Commander, *chihwisa* 指揮使, of Chŏlla Province where he was instrumental in crushing a large bandit group led by a certain Yi Yŏnnyŏn (~ Yŏllyŏn) 李延年 (d. 1237; *BTKP* 146. 1341) and his brothers which had been plaguing the Naju 羅州 area. For this feat Kim was appointed

Director of Memorials in the Bureau of Military Affairs, *ch'umirwŏn chijusa* 樞密院知奏事, and then, after being cleared of plotting to poison Ch'oe U, he was transferred to be Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, *ch'umirwŏn pusa,* 樞密副使. Exiled to Paengnyŏng Island 白翎島 when Ch'oe Hang took over the government in 1249, he was drowned in 1251 on Ch'oe's orders due to his relationship by marriage to O Sŭngjŏk 吳承績 (d. 1251; *BTKP* 88. 826) the son by a former husband, of Ch'oe Hang's stepmother who was exterminated by Ch'oe in an act of revenge. Kim had one son Hon 琿(1239-1311; see *KS* 103. 29a-30b) who was the paternal first cousin of Queen Kyŏngsun 敬順王后. Kim Kyŏngson's biography is contained in *KS* 103. 26a-29a and in *HY* 27. 17b-18a from which the above information has been taken except as noted; also see *BTKP* 61. 591.

8. The city of T'aeju 泰州 is the present T'aech'ŏn 泰川 in N. P'yŏngan Province. The city of Wiju 渭州 was located in the modern N. P'yŏngan Province about half-way between the modern Pakch'ŏn 博川 and T'aech'ŏn. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 54. 14a ff and *TYS* 54. 6a ff for T'aeju and Wiju respectively.

9. I understand the term *toryŏng* 都領 in the sense of 'commanding officer, officer-in-charge', etc., and have generally rendered it 'commander'. Yet several other possibilities immediately suggest themselves. It may have also been used in the sense of district magistrate analogous with *hyŏllyŏng* 縣領 or Magistrate of a *hyŏn*. It could refer to a 'commander of one thousand' as a *yŏng* 領 was a unit of 1 000 men in the Koryŏ military system (cf. *KS* 81. 1a), and we see that Hong Pogwŏn was a cavalry commander, *singi toryŏng* (*YKC* 5a). This would not be inconsistent with the decimal organization of the Koryŏ military which had chiefs of fifty, chiefs of one hundred, and chiefs of one thousand, each of whom were issued a plaque, *pae* 牌, of authority (cf. *YKC* 15a). Further, in the tenth month of 1172, i.e., the third year of the reign of Myŏngjong, military men were placed in charge "... from the three capitals, *kyŏng* 京, the four Defense Commands, *toho (-pu)* 都護 (府), the eight *mok* 牧 administrations, reaching down to the *kun* 郡, *hyŏn* 縣, hostels, *kwan* 館, and post stations, *yŏk* 驛 ..." (*KS* 19. 22b). It is interesting to note that a certain Chi Kwangsu is called the *chief* of the Ch'ungju slave army in *KS* 129. 37a-b while he is called the *toryŏng* of this same force in *KSC* 16. 12a.

Yi, *Han'guk-sa,* Vol. 2, appended Chart 5 which deals with the regional military forces, lists one "Senior Colonel In Charge", *toryŏng chungnangjang* 都領中郎將, as the chief military officer at the cities

of Anbuk-pu 安北府, Kuju, Sŏngju, Yongju, Chŏngju 靜州, and Sukchu 肅州 in the Koryŏ northwest, and a total of 16 *toryŏng* as the chief officers of various cities in the northeast.

10. Hong Pogwŏn 洪福源 (1206-1258) of Tangsŏng 唐城, had the former name of Pongnyang 福良. He had gone to live in Inju where his father Hong Taesun 洪大純 was commander, *toryŏng*. Due to his father's position Pogwŏn was made a cavalry commander, *singi toryŏng*. In 1218, his father had submitted to the Mongols when the latter were attacking the Ch'i-tan at Kangdong. Pogwŏn submitted to the Mongols in 1231, and joined Sartaq in his attack on Koryŏ. After being driven from Koryŏ by Koryŏ forces in 1233, he assembled 1 500 registered households and went north into Liaotung where they were settled between Liaoyang and Shenyang 瀋陽. In the summer of 1234 he was bestowed with a golden tally, *chin-fu* 金符, and given charge of all Koreans who had submitted. He subsequently accompanied the invasions of Koryŏ under Tanqut and A-mo-k'an. In 1250, he was awarded the tiger tally, *hu-fu* 虎符, and placed in charge of the people and army of Koryŏ. He subsequently accompanied the invasions of Koryŏ under Yekü and J̌alairtai. Later he sent his son, Hong Tagu 洪茶丘, with J̌alairtai's forces into Koryŏ. In 1258, he engaged in a bit of black magic which ended in a name-calling bout with Sun, the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng, after the latter had been sent to the Mongols as a Koryŏ hostage. Since Sun had joined the Mongols and had married a Mongol princess, it proved disastrous for Hong Pogwŏn when the Emperor (Möngke) heard his daughter's story. When Pogwŏn learned that they were going to inform the Emperor, he converted his goods into money in order to 'bribe' prince Sun and then went to seek the latter, but in the wrong direction. At that moment, he encountered an Imperial messenger — apparently sent by the Emperor — and the Imperial Messenger then ordered several tens of strong men to kick Pogwŏn to death. This was in 1258 and he was then fifty-three. He had seven sons of whom his second son, Hong Tagu, is most well-known. Pogwŏn was later posthumously given the title of *Chia-i tai-fu* 嘉義大夫, Marquis of Shen-yang 瀋陽侯, and awarded the posthumous appelation of *Chung-hsien* 忠憲. For biographical information see *YKC*; *YS* 154. 1a-9a; *KS* 130. 3a-5a; *CHSL* 4. 33a-b from which the above information has been taken. Succinct accounts are also given in *Han'guk-sa sajŏn* 韓國史辭典, published by the Tonga ch'ul-p'ansa 東亞出版社, Seoul, 1960, p. 421 and the *Tōyō rekishi daijiten*, Vol. 3, 143; also see *BTKP* 40. 371.

11. The city of Ch'ŏlchu 鐵州 is the modern Ch'ŏlsan 鐵山 in N. P'yŏngan

Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 53. 18a ff.

12. Mun Tae 文大 (d. 1231) has a brief 'biography' in *KS* 121. 11b-12a which simply relates the incident described in the text without giving any further particulars of his life.
13. The reasons for the Mongols emphasizing their identity is that the Koryo cities had been raided by non-Mongol troops, chiefly Jürčen, who wore Mongol uniforms and claimed to be Mongol soldiers. Cf. *KSC* 15. 36a; *KS* 103. 32a-36a. Also see Yanai, op. cit., p. 108 note 1.
14. While there were three Administrators, *p'an'gwan* 判官 , assigned to each of the two Northern Frontier-Districts who were to be of the fifth or sixth grades (cf. *KS* 77. 33b), I am unsure of either their grade or number at the town-level.
15. *chaesang* 宰相 = *chaech'u* 宰樞 , i.e., ministers of the second rank and above. The term itself is a rather ancient one in Chinese history and occurs in texts from the third century B.C.; it became the regular official term for the Premier in the late Chou period. Cf. p. 4, Sven Broman, 'Studies on the Chou Li', *BMFEA* No. 33, 1961, pp. 1-90. *HY* 20. 27b states that Ch'oe I (= Ch'oe U) held the post of *chaesang*, i.e., prime minister, however, they are using the term in a literary sense.
16. The term Three Armies refers to the organization of the Koryŏ army into three divisions each commanded by a Battle Commander, *chinju* 陣主 , who held the rank of General or above. According to the encyclopedia *TMP* 109. 5b, in the third year of the reign of Ŭijong 毅宗 (1148) one of the army commanders submitted a petition requesting that Koryŏ's Five Armies be reduced to Three Armies and it was approved. A division into five armies was tried at least once after that, viz , against the Ch'i-tan invasions of 1216-18 but was quickly scrapped in favor of the traditional (cf. *KS* 1) system of three divisions after a series of defeats (cf. *KS* 103. 15b-16a). Yet, in view of the repeated use of the number three as a pseudo-number throughout the *KS*, I cannot but wonder if the number three in 'Three Armies' did not carry some 'magical' flavor at the time.
17. The city of Kwakchu 郭州 is the present Kwaksan 郭山 in N. P'yŏngan Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 53. 37a ff. The city of Sŏnju 宣州 is the present Sŏnch'ŏn 宣川 in N. Hamgyŏng Province; for topographical and historical information see *TYS* 53. 34a ff.
18. The city of Chaju 慈州 is the present Chasan 慈山 in S. P'yŏngan Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 54. 25b ff.
19. Pongju 鳳州 is the present Pongsan 鳳山 in Hwanghae Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 41. 27a ff.
20. Yi Chasŏng 李子晟 (d. 1251) was of Ubong 牛峯 which was also

the ancestral home of the powerful Ch'oe clan who ruled Koryŏ at this time. His father was President, *sangsŏ* 尙書 , of the Department of War, *pyŏngbu*. His biography characterizes him as a man who was brave and strong, and good at archery; he followed the army and gradually rose to the rank of Supreme General. In the year following the Mongol onslaught of 1231, Chasŏng, as Battle Commander, *chinju* 陣主 , of one of Koryŏ's Three Armies, assisted in quelling the slave-monk uprising which occurred in Kaegyŏng following the transfer of the capital to Kanghwa Island. He subsequently was in command of forces which quelled a slave revolt at Ch'ungju in 1232 and, in 1233, he led an army on a two-day forced ride to put down a large bandit rebellion emenating from the area of the Eastern Capital. He died in 1251 and was awarded the posthumous appellation of Ŭiryŏl 義烈 . For further biographical information see *KS* 103. 3a-39a from which the above information has been drawn; also see *BTKP* 126. 1175.

21. The Tongsŏn postal relay station 洞仙驛 was on the eleven station Piryŏng circuit 畢嶺道 . It was the Pongju station. Cf. *KS* 82. 9b.
22. Min Hŭi 閔曦 (fl. 1230-1249). Little is known of Min other than his active role in resisting the Mongols. He ultimately reached the post of Supreme General but was exiled in 1249 when Ch'oe Hang came into power.
23. *pundae ŏsa* 分臺御史 or Regional Censorate; I do not know how many Regional Censorates there were nor their administrative structure.
24. I note that according to *YS* 149, which contains the biographies of Wang Ying-tsu 王榮祖 , I-la-mai-nu 移剌買奴 and Hsieh-tu 薛闍 , that each of these persons was in Koryŏ. Wang was deputy to Sartaq; I-la-mai-nu was one of Sartaq's principal commanders; and Hsieh-tu, the son of Yeh-lü Liu-ke was another commander. Yet I have not seen these persons mentioned in the Koryŏ records.
25. *naesi nangjung* 內侍郎中. Song's position was that of *naesi* or Palace Attendant and his rank was that of *nangjung*.
26. Song Kukch'ŏm 宋國瞻 (d. 1250) of Chinju 鎭州 , was good in literature, passed the exams, and was placed directly in the Historiographical Bureau, *sagwan*. From this post he entered the service of Ch'oe U, later serving his son Ch'oe Hang, and was active in the *Chŏngbang* 政房 or Civil Council. For biographical information see *KS* 102. 14a-b; also see *BTKP* 104. 980.
27. *Hei* 黑 or Black Ch'i-tan, is the Chinese rendering of Qarā-Khitāy, cf. Wittfogel and Feng, 'Qarā-Khitāy', pp. 619-674. They have also noted this and remark that the Mongols tended to identify the 'Chin' Ch'i-tan

with the Black Ch'itan of Central Asia and cite this incident as an example of mistaken identity. Cf. Wittfogel and Feng, op. cit., p. 625, note 69.

28. There is little doubt that the killing of the Mongol envoy was in part responsible for the return of the Mongol forces to Koryŏ. G. Vernadsky, 'The Scope and Contents of Chingis Khan's *Yasa*', *HJAS* 3 (1958) 1, pp. 337-360, mentions (p. 346) the apparently unwritten inviolability of ambassadors and points out that "... it was by murdering the Mongol envoys that the Russian princes brought down the Mongol wrath upon their heads in 1223". W. Barthold, *Four Studies* ..., Vol. 1, p. 37, remarks that the expedition against Turkestan in 1219 was due to the killing of Mongol envoys by the Khorezm shah. The charge was often repeated in Mongol missives to Koryŏ. Cf. *TYSC* 28; *KS* 23. 20b ff.

It should also be noted that the slaying of a Mongol envoy provided a reasonable pretext both for invasion and for subsequent demands. The opinion that the Mongols simply used the slaying of the envoy as a pretext for invasion has been expressed by most Japanese and Korean scholars; see, for example, Yanai Watari, *Meng-ku-shih yen-chiu* 蒙古史研究 (being the Chinese translation of articles published in Japanese in *TG*), Commercial Press, 1932, p. 11, and Ikeuchi Hiroshi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū*, Vol. 1, p. 626.

29. Chŏng 侹 (d. 1234) was the son of Chin 稹, the Marquis of Yŏngin 寧仁侯 (d. 1220; *BTKP* 113. 1064). His mother was Princess Yŏnhŭi 延禧宮主, the daughter of Myŏngjong 明宗. Chŏng himself married Princess Kyŏngnyŏng 敬寧宮主, the daughter of Sinjong 神宗. He was first enfeoffed as Count of Shihŭng 始興伯, later advanced to Marquis of Sihŭng, and then, still later, made Duke of Hoean 淮安公. He died in 1234. Biographical information is contained in *KS* 90. 9b-10a; also see *BTKP* 114. 1072.

YKC 3a and *YS* 2. 2b identify him (incorrectly) as the younger brother of Kojong, then the reigning monarch. The Mongols were demanding hostages from the royal family among whom the Crown Prince was particularly desired (cf. *YS* 120. 15a). Koryŏ later showed no hesitation in sending the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng, falsely labelled as the Crown Prince to the Mongols as a hostage. Therefore, I regard this as a Koryŏ tactic, i.e., the Koryŏ authorities were simply passing Chŏng off as the King's younger brother with the intention of submitting as their hostage if no alternative was offered; I do not believe this is a case of scribal or other error in *YKC*. Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, p. 555, note 1, is also of the opinion that the Koryŏ authorities misled the Mongols.

30. The title of Duke, *kong* 公, was an honorary title and except for occa-

sional awards which were often posthumous, was customarily reserved for members of the royal family, especially the cadet branches. It carried with it an annual stipend of 400 *sŏk* 10 *tu* of rice (Yi, Table 6). *HY* 20. 24b informs us that the enfeoffed members of the royal relatives were charged with no affairs, and "those that were, by their relationship, venerated, were the Dukes, *kong*; the next were the Marquis, *hu* 侯 ; the distant [relatives] were made Counts, paek 伯 [while] the young were made *sado* 司徒 and *sagong* 司空 . In general they were called Princes, *chewang* 諸王

The titles *sado* and *sagong* were the second and third of the Three Dukes *samgong* 三公 ; the first was *taewi* 大衛 . While all of these honorary titles held the official grade of First Class primary, their stipends and allotments varied considerably. See *KS* 76. 2b.

31. Pak Sŏ 朴犀 (fl. 1230's) of Chukchu 竹州 first rose to prominence as defender of Kuju against the Mongol invasion of Sartaq in 1231-32. For his valiant defense of Kuju he was appointed Senior Councillor, *p'yŏng-jangsa* 平章事 of the Royal Chancellory *munha* (*sŏng*) 門下 (省), and even the military ruler Ch'oe U told him: "Sir, in the nation [your] fidelity is really incomparable." We are told that he retired to his native village following the battle at Kuju but his biography in *KS* 103. 23a-26a tells us little other than his role as defender of Kuju; *BTKP* does not list him.
32. The Koryŏ victory over the Liao forces at Kuju in 1018 resulted in the Liao dropping their demands for six Korean cities and for the Koryŏ monarch to visit the Liao capital. Cf. Kim Sanggi 金庠基 , *T'an'gu wa ŭi hangjaeng* 단구와의항쟁 , [The Ch'i-tan Incursions and Resistance Offered], *Kuksasang ŭi chemunje* 국사상의제문제 , ["The Problems of Korean History"], 2 (1960), pp. 101-175.
33. *KS* 103. 23a-26a reads *pundo changgun*; *KS* 103. 26a-29a reads simply *sujang* 戍將 or military officer.
34. *toho(pu) pyŏlch'o* 都護 (府) 別抄 . The *pyŏlch'o* 別抄 or 'those especially selected' were elite teams of infantry. I have chosen to render *pyŏlch'o* as 'patrol'. A more detailed discussion of the *pyŏlch'o* is given later. This particular *pyŏlch'o* was probably from the Northern Defense Command, *anbuk toho-pu*, located at the walled-city of Anbuk (mod. Anju 安州) to the South of Kuju.
35. In reconstructing the battle at Kuju, I have followed the sequence of events as set forth in *KSC* 16. 5a-6a; *KSC* 16. 7a-b and *KSC* 16. 8b ,which differ in minor respects with the accounts in the biographies of Pak and Kim.

36. Where I have rendered 'called his small group' the text reads 吹雙小笒 and I am unsure of the meaning. ??"blew twice on a bamboo [whistle]".

37. This is the earliest of four such instances of the Mongols using human fat that I have seen. While naphtha was widely used in making fire missiles in the middle eastern campaigns (cf. the works of Barthold and of Bretschneider), yet John of Plano Carpini (cited H. Yule and H. Cordier, *The Book of Ser Marco Polo,* 2 Vols., 3rd ed. London, 1929, Vol. 2, pp. 180-181) noted the mixing of human fat with Greek fire and remarked that "this caused the fire to rage inextinguishably."
P. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo,* Paris, 1959 (a posthumous publication, see the forword by L. Hambis), p. 22, cites the *Hsü t'ung-chien kang-mu* account of Bayan's siege of Ch'ang-chou in 1275, which relates that Bayan killed and burnt captives and "used the boiling fat of the corpses to manufacture fire-missiles which were thrown to set alight the wooden 'chevaux-de-frise' of the wall battlements ..." It was used again in Koryŏ in 1236, in an assault on Chukchu 竹州 cf. *KS* 103. 25b-26a.

38. *KS* 103. 26a-29a gives twenty days for this attack.

39. There were two Recorders of the Academy, *hangnok* 學錄, assigned to the National Academy, *kukchagam*; they were of the official grade of Ninth Class primary (Yi, Table 4) which carried an annual stipend of 10 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice (Yi, Table 6).

40. *tae up'o* 大于浦 is defined following its appearance as: "*Tae up'o* signifies a large blade, a large weapon" 大于浦者大刃大兵也. The usual interpretation of the word is taken from this definition and is simply *k'ŭn k'al* 큰 칼 or 'large knife', e.g., Yi, *Han'guk-sa* p. 555. *Tae* 大 is without doubt to be read *k'ŭn* 'large', i.e., the adjectival or modifier form of the qualitative verb *k'ŭta*. I read *u* in the sense of 'to go', i.e., *kal · u* 갈 · 우 and *p'o* 浦 in the meaning of 'stream, rivelet' = *ke ~ kae* 게 ~ 개 . *Ke* in the sense of 'implement, devise' is commonly added to verb bases to form substantives and it survives, for example, in *ji-* 'to carry on the back', plus *ke,* = *jige* 'packboard'. S.E. Martin, *Korean Morphophonemics,* Baltimore, 1954, pp. 51-52 gives several examples and G.J. Ramstedt has discussed *ke* at length in his "Koreanisch kęs 'Ding, Stück", *Journal de la Société Finno-ougrienne,* LXVIII, 1945.
The reason for interpreting 于 as 'knife' *k'al* is probably due both to the definition following its appearance and the fact that *kal* (i.e., *u · kal*) is an older form of *k'al* 'knife'. The latter is attested in the Yi Dynasty work *Hunmin chŏngŭm haeryebon* 訓民正音解例本 (cf. p. 28,

Tonga Saegugŏ sajŏn 동아 새국어 사전 , Seoul, 1959). Yet, if we accept the premise that 浦 = *ke* = 'implement', as I believe is correct, then, as *ke* adds to *verb* bases it follows that *kal* in *noun* form must be rejected. This immediately suggests *kal* ~ *k'al* as an older verb form. One immediately thinks of the modern *kalkita* 갈기다 'to slash, to beat'. From the verb *kalkta, kakta* Ramstedt has postulated; *n. kalgo* (< ? * *kalgaɣ*) and its derivatives *kalgori* 'a hook, a curved stick'. See G. J. Ramstedt, *Studies in Korean Etymology,* Mémoires de la Société Finno-Ougrienne, XCV, Helsinki, 1949; also cf. *karida,* p. 98; *kalda,* p. 87, and *kalda,* p. 88.

While it is tempting to postulate the incorporation of a Chinese loanmorph here (? 鍥 as a verb 'to cut, to cut through' mod. Ch. *ch'ieh* [4]), T'ang Ch. *k'iet,* mod. Kor. *kyŏl* — as a noun read *kye* in mod. Kor.), it would seem that in this word we have a form of the * *kalgaɣ* postulated by Ramstedt. Therefore I reconstruct *up'o* as * *kalge* [ɣ] ~ * *kalkke* [ɣ] and translate *tae up'o* or *k'ŭn kalgeɣ* as 'large implement for slashing, large implement for smashing'. For the T'ang pronunciation of *k'iet* see B. Kalgren, '*Grammata Serica* ...', 87. 279 f. The above reconstruction is of course tentative; a great deal of work remains to be done in Korean palaeographic studies before firm conclusions are reached.

41. Ch'oe Ch'unmyŏng 崔椿命 (d. 1250), a descendant of Ch'oe Ch'ung 崔冲 (d. 1068; bio. *KS* 95. 1a ff; *BTKP* 23. 224), was of Haeju 海州. For his merit in the defense of Chaju he was appointed Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, *ch'umirwŏn pusa.* He had one son, Chom 怗 , who became an officer of the guards. His biography in *KS* 103. 30a-32a is principally an account of his defense of Chaju; also see *BTKP* 25. 229.
42. Tae Chipsŏng 大集成 (d. 1236) was one of the military officers surrounding Ch'oe U. He secured his position by marrying his daughter to the military overlord. *KS* carries no biography for Tae but his activities are mentioned in *KS* 23 and *KS* 129; also see *BTKP* 110. 1030.
43. This document and the preceding dispatch from Sartaq contained in *KS* 23. 4a-5b, have been studied and 'translated' by Murakami Shōji 村上正二 Mōkō raichō no honyaku 蒙古來牒の飜譯 ["Translation of Mongolian Credentials in the Goryeo-sa"], *CG* 17 (1960), pp. 81-86. After completing this, I learned that Gari Ledyard of Berkeley has translated and annotated these documents and that his study, unavailable to me, will appear in a future issue of *JAOS*; this should be a definitive work. Murakami suggests (p. 86 note 1) that the term *yŏnggong* is simply being used as 'Your Excellency', *kakha* 閣下 . According to Kim Sanggi, to the Koreans the term, which was used in Silla times, meant a member of the

royal family who held the rank of Duke, Marquis, or Count. Cf. pp. 220-221 and p. 240 note 7, Kim Sanggi, Koryŏ muin chŏngch'i kigu ko 高麗武人政治機構考, incorporated in *Tongbang munghwa...*, pp. 207-243. Yet the Koreans themselves referred to Ch'oe Ŭi as *yŏnggong* (cf. *KS* 129. 54b; *KSC* 17. 35a-b), and I note that Ch'oe Hang's position in the entry recording his death in *KS* 24 is given as *chungsŏ-yŏng* 中書令. According to *Tzu-hai*, 87B, the term *yŏnggong* was first used by Emperor Hsiao-Wen 孝文帝 of the Northern Wei as a title of respect for Kao Yün 高允 (390-487; see H.A.Giles, *A Chinese Biographical Dictionary*, London, 1898, p. 369, entry 970) who held the post of 'Chancellor of the Secretariat' 中書令. I believe Murakami's suggestion is closer to the mark.

In 1232, the Mongol Marshal *Ho-hsi* 河西 sent an envoy to the Koryŏ authorities with two bolts (*p'il* 匹) of gold damask 金錦 and a missive addressed to the *yŏnggong* 令公. Ch'oe U refused to receive it and the envoys then tried, unsuccessfully, to give the missive to Chŏng, the Duke of Hoean. Ch'oe finally had Yi Kyubo write an answer for Chŏng to take back (cf. *KS* 129. 37a-b; *KSC* 16. 14b). The letter written by Yi is probably that contained in *TYSC* 28. 9a-10a and addressed to Marshal *Ho-hsi* and dated in the fifth month of 1232; a reply from the Duke of Hoean also addressed to Marshal Ho-hsi follows in *TYSC* 28. 9a, both referring to Mongol demands for Koryŏ military assistance in the Liaotung area. Perhaps the Ho-hsi mentioned is the individual whose name occurs commonly as Tanqu[t] 唐古. As is well known, Ho-hsi was a common Chinese name for the Tanqut or Hsi-hsia country during this period and from this derived the Mo. *Qaši*, a name tabooed from 1236. Cf. P.Pelliott, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 115 and 126. The affairs of Koryŏ at this time were in the hands of Ch'oe U and the Koryŏ correspondence with the Mongols was largely prepared by Yi Kyubo (1168-1241; *BTKP* 137. 1268) who acted as a sort of Secretary of State for Ch'oe U until his (Yi's) death in 1241, as may be seen in the genealogical record attached to the front of his collected works. *TYSC*.

44. The stimulus was probably a second Mongol missive sent to the Koryŏ court in the fifth month of 1232. Cf. *YKC* 3a. 3.

45. *chiyu* 指諭; *KS* 129. 37a-b reads *chihwi* 指揮; I have rendered simply 'Commander' since I am unsure of the function of a *chiyu*. The *chiwi-sa*, appear to have been especially dispatched to troubled areas and it appears to have been a temporary post. For example, a Supreme General was appointed Special Commander, *chihwi-sa* 指揮使, of the southeastern provinces and a Circuit Commissioner was appointed as his deputy. Cf. *KS* 23. 30a.

46. Kim Sech'ung 金世冲 died on the sixteenth day of the sixth month of 1232, cf. *BTKP* 64. 621. Other than his brief appearance before Ch'oe at this time, little is known of him.

47. According to *KS* 81. 15b, the *Ya pyŏlch'o* 夜別抄 or Night Patrol was organized by Ch'oe U to patrol the capital area at night to prevent violence. The organization of the *Ya pyŏlch'o* is discussed in detail later.

48. Wang Kŏn 王建 the founder of the Koryŏ dynasty, was born in 877, reigned 918-943, died in 943, and was canonized T'aejo 太祖. For biographical information see *KS* 1. 1a5-b8 and *KS* 2. 16a1-8; also see *BTKP* 112. 1047.

49. Ch'oe's first wife, who was of the Chŏng 鄭 clan, died in the fifth month of 1231 and was given the funeral of a queen (*KSC* 16. 3b-4a). Ch'oe subsequently married the daughter of Tae Chipsŏng (*KS* 129. 37a-b; *KSC* 16. 12a-b).

50. The Koryŏ capital was transferred to Kanghwa Island in the seventh month of 1232 (*KS* 23. 14a-b; *TT* 33. 359a-b) where it remained until the fifth month of 1270 (*KS* 26. 34b). The wisdom of Ch'oe's move is apparent. Koryŏ forces had proved no match against the Mongol forces on the mainland despite stubborn and often heroic resistance. In shifting to Kanghwa Island, Koryŏ's one remaining asset, her maritime tradition could be utilized. Government storage granaries were located at coastal harbors — the two exceptions were located on the Han River — and maritime transport of grain was already the normal mode employed (cf. *KS* 79. 35a-37b).

    Kanghwa, a large island off the coast of the modern Inch'ŏn 仁川, is separated from the mainland by a strait "... infested with rocks and rapids and with a tide rushing like a mill-race ..." (cf. M. M. Trollope, 'Kanghwa', *TKBRAS*, 2 (1901) 1-36, p. 1). Since the Mongols had never been noted for their skill in amphibious warfare, Kanghwa Island made an excellent refuge. The move also set a precedent and the island was used as a refuge by the Koryŏ court from the Qadān 哈丹 rebels in 1290 (For a general account see K. Susa 須佐嘉橘, *Gen no nidaishiseki* 元の二大史蹟, Tōkyō, 1937, p. 65 ff) and later by the Yi Dynasty court from the Manchu invasions in the early 17th century, see W. W. Rockhill, *China's Intercourse with Korea from the XVth Century to* 1895, London, 1905. For topographical and historical information on Kanghwa Island see *TYS* 12. 215-221.

51. We are told that the population of Kaegyŏng had reached 100 000 households *ho* 戶 (cf. *KS* 102. 6a; *KSC* 16. 15a) which, at the usual m.p.h. (mouths per household) rate of 5-1 would give a population of 500 000

persons. Yi, *Han'guk-sa* Vol. 2, p. 563, note 2, would read '*mouths*' *ku* 口 in lieu of 'households', *ho*, making 100 000 persons and a more believable figure.

52. Kim Sanggi, *Tongbang munhwa* .., pp. 127-128, gives an account of the various palaces, Buddhist temples, and the like which were constructed on Kanghwa in the period 1232-1270 when it was the capital of Koryŏ.

53. Sartaq apparently withdrew his forces westward into Liaotung. Cf. Yi, *Han'guk-sa* Vol. 2, p. 557.

54. The slave rebellion at Ch'ungju was a rather interesting development and is reflective of the disorder of the times. The story begins just prior to the Mongol attack on Ch'ungju in the winter of 1231 (*KSC* 16. 9b). A certain U Chongju 于宗柱, the Deputy Commissioner, *pusa*, of the city and the Administrator, *p'an'gwan*, one Yu Hongik 庾洪翼, who quarrelled continually, had a falling out when they discussed the defense of the city after hearing of the approach of Mongol troops. Chongju assumed command of a 'Selected Force of the Upper Classes' *Yangban pyŏlch'o* 兩班別抄 and Hongik took command of the slave army, *nogun* 奴軍, and a selected force, *chamryu pyŏlch'o* 雜類別抄 They were mutually suspicious of each other and when the Mongol troops arrived they fled leaving the defense of the city to the slave army and the selected force who routed the Mongols. Returning they checked the government and private silver utensils and the slave army offered the pretext that the Mongol troops had stolen them. Some local officials secretly plotted to kill the head of the slave army. Learning of this, the slave army accused the officials for deserting the city and then wanting to charge the slaves with the Mongols' crime. Gathering under the pretense of a burial party, they assembled their followers with blasts on a conch shell and then took over the city, threatening the families of any who dared to flee, setting fire to the homes of the plotters, and then hunting down and killing those against whom they held grudges (*KS* 103. 36a-39a; *KSC* 16. 11a-12a). In the first month of 1232, upon the request of U and Yu, Ch'oe U appointed two administrators, one Pak Munsu 朴文秀 and a certain Kim Chŏng 金鼎, as Temporary Military Governors, *anmu pyŏlgam* 安撫別監 (*KSC* 16. 11a8-b9). Pak and Kim returned in the same month escorting the commander, *toryŏng*, of the slave army, the *yŏngsa* Chi Kwangsu 池光守, and the Buddhist priest Ubon 牛本 (*KSC* 16. 12a) who had apparently both been conspicious in the defense of Ch'ungju. Ch'oe U rewarded them and appointed, *po* 補, Kwangsu a military officer with the rank of captain, *kyowi* 校尉, and made Ubon head of the important temples, *taewŏnsa-chu* 大院寺主, of Ch'ungju and elevated him

to the rank of *samjung* 三重 (= *samjung taesa* 三重大師 ; for an explanation of which see Yi, *Han'guk-sa* Vol. 2, p. 143) cf. *KS* 129. 37a; *KSC* 16. i2a.

After returning to Ch'ungju, Ubon stirred up a revolt and, in the eighth month of 1232, Koryŏ's Three Armies commanded by Yi Chasŏng were sent to suppress the uprising (*KSC* 16. 17a). As tney were building a bridge to cross a deep river near Ch'ungju, the army was contacted by several rebel leaders who desired to kill Ubon and surrender. This was accepted by the government forces and enabled them to enter the city. Those of the gang who were bold and robust fled and those supporters who remained were captured and executed. The valuables, and livestock seized by the gang were brought back and presented to the authorities in the capital (*KS* 103. 36a-39a; *KSC* 16. 17a-b).

55. Mongol demands are discus sed in detail later.

56. The removal of the capital from Kaegyŏng stimulated a rebellion in the city. A certain Yi T'ong 李通 , a servant, *chorye* 皂隷 , of the Censorate, *ŏsadae,* assembled the petty bandits in the capital area and the slaves in the city and drove out the military commander left to garrison the city. Then, pretending to represent Koryŏ's Three Armies, he sent dispatches to Buddhist monasteries in the area to assemble bands of monks to strengthen his group. When Koryŏ's Three Armies were sent against them, the rebels advanced a force to meet the government army near Sŭngch'ŏn-pu, the landing point from Kanghwa. As this was taking place, the Koryŏ Night Patrol, *ya pyŏlch'o,* reached the city and gained entrance by pretending to be a part of the rebel band then fighting at Sŭngch'ŏn-pu. The government forces arrived shortly thereafter and the rebellion was crushed (*KS* 103. 36a-39a).

57. Yi Chehyon, one of the foremost historiographers of the Koryo period, was born in 1288 and died in 1367, the sixteenth year of the reign of King Kongmin 恭愍王 (r. 1352-1374) at the age of eighty-one. For biographical information see *KS* 110. 21a-42a and the genealogical information contained in *Ikchae-chip* 益齋集 , his collected works. His home was a well-known gathering place for historians, and perhaps the national history he is mentioned as working on (*KS* 110. 39a) — he was an official historian — may partially remain in his surviving works. Viz., the *Kuk Ch'unghŏn Wang Sega* 國忠憲王世家 (i.e., annals of Kojong) contained in *IC* 9A. 1a-20a. I note that the birth-death dates for Yi in *Han'guk-sa sajŏn* 韓國史辭典 , Seoul, 1960, are correctly given on p. 280 but are erroneously given as 1386-1397 on p. 314, undoubtedly a printing error to which such works are regrettably prone. *BTKP*

125. 1166 reads the name as Yi *Chae*hyŏn. This brings up a problem which, as does romanization, confronts all students of Korean history and literature. His name is written 李齊賢 . The character 齊 has the three readings of *chae, che,* and *cha,* only the latter two having common identity slogans, viz., *nara · che* and *sangusiraehŭl · cha,* while the reading *chae* is so uncommon as to lack an identity slogan. I can see no reason to deviate from the practice of modern Korean and Japanese historians in using the most common modern reading until it is historically proven that a less common reading is applicable. The most common reading of the character 齊 is *che*; therefore I read Yi *Che*hyŏn and consider *BTKP* to be incorrect.

58. For biographical information see Vol. 2, p. 855, A.Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period,* 2 vols., U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1943.

59. See p. 25, H.Franke, *Geld und Wirtschaft in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft,* Leipzig, 1949. Franke also discusses at length the surviving portions of the *Ching-shih ta-tien.* Franke was not, of course, the first to notice this. Some 20 years earlier Yanai Watari, *Meng-ku-shih yen-chiu,* pp. 104-126 discussed the relationships of the Yüan Veritable Records, *shih-lu,* with the *Ching-shih ta-tien* and (p. 121) pointed out that *YS* 208 (he calls it the *Jih-pen chuan* 日本傳) was based on the *Ching-shih ta-tien.*

60. I believe we can answer some of Yi Chehyŏn's questions. First, these officials were established by Sartaq who was, of course, acting under Imperial Orders (cf. *YS* 154. 1b; *YS* 2. 2b; *YS* 59. 4b-6b; *YKC* 3a). And this was in keeping with Mongol custom at the time. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* Vol. 1, p. 293, notes that when Činggis captured a western country he placed a daruγači in every city.
In later days, as Yi Chehyŏn remarks, the daruγači were indeed important persons. Bretschneider, op. cit., p. 190, has already pointed out that in the biographical section of the *Yüan shih* all the distinguished Mongols, with few exceptions, were either with the army or were provincial resident commissioners. Yet it is also well known that the period prior to 1260, i.e., the ascension of Qubilai, is not covered in detail in the Yüan records and perhaps this is the reason that their names have not been transmitted. In later days, i.e., after 1270, there was only one daruγači and one vice-daruγači in the Koryŏ capital and it was probably this system with which Yi was familiar. Yi's remark on the small size of the capital prefecture where he understood the seventy-two daruγači to have been stationed does not apply since the area concerned was the

entire Koryŏ northwest and not merely the capital prefecture. And, as we have seen, the Koryŏ records do indeed mention them.

61. Yi, *Han'guk-sa* Vol. 2, p. 560.

62. There was an earlier Korean participation in Yüan records by Kim Pyŏng 金賦 (d. 1301; *BTKP* 64. 613) and Im Ik 任翊 (d. 1301; *BTKP* 46. 436) who accompanied Prince Sim 諶 when the latter went to the Yüan court as a hostage in 1271, and they assisted in the compilation of the records, *shih-chi* 事跡, of Shih-tsu (Qubilai).

63. *KS* 23. 25 identifies the location as "a small stronghold, *sŏng*, of the village of Ch'ŏin 處仁, a hamlet subordinate to Suju 水州" *TYS* 10. 16b remarks that it was of earthen construction and had a military granary 軍倉. The story of the shooting of Sartaq is also given as well as mention of Sartaq's attack on the citadel of refuge at Hanyang 漢陽 (mod. Seoul). Also see W. Bacon, '*Fortresses* ..., p. 12 and p. 16.

64. Kim Yunhu 金允侯 (fl. 1230's) of Kyŏngju was a Buddhist priest who was living at Paekhyŏn-wŏn 白峴院 when the Mongol forces arrived in the area in 1232. He declined an appointment as Supreme General, *sangjanggun*, as a reward for shooting the Mongol commander Sartaq, saying, "At the time of the battle I was without bow and arrows. How can I presume to falsely receive an important reward?" He was then given a temporary appointment as Colonel, *nanjang*, and, subsequently, was appointed Special Supervisor of Defense, *pangho pyŏlgam* of Ch'ungju's citadel of refuge where he played a major role in the seventy-day siege of Ch'ungju. He was promoted to Supreme General for his feats at Ch'ungju and given the post of Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northeastern Frontier-District but, as the Eastern Frontier-District had already fallen to the Mongols at that time, he did not go to his post. No other particulars of his life are given in his *KS* 103. 39b-40 biography; see also *CHSL* 4. 27; *BTKP* carries no entry.

65. According to *YS* 208. 3a this occurred in the eighth month of 1232. However, in a Koryŏ answer to an Eastern Jürčen dispatch contained in *TYSC* 28. 21b-22b = *KS* 23. 25b-26b, we learn that Sartaq died on the sixteenth day of the twelfth month of 1232 = January 27, 1233.

66. The Ke-pu-ai 哥不罕 here mentioned is Wan-ti-han Ke-pu-ai 完迪罕哥不罕 whom the Chin had placed in charge of the Liaotung Mobile Bureau 遼東行省 in 1219. Cf. p. 8206A-B, Wu T'ing-hsieh 吳廷燮, *Chin fang-chen nien-piao* 金方鎮年表, incorporated in Vol. 6 of the *Erh-shih-wu-shih pu-pien*; also see his biography in *Chin-shih* 103.

67. Mongol envoys came and went through Wan-nu's territory because of the Chin garrisons in the south, viz., in P'o-su-lu. The Koryŏ letter is simply saying that despite Korean protests, the envoy insisted on returning via P'o-su-lu and thus, the whole matter was taken out of Korean hands. Whether the Koreans were connected with the killing of the envoy is unknown. Yanai, *Yüan-tai* ..., pp. 135-138 believes that it is unlikely that the Koryŏ authorities were not connected with the incident.

68. A certain Song Tŭkch'ang 宋得昌, a military officer of the rank of Captain, *kyowi* 校尉 who had been in the mission headed by Chi Ŭisim, escaped and returned to the Koryŏ capital to report that Chi had been sent under escort to the Mongol Emperor and that the rest of the party had been detained by Sartaq. Cf. *KS* 23. 14a; *YKC* 3b. He is our Song Ipchang and the Koryŏ authorities were protecting him. Kim Sanggi, Sam pyŏlch'o wa ŭi ku ŭi nan e tae hayŏ 三別抄와 그의 亂에 對하여 [Concerning the *Sam pyŏlch'o* and their Rebellion], incorporated in pp. 92-204, *Tongbang munhwa kyoryu-sa non'go* 東方文化交流史論攷 (Vol. 8 of the Han'guk munhwa ch'ongsŏ 韓國文化叢書) Seoul, 1948, pp. 124-125, and pp. 155-156 note 24, points out that he is probably also the Song Ŭi 宋義 who was Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Office in the court of Wŏnjong in 1270 at the time of the transfer of the capital back to Kaegyŏng and who is described as a subordinate officer who was promoted for just such an action as is described for Song Tŭkch'ang. A certain Hŏ Kongjae 許公才 is also mentioned in the Koryŏ missive but I have been unable to identify him (*YKC* 3b; *KS* 23. 14).

69. The last cited Koryŏ missive is dated the third month of 1232 and corresponds to the withdrawal of Mongol forces from Koryŏ. These forces were subsequently sent against P'u-hsien Wan-nu in the Liaotung area, hence the request for troops from Koryŏ. (Cf. *YKC* 8b - the request was made in 1232). Portions of the Liaotung area had been repeatedly scorched by warfare (cf. *YS* 59. 5a), in 1216, for example, the Mongols had defeated 30 000 Chin troops at Kai-chou-kuan 開州館, driving them eastward to Ta-fu-ying 大夫營 (cf. *KS* 103. 7b-8a). Hence the requests for farming families to be sent to Kai-chou-kuan. *Chung-kuo ku-chien ti-ming ta-tz'u-tien*, p. 954A identifies Kai-chou as the present Feng-ch'eng 鳳城. Ta-fu-ying was on an island in the Yalu River, near the modern Ŭiju.

70. As accused, Koryŏ had not sent envoys to the Mongol court prior to 1232, and this was in accordance with the original agreement. Because the roads were blocked, the Mongols were to send envoys to collect the tribute. According to *YKC*, the first Koryŏ embassy went to the Mongol Court

in the fourth month of 1232, and a second embassy went in the tenth month of 1232 (*YKC* 3b). There were, of course, many envoys sent to the garrisons of the Mongol field commanders in Koryŏ.

The Cha-la mentioned here, however, presents a problem. *CS* Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 104, postulates an identification with the envoy Chu-ku-yü. Yanai, op. cit., p. 143 note 2, suggests a textual lacuna and believes that the Cha-la mentioned here is an error for Han-she 喊捨, the Ch'i-tan leader at Kangdong in 1218-19. Yanai's supposition of an omission in the text is based on what he terms the faulty grammatical structure, but this could be said for the entire missive which is written in a colloquial style and Yanai is rather quick to solve problems by suggesting lacunae or textual corruption — although he is quite often correct. If it is assumed that as far as the name is concerned we are dealing with a certain Cha-la, then both the *CS* and Yanai's suggestions must be discarded on linguistic grounds, as must the equation of Cha-la with Sa-li-ta (Sartaq). Who then is this Cha-la?

According to the documents in *TYSC* 28, following the slaying of the envoy Chu-ku-yü, P'u-hsien Wan-nu informed a Mongol representative in his territory that Koryŏ had turned away from the Mongols. In order to learn the truth of the matter, the envoy set out for Koryŏ but was ambushed by Wan-nu's men who dressed in Korean clothing and killed the envoy in the mountainous border area between the two nations — according to the Koryŏ explanations (cf. *TYSC* 28. 14b-17b). This envoy must have been the Commissioner of the Eastern Lu-administration, *tung-lu-shih,* Koryŏ was accused of killing (cf. *KS* 23. 20b). This I would suggest is our Cha-la — again, assuming no textual error — and he is possibly the same Cha-la who was with the Mongol forces at Kangdong in 1218-19. I note that a later Yüan missive, dated in 1249, mentions that Ho-ch'e 合車 and Cha-la 劄剌 were already dead and treats Cha-la, Chu-ku-yü and Sartaq as separate individuals.

71. For *kuan* 關 read *ch'üeh* 闕, an abbreviation of *kung-ch'üeh* 宮闕, 'palace gates', an expression which was often used to designate the Emperor.

72. Where I have rendered "to kill [them]" the text reads 射回. While it may be an abridgement of a phrase like 射得回去, I believe it is a simple compound but I am unsure of the meaning.

73. 汝弼 = 汝輩, i.e., 汝等; similar to the often used 你每 for 們等 in Mongol documents contained in *KS* 23 and *TYSC* 28.

74. The reasons for demanding a census were practical ones: taxation, corvée, and military service. In 1235-36, an extensive census of North

China was carried out and on the basis of this, social status and obligations were fixed. Cf. Schurmann, *Economic Structure ...*, p. 7. While it remained an often repeated Yüan demand (cf. Qubilai's instructions to Koryŏ Wŏnjong in *YKC* 9b-10), Koryŏ avoided it as long as possible.

75. Koryŏ had said that the refractory 逆 peoples (perhaps a reference to Hong Pogwŏn) of one or two cities in the north, in order to rebel 叛, had wantonly instructed 安諭 the daruγači of the city to slay the people and the daruγači had also killed the envoy sent by the Koryŏ authorities (*KS* 23. 21a-b). Yet, Pian de Carpine remarked that when the Mongols held a city in siege that they would endeavor to entice the inhabitants to surrender and then, if they surrendered, would say to them "come out, so that we may count you according to our custom". When the people came out, the Mongols separated the artisans and those they desired as slaves and the rest they killed. Cf. pp. 37-38, C. Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, London, 1955. Barthold, *Turkestan ...*, p. 435-436, mentions that at the fall of Gurgānj in 1220, the artisans were separated from the rest of the population and "The children of tender years and young women were made prisoners; the remainder of the inhabitants were killed." In one instance, when the Mongol took a Koryŏ city, all males over the age of ten were killed and the girls, women, and young boys were divided among the soldiers. Cf. p. 29, Yu Hongnyŏl 柳洪烈, Koryŏ ŭi Wŏn e taehan kungnyŏ 高麗의 元에 対한 貢女 ["Presentation of Women from Koryŏ to the Yüan Court"], *The Chintan Hakpo* 震檀學報 (published by the Chintan Society, Seoul), 18 (1957), pp. 25-46.

76. Howorth, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 135, summarizes this edict but mentions a different fifth offense, viz., "... fifthly of having killed his prefects." The majority of Yüan edicts contained in *YKC* end with the phrase 我朝安能知之上天其監之哉 (e.g., *YKC* 6a, 6b, 8a, 9b) a closing formula of which Vernadsky says, "... the Great Yasa of Chingis Khan recommended the following formula: "If ye resist — as for us what do we know? The everlasting God knoweth what will happen to you." See p. 96, G. Vernadsky and M. Karpovich, *The Mongols and Russia* (a history of Russia, 3 vols. published to date?), New Haven, 1953; W. Kotwicz' articles in *Collectanea Orientalia* 4 (1933) and 10 (1936) are cited but neither are available to me. In *KS* 23. 4a we find the initial formula often used in Mongol correspondence employed. For a discussion of these formulae see Vernadsky and Karpovich, loc. cit., and the works cited therein; also see G. Vernadsky, 'The Great Yasa of Chingis Khan', p. 345. A discussion of the initial formula may be found on pp. 135-139 of Wladyslaw Kotowicz, 'Formules initiales des documents Mongols aux

XIIIe et XIVe ss', *Rocznik Orientalistycsny*, 10 (1934), pp. 129-157, the only article of W. Kotowicz I have been able to see. Lien-sheng Yang, 'Marginalia to the Yüan Tien-chang', HJAS 19 (1956), pp. 42-51 has pointed out (p. 44) that imperial decrees normally used in North China were translated from Mongolian into colloquial Chinese and designated *sheng-chih* 聖旨, a term often found in Mongolian edicts sent to Koryŏ. Yang also discusses opening and closing phrases in Chinese which appear in these documents.

77. The text (*YKC* 4b) mentions "Within your borders, the ten walled-cities [subordinate to] the Western Capital which are under the jurisdiction of Kim Sinhyo, et al. ...." 爾之境內西京金信孝等所管十數城. I find this passage a bit strange since there is no mention of Kim Sinhyo in the Koryŏ records. There is also the possibility that the text is corrupt and that the two characters 所管 should come between the characters 京 and 金. In such case we would read, "Within your borders, the ten-walled cities of Kŭm(sŏng), Sin(sŏng), Hyo(sŏng), etc., which are subordinate to the Western Capital ..." *YKC* 5b mentions the capture of a Sinsŏng 信城, a Kŭmsansŏng 金山城 and a Kŭmdongsŏng 金洞城.
78. P'u-hsien Wan-nu's state fell in the ninth month of 1233 and Wan-nu was beheaded (cf. *YS* 11; *YS* 59. 5b).
79. Yanai, op. cit., p. 114, p. 116 note 8 and p. 117 note 1, argues that this occurred in the tenth month of 1233 and not in the fifth month as recorded in the *KS*. Hong Pogwŏn's petition to move to the Liaotung area due to Jŭrčen, Ch'i-tan and Koryŏ attacks in the tenth month would seem to support this. Yet, one would think that Koryŏ would have endeavored to retake the lost territory in the northwest while the Mongols were attacking P'u-hsien Wan-nu, whose state fell in the ninth month of 1233. The Mongols were also busy with a final drive upon the Chin capital which fell in the first month of 1234. Therefore, I have followed *KS*. Hong's petition, incidentally, is evidence that it was the entire northwest and not merely the area of the Western Capital which Hong held, for the Jŭrčen and Ch'i-tan attacks would have been much further north than the Western Capital and probably reference is made to border cities.
80. P'il Hyŏnbo 畢賢甫 (d. 1234), see *BTKP* 99. 930. *BTKP* incorrectly renders the last character as *po* 輔; it should read *po* 甫.
81. *Sŏnyusa* 宣諭使 is simply a rather lofty way of saying Pacification Commissioner. In *KSC* 15. 22b5 we find a *sŏnyusa* who was a general appointed earlier (*KSC* 16. 22a8-9) to pacify the rebellion of Han Sun at Ŭiju.
82. Chŏng Ŭi 鄭毅 (d. 1233), see *BTKP* 17. 164 and *BTKP* 17. 165.

BTKP's Chŏng Ŭi 鄭顗 is the same person as their Chŏng Ŭi 鄭毅 which a simple cross-check of their references indicates. There is a brief biography in *KS* 121. 10 ff.

83. Pak Nokchŏn 朴祿全 (d. 1233), see *BTKP* 94. 878. Little is known of him beyond his unsuccessful trip to the Western Capital.
84. The number 3 000 is consistently used for the number of men in the house army of the Ch'oe clan and I suspect that it is a pseudo-number and should read 'several' rather than 'three' thousand. For such usage see p. 218, Yang Lien-sheng, 'Numbers and Units in Chinese Economic History', *HJAS* 12 (1949) 1, pp. 217-225.
85. The phrase 'the forty walled-cities' occurs repeatedly in the Koryŏ records and it is simply a reference to the northwest section of the country, i.e., the Northwestern Frontier-District.

Chapter III

THE INVASIONS OF TANQUT-BĀTUR AND OF PRINCE YEKÜ

By late 1233, Mongol armies led by Prince Güyük and Prince Alčitai 按赤帶 [1] had completed the conquest of P'u-hsien Wan-nu's Eastern J̌ürčen; in the first month of 1234, the Mongol forces, supported by Sung troops who were to get the Honan area for their participation, seized the Chin capital at Feng-ching and completed their conquest of North China. Then, at the Quriltai held by Ögödei in 1235, it was decided to field armies against Koryŏ, the Southern Sung, and the nations west of the Volga, while a fourth group was sent to the borders of Cashmir [2].

In the seventh month (July 17 - August 15) of 1235, Mongol troops raided the Eastern Defense Command, *anbyŏn toho-pu*. Coastal defenses were hurriedly begun on Kanghwa and the inhabitants of the Southern Capital and nearby Kwangju were ordered to evacuate their cities and come to the island (*KS* 23. 29b). The next month the Mongol offensive, under the command of Tanqut-bātur [3] and Hong Pogwŏn opened with the capture of Yonggang 龍岡, Hamjong 咸從, and Samdŭng 三登, major cities in Sŏhae Province (*YKC* 5b; *KS* 23. 29b; *YS* 208. 4a). Later that year the Mongols began throwing Eastern J̌ürčen troops into the battle in the northeast (*KS* 23. 30a). During late 1235, Mongol and Eastern J̌ürčen forces had pushed down Korea's rough eastern littoral as far as Haep'yŏng 海平 (mod. Sangju 尙州) (*KS* 23. 30a). But these forces were only an advance group; in the tenth month (Nov. 12 - Dec. 11) of 1235, reports sent in by the military commissioners in the northeast and northwest all told the same story: many Mongol soldiers crossing the frontier (*KS* 23. 30a).

In the spring of 1236, Mongol forces which had been camped in some seventeen places in the north (*KS* 23. 31a-b), began moving south. Hwangju 黃州, Sinju 信州, and Anju 安州 fell in the third month (April 8 - May 6) of 1236 (*KS* 23. 31b); in the eighth month (Sep. 2 - Oct. 1), Mongol forces had reached Kaeju 价州 (*KS* 23. 31b); the following month encounters were reported at the Southern Capital, and south of the Han River at P'yŏngt'aek 平澤, Aju 牙州, and Hayang-chang 河陽倉. By the

onset of winter (November), Mongol forces had penetrated to Chŏnju [4] (*KS* 23. 32a), some 470 kilometers south of the Yalu.

During this period, Koryŏ did not once attempt to field an army against the Mongols, nor was there any Mongol attempt to storm the island of Kanghwa, either at this time or later [5]. Koryŏ offensive action was limited to the guerrilla-like raids of small patrols, *pyŏlch'o,* which harassed the Mongols with surprise night-raids and ambushes in Korea's many mountains (e.g., *KS* 23. 29b). Population centers which had strong defensive installations and capable garrisons like Chŏnju, Ch'ungju, etc., were left to defend themselves. The people of the small towns, unprotected cities, and scattered settlements in the valleys were evacuated to coastal islands and mountain citadels of refuge (e.g., *KS* 23. 29b); this latter defensive measure was once again to assume large proportions as it had previously in 1231-32.

On Kanghwa Island an elaborate set of defensive works was erected (e.g., *KS* 23. 29b; *KS* 23. 33b). Koryŏ also attempted to stimulate the northern Chinese and the Jürčen to continue resistance to the Mongols at this time but little is known of the outcome of their efforts (cf. *TYSC* 28. 24a-25b).

There were also actions of a spiritual or religious nature of which the greatest were Buddhist activities although the astrologers and diverse diviners were not overlooked. One astrologer submitted the suggestion that the sun be worshipped during the morning hours from 7 AM to 11 AM in order to exorcise the Mongol troops from the peninsula (*KS* 23. 29b) [6].

But undoubtedly the greatest religious activity directed toward the removal of the invaders was the monumental task of recarving the Buddhist Tripiṭaka, *Taejanggyŏng* 大藏經. Begun in 1237, the 81 137 woodblocks comprising the Tripiṭaka were completed some sixteen years later in 1251 (cf. *KS* 24. 2b-3a; *KS* 129. 50b) [7]. A similar Buddhist activity was the *chaehoe* 齋會 designed to cleanse or purify the nation in which Buddhist monks were feasted. There are many records of '30 000 monks' being feasted (e.g., 1225 - *KS* 22. 28b; 1231 - *KS* 23. 2b; 1238 - *KS* 23. 35a, etc.) and this is often interpreted to show the strength of Buddhism in Koryŏ. Such an interpretation misses the mark. First, 30 000 is a pseudo-number and refers to all the monks in the nation [8]. Second, the ceremony which dates to Silla times was, of course, religious in origin and concept but it was, like the carving and recarving of the eighty-one thousand xylographs of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka, a religious act designed to exorcise or scourge invaders from the land [9]. Further, it was largely the Court and not the military government which devoted themselves to these activities. In fact, the frequent Buddhist ceremonies in which the King participated is evidence that his power was symbolic rather than actual at this time. And in this respect there is a striking analogy be-

tween the Koryŏ court under the military government and the Japanese Court under the Hōjō Regents [10].

The Mongol onslaught brought with it a renewal of desertions from the Koryŏ ranks which continued the build-up of a strong Korean settlement in Liaotung. In the fifth month (June 14 - July 12) of 1238, a certain Cho Hyŏnsŭp 趙玄習 and one Yi Wŏnu 李元祐 submitted to the Mongols with 2 000 men. Cho was given a Silver Plaque or authority of a Chiliarch, *ch'ien-hu*, and he and his people were placed under the command of Hong Pogwŏn in Liaotung. A certain Yi Kunsik 李君式 also submitted with twelve people at this time (*YKC* 5b; *YS* 208. 3a-4b).

Despite Koryŏ efforts to resist, the Mongols were too much. Another respite was desperately needed and peace negotiations were opened in the winter [11] of 1238 (*YKC* 6a) with Koryŏ pledging eternal submission (*KS* 23. 33b-34b; *KSC* 16. 27a-b). The Koryŏ envoys returned with the Yüan reply in the spring of 1239 (*YKC* 6a), accompanied by twenty Mongols (*KS* 23. 34b). With the opening of negotiations and the Koryŏ submission, the Mongol troops withdrew (*KS* 23. 34a).

One of the demands brought by the first delegation of Mongol envoys was for the King to present himself at the Mongol Court; a second delegation of 137 Mongols brought a similar demand a few months later (*KS* 23. 34b; *KSC* 16. 28a). As the Koryŏ Queen Dowager, *t'aehu* 太后, had died just at this time (*KS* 23. 34b), the King used the three-year mourning period (cf. *KS* 64. 22b) to avoid the demand (*YKC* 1a; *YKC* 6b). It was still to be many years before the Mongols would be able to coax the King even across the straits to the mainland. Koryŏ used many excuses: the King was ill (*KS* 24. 7b-8a), mourning for his mother (*YKC* 1a; *YS* 208. 4a), later he was too old (*KS* 24. 3a-b; *KS* 24. 7a-8a), etc. Yet the Mongol demands, particularly their demand for a hostage, could not be ignored. Koryŏ's first effort was to dispatch Chŏn [12], the Duke of Sinan (*KS* 23. 34b), whom they passed off as the King's younger brother (cf. *YKC* 8a), to the Mongol Court with a retinue of 148 men to present a petition and tribute (*YS* 208. 4a). For the next several years he scurried back and forth conveying Mongol demands and Koryŏ's evasive replies.

At this point the Mongols repeated some of their demands in a forcefully worded edict which called for Koryŏ to endeavor to fulfil several specific instructions: to leave the islands, to take a census of the people and submit household registers, to produce hostages, to submit annual tribute, and to produce those who had transgressed (by advocating resistance, i.e., Ch'oe U, et al.) (*YKC* 6b-8a).

The pressure for the King to visit the Mongol Court and the demands for hostages resulted in a bit of fakery. "In the summer, the fourth month of the

twenty-eighth year of the reign (of Kojong = May 13 - June 10, 1241), they took a royal relative, Sun [13], the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng, and proclaimed him to be the [Crown] Prince. Leading ten officials and male relatives, he entered the Mongol [Court] as a hostage" [14] (*KS* 23. 35a-b; also see *KS* 87. 9a; *YS* 2. 7a; *YS* 208. 4b; *HY* 20. 25a). The substitution was not discovered until some fourteen years later and it is easy to imagine a look of disbelief on Möngke's face when he asked Wang Sun, "Why did you call yourself the Prince before?"

Sun replied: "[When] I, [Your] Servant, was small, I was brought up in the palace and I believed that the King was my father and I regarded the Queen as my mother. I didn't realize that I was not [their] hostage son" (*TT* 32. 56. 4-5; also see *KS* 99. 5a).

Wang Sun was of royal blood, but his family had branched from the 'main stem', *taejong* 大宗, several generations back and, moreover, Chŏn 倎, the Crown Prince, was then twenty-two years of age and qualified as a hostage. Thus, Sun was, in this case, unacceptable. Yet Sun, the Koryŏ sacrificial goat, was to serve the Mongols loyally and even to marry a Mongol Princess, one of the daughters of Möngke; the first link by marriage between the Mongol and Koryŏ royal families.

And so, in 1241, the thirteenth year of the reign of Ögödei, the great Mongol General Üyer [15] led seventeen-year old prince Sun, and the relatives [16] of Hong Pogwŏn, whose release Tanqut-bātur had been instructed to obtain two years earlier (cf. *YKC* 5b), to the Mongol Court at Qarā-qorum. Ögödei was so pleased, it is related, that he awarded Üyer with the office of supreme military commander over seven *lu* 路('province') administrations (*YS* 120. 15a; *KS* 130. 4b; *YKC* 6a. 10).

This engendered a truce which was to last, after a fashion, until 1247 [17]. Koryŏ tribute missions, which recommenced as a preliminary effort in late 1239, once again trekked toward the Mongol Court (*KS* 23. 36a; *YKC* 6b; *YKC* 8a) and buildings began to spring up at Sŭngch'ŏn-pu, the jumping-off point for Kanghwa on the mainland, for the lodging and entertainment of the frequent Mongol envoys. The question on Kanghwa was how long they would be able to avoid the frequently repeated Mongol demand for the removal of the court and officials back to the former capital (e.g., *YKC* 7a). While the Mongols were, some years later, able to get the King to cross to the mainland for short periods to meet Mongol envoys, Ch'oe U and his successors, were to remain on the island the rest of their lives. For it was principally Ch'oe U and the military faction surrounding him who were responsible for Koryŏ's continued resistance. The breathing spell was used to recover and re-equip. One measure taken was to send the active Min Hŭi, et al., 37 men to the southern provinces in 1243; "they were called Special Supervisors for the Encouragement of

Agriculture, *kwŏnmong pyŏlgam* [18] 勸農別監, but really they were to prepare the defenses" (*KS* 79. 7b-8a; *KS* 23. 36a-b).

The Mongol reaction to the continued Koryŏ stalling was as expected [19]. It was decided at the Quriltai which elected Güyük (Ting-tsung 定宗, r. 1246-1248) in August of 1246 [20], to launch an attack on Koryŏ and, in the autumn of 1247, a Mongol force, commanded by Marshal A-mu-k'an 阿母侃 and supported by Hong Pogwŏn, arrived to camp in the Yŏmju 鹽州 (mod. Yŏnan 延安) area (*KS* 23. 39a-b; *YKC* 8a). In early 1248, the Koryŏ authorities issued an order to the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northern Frontier-District to lead the inhabitants of all the walled-cities in the northern district to seek safety on the coastal islands (*KS* 23. 39b-40a).

Frequent groups of mounted Mongols appeared who said they were hunting but whom the Koryŏ authorities suspected of being reconnaissance groups (e.g., *KS* 23. 39b) and we read that "the Sŏhae Province 西海道 Circuit Commissioner, *anch'al-sa,* reported that forty mounted barbarians forded the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River 淸川江 and entered the borders saying they were hunting marmots. Due to this, all the *yangban* (i.e., military and civil officials) [21] who had gone to Songdo 松都 (= Kaegyŏng) returned to Kanghwa." At the time, they had sent the *yangban* to go in shifts to guard Songdo (*KS* 23. 40a). This passage would imply Mongol control north of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River which is not unbelievable as some cities in the northwest are recorded in the Yüan records as having been retaken at this time (cf. *YKC* 8a). There was, moreover, no real offensive launched southward from this area. Further, Chŏn, the Duke of Sinan, who had been sent to the Mongol Court in the tenth month (Oct. 22 - Nov. 20) of 1245 (*KS* 23. 38a), returned in early 1249 (*KS* 23. 40b) just after news had come in of the death of Güyük, the Mongol Emperor (*KS* 23. 40b), which implies relations had not been severed. The Mongols did, at any rate, control the area north of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River but it should probably be viewed as a *fait accompli* which the Koryŏ authorities had no alternative but to accept. In support of this, we see that from the third month (April 4 - May 3) of 1250, all the people of the North(western) Frontier-District, *pukkye,* were moved southward to the Western Capital, Kaegyŏng, and Sŏhae Province area (cf. *KS* 23. 42a; *KSC* 16. 41a).

There was, however, no lull in the arrival of Mongol delegations in Koryŏ nor the dispatch of envoys to the Mongols by Koryŏ (e.g., *KS* 23. 24a). Koryŏ's relations with the Eastern Jürčen were as bad as ever despite the fact that both nations were nominally under the Mongol cloak. In answer to a dispatch from an Eastern Jürčen Chiliarch received in the spring of 1247, which informed Koryŏ that they would send some fifty men into Koryŏ territory to search for fugitives who had fled into Koryŏ, Koryŏ replied that between the

two nations, the mountains were formidable and the roads perilous and therefore empty of travellers. The reply went on to accuse the Eastern Jürčen of raiding Koryŏ under the pretext of hunting or tracking down fugitives and suggested that the matter be submitted to the Mongol Emperor; the frontier, Koryŏ said, was to be considered closed (*KSC* 16. 36a). Hostilities flared briefly with raiding Eastern Jürčen troops in late 1249 and extended into late 1250 (*KS* 23. 41a-43a).

In the interim, additional fortifications were erected on Kanghwa Island (*KS* 23. 43a) which now consisted of coastal defenses along the side of the island facing the straits (*KS* 23. 29b), an outer defensive wall on the island (*KS* 23. 33b), and a middle defensive wall around the city of Kangdo (*KS* 23. 43a). To the queries of the Mongol envoys who pointed out that they had already submitted, Koryŏ replied that the installations were for the protection of the people from Sung 'pirates' [22] (*KS* 23. 1b). While there was a germ of truth in the statement, the additional fortifications were erected just after Ch'oe Hang [23], the son of Ch'oe U, took over control of the Koryŏ military government upon his father's death in 1249 (*KS* 23. 41a-b).

Defensive installations did not, of course, constitute the sole construction on Kanghwa Island. In the city of Kangdo 江都 which served as the capital on the island, palaces and governmental buildings were slowly build through the years. The King who had first been lodged in a hostel, was moved into the home of a general (*KS* 23. 28a). Shortly thereafter, mention is made of an audience chamber, *naejŏn* 內殿 (*KS* 23. 27a), but not until 1243, is the main palace, *pon'gwŏl* 本闕 , mentioned (*KS* 23. 37a). After the transfer to the island, it is related, the designations of the ball fields, the palaces, temples, and shrines all resembled those of the former capital, while the many Buddhist festivals and assembles were all performed according to the old ceremonies (*KS* 23. 28a). One manner in which this was done was the utilization of private dwellings already on the island. An example of this is the confiscation of a private residence which was designated Pongŭn Temple 奉恩寺 after its famous namesake on the mainland (*KS* 23. 27a). Among the buildings of interest were the National Academy, *Kukchagam* 國子監 built in 1251 and located in Hwasan-dong 花山洞 (*KS* 24. 2b) and the Office for Xylographs of the Tripiṭaka, *Taejanggyŏng p'andang* 大藏經板堂 located outside of the west gate of the city (*KS* 24. 2b-3a), where in 1251, as related above, the recarving of the Tripiṭaka was completed [24].

Of interest also are the buildings belonging to the ruling Ch'oe clan which included the Household Bureau of the Ch'oe Clan, Chinyang-pu 晉陽府 (*KS* 23. 33a). But more spectacular were the Ch'oe mansion and grounds. In 1234, Ch'oe U had used the Guard Corps, *tobang* 都房 , and 4000 soldiers

to transport lumber by ship from the old capital, in the process of which it is said many were drowned. They also brought back enough pine and juniper trees to make a park 'several tens of *li*' in area by the Ch'oe mansion (*KSC* 16. 22a). One of the sights of the new capital was Ch'oe U's 'winged pavilion', *sipcha-gak* 十字閣, so-called because it was built in the form of a cross and which, a contemporary assures us, "Truly it is that which has never been seen among men" (*TYSC* 24. 1a). It was located to the west of Ch'oe's residence – to the south was an enormous tower, said to be capable of seating 1 000 persons, which overlooked the Ch'oe polo field (*TYSC* 24. 3b-4b). Both Ch'oe U and his successor Ch'oe Hang were fond of polo, *kyokku* [25] 擊毬, which was chiefly a military sport in Koryŏ and often played by the Koryŏ cavalry units, *sin'gi* (e.g., *KS* 81. 13b). At times the matches sponsored by the Ch'oe clan had the appearance of festivals. The King and Chief Ministers were invited and often featured javelin throwing and mounted archery; competition was flavored by awarding prizes while at times the meets continued for five or six days (*KS* 129. 35; *KS* 129. 45b).

The death of Ch'oe U in the winter of 1249, brought with it the expected repercussions. The Guard Corps, *tobang,* immediately assembled at Ch'oe Hang's residence (*KSC* 16. 39a), although Ch'oe U had thoughtfully given his son five hundred men of his own house army the previous year (*KSC* 16. 38a). Two of the first casualties were Director of Affairs for the Bureau of Military Affairs, *chich'umirwŏnsa,* Min Hŭi and Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Kim Kyŏngson, who were exiled to islands. Several other military and civil officials, and thirty of Ch'oe U's concubines suffered the same fate (*KSC* 16. 39a). Reassured of his position, Ch'oe Hang, in an attempt to gain popularity among the people, remitted the special regional tribute and the fishing boat and fish-pond taxes of several regions (*KSC* 16. 39b). But these measures were to small avail. The first attempt to overthrow Ch'oe and to restore power to the monarch occurred in the third month (April 4 - May 3) of 1250, when Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, one Chu Suk 周肅 (d. 1250; *BTKP* 19. 180), attempted to use the Guard Corps, *tobang,* the Night Patrol, *ya pyŏlch'o,* and some soldiers to this end. Chu's indecision led to the failure of the plot and resulted in a wide-spread purge (*KS* 129. 43a; *KSC* 16. 40a-41a; *TT* 32. 60) which lasted into the following year when Ch'oe Hang used the Night Patrol, *ya pyŏlch'o,* to eliminate his stepmother of the Tae clan, her family, including a son by a former husband, and her slaves (*KS* 129. 45b-46a; *KSC* 17. 1a-2b; *TT* 32. 63).

In addition to his Chinyang fief [26] and large land holdings in the Kaegyŏng area, Ch'oe Hang also inherited control of the organs of the military government.

Let us pause at this point for a brief consideration of these mechanisms and their development [27].

The *Chungbang* 重房 or Military Council was one of the earliest organs to be utilized and traces its origins to the reign of Mokchong 穆宗 (r. 998-1009) when it was established as a central headquarters for the high military generals of the army and the royal guard units (*KS* 77. 30a).

The early military rulers, i.e., before the rise of the Ch'oe clan, ruled through the Military Council (see *HY* 17. 3a) and control of the Military Council, i.e., the military men who comprised it, was essential to the retention of power since these military men commanded the various units of the government army [28]. During the reigns of Ŭijong and Myŏngjong, the Military Council grew in importance (*KS* 77. 30a) until it not only handled military affairs but also handled criminal cases; regulated trade to the extent of setting market prices and standardizing the bushel (*kok*) and peck (*tu*) measures (*KSC* 12. 51b-52a). Military officials were placed in charge in all the provincial posts in 1172 (*KS* 19. 22b), a necessity in the capital as well due to the purge of the literati. An exception were the Administrators, *p'an'gwan*, of the *chu* and *chin* administrations in the two Frontier-Districts who were not allowed military appointments (*KSC* 12. 30a). Following the rise of the Ch'oe clan, the Military Council lost its importance as a central governing authority and many of its functions were shifted to other organs. After the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan in 1258, the Military Council was retained. It was abolished briefly in the reign of King Ch'ungsŏn 忠宣王 (r. 1309-1313) but was reestablished and continued in use until the end of the Koryŏ period (*KS* 77. 30a) [29].

In 1209, Ch'oe Ch'unghon established the *Kyojŏng togam* 敎定都監 or Supreme Directorate as an emergency measure to put down an attempt to overthrow him (*KSC* 14. 25a-b). During the rule of Ch'oe U it assumed many of the functions previously handled by the Military Council and became the chief governing body of the military rulers who were appointed to head it as Supervisor, *pyŏlgam*. The Supervisor of the Supreme Directorate was, in brief, the military overlord and the appointment as Supervisor was always made by the King [30], following which all the officials would make their appearance to present congratulations, etc. The Supreme Directorate, which lasted until the overthrow of the Im clan in 1270, supervised the various departments of government and it is said that "in general, all that which was implemented emanated from the Supreme Directorate" (*KSC* 15. 38a). Collection (and remission) of special regional taxes and tribute was also handled by tax-collectors, *suhwagwŏn* 收穫員 (lit. harvest-men) placed in the various provinces by the Supreme Directorate; these officials were recalled when Ch'oe Hang assumed power and their duties were turned over to the Circuit Inspectors, *anch'al-sa* (*KSC* 16. 39b).

In the sixth month (July 7 - Aug. 5) of 1225, Ch'oe U established the *Chŏngbang* [31] 政房 or Civil Council in his residence. The officials of the Civil Council who were appointed government officials had private designations, as opposed to the official title of their posts, viz., those who became ministers were called *Chŏngsaek sŭngsŏn* 政色承宣 or Ministers who were members of the Civil Council; those of the official grade of Third Class were called *Chŏngsaek sangsŏ* 政色尙書 or Presidents of Departments who were members of the Civil Council; those of the official grade of Fourth Class and below were called *Chŏngsaek sogyŏng* 政色少卿 or Secretaries who were members of the Civil Council. Beneath the latter were selected literati called *Chŏngsaek sŏje* 政色書題 or Scribes, who were also known as *p'il-to-ji* (Mo. *bičigečí*) [32] 必闍赤, who carried writing materials and made notations on matters brought up for Ch'oe's decision by the officials of the Civil Council. It is related that at the time the Civil Council was established, all the officials had gone to Ch'oe U's residence to present the Annual Résumé of Government *chŏngnyŏn tomok* 政年都目 [33]. As Ch'oe U sat and heard the reports, officials below the Sixth Class in official grade bowed twice, while those outside the hall prostrated themselves on the ground (*KSC* 15. 34b). The Annual Résumé of Government undoubtedly included the personal record sheet, generally known as *chŏngan* 政案, which listed the merits and demerits of each official and which formed the basis for advancement. The decisions reached in the Civil Council were passed on to the King who "simply handed them down and that was all." The Civil Council, at any rate, outlasted the military overlords. Following the fall of the Ch'oe clan it was established in an appropriate palace at the suggestion of the Confucianist Yu Kyŏng (*KS* 105. 2a). It was abolished in 1298, reestablished in 1320, abolished and immediately reestablished in 1345, abolished and reestablished once more in 1352, and, during the reign of King Chang 昌 (r. 1389), the designation was changed to *Sangsŏ-sa* 尙瑞司 (*KS* 75. 2b-7a; *KSC* 15. 34b; *IC sŏlch'ŏn* 1. 8b-9a; *IC* 9A; *CHSL* 4. 25a).

In addition to the above there were other organs and units associated closely with the Ch'oe clan. The Ch'oe holdings, for example, were handled by the Household Bureau of the Ch'oe clan, known first as *Hŭngnyŏng-pu* 興寧府 and later as *Chinyang-pu* 晋陽府. But far more important were the various military units which grew powerful during the rule of the Ch'oe clan, and which included the *tobang* or Guard Corps. The term *tobang* was originally used by the military overlord General Kyŏng Taesŭng for a select unit of 110 bodyguards he organized in 1179 and which was disbanded following his death in 1183. Shortly after Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn rose to power, a sudden crisis developed when his brother Ch'oe Ch'ungsu 崔忠粹 (d. 1197; *BTKP*

24. 228) rebelled with 1 000 soldiers. Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn subsequently formed a private guard unit, selecting those that were brave and strong from among the civil and military functionaries, and the soldiers. They were divided into six units, *pŏn* 番 [34], to do guard duty on alternate days at the Ch'oe residence and were called the *tobang* or Guard Corps; they also acted as an escort when Ch'oe left his home. Originally composed of six units, by 1257 their strength had increased to thirty-six units. During the rule of Ch'oe U, the designations Inner Guard Corps, *nae-tobang* 內～, and Outer Guard Corps, *oe-tobang* 外～, appear which indicates a division of this large group although the reason for the division or its significance is unknown [35]. The Guard Corps, although originally the private guard of Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn, assumed an important role as a power instrument and the later military ruler Im Yŏn utilized a six unit Guard Corps. The Guard Corps was finally disbanded in 1270 following the fall of the Im clan (*KS* 100. 18a; *KS* 129; *HY* 17. 36; *TT* 29. 4; *TT* 34. 74; *TUK* 6. 36b-37a).

Other military units included the *Sŏbang* 書房 or Civil Guards established by Ch'oe U. It is related that among Ch'oe U's retainers, *mun'gaek* 門客, there were many learned scholars and so, in 1227, they were divided into three units. While their duties are not entirely clear and it is difficult to see a distinction between the Civil Guards and the Guard Corps, they did act as a guard unit. It has been suggested that they were scribes who also did guard duty [37]. The Civil Guards were disbanded in 1270 following the downfall of the Im clan (*KS* 129; *KS* 130. 26b).

A discussion of other military units associated with the military rulers and the Ch'oe clan in particular, is contained in the Appendix 'Patrols', *pyŏlch'o*.

As Ch'oe Hang was consolidating his own power, Mongol-Koryŏ relations which had been relatively calm during the interlude following the death of Güyük in 1248, once again became turbulent. When Möngke (Hsien-tsung 憲宗, r. 1251-1259) ascended the throne, he repeated the two strong Mongol demands that the King visit the Mongol Court and that the Koryŏ authorities leave Kanghwa Island and return to the old capital on the mainland (*KS* 24. 3a; *KSC* 17. 4a). The Chief Ministers and those of the official grade of the fourth rank and above discussed a reply to the edict. While it was suggested that the Crown Prince be sent to the Mongol Court, a second proposal was made that they could offer the excuse that the King was too old and ill to visit the Mongol Court and that there was still time to re-examine the proposition of sending the Crown Prince (*KS* 24. 3a-b).

Some two thousand Eastern Jürčen troops were reported crossing the frontier in mid-1252 (*KS* 24. 4a), just prior to the arrival of a delegation of

Mongol envoys who again endeavored to get the King to cross the straits and receive them. The Korean refusal to follow the Emperor's instructions infuriated the Mongols (*KS* 24. 4b). By the autumn of 1252, Koryŏ quietly began to prepare for the worst and Special Supervisors of Defense [38] were sent to all the mountain citadels of refuge (*KS* 24. 5a). In early 1253, three hundred Eastern Jŭrčen cavalry surrounded Tŭngju [39] in the northwest (*KS* 24. 5), a small raiding party was reported in the summer and then, a few days later, the gravity of the situation was revealed. Some inhabitants of Wŏnju 原州 who had been taken captive by the Mongols, returned to inform the Koryŏ authorities that A-mu-k'an and Hong Pogwŏn had told the Emperor that Koryŏ was building heavy fortifications and had no intention of returning to the mainland. The Emperor, they said, had ordered the Imperial Brother Sungchu [40] to take a force of 10 000, go through the nation of the Eastern Jŭrčen and enter from the Eastern Frontier-District. At the same time, he had ordered A-mu-k'an and Hong Pogwŏn to proceed to the Northern Frontier-District. These forces, the informants said, were then encamped at Ta-i-chou 大伊州 (*KS* 24. 6a).

Actual operations were under Prince Yekü [41] who sent a delegation of sixteen men to the Koryŏ court in the fifth month of 1253 (*KS* 24. 6a), but apparently there was no change in the Korean position, for on August 3 (*chia-shen* 甲申 day of the seventh month) of 1253, Mongol troops crossed the Yalu. Dispatches were immediately sent to the Circuit Inspectors, *anch'alsa,* and the Civil Governors, *sunmunsa,* to lead the people to seek refuge in the mountain citadels and coastal islands (*KS* 24. 6b). By August 10 (*hsin-mao* 辛卯 day of the same month), Mongol forces had forced the Taedong River 大洞江 (*KS* 24. 7a).

An attack on Kanghwa was evidently anticipated, for the Koreans practiced naval warfare in the straits, but far more active were the regional patrols, *pyŏlch'o* (*KS* 24. 7a).

The Koryŏ Chief Ministers had debated whether or not the Crown Prince, *tonggung* 東宮 , or his younger brother Ch'ang [42] 淐 , the Duke of An'gyŏng 安慶公 , should be sent to lead the officials of the third rank and below out to submit (*KS* 24. 7; *KS* 130. 48b-49b). In a previous discussion regarding submission, Ch'oe Hang told the ministers, all of whom advised submission, that they had submitted the spring and autumn tribute continuously and they had sent three hundred persons (as envoys) who had not yet returned. Even though they submitted, Ch'oe said, he feared it would be profitless (*KSC* 17. 8a-b).

Even as they met, one Mongol force rode through the northeast pillaging and a second force was active in Sŏhae Province. Prince Yekü had sent mis-

sives repeating the Mongol demands, informing the Koryŏ authorities that he had been sent to find out if the King were really too old and sick to go to the Mongol Court, and he had set a limit of six days for the King to appear on the mainland (*KS* 24. 7b-8b).

After sending gifts to the Mongol commanders, the Koryŏ Chief Ministers finally decided upon a reply: if the Mongol armies would withdraw, they would leave the islands and return to a peaceful life on the mainland (*KS* 24. 8b). Yekü replied that the troops could be withdrawn when the King came out and submitted; the alternative was to continue the fighting (*KS* 24. 9a).

On the mainland the Mongol forces rode unchecked in groups numbering from ten to three thousand. As before, Koryŏ maintained a defensive position with the exception of the raids of the patrols, *pyŏlch'o,* which were, in the main, limited to small-scale ambushes and surprise attacks (*KS* 24. 8-14).

Fierce fighting surrounded many of the cities whose garrisons could count on little save their own efforts to withstand the Mongol troops. Ch'ungju 忠州 managed to hold out through a seventy-day siege which began in the ninth month (Sept. 25 - Oct. 23) of 1253 (*KS* 24. 9a; *KSC* 17. 10b-11a) chiefly through the efforts of Special Defense Supervisor Kim Yunhu. When provisions ran out, Yunhu advised his men to forget their class differences and then by way of encouragement, burned the government slave registers [43] and divided up the livestock which had been captured. Yunhu also promised that all who put forth their best efforts would be given official rank. In this way, the soldiers were encouraged and Ch'ungju held (*KS* 24. 12a; *KS* 103. 39b-40a; *KS* 130. 9a; *KSC* 17. 14a). The Koryŏ authorities kept Kim's pledge early the following year. Kim himself was made Supervisor of the Gate Guards, *kammunwi* 監門衛, with the temporary rank of Supreme General, while those of his force, including the government slaves and the *paekchŏng* [44] 白丁 class, were given rank in accordance with their station (*KS* 103. 40a; *KSC* 17. 16b).

Other cities were not so fortunate. At Ch'unju 春州 the Mongols erected a double barricade of wood around the city to prevent escape. Inside the city the wells ran dry and so the blood of the livestock was drunk. Some, in their hopelessness, burnt themselves and their families to death. An attempt was made by a dare-death squad to break through the palisade but it was unsuccessfull. In the end the Mongols slaughtered the inhabitants of the city (*KS* 24. 9a; *KS* 121. 12a-b; *KS* 130. 9a).

In the winter of 1253, Yekü fell ill at Ch'ungju — which was then under siege — and was told by a diviner that he should not remain long at that spot if he wished to recover. And so, leaving A-mu-k'an and Hong Pogwŏn to carry on, he rode north with 1 000 picked cavalry. Koryŏ sent Hŭi [45] 僖, the Count

of Yŏngan 永安伯 ; to convey gifts to him at Kaegyŏng and to request the withdrawal of the Mongol forces. Yekü told them accusingly, "The troops can be withdrawn only when the King crosses the river to welcome my envoys." Then he sent Mangɣudai, *meng-ku-ta* 蒙古大 , et al., 10 men to Kanghwa (*KS* 24. 10a-b).

There had been a great deal of discussion on Kanghwa about the appropriate policy to follow in order to bring about the withdrawal of Mongol forces (*KS* 24. 8a; *KS* 24. 9b-10a) and they tried to win some respite by sending gifts to Yekü and his commanders, notably A-mu-k'an (*KS* 24. 8a-b; *KS* 24. 10a).

These measures had proven ineffective and so when the delegation led by Mangɣudai arrived at the new palace at Sŭngch'ŏn-pu, the King, who had formerly received envoys at Chep'o 楸浦 the entry point on Kanghwa (e.g., *KS* 24. 6a-b), crossed to the mainland escorted by 80 men of the Night Patrol, *ya pyŏlch'o,* to meet them. Mangɣudai accused the King of killing thousands to save himself and charged him to submit. At this point (1235.11 = Nov. 23 - Dec. 21), Yekü sent an envoy to tell them to establish daruɣači or resident commissioners and to dismantle the fortifications on Kanghwa. There was also a letter from one of his officials [46] demanding gold, silver, otter pelts, ramie cloth, and other items (*KS* 24. 11a). Answering the letters, Koryŏ replied that it was not their custom to live exposed and pointed out the tragic truth that they had been the target of plundering pirates since time immemorial. They also reminded Yekü that he had promised to withdraw his forces if the King crossed to the mainland to welcome his envoys but that the promise was not kept. On the contrary, they complained, his letter clearly indicated that the Mongols intended to establish daruɣači and to station 10 000 troops in Koryŏ. How, they asked, could they be expected to return to the old capital on the mainland if this was the result of Yekü's promise (*KS* 24. 11a-b) To the demands for goods they pleaded insolvency but they did sent articles as evidence of their good faith (*KS* 24. 11b).

In the twelfth month (Dec. 22, 1253 - Jan. 20, 1254), the siege at Ch'ungju was finally lifted and, in the first month of 1254, Ch'ang, the Duke ot An'gyŏng, who was destined to play an important role in later events, was dispatched to the Mongol garrison (*KS* 24. 12a; *KSC* 17. 15a) [47].

Although the Mongols tried their hand at amphibious warfare, landing seven troopships on Kal Island 葛島 in the second month (Feb. 19 - Mar. 20) of 1254, and taking captive thirty households (*KS* 24. 13a), the situation was relatively calm from the winter of 1253 when the siege of Ch'ungju was lifted. This is attributable to the withdrawal of Mongol forces following the dismissal of Prince Yekü due, not to illness, but to his resentment at being attached to the forces of Prince T'a-la-erh [48] 塔剌兒. The forces under A-mu-k'an

began their withdrawal in the spring of 1254 after the arrival of Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyŏng, at their camp (*KS* 24. 12b).

As the Koryŏ monarch was getting into the habit of crossing to Sŭngch'ŏn-pu, which by this time had grown to a small walled-city, to entertain Mongol delegations in a new Korean move toward reconciliation and, as a pestilence racked the capital (*KS* 24. 14a), a Master of Divination, *chŏnch'ŏm* 典籤, of An'gyŏng-pu 安慶府 or Household Bureau of the Duke of An'gyŏng, returned from the Mongols with the news that the Emperor had commissioned J̌alairtai, *Che-lo-ta* [49] 車羅大, to govern Tongguk [50] 東國, i.e., Koryŏ (*KS* 24. 14a; *KSC* 17. 16a-17b). Shortly thereafter, a Mongol envoy arrived with a dispatch [51] which said that although the King had come to the mainland, Ch'oe Hang, Yi Ŭngnyŏl 李應烈, Chu Yŏnggyu 周永珪, and Yu Kyŏng [52] 柳璥 had not come over. "Was this truly submission?" the note asked (*KS* 24. 14a-b) [53].

Notes to Chapter III

1. Cf. Ikeuchi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū,* Vol. 1, p. 636; also see Yanai, *Yüan-tai ...*, p. 70 ff and p. 114.
2. Cf. Howorth, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 135; Boyle, op. cit., pp. 195-198; Yanai, *Yüan-tai ...*, pp. 117-118, who places this assembly in the autumn of 1234. Also see *YS* 2. 5a.
3. Tanqut-bātur 唐古拔都魯 . Tanqut refers, of course, to the nation of that name, also known as Hsi-hsia. Bātur, a contraction of Ba'atur (< Bayatur), means 'hero' in Mongolian.
4. The city of Chŏnju 全州 is in the modern N. Cnŏlla Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 32. 548b-557b.
5. It is generally said that the Mongols, unskilled in amphibious warfare, and with only a comparatively weak force in Koryŏ, were unable to take Kanghwa Island and so they tried to force the Koryŏ authorities off the island and attempted to bring about their submission by ravaging the mainland. See Yi, *Han'guk-sa,* Vol. 2, pp. 567-568, and Yanai, *Yüan-tai ...*, p. 127-128. Yanai, op. cit., p. 118, has also noted that the Mongols seldom concentrated their forces during this period but scattered in small groups to pillage. Yet, the Mongols certainly considered the idea of attacking Kanghwa and, in 1232, had even built ships for that purpose. A certain Pyŏn Yŏ 邊呂 who had been captured at T'aeju, persuaded them that it was too dangerous to try and so they burnt the boats. Pyŏn managed to escape and was given the rank of Supreme General for his deed. Cf. *TYS* 54. 15b-16a.
6. For the role of the astrologers, whose religious function is often overlooked, also see *KS* 24. 5b. For an example of monks as prophets see *KS* 23. 28a. A thorough study of the subject has been made by Yi Pyŏngdo, *Koryŏ sidae ŭi yŏn'gu* 高麗時代의研究 [Research on the Koryŏ Period], Seoul, 1954; another excellent source is Part II of Hyŏn Sangyun's 玄相允 , *Chosŏn sasang-sa* 朝鮮思想史 (Part I published in *AY* 3 (1960) 1, pp. 261-312 and Part II in *AY* 4 (1961) 1, pp. 299-355; presumably the other sections will also be published in future issues of *AY.*
7. These endeavors have been well summed up by H. Hammitzsch and F. Vos, *Die Religionen Japans und Koreas,* Stuttgart, 1963 (Chapter 'Buddhismus'); "So wurde das Tripiṭaka (*Taejang-gyŏng*) zweimal gedruckt; das erste Mal (in der ersten Hälfte des 11. Jahrhunderts) als eine Art Beschwörungsmittel (!) gegen die Einfälle der Khitan, das zweite Mal zwischen 1237 und 1251. Die 81 258 Holtzplatten zum Druck der zweiten Ausgabe befinden sich heute in Haeinsa, einem Kloster auf dem Kaya-san, westlich von Taegu."
The most detailed studies are Ikeuchi Hiroshi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū,* Vol. 2,

pp. 483-642, Tōkyō, 1937, and P.Demiéville, 'Les Versions Chinoises du Milidapañha', *Bulletin de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient* XXIV (1924), pp. 1-301; see pp. 190-207. Also see L.G.Paik (Paek Nakchun 白樂濬) 'Tripiṭaka Koreana', *TKBRAS* XXXII (1951), pp. 62-78. The carving of the Tripiṭaka was done by the Bureau for the Tripiṭaka, *Taejang togam* 大藏都監 , located outside the west gate of the city of Kangdo. It is interesting to note that this bureau also published the *Hyangyak kugŭp pang* 鄕藥救急方 , the oldest surviving Korean medical text; a reprint was made in the reign of Yi T'aejong 太宗 (r. 1401-1418), and a second reprint in 1427. The sole surviving copy is at present in the Archives of the Imperial Household Bureau of Japan, cf. Doo Jong Kim (Kim Tujŏng), 'Hyang Yak Ku Kup Pang', *Bulletin* No. 12, (1960) of The Korean Research Center, Seoul, pp. 35-36.

8. Cf. Ninomiya Keinin 二宮啓仁 , Kōrai no saikaj ni tsuite 高麗の齋會について [The Koryŏ *Chaehoe*], *CG* 21 & 22 (1961), pp. 228-236.
9. The intent of the carving and recarving of the Tripiṭaka has been well summarized by Lee who says that "The intention of this enterprise was to repel the invading Tartars and Mongols by meritorious deeds to Buddha." Cf. P.H.Lee, 'Introduction to the Chang'ga: The Long Poem', *Oriens Extremus*, 3 (1956), pp. 94-115; also see *TYSC* 41 and note 7 above.
10. See Sansom, op. cit., p. 441 for the situation in Japan at this time.
11. Winter was normally an ideal time for negotiations. The repeated withdrawal of Mongol forces north to the Yalu region during the winter was not a matter of weather alone but formed an important institution of nomadic life, the hunt. During the frequent periods of respite, Mongol forces in Koryŏ often occupied themselves in hunting (e.g., *KS* 23. 40a). This was evidently a common practice and Bar Hebraeus (viz., Gregory Abu'l Faradj, 1225-1286) in his *Chronography* cites the Mongol Hunting Statue, "When (the Mongols) are unoccupied after a war with enemies, they shall devote themselves to the chase." Cited Vernadsky, '*The Scope* ...', p. 351.
12. Chŏn 佺, the Duke of Sinan 新安公 (d. 1261), was a descendant in the eighth generation of Hyŏnjong 顯宗 , but he was not Kojong's brother. Kojong had no brothers, as I have pointed out previously. This was simply a Koryo ruse which they had used before and were to use again. Chŏn was the son of Wang Ch'un 王琠, the Duke of Hawŏn 河源公 (cf. *KS* 90. 9a-b), while Kojong was the son of Kangjŏng 康宗 (cf. *KS* 22. 1a; *KS* 24. 44a-b). Chŏn's daughter later married the

Crown Prince (= Wŏnjong) after the latter's first wife had died. For biographical information see *KS* 90. 9a-b; also see *BTKP* 114. 1068.

13. Wang Sun 王綧 (1224-1283), the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng 永寧公, was a descendant in the eighth generation of Koryŏ Hyŏnjong. He later married a Mongol Princess, one of the daughters of Möngke, and after the death of Hong Pogwŏn succeeded to the latter's position as supreme commander of the Korean community in the Liaoyang-Shenyang area. He returned to Koryŏ with Yekü's forces (cf. *KSC* 17. 7b-8a) and then with J̌alairtai's forces and, in 1262, he led troops against the rebel Li Tan 李璮 in the Chi-nan 濟南 area. In 1270, he led a contingent of troops to Koryŏ to aid in suppressing the rebellion of the Three Patrols, *sam pyŏlch'o*. He visited the Koryŏ royal family at this time, but fell ill in the eleventh month of 1270 and returned to Liaoyang. He died in 1283 at the age of 61. He had several sons: Im 琳, Hwa 和, Che 禔, Hŭi 熙, and Ong 雍. His *YS* 166 biography also mentions a son under the Mongol name of Wu-ai 兀愛 who went on to a rather successful career as a soldier. Yanai, *Yüan-tai* ..., p. 119, says that Sun was sent as a hostage, never to return to his native land. Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, p. 569, says the same. This is incorrect. He returned with his family in 1270, as I have said above. Cf. *KS* 26. 34a. For biographical and historical information see *KS* 90. 7a-9a and *YS* 166. 1a-b; also see *BTKP* 119. 1114.

14. The term *t'u-lu-hua* 禿魯花, Mo. *turγaq*, 'guards', is defined following its appearance in *KS* 23. 35b: "*T'u-lu-hua*, in Chinese they say hostage son, *chih-tzu* 質子." P. Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or*, pp. 15-16, defines the term as "garde du corps"; they were so called, because they often performed guard duty at court. Also see p. 518, Lien-sheng Yang, 'Hostages in Chinese History', *HJAS* 15 (1952), pp. 507-521; this study is also incorporated in *Studies in Chinese Institutional History*, Cambridge, 1961. Reference to this substitution is mentioned in a decree issued in 1268, cf. *YKC* 13a-b.

15. Üyer, *Wu-yeh-erh* 吾也而, had accompanied Sartaq's forces in the conquest of Liaotung in 1230 and subsequently followed him into Koryŏ in 1231-1232. His activities in North China have been detailed by Martin, op. cit., passim. His biography in the *Yüan shih* makes it plain that a royal hostage had been demanded as a prerequisite for the withdrawal of Sartaq's forces earlier. According to this account, "Koryŏ was afraid and requested peace. Wu-yeh-erh (Üyer) instructed them saying, 'If we can take the Heir Apparent as a hostage, then we will withdraw the troops.'" (*YS* 120. 15a). For the reconstruction of the name Üyer see p. 43, P. Pelliot, 'Notes sur le "Turkestan" de M. W. Barthold', *TP* XVII (1930), pp. 12-56.

16. Hong Pogwŏn's father, Hong Taesun 洪大純 (fl. 1218-1250) was not among those released. He was apparently freed in 1250. Cf. *KS* 23. 41b-42a; *KS* 130. 4b (*YKC* and *YS* 154. 1a write Hong Tae*sŏn* 洪大宣).
17. Contributing to the peace was the death of Ögödei in late 1241; the Empress handled affairs until the election of Güyük in 1246.
18. *Pyŏlgam* 別監 were special supervisors in charge of temporary bureaus; *togam* 都監 designated a supervisory bureau; *kam* 監 designated a supervisor of a permanent bureau.
19. Yanai, *Yüan-tai* ..., pp. 120-122, attributes the 1247 invasion of Korea to the Korean failure to submit tribute.
20. Pian de Carpine mentioned that several princes of the Ch'i-tan and the Solanges (= Koreans) were present at the Mongol court at this time. Reference is probably being made to Prince Sun. Cf. Rockhill, *The Journey of William* ..., p. 20.
21. When the Koryŏ court was in formal session, the King sat facing south. The civil officials lined up according to rank on the east, hence the name *tongban* 東班 or eastern file; they were also called *munban* 文班 or literary group. The military officials lined up according to rank on the west, hence their designation *sŏban* 西班 or western file; they were also called *muban* 武班 or military group. Collectively, they came to be known as *yangban* 兩班 and this term took on the meaning of 'aristocracy, upper classes'. The term *yangban* is still used today, but chiefly as a term of reference meaning simply 'gentleman, gentlemen'. There was one other *pan* in the Koryŏ system, viz., the *namban* 南班 or southern file, after their position at court, whose members consisted chiefly of palace functionaries who were as a group restricted to positions up to, but not beyond, the official grade of Eighth Class. The positions of the officials at court are set forth in detail in *KS* 67. 31b-32a. The *yangban* as a system was established in the 14th year of the reign of Sŏngjong (r. 982-997), cf. Suematsu Yasukazu, Kōrai no shoki no *ryōban* ni tsuite 高麗の初期の兩班について [Concerning the *Yangban* of the Early Koryŏ Period], *TG* 36 (1946) 2.
22. Piracy had been endemic in Korean waters since time immemorial. Korean coastal settlements were easy prey and the several thousand (3 000 plus) islands along the Korean coasts made Korean coastal waters especially attractive to freebooters. Who these Sung 'pirates' were I do not know. The powerful Sung pirates Chu Ch'ing 朱清 and Chang Hsüan 張瑄 are known to have had a large fleet operating in Chinese waters. Later, in 1290, after they had deserted to the Mongols, they were commissioned to transport grain from Korea and Manchuria. Cf. Jung-Pang

Lo, 'The Controversy over Grain Conveyance During the Reign of Qubilai Qaqan, 1260-1294', *FEQ* 13 (1954) 3, pp. 262-285 and H. F. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 126, note 3. Lo and Schurmann give several examples of Sung pirates who operated along the China coast in the thirteenth century. There were also many Chinese adventurers with the Wakō. Brown, loc. cit., estimates that 20-30% were Chinese. In the seventh month of 1266, a Sung pirate ship was captured by the Koreans; seventy pirates were killed and five prisoners taken in the fighting. Cf. *KS* 26. 8a. For Eastern Jürčen pirates operating along the Korean coast earlier (in the eleventh century), see Ikeuchi Hiroshi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū*, Vol. 2, pp. 265-348.

23. Ch'oe Hang 崔沆 (d. 1257) was the son of Ch'oe U by a dancing girl. He entered the Buddhist priesthood as a Zen (Kor. Sŏn) 禪 priest with the name Manjŏn 萬全 and gathered about him a band of rowdy followers who terrorized the areas where he stayed. He was recalled to secular life by Ch'oe U and given the name Hang 沆. He assumed power upon his father's death in 1249, and instituted a purge to secure his own position which extended to the elimination of his stepmother of the Tae clan, her relatives, and supporters. He initially took a girl of (presumably another) Ch'oe clan as a wife but he abandoned her when she became ill and married the daughter of Cho Kyesun 趙季珣, son of Marshal Cho Ch'ung. He had one son, Ŭi 竩, as the result of illicit relations while he was a Zen priest. For biographical information see *KS* 129. 41b-52a; also see *CHSL* 4. 29b; and *BTKP* 24. 232.
24. For the various constructions on the island at this time see Yi Pyŏngdo, *Koryŏ Sidae ŭi Yŏn'gu*, pp. 275-278.
25. Imamura Tomo 今村鞆 in his *Chōsen fūzoku shiryō shūsetsu sen, hidarinawa, dakyū, pakachi* 朝鮮風俗資料集説扇左繩打毬靴, Chōsen Sōtokufu, Keijō (Seoul), 1937, pp. 278-285, makes some disappointingly desultory comments on polo in Koryŏ and remarks that polo entered Koryŏ from T'ang China via P'ohai and that the first reference appears in 918 in the *Koryŏ-sa*.
26. The Ch'oe fief in Chinyang 晋陽 (mod. Chinju 晋州 in S. Kyŏngsang Province) dates to 1205, when Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn was given an honorary fief of 1 000 households and actual fief of 300 households. For a discussion of the Ch'oe holdings and their growth, see pp. 74-75, Kim Jong-gug (Kim Chongguk) 金鍾國, Kōrai bushin seiken no tokushitsu ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu 高麗武臣政權の特質に關する一考察 ["Inquiry into the Characteristics of the Military Government of Goryeo"], *CG* 17 (1960), pp. 51-80, which is an excellent study of the military government.

27. In addition to the references cited in the text, I have drawn material for this résumé of the organs of the military government and the Ch'oe clan from the following studies: Kim Sanggi, Koryŏ muin chŏngch'i kigu ko 高麗武人政治機構考, incorporated in *Tongbang munhwa* ..., pp. 207-243; Gim Jong-gug, 'Kōrai bushin ...', and Naitō Shumpo 内藤雋輔, Kōrai jidai no jūbō oyobi seibō ni tsuite 高麗時代の重房及び政房に就いて [Concerning the *Chungbang* and the *Chŏngbang* of the Koryŏ Period] incorporated in pp. 274-295 of *Chōsen-shi kenkyū* 朝鮮史研究 (pagination continuous), published by the Tōyōshi kenkyū-kai 東洋史研究會 of Kyōto University (printed in Okayama City 岡山市), 1961; and the accounts contained in Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, p. 527 ff and *Han'guk-sa sajŏn*, passim.

28. Kim Sanggi, 'Koryŏ muin ...', would divide the period of the military government into three periods, viz., pre-Ch'oe (1170-1196), Ch'oe (1196-1258), and post-Ch'oe (1258-1270). Gim Jong-gug, 'Kōrai bushin ...', has pointed out that the early military overlords made effective use of the *pubyŏng* 府兵 or militia units in the power struggle. This emphasizes the importance of control of the Military Council in the 'pre-Ch'oe' period. Gim also makes the point that provincial armies such as existed in Japan at the time, did not exist during this period in Koryŏ and that the house troops, *kabyŏng*, of these military rulers were of a different character. Gim would place the development of strong house armies in the 'Ch'oe' period as against the general view of an earlier development.

29. There were also a Generals' Council, *changgunbang* 將軍房, and an Officer's Council, *kyowibang* 校尉房; presumably they were directly subordinate to the Military Council, but little is known of their function. For a discussion see Kim Sanggi, op. cit., p. 209, and Gim, op. cit., p. 75 ff.

30. There were two 'exceptions', viz., Im Yŏn received the appointment from Ch'ang whom he had put on the throne and Im Yumu received the appointment from Chong 琮, the Marquis of Sunan 順安侯, who had been placed in charge when Wŏnjong went to the Mongol court. Cf. Kim Sanggi, 'Koryŏ muin ...', p. 217. It should be mentioned that the military rulers from Ch'oe U onward, all received appointments as Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, as well.

31. The term *Chŏngbang* 政房 suggests an analogy with the Japanese *mandokoro* 政所, the Central Administrative Bureau under the Kamakura and Muromachi Shogunates; the actual resemblance between the two and possible influences remain to be studied.

32. For the reconstruction of this word see p. 257, P. Pelliot, 'Les mots mongols dans le 高麗史 Korye sâ', *JA* 217 (1930), pp. 251-266.
33. *Tomok* 都目 during the Yi dynasty signified the promotion and demotion of officials in the sixth and twelfth month of each year I am uncertain whether it was so used at this time or whether it included other matters as well.
34. *Pŏn* 番 was used in the sense of 'shift, watch' when the *tobang* or Guard Corps was first organized since they were primarily units whose *pŏn* or watches did guard duty on a shift basis. The term *pŏn* also came to be used in the sense of 'subordinate unit', e.g., in the reign of King U (= Sinu 辛禑 , r. 1375-1388), the Three Patrols were referred to in restrospect as "the three units, *pŏn*, of our nation's Night Patrol" (*KS* 81. 26b). The *tobang* or Guard Corps grew in size until it contained 36 units, *pŏn*.
35. Kim Sanggi, 'Koryŏ muin ...', p. 231, believes that when Ch'oe U took over the military government, he organized his own house troops into the Inner Guard Corps for his own protection and then designated the *tobang* established by Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn as the Outer Guard Corps to do guard duty at the homes of his relatives.
36. Gim Jong-gug, 'Kōrai bushi ...', has studied the relationship of the *mun'gaek* or 'retainers' to the military overlords and has pointed out that the *mun'gaek* of the early military rulers were themselves often military men of high rank.
37. Cf. Kim Sanggi, 'Koryŏ muin ...', p. 238; however, also see Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, p. 532. Kim, op. cit., pp. 237-238, sees Mongol influence here and in the scribes of the Supreme Directorate as well as in Ch'oe U's mounted guard corps, the *ma pyŏlch'o* 馬別抄. Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, p. 529, believes the use of the Mongol term for scribe is reflective of later Mongol influence and not their original designation.
38. *Pangho pyŏlgam* 防護別監 or Special Supervisors of Defense, were temporary appointments made anew for each crisis and were in charge of the defense of the various mountain citadels of refuge, *sansŏng*, and, at times, of the walled-cities, which is made clear in *KS* 24, 25 and 26.
39. For historical and topographical information on the city of Tŭngju 登州 see *TYS* 49. 1a ff.
40. 'Imperial Brother' Sung-chu 皇弟松柱. I am uncertain of his identity. However, the informants were correct. In 1258, he led troops into the old Hwaju 和州 area where he established a Governor's Command, *tsung-kuan-fu*, under two Koryŏ rebels (*KS* 24. 38b) and in 1259,

he and Yü-ch'ou-ta (Yesüder) were in Tung-ching where they were visited by the Koryŏ Crown Prince on his way to the Mongol court (cf. *KS* 24. 42b-43b). Actual operations were, however, under Prince Yekü (cf. *KS* 24. 7a-b; *YKC* 9b; *CHSL* 4. 31a; *YS* 3. 5a-b; *YS* 154. 2b; *YS* 166. 1a); also see note 41.

41. Prince Yekü 也窟大王; the name occurs in several orthographic variants including: *yeh-k'u* 也窟 (*KS* 24. 6; *KS* 24. 7; *KS* 24. 8; *CHSL* 4. 31a) and *yeh-hu* 耶虎 (*YKC* 9b; *YS* 4. 12a). For the reconstruction of this name see Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII* ..., p. 24, who also lists the variants *yeh-k'u* 野苦 (*YS* 3. 2b; *YS* 3. 5b) and *yeh-k'u* 也苦 (*YS* 3. 6b). According to Yanai, *Yüan-tai* ..., p. 124 note 2, Yekü was the half-brother of Tolui, Möngke's father.

42. Wang Ch'ang 王昌 was the second son of Kojong and Queen Anhye. His former name was Kan 倎. He was first made Marquis of An'gyŏng 安慶侯 and then, shortly before being sent to the Mongol Court in 1253, was advanced to Duke 公. He was put on the throne in 1269 when Im Yŏn 林衍 deposed Wŏnjong 元宗, Ch'ang's elder brother, but was deposed the same year as a result of Mongol pressure. He was posthumously canonized Yŏngjong 英宗. His son Hyŏn 儇, the Marquis of Hanyang 漢陽, married a daughter of King Ch'ungnyŏl 忠烈王. For biographical information see *KS* 91. 6a-7a; *BTKP* carries no entry.

43. For slavery in the Koryŏ period see Kameda Keiji 亀田敬二 'Kōrai no nubi ni tsuite', 高麗の奴婢に就いて [Slavery in Koryŏ], *SG* 26 (1936) and 28 (1937); Sudō Yoshikose 周藤吉之, 'Kōrai makki yori Chōsen shoki ni itaru nubi no kenkyū', 高麗末期より朝鮮初期に至る奴婢の研究 [Research on Slavery from the End of the Koryŏ period to the Beginning of the Yi Dynasty], *RGK* 9 (1939), Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

44. For a study of the *paekchŏng* 白丁 in the Koryŏ period and a critical review of previous studies, see Hatada Takashi 旗田巍, 'Kōrai jidai no hakutei 高麗時代の白丁 ["*Paekchŏng* in the Koryŏ Period], *CG* 14 (1959), pp. 291-308. For the *paekchŏng* in general see Imanishi Ryū 今西龍, Chōsen hakutei kō 朝鮮白丁考 [A Study of the Korean Paekchŏng], *Geibun* 藝文 IX, 4 (Kyōto 1918), pp. 337-363; H. Passin, 'The Paekchŏng of Korea; a brief social history', *Monumenta Nipponica* XII (1956-1957), pp. 195-240, and H. Passin, 'Untouchability in the Far East', *Monumenta Nipponica* XI (1955), pp. 247-267. In the latter study, Passin remarks (p. 235, note 18) of the term *paekchŏng* that "... until the Yi Dynasty, it referred to a subclass of the 'good' people, just as in Japan, that had 'neither government service nor property'. This usually included farmers."

45. Hŭi 僖, the Count of Yŏngan 永安伯 (d. 1263), was the son of Wang Sŏ 王昶, the Duke of Yangyang 襄陽公 and the nephew of Sinjong 神宗. For biographical information see *KS* 91. 1a; also see *BTKP* 115. 1078.

46. The official was termed *hu-hua-chi* 胡花赤 but I am unsure of the meaning.

47. Yu, op. cit., p. 31, says that Prince Ko was sent to the Mongols as a hostage at this time. He gives no source and I have failed to find that there was even a Prince Ko living at this time. There were two royal princes at this time, namely, Chŏn 禛, the heir-apparent and Ch'ang 昌 his younger brother. I believe that Yu erred due to the confused text of *HYS* 249. 4b which is the only source I have seen which might have caused him to make such a mistake. In the *HYS* text there is a mass confusion of several Korean Kings and Prince Ko enters the confusion. This Prince Ko had not yet been born. If Prince Ch'ang is meant, then it is a different story. He did go to the Mongol Court at this time.
It was possibly Prince Ch'ang and his party whom Friar William of Rubruck mentions seeing at Möngke's court in 1254, although it could well have been another group since Friar William calls them simply 'envoys'. Cf. Rockhill, *The Journey of William* ..., pp. 152-154.

48. According to *YS* 3. 4a, Prince Yekü was dismissed from command of the forces attacking Koryŏ in the 1st month of 1253, and J̌alairtai was appointed to succeed him. The error in dating has already been pointed out by Yanai, *Yüan-tai* ..., p. 124 note 4. *YS* 3. 5a-b carries the entry dated the 12th month of 1253, that Prince Yekü was commanded to conquer Koryŏ; this entry is also erroneously dated. *YS* 3. 5b carries the entry, dated in 1254, that J̌alairtai was commanded to subjugate Koryŏ and shortly thereafter, he appeared in Koryŏ. *YKC* 9b dates the appointment of Yekü in 1253 and the appointment of J̌alairtai in 1254.
The first we hear of Yekü in the Koryŏ records is in the fourth month of 1253 (*KS* 24. 6); the last we hear of him in the Koryŏ records is in the eleventh month of 1253 (*KS* 24. 11). Therefore, his appointment was in early 1253, and his dismissal and the subsequent appointment of J̌alairtai was either in late 1253 or early 1254.
As for Prince T'a-la-erh 塔剌兒, I cannot but wonder if the *la* of this name is not a scribal error, as there was a Prince (of the first rank), Kuo-wang 國王, Tačar 塔察兒, who was the grandson of Temüge-otčigin whose descendants to the fourth generation inherited the former lands of P'u-hsien Wan-nu as an appandage.

49. J̌alairtai, the father of Taču, was of the J̌alair tribe and served Činggis

(*YS* 133. 1a-b). From 1254 to 1258, he led the Mongol forces against Koryŏ, accompanied first by Hong Pogwŏn and later by the latter's son Hong Tagu (*YKC* 9b). There are several orthographic variants of the name. *KS* usually renders Ch'e-lo-ta 車羅大. *YKC* 9b has *Cha-la-tai* 札剌台 (as does *YS* 133. 1a-b), *Cha-la-ta* 劄剌解 and *Ch'e-tz'u-ta* 車剌大 (for *tz'u* read *la*). While the period of time involved was considerable and we do not know his age during the latter period, Mongol generals of seventy years are known to have been with the Mongol forces in Koryŏ (cf. *KS* 103. 26a).

50. Tongguk 東國 was one of the early designations for Korea. Other names included Solongyos, which Shiratori would trace to Kor. *Silla* 新羅 plus Ch. *kuo* 國. Cf. Shiratori Kurakichi, Shiragi no kokugō ni tsuite 新羅の國号に就いて [Concerning the National Designations for Silla], *Rekishi chiri*, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 369-454. There was also an ancient name for Korea in Central Asia and towards the end of the T'ang it was written Mukuri in Sanscrit and Mug-lig in Tibetan. Cf. Bagchi, *Deux lexiques sanskrit-chinois*, rev. ed., 1929, I, 295, cited Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, p. 235; also see Shiratori, loc. cit. There is, however, reason to believe that *Mug-lig*, the Turkish *Bükli*, transcribes *Mo-he* 靺鞨 (Kor. *Malgal*), cf. G. Clauson, 'À Propos du Manuscrit Pelliot Tibétain 1283*', *JA* CCXLV (1957), pp. 11-24. The name of Korea was transmitted to the west with the 'Gori' of Giovanni da Empoli (1514). Cf. Pelliot, op. cit., pp. 234-237 who suggests that the 'Gori' of Fra Mauro is probably the same name in which case such knowledge should have reached Europe at least in the middle of the 15th century. For this designation see M.C. Hagenauer, 'Encore la question des Gores', *JA* CCXXVI (1935), pp. 5-115. There were many other designations for Korea, for which see the chapter "Kukho-ryu" 國號類 in Ch'oe Namsŏn 崔南善, *Chosŏn sangsik* 朝鮮常識 : *Chiri-p'yŏn* 地理篇, Seoul, 1948, pp. 131-162.

51. The dispatch also accused the Korean authorities of executing Korean functionaries who had submitted their cities. A certain Yi Hyŏn 李峴 was one of the persons concerned (*KSC* 17. 17a) and he had been beheaded in the market-place, his property confiscated, and his relatives exiled to islands (*KSC* 17. 15a-b). The Korean authorities were able to produce two other deserters whom they displayed to the envoy to allay his suspicions (*KSC* 17. 17b).

52. Yu Kyŏng 柳璥 (1212-1289); his style, *cha*, was Ch'ŏnnyŏn 天年; another style was Changji 藏之. He passed the exams in the reign of Kojong and gradually rose to be Headmaster, *taesasong* 大司成, of

the National Academy, *kukchagam*. He worked in the Chŏngbang or Civil Council while Ch'oe Hang was overlord and was one of the principal leaders in the overthrow of Ch'oe Ŭi which ended the rule of the Ch'oe clan. He was later exiled by Im Yŏn, but was subsequently summoned to return. He was later exiled again, and died in 1289 at the age of 79. He was given the posthumous appellation of Munjong 文宗. One of his more noteworthy endeavors was that he was in charge of the Historiographical Bureau, *sagwan*, while the Veritable Records, *sillok*, of Sinjong 神宗, Hŭijong 熙宗, Kangjong 康宗, and Kojong 高宗 were being compiled. He had one son, Sŭng 陞 (1248-1298; *BTKP* 153. 1401). For biographical information see *KS* 105. 1a-8a; also see *BTKP* 151. 1384.

53. This was not the first time that the Mongols had attempted to coax one of the Ch'oe military rulers to the mainland. In 1232, they had tried, also unsuccessfully, to get Ch'oe U to leave Kanghwa. Cf. *KS* 23. 24b.

Chapter IV

THE INVASION OF JALAIRTAI-QORČI

On September 6, 1254 (*jen-hsü* 壬戌 day of the seventh month), the Northwest Commissioner of Men and Horse reported that Jalairtai had crossed the Yalu at the head of a force of 5 000 men (*KS* 24. 14b). By September 8 (*chia-tzu* 甲子 day of the same month), 3 000 Mongol advance cavalry soldiers reached Sŏhae Province (*KS* 24. 15a). By the time that the main Mongol forces entered the northwest on August 19 (*ping-tzu* 丙子 day of the eighth month), the advance cavalry had reached Kwangju 廣州 (*KS* 24. 15a).

Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyŏng, returned with ten Mongol envoys who undoubtedly repeated the Mongol demands (*KS* 24. 15a) and Koryŏ sent a delegate to Jalairtai's camp with gifts of gold, silver, wine utensils, pelts, and coins for Jalairtai, and the other Mongol commanders as well as for Hong Pogwŏn and Sun, the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng. When this delegate returned he brought news of a new modification of the Mongol demands: when the ministers and people came out to submit, they were to shave their heads [1] (*KS* 24. 15b).

With no sign of Koryŏ's willingness to submit, Jalairtai's forces swept southward to renew the attack on Ch'ungju but a violent storm caused them to lift the attack almost immediately (*KS* 24. 16a). As the Mongol forces rode south, dispatches from the Eastern Frontier-District reported many Eastern Jürčen troops crossing the border (*KS* 24. 15b).

In the next 10th month (Nov. 12 - Dec. 11), a Mongol force attacked the mountain citadel at Sangju 尙州 where their fourth ranking official was shot by a Buddhist monk from Hwangnyŏng Temple 黃嶺寺 . The siege was finally lifted after the Mongols had lost an estimated fifty percent of their force (*KS* 24. 16a).

Koryŏ envoys sent to request the withdrawal of Mongol forces (*KS* 24. 16) returned with the news that Jalairtai had said, "If Ch'oe Hang [reverently] leads the King out to the mainland, then the troops can be disbanded" (*KS* 24. 20a; also see *CHSL* 4. 32a). But it was still to be some time before Koryŏ was to submit completely.

In the first month (Feb. 9 - March 9) of 1255, inhabitants of Taegu 大丘 (= Taegu 大邱 ?) who had been captured and then escaped, reported that

the Emperor had instructed J̌alairtai to return speedily with the army and that the Mongol forces garrisoned in the Northern Frontier-District had already crossed the Yalu (*KS* 24. 20b). Other detachments of Mongols were also riding northward (*KS* 24. 20b; *KS* 24. 21a), and J̌alairtai himself was then encamped at Kaegyŏng (*KS* 24. 21a) [2]. Taking advantage of the situation, Koryŏ immediately sent envoys to present regional products and again beg for the disbanding of the Mongol troops (*KS* 24. 20b-21a). The situation remained relatively calm until the eighth month (Sept. 3 - Oct. 1) of 1255. The Mongol forces had withdrawn to the northern borders and were then encamped on the borders of Ŭiju and Chŏngju from Mt. Hyŏngje 兄弟山 to Taebu-sŏng [3] (*KS* 24. 22a). There was some pillaging in the north, mostly of farm oxen and horses (*KS* 24. 22b; *KS* 24. 23a) and the Eastern J̌ürčen still raided on the east coast (*KS* 24. 22b) but there was no major offensive. The Mongol forces appear to have merely withdrawn north of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River although at least one raiding party came south of the river (*KS* 24. 23a).

Martial law was lifted on Kanghwa in the second month (March 10 - April 8) of 1255 (*KS* 24. 21b) and Koryŏ immediately began to repair the damage. Conditions had reached an extreme with the abandonment of the farms. In the third month (April 9 - May 7) those who had sought safety on the islands and in the mountain citadels were ordered to return to the mainland. The removal of the peasants from the land, in many cases by forced evacuation, to the coastal islands and mountain citadels of refuge had the immediate effect of consuming stores and leaving fields idle [4]. To which were added the pillaging of the Mongols and natural disaster in the form of a drought which reoccurred through the late 1250's. There was a general famine and the old and the weak died of starvation in great numbers. Other victims were those distant from their native villages, as were the young as infanticide increased (*KS* 24. 21b). A continuous stream of escapees made their way back and the roads were covered with the skeletons of the dead. Although small doles of rice were distributed to alleviate the suffering, the dead were without number (*KS* 24. 22a-b). At the end of 1254, an estimated 206 800 persons had been taken prisoner during J̌alairtai's invasion, the number of dead was beyond reckoning, and the countryside was reduced to ashes (*KS* 24. 20a-b; *CHSL* 4. 32a). We are told that "... those who died of starvation were multitudinous; [the corpses of] the old and weak clogged the ravines and it reached the point where some tied babies in the trees and left" (*TT* 33. 71). Officials of the fourth rank and above were ordered to present plans for stabilizing the life of the people, and for withstanding the enemy (*KS* 24. 22b), one outcome of which was the dispatch of a Commissioner for the Encouragement of Agriculture, *kwŏnnong-sa* 勸農使, to each province (*KS* 24. 22b; *KS* 78. 4a). Condi-

tions on the mainland naturally affected those on Kanghwa Island. Maritime transportation of grain had been the principal method utilized prior to the removal to Kanghwa and after the transfer of the capital was implemented, grain transport ships would simply stop at the island instead of proceeding up the river to Kaegyŏng. The general shortage of grain led to the suggestion in 1257 that fields be distributed in lieu of official salaries and a Bureau for Distributing Land, *kŭpchŏn togam* 給田都監, was established [5] to implement the suggestion (*KS* 78.18b).

In the eighth month (Aug. 4 - Sept. 2) of 1255, reports received of Mongol forces raiding south of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River and the appearance of twenty Mongol cavalrymen at Sŭngch'ŏn-pu were sufficient to cause the capital to declare martial law again (*KS* 24. 23a). Korean envoys returned with six Mongol envoys the next month to report that the Mongol forces were again moving south [6]. J̌alairtai and the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng, in command of a great force, had reached the Western Capital and the advance cavalry was already at Kŭmgyo [7] in Sŏhae Province.

Mongol activity in amphibious warfare increased. They built ships and attacked Cho Island 槽島, unsuccessfully however, in late 1255 (*KS* 24. 24a). Then, in the first month (Jan. 29 - Feb. 27) of 1256, word was received that the Mongols were planning to attack the southern islands so a fleet, *chusa* [8], with 300 men was sent south under General Yi Kwang 李廣 and General Song Kunbi 宋君斐 (fl. 1250-1270) (*KS* 24. 24b). In the engagement which followed, General Song inflicted a defeat on the Mongol forces by a ruse and captured four of their officials (*KS* 24. 25a).

As usual envoys were scurrying back and forth and J̌alairtai told one group that if the King came out to welcome his envoys and if the Crown Prince went to the Mongol court, then the Emperor would cause the army to be withdrawn (*KS* 24. 25b) [9].

In mid-1256 the Koryŏ patrols, *pyŏlch'o,* were again active on the mainland, attacking small Mongol detachments (*KS* 24. 25b-26a). The Mongols themselves were at the same time attacking Ch'ungju again (*KS* 24. 26a). The effectiveness of the Koryŏ sallies, in which even Ch'oe Hang's Guard Corps, *tobang* 都房, participated (*KS* 24. 25a), is attested when J̌alairtai angrily told a Korean envoy who had come to his Naju [10] camp, "If you desire peace and friendship, then why do you kill our soldiers in great numbers?" (*KS* 24. 26a-b).

But as long as Mongol forces were on the peninsula, action against them could be expected. J̌alairtai was encamped at Mudŭng Mt. 無等山 at Haeyang 海陽 (mod. S. Chŏlla Province), whence he sent a force of 1 000 south to pillage (*KS* 24. 26b-27a). People were again being evacuated to coastal

islands when J̌alairtai, the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng, and Hong Pogwŏn arrived outside of Kaphwan River 甲串江 . They unfurled their flags, pastured their horses in the fields, and climbed Mt. T'ongjin 通津山 to look at Kangdo 江都 (the capital on Kanghwa). Then they withdrew to camp at Suanhyŏn 守安縣 (*KS* 24. 27a). If an assault on Kanghwa was planned it never materialized, for in the ninth month (Sept. 20 - Oct. 19) of 1256, Kim Sugang[11] returned from the Mongols with the report that the Emperor had sent an envoy with an order for the army's return. A few days later J̌alairtai ordered the army to return northward (*KS* 24. 27a-b). In the following month, martial law, after having been imposed for fifteen months, was lifted and the soldiers were disbanded (*KS* 24. 27b).

The respite from the Mongol forces was not to last long, but in the interim there were other diversions. In late 1256, Sungšan [12], the Governor, *tsungkuan* [13], of T'ung-ching province (*lu* 路) led his family and a handful of followers to submit to Koryŏ. When asked his reasons for coming, Sungšan replied: "It is not because the Mongols are perishing while your country is flourishing. I came simply because I have committed three crimes. When J̌alairtai entered the southern districts [of Koryŏ], I [was charged with] garrisoning Ŭiju and I was unable to defend it; that is the first. Then, they sent me to encourage agriculture, [but] the forage and grains were not abundant and the storehouses were barren; that is the second. When I heard that Koryŏ soldiers were coming, I sent seventy men to investigate. Not one man returned; that is the third." For his submission, Sungšan was rewarded with grain, implements, textiles, and three slaves (*KS* 24. 27b-28a).

Conditions were bad both in the countryside and on Kanghwa; thieves entered the *t'aeja-pu* 太子府 or Household Bureau of the Crown Prince and stole a number of items (*KS* 24. 28a) and we read that: "There was no snow this winter [14]; and [through] starvation and disease, the roads were once again covered with corpses. One *kŭn* 斤 of silver was worth [only] two *kok* 斛 of rice" (*KS* 24. 28a). The regions were in similar condition or worse. One uprising at Wŏnju 原州 (in mod. Kangwŏn Province) in mid-1257 was finally crushed after a battle at the Hŭngwŏn Granary 興元倉 (*KS* 24. 28b) which suggests a 'rice riot'. In the intercalary fourth month (May 16 - June 13) of 1257, there was a great famine in the capital (*KS* 24. 29a). The *KS* period of spring hunger brought a general tightening of belts in the capital; it also brought out the ravenous Eastern J̌ürčen in the northeast (*KS* 24. 29a; *KS* 24. 29a-b) and renewed Mongol activity in the northwest (*KS* 24. 29a-b). Koryŏ made her usual preparations by dispatching Special Supervisors of Defense, *pangho pyolgam* to all the strongholds (*KS* 24. 29b). Envoys were again sent to request the withdrawal of troops as soon as the Mongol advance cavalry

reached Kaegyŏng, and P'u-po-ta 浦波大 told the Koryŏ envoy Yi Ŭng 李凝, "Whether we go or remain is up to J̌alairtai" (*KS* 24. 29b). By the sixth month (July 13 - Aug. 11) of 1257, the main Mongol force had arrived in the Western Capital (*KS* 24. 29b) and Mongol envoys once again began appearing at Sŭngch'ŏn-pu to be taken to the Chep'o Hostel 梯浦館 at the entry port on Kanghwa and then escorted to see the King in the palace at Chep'o (*KS* 24. 30a). The familiar demands were made. J̌alairtai told one Korean envoy, "If the King comes out in person, I will then withdraw my forces. And, if you order the King's son to enter our Court, eternally, there will be no later grief" (*KS* 24. 30a). This,of course, was actively debated by the Koryŏ authorities and many strongly favored sending the Crown Prince as hostage in order to secure peace. It was finally decided, "First, to send a royal kinsman to survey the situation and thereafter, they could send [the Crown Prince]. Then, they dispatched Hŭi, the Duke of Yŏngan, to present 100 silver pyŏng-coins, ceremonial gifts (lit. fruit and wine), and other items to J̌alairtai" (*KS* 24. 30b). "When he returned from J̌alairtai's camp, he said that J̌alairtai asked, 'Why have you come?' He answered, 'While Your Excellency has ordered your forces to return southward, you have also prohibited them from destructively trampling [the growing] grain. As our King was greatly pleased, he sent me [Your] Servant, to offer this cup of wine.' J̌alairtai said, 'I will withdraw and camp at Pongju on the day the Crown Prince arrives.' " (*KS* 24. 30b).

A decision to send the Crown Prince to the Mongol Court as a hostage was being actively sought by the Chief Ministers at this time (*KS* 24. 30b-31a) and this resulted in Kim Sik 金軾 again being sent to J̌alairtai's camp to present gifts of ceremonial items (lit. fruit and wine), silver coins, otter pelts, and other articles in order to observe his intentions (*KS* 24. 31a) [15].

The Mongols again tried their hand at amphibious warfare, capturing Sinwi Island 神威島 (*KS* 24. 31a; *KS* 121. 22b) and invading Ch'angnin Island 昌麟島 (*KS* 24. 31b-32a). But in naval matters, Koryŏ with her long maritime tradition completely outclassed them. The Koryŏ fleet also provided transport for forces sent against the Mongols. One instance occurred in the summer of 1256, when, "they sent General Yi One-Thousand [16] 李阡 with a fleet with over 200 men to ward off the Mongols in the southern provinces" (*KS* 24. 26b). "General Yi One-Thousand fought with the Mongol forces at Onsu-hyŏn 溫水縣 (in mod. S. Ch'ungch'ŏng Province), took several tens of heads and seized over 100 men and women who had been taken captive. [Upon their return] Ch'oe Hang rewarded the soldiers with six *kŭn* of silver" (*KS* 24. 26b).

In the tenth month of 1257, Kim Sugang returned from the Mongol Court

where he had once again been successful in obtaining the Emperor's permission to have the Mongol armies in Koryŏ withdrawn (*KS* 24. 32a) which once more brought a measure of peace to the peninsula. During the months that Kim had been at the Mongol court, Ch'oe Hang had died (*KS* 24. 29a) to be succeeded by his son Ch'oe Ŭi [17]. Discussions were again held regarding whether or not to dispatch the Heir-Apparent (as a hostage) as well as preparations for resisting the Mongols (*KS* 24. 32a).

In the beginning of 1258, as the Mongols were busy walling Ŭiju in the northwest (*KS* 24. 32b), a plot was afoot in the Koryŏ capital which was to result in the overthrow of Ch'oe Ŭi and the final fall of the Ch'oe clan from the power it had held for over sixty years. Upon his assumption of power in 1257, Ch'oe Ŭi had made some rather niggardly doles of rice (*KS* 129. 52a-b), but through the continued years of poor harvests and famine he had consistently refused to open the granaries and distribute adequate relief which turned the populace against him (*KS* 105. 1b; *KS* 129. 53a-b; *KSC* 17. 34a). And after Ch'oe Hang's death, Ch'oe Ŭi, it is related, trusted only Ch'oe Yangbaek [18] and Yu Nŭng [19] while he grew cool toward the old Ch'oe clan retainer Kim Injun [20] who consequently felt insecure (*KS* 130. 12a; *KSC* 17. 34a). Then, when he exiled the cruel and sadistic Grand General Song Kiryu [21], a former supporter of Ch'oe Hang and Commander, *chiyu*, of the Night Patrol, he became even further estranged with Yu Kyŏng, Kim Injun, and the latter's sons who had tried to intervene in Song's behalf. Song was exiled and his supporters were reprimanded by Ch'oe Ŭi for intervening (*KS* 122. 28-29; *KS* 129. 53b; *KSC* 17. 34a-b).

Then, the Sinŭigun [22] cavalry's commanding officer, *toryŏng*, Colonel, Pak Hŭisil [23] and Commander, *chiyu*, Colonel, Yi Yŏnso 李延紹 (fl. 1250's), secretly told a group of people which included Yu Kyŏng, Kim Injun, Kim Sŭngjun (Injun's brother), Acting Colonel Yi Kongju 李公柱 (fl. 1250's), General Pak Songbi [24] Colonel in Charge (of the Night Patrol ?) *toryŏng nangjang*, Im Yŏn [25], Lieutenant, *taejŏng* [26], Pak Ch'ŏnsik 朴天湜 (fl. 1250's), Junior Colonel, *pyŏlchang tongjŏng*, 別將同正 Ch'a Songu [27], Colonel Kim Hŏngch'wi [28], and Kim Injun's sons Kim Taejae 金大材, Kim Yongjae [29], and Kim Sikchae 金式材, that Ch'oe was friendly only with the specious and the petty, that he believed slander and was full of superstition; and advised the group that the time for action was growing short. Subsequently, they decided to carry out the matter (of killing Ch'oe Ŭi) and set a date, the eighth day of the fourth month because of the lantern viewing (*KS* 129. 53b; *KSC* 17. 34b). Kim Injun had invited Ch'oe On [30], then Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, *ch'umirwŏnsa*, to discuss the matter with him (*KS* 99. 7a). It was probably in this way that Senior Colo-

nel, *chungnangjang* [31], Yi Chu 李柱 heard of it. Yi, with Ch'oe On's son, the leader of one of the Royal Guard units, *Kyŏnyong haengsu* 牽龍行首 Ch'oe Munbon 崔文本, Major, *sanwŏn* [32] Yu T'ae 庾泰, Captain, *kyowi* [33], Pak Sŏn 朴瑄, Lieutenant Yu Po [34] 兪甫, et al., secretly wrote to Ch'oe Ŭi and communicated the plot to him. Ch'oe Yangbaek, the father-in-law of Kim Taejae, one of Kim Injun's sons, was apparently warned by the letters [35], for he reported the matter to Ch'oe Ŭi (*KS* 129. 54a; *KSC* 17. 34b). This was on May 1, 1258 (i.e., *ping-tzu* 丙子 day of the third month. Cf. *KS* 24. 32b-33a). Ch'oe Ŭi hurriedly summoned Yu Nŭng to discuss a plan. By that time the sun had already set. Yu Nŭng advised that as it was night, that there was nothing to be done, but he suggested that a letter of instructions be sent to the Night Patrol Commander, *chiyu*, Han Chonggwe [36], and that they wait until morning and then summon Yi Irhyu [37], et al., to force the soldiers to subjugate Kim Injun; there was, he said, still time. Ch'oe Ŭi approved it. (*KS* 129. 54a; *KSC* 17. 34b-35a).

Kim Taejae's wife was present and she heard these measures which she reported to her husband. He in turn reported the matter to his father, Kim Injun, advising him that the matter must be speedily carried through and that there was not much time left (*KS* 129. 54a; *KSC* 17. 35a). Kim Taejae had believed that it was Pak Hŭisil who had leaked the affair to Ch'oe Yangbaek (*KS* 129. 54a; *KSC* 17. 34b), and it was not until after Ch'oe Ŭi's death that it was revealed that Ch'oe Munbon had divulged the matter when one of the letters was found (*KS* 99. 7a). Kim Injun heard his son's report and then led his sons to urge the Sinŭigun cavalry (to act with them). Kim met Pak Hŭisil and Yi Yŏnso and told them that since the matter had leaked out, that they could not go according to their previous plan (but must act speedily). Then he assembled the plotters and Junior Colonel Pak Yŏngjŏng 朴永貞, Lieutenants Sŏ Chŏng 徐挺 and Yi Che [38], and Im Yŏn (*KS* 129. 54b; *KSC* 17. 35a). He had sent Im Yŏn, Commander Cho Munju 趙文柱, and O Susan 吳壽山 to arrest Han Chonggwe and kill him. He also summoned Commander Sŏ Kyunhan 徐均漢 et al., to assemble the Three Patrols, *sam pyŏlch'o* [39], at the Hall of Archery, *sach'ŏng* 射廳. They sent men to cry out in the road, "The *Yŏnggong* 令公 (= Ch'oe ŬI) is dead!" All those who heard this gathered. Yu Kyŏng and Pak Sŏngbi et al., also arrived. Then Kim Injun suggested that an important minister who held the respect of the people be brought in to lead the crowd as a great affair such as they were embarked upon could not be carried out without a leader. Then he summoned Ch'oe On. Kim also met Supreme General of the Ŭngyang 鷹揚 guards [40] Pak Sŏngja [41] and discussed the matter (*KS* 129. 54b; *KSC* 17. 35a-b). Kim Injun then summoned Ch'oe Yangbaek. Yangbaek had not even entered the

the hall (where they were meeting) when some soldiers of the patrol, *pyŏlch'o,* [seized him and] pushed burning torches into his mouth; then they beheaded him (*KS* 129. 54b; *KSC* 17. 35b). Im Yŏn also went to the home of Yi Irhyu and beheaded him (*KSC* 17. 35b; *KS* 129. 54b). Kim Injun, in the meanwhile, had ordered Ch'oe Ŭi's gate guards not to report the situation. He then distributed files of soldiers in an open space; [their] burning pine [torches] made it bright as day. Although there was a great clamor from the crowd there was not one of Ch'oe house soldiers, *kabyŏng* 家兵, who knew about the situation (*KS* 129. 54b; *KSC* 17. 35b). In the early dawn, the Night Patrol smashed down the walls around Ch'oe Ŭi's home and went inside (the grounds). Sŏng Wŏnbal [42], a strong soldier, and the maternal uncle of Ch'oe Ŭi, was guarding Ch'oe's house and hearing the clamor became alarmed. He managed to hold off the soldiers trying to get through the small door, but seeing that he could not succeed by himself, he wanted to shoulder Ch'oe Ŭi over the wall, but Ŭi was too fat and heavy. Then Sŏng helped Ŭi up to his room and blocked the door with his body. O Susan broke in and Sŏng fled, pursued by the soldiers of the Night Patrol who caught him and beheaded him by the river bank. Ch'oe Ŭi and Yu Nŭng were also caught and beheaded (*KS* 129. 55a).

Then, Yu Kyŏng, Kim Injun, and Ch'oe On, et al., went to the palace to return the government to the King (*KS* 24. 32b-33a; *KS* 99. 2a; *KS* 129. 55a). Kim Injun stepped forward while they were conferring with the King and accused Ch'oe Ŭi of sitting and watching the people starve to death without aiding them; it was, he said, an act of righteousness that they had executed him (*KS* 130. 12b). Promotions were apparently made on the spot. Yu Kyŏng was made Deputy Minister of the Right of the Bureau of Military Affairs, *ch'umirwŏn ubusŭngsŏn* 樞密院右副承宣, Pak Songbi was made Grand General, Kim Injun was made General and the others were all awarded rank in accordance with their station (*KS* 24. 32b-33a). And then, "On May 4 (*chimao* 己卯 day of the 3rd month), the King honored the Kangan Hall 康安殿 with his presence. All of the officials offered congratulations. It was like a new enthroning ceremony. When it was over and they were coming out, Pak Songbi and Kim Injun used the occasion to lead all the Meritorious Ministers, the Left and Right Patrols, *pyŏlch'o,* the Sinŭigun cavalry, and the Guard Corps, *tobang,* into the courtyard of the audience chamber. They knelt around the King and shouted '*manse*' 萬歲 (lit. 10 000 years = 'Long live the King'). Then they doled out the household property of Ch'oe Ŭi and it was divided and distributed in accordance with the recipient's station (*KS* 24. 33a).

The distribution of the Ch'oe clan's wealth was not so quickly completed nor was it as meagre as the above passage implies. A few other records of

the disposal of their property in 1258-1259 gives a clearer view of their holdings. Ch'oe Ŭi's grain was doled out and bestowed upon the officials according to the station of the recipient; the Household Bureau of the Crown Prince, *t'aeja-pu,* received 2 000 bushels (*sŏk*), the princes, *chewang,* Chief Ministers, *chaech'u,* the civil and military officials, even the minor functionaries, the soldiers, the government slaves, *chorye* 皂隷, and the common people of the city received doles of at least three bushels (*KS* 129. 55a). Yu Kyŏng, for example, received two hundred bushels (*sŏk*) of rice, a class-A mansion, and lands (*KS* 105. 2a). Silks, *paek* 帛, presumably from the Ch'oe stores, were given the princes, the Chief Ministers and down to the lower ranking civil and military officials, according to the recipient's station (*KS* 129. 55b). The horses Ch'oe had raised were divided among the civil and military officials of the fourth rank and above (*KS* 24. 34a; *KS* 129. 55b). Colonel Pak Sŭnggae [43] 朴承蓋 was sent to Kyŏngsang Province and Palace Attendant, *naesi,* Chŏn Chong 全琮, was sent to Chŏlla Province to confiscate the slaves, the fields and orchards, the silks and silver, and the grains of Ch'oe Ŭi and his brother, the Buddhist Priest, Manjong (*KS* 129. 55b). Some 15 000 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice were later taken from Ch'oe Ŭi's separate storehouse to supplement the salaries of the officials of the fourth rank and below (*KS* 80. 16a-b) and, in late 1259, three thousand *kyŏl* [44] of Ch'oe Ŭi's lands were distributed to the princes and the various officials (*KS* 78. 4b) [45].

Lavish rewards and promotions followed the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan (*KS* 24. 33a-34a). Of particular interest for the light it throws on the incident are the special awards made to the soldiers of the Night Patrol and the Sinŭigun (*KS* 24. 33b) [46], and the individuals given the honorific title of Meritorious Guardian of the Altar of the Earth, *wisa kongsin* [47] 衛社功臣. Those especially honored were Yu Kyŏng, Kim Injun, Pak Hŭisil, Yi Yŏnso, Pak Songbi, Kim Sŭngjun, Im Yŏn and Yi Kongju.

Later, as a result of a petition submitted by the Chief Ministers, the sons of Yu Kyŏng and Kim Injun were each given the official grade of Sixth Class, and were presented with 100 *kyŏl* of fields, and 15 slaves each; the sons of Pak Hŭisil, Yi Yŏnso, Kim Sŭngjun, Pak Songbi and Im Yŏn were each given the official grade of Seventh Class and were presented with 50 *kyŏl* of fields, and five slaves each (*KS* 24. 36b-37a; *KS* 105. 2a).

If we look back over these events briefly, it becomes clear that there was discontent among the leadership group and general discontent among the populace. The latter attributable to bad harvests due to drought and the pillaging of the Mongols which led to widespread famine; the former due to the personal relationship between Ch'oe Ŭi and those who had formerly served the Ch'oe clan. Ch'oe Ŭi not only failed to issue doles in this period of dearth, but even instituted private tax-collectors on Kanghwa Island.

It is also clear that the military units involved were the Night Patrol and the Sinŭigun led by Pak Hŭisil, Yi Yŏnso and Im Yŏn. There were two groups involved in the struggle against Ch'oe Ŭi. The Confucian-Royalist faction led by Yu Kyŏng and supported by the aged literatus Ch'oe Cha [48] (now 72), who desired to send the Crown Prince as a hostage to the Mongols in order to bring an end to the fighting (*KS* 24. 30b; *KS* 102. 15b-16a) [49]. The real power group, however, was the military faction of Kim Injun, whose interests coincided with those of the Confucianists as far as the elimination of the Ch'oe clan was concerned but who had no desire to drastically alter Koryŏ's policy of continued resistance to the Mongol forces, although they advocated, as future events show, a temporary cessation of the fighting. As a withdrawal of the Mongol forces could only be gained by concessions to the Mongols, they supported these concessions, e.g., sending the Crown Prince as a hostage. But, as later events testify, complete submission to the Mongols was the notion of the Confucian-Royalists, not of the Koryŏ military.

It also appears that the restoration of a measure of power to the monarch was prompted chiefly by Yu Kyŏng. As later events show, the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan did not mean that the monarch regained complete control of the government at all. The real power in Koryŏ still remained in the hands of the military. With Ch'oe gone, a struggle began among the men who had overthrown him to reconcentrate power in their own hands. An initial casualty was Ch'oe On, Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, who was banished to distant Hŭksan Island 黑山島 (*KS* 24. 33a).

In the meantime, the Koryŏ authorities were still concerned with the Mongol forces on the mainland.

Although the Koryŏ authorities had dispatched the Night Patrol against an advance force of one thousand Mongol cavalry (*KS* 23. 33b) and skirmishes continued on the mainland (*KS* 24. 34a-b), they now pursued a policy which sought to bring about the withdrawal of Mongol forces. Thus, in the fourth month (May 5 - June 3) of 1258, when the King heard that Jalairtai had sent an envoy to spy on the actual state of the move back to the mainland, all the civil and military officials were sent across the straits to Sŭngch'ŏn-pu where repairs were made to the palaces and to the homes of the officials (*KS* 24. 33b). But such measures did not fool the Mongols and, when Mongol envoys appeared in the sixth month (July 3 - July 31), they conveyed a threat from the Emperor to storm Kanghwa unless the Koryŏ authorities came to the mainland and submitted. The usual demands were again made: if the King and Crown Prince came to the Western Capital and submitted, the troops would be withdrawn. To all of which the King replied that he was much too old and ill to travel far. Then, Hŭi, the Duke of Yŏngan, was sent to Jalairtai's camp (*KS* 24. 34b-35a).

This Koryŏ delegation returned and informed the King: Yesüder [50] Yü-ch'ou 余愬 told me, [Your] Servant, 'The Emperor has placed the business of Koryŏ with me and J̌alairtai. Do you know this? Whether I leave or remain rests simply on whether your nation submits or not. Even though your King does not come out in person, if he sends the Crown Prince to welcome [us] and to surrender in front of the army, then on the same day, we will withdraw the army. If you refuse, then we will unleash our forces and enter the southern regions.' I answered simply, 'The Crown Prince will come to present himself' " (*KS* 24. 35a-b).

Yet, when Yesüder showed up at Sŭngch'ŏn-pu in the seventh month (Aug. 1 - Aug. 30) of 1258, he was first asked to come with a few cavalrymen and see the Crown Prince at Mt. Paengma 白馬山 (near Sungch'ŏn-pu). "Am I to go and see the Crown Prince or is the Crown Prince to come to see me?" Yesüder asked. A few days later he was informed that the Crown Prince was ill and unable to come. After a few days wait, the Mongols, declaring the falsity of Koryŏ, let their forces loose to pillage (*KS* 24. 35b-36a).

A second Mongol delegation from J̌alairtai's camp received the same answer from the King himself. "The Crown Prince is ill," the King told Mangɣudai, "How can he come out?" (*KS* 24. 37a-b). For the next ten months the Mongol forces rode rampant over the countryside and even remote mountain villages were sacked. The Eastern J̌ürčen troops were also active in the northeast and in the winter of 1258, "the Eastern J̌ürčen came with a fleet, surrounded Song Island 松島 of Kosŏng-hyŏn 高城縣, and burnt the warships" (*KS* 24. 38b).

The Mongols had by this time decided to occupy Koryŏ themselves. They had begun in the northwest by walling Ŭiju in early 1258. When the Eastern J̌ürčen and Mongol troops attacked in the northwest in late 1258, the people of some fifteen *chu*-administrations including Hwaju, Chŏngju, Changju 長州, Ŭiju 宜州, and Munju sought refuge on Chŏ Island 猪島. Because of the number of people involved, the Northeast Commissioner of Men and Horse, a certain Sin Chipp'yŏng 愼執平, forcibly transferred them to Chuk Island 竹島 which was without wells or springs. Grain supplies were requested, and presumably sent, from the capital. At this time, Cho Hwi [51] of Yongjin-hyŏn 龍津縣, T'ak Chŏng 卓定 of Chŏngju, and men of Munju and Tŭngju, killed Sin Chipp'yŏng and the Deputy Commissioners of Hwaju and Tŭngju, and men of the Capital Patrol, *kyŏng pyŏlch'o* 京別抄 planning to bring in the Mongol forces. Then they attacked Kosŏng 高城, burning dwellings, killing, and plundering. Subsequently, they submitted the area north of Hwaju to the Mongols. The Mongols then established the Ssangsŏng 雙城 Governor's Command, *tsung-kuan-fu* 捴管府, in the Hwaiu

area [52]. Cho Hwi was made Governor, *tsung-kuan,* a position which was inherited by his son and grandson; T'ak Chŏng was made Chiliarch, *ch'ien-hu* [53]. Cho's men subsequently guided Mongol and Eastern Jŭrčen troops in attacking other Korean cities (*KS* 24. 38b; *KS* 130. 10a-11a; *CHSL* 4. 34a).

The appearance of permanent installations on the lower part of the western coast begins with the record of a Koryŏ delegation sent to the daruɣači or resident commissioner in the twelfth month of 1268, where they blamed Koryo's past resistance on the military overlords. Since Ch'oe Ŭi was already dead, they said, they wanted to come to the mainland in order to obey the Mongols commands but they feared the Mongol troops; "[when] the cat guards the mousehole, [the mouse] simply does not dare to come out," they explained (*KS* 24. 39b). A second delegation, led by Vice-President of the Department of Justice, *hyŏngbu sirang* 刑部侍郎 , Yi Ŭng, is recorded as having gone to the Western Capital to the camp of Myriarch Wang 王 [54] (*KS* 24. 40a) who asked them: "Doesn't your Monarch love his people? Why does he listen to the stories of [the deserters] Yun Ch'un [55] and Sungšan [that he should] not come out and submit? If he submits then even the down on the plants will not be molested." At that time, it is related, Myriarch Wang had led an army of ten thousand to reconstruct the old walls at the Western Capital, and to build warships and open military colonies, *t'un-t'ien* [56], as a long-term occupation policy (*KS* 24. 40b). Thus, Koryŏ lost her northeast area to the Mongols and Mongol forces had occupied both Ŭiju and the Western Capital on a permanent basis.

Koryŏ resistance during this period, while stubborn, was weakening. In the first month (Jan. 25 - Feb. 23) of 1259, the Eastern Jŭrčen raided Kŭmgang-sŏng 金剛城 and a 3 000-man patrol was sent against them (*KS* 24. 39b). There was a great increase in the number of revolts, especially those led by the local officials themselves (*KS* 24. 34a; *KS* 24. 37b) and in many cases the people would simply kill the Supervisor of Defense and surrender rather than fight (e.g., *KS* 24. 37b; *KS* 24. 39a). Some measures were taken in an attempt to bolster loyalty and resistance. For example, in the summer of 1258, "... they bestowed upon each District Magistrate, *hojang* [57], and Colonel of all the walled-cities of the Northern Frontier-District, one *kŭn* of white silver and two bolts (*p'il*) of black silk gauze" (*KS* 24. 34b; see also *KS* 24. 40a).

Such measures were predictably too few and too meagre [58]. The last entry for the year 1258, makes the point: "This year the grain of all the provinces was exhausted due to the pillaging of the Mongol troops" (*KS* 24. 39b). Thus pressed Koryŏ yielded to Mongol demands to send the Crown Prince to the Mongol Court as a hostage. They also agreed to remove the capital from

Kanghwa Island back to Kaegyŏng, but it was still to be many years before they kept the latter promise (*KS* 24. 40b-41a).

With a peace agreement concluded in the third month (March 26 - April 24) of 1259, priority was given to agriculture and "they ordered the Magistrates, *suryŏng* 守令, of the *chu* and *hyŏn* administrations to lead the people who had fled from the disorders back to the mainland to plow and plant [the land]" (*KS* 24. 41b; duplicate entry *KS* 79. 8b).

1. Rubruck, Pian de Carpine, and others have described the Mongol custom of shaving a square on the top of the head, shaving both temples to the ears, shaving the back of the head, and then wearing the remainder of the hair in long plaits behind the ears. See Rockhill, *The Journey of William ...*, p. 72 and Dawson, *The Mongol Mission,* pp. 101-102. In 1278, when Mongol customs and clothing were introduced into Koryŏ by fiat, this custom was included. Even students were shaved -- the only ones who appear to have escaped this tonsorial treatment were the masters of the Court School. Cf. *KS* 72. 21b.
2. *KS* 24 and *CHSL* 4. 32b-33a credit the withdrawal to the diplomatic efforts of Kim Sugang 金守剛 who had accompanied Mongol envoys to Qarāqorum where he pleaded for the withdrawal of the Mongol forces. See note 11 below.
3. *CS* Vol. 3 No. 4, p. 242 identifies Taebu-sŏng 大府城 as Ta-fu-ying 大夫營. As this was near Ŭiju, Mt. Hyŏngje was probably in the vicinity of Chŏngju. The camps then were located from Ŭiju northeast along the Yalu River.
4. Attempts were naturally made to alleviate the situation by bringing fields back into production. In early 1254, commissioners had been sent on an inspection tour of the citadels of refuge and sea islands of Ch'ungch'ŏng, Kyŏngsang, and Chŏlla as well as Sŏhae Province, to measure and distribute land (*KS* 78. 4a). Then, in late 1256, instructions were issued permitting those who were not in excess of one day from their villages to return to cultivate the fields (*KS* 78. 4a-b). Wastelands along the coast and lands belonging to the royal household, *kung* 宮, the temples, *sa* 寺, and the monasteries, *wŏn* 院, were distributed to supplement the above (*KS* 78. 4a-b).
5. Perhaps 're-established' would be a better word here, for this bureau certainly existed earlier. Cf. *KS* 102. 14b ff.
6. *YKC* 9b merely remarks very succinctly that Koryŏ was attacked in 1256, 1257, and 1258.
7. Kŭmgyo 金郊 was the overland relay station at Ŭmgang 陰ㄴ仝 ; it was one of the 16 stations on the Kŭmgyo circuit 道 (*KS* 82. 9).
8. *Chusa* 舟師 or fleet, cf. 9.479C, *Daikanwa jiten* 大漢和辭典, published in 13 vols. by Daishukan shoten 大修館書店, Tōkyō, 1945-1950.
9. Howorth, p. 212, says "in 1256, the King of Corea went in person to Mangu's court to do homage." Howorth cites d'Ohsson, ii. 321 (i.e., Baron

d'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchingis-Khan jusqu'à Timour Beg ou Tamerlane*, Paris, 1852). The basis for d'Ohsson's statement was undoubtedly *YS* 3. 7a which relates that in the sixth year of the reign of Mongke, the *Kao-li kuo-wang* 高麗國王 and the heads of other nations came to court. Since Kojong, the Koryŏ monarch at the time, never went to the Mongol court, the passage must be considered erroneous. It may be a reference to prince Sun, as *kuo-wang* referred to a Prince of the first rank in the Mongol system, however, I believe that it is more likely a reference to Wŏnjong's visit to the court of Qubilai in 1264.

10. The city of Naju 羅州 is in the modern S. Chŏlla Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 35. 615a-622a.
11. Kim Sugang 金守剛 (fl. 1232-1250's) passed the exams in the reign of Kojong and was placed in the Historiographical Bureau, *sagwan*, then gradually rose to the post of Attendant Censor, *siŏsa* 侍御史. He was twice responsible for the withdrawal of Mongol forces. He was first sent to Mongolia on a tribute mission to present regional products and to ask for the withdrawal of Mongol troops in Koryŏ. He accompanied the Emperor into the walled-city of Qarā-qorum, and, when the Emperor declined to order the troops to disband since the Koryŏ authorities had not returned to the mainland, Sugang made an analogy of the Koryŏ position. "It is like the game entering the burrows when the hunters pursue; can trapped animals [be expected] to obey and come forth when [the hunters] stand before them grasping bow and arrows? Again, it is like when ice and snow are cruelly cold and the veins of the earth are frozen shut; can the grasses and trees live?" The Emperor assented and told Kim, "You are indeed an envoy who is equal to [the task of] uniting [our] two nations in friendship." Thereupon, he sent one Hsü Chih 徐趾 to Koryŏ to order the troops to disband

    Later, when the Mongol troops returned, Sugang was once more dispatched to request that they be withdrawn. The Emperor at the time was in the field against the Sung and Sugang went to his Mobile Garrison, *hsing-ying* 行營. Once again, the Emperor allowed the troops to be disbanded and sent an envoy to accompany Sugang back to Koryŏ. For biographical information see *KS* 102. 20b-21a.
12. Sungšan 松山; for the reconstruction of this name see L. Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII ...*, p. 130.
13. There was a *tsung-kuan* 摠管 or governor in the Yüan *lu* administration. See Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 33. There was also a *tsung-kuan* or commander under the myriarch, *wan-hu* 萬戶. See Ratchnevsky, op.

cit., p. 238; also see F.Aubin, *Index de 'Un Code des Yuan'*, Paris, 1960, p. 504.

14. The entry of the absence of snow is not merely a record of an unusual event but rather has important agricultural significance, specifically concerned with barley and similar crops which are planted prior to the snowfall and which ripen in the spring. Snow insures a good barley crop in the spring.
15. This entry is paralleled in *KS* 24. 32a.
16. One-thousand was a number used in lieu of the given name which was a practice much in vogue at this time. Cf. Yang Lien-sheng, 'The Form of the Paper Note Hui-tzu of the Southern Sung Dynasty', *HJAS* 16 (1953), pp. 365-373, p. 366 note 6. His real name may have been Yi Kwang, see *KS* 24. 24b.
17. Ch'oe Ŭi 崔竩 (d. 1258) was the illegitimate son of Ch'oe Hang and, as Ch'oe Hang had no sons by his principal wife, he made Ŭi his heir. Ŭi was the last of the Ch'oe military rulers; he was killed in early 1258, after having held power for only one year. For biographical information see *KS* 129. 51-55; also see *BTKP* 30. 282.
18. Little is known of Ch'oe Yangbaek 崔良伯 (d. 1258) beyond his participation in the events depicted here. For biographical references see *BTKP* 31. 289.
19. Yu Nŭng 柳能 (d. 1258) was of Chŏnju 全州. He was the son of Senior Councillor, *p'yŏngjangsa,* Yu So 柳韶 (d. 1258; *BTKP* 152. 1396). Little is known of him other than his brief service with Ch'oe Ŭi. For biographical information see *KS* 101. 12b; also see *BTKP* 151. 1387.
20. Kim Injun 金仁俊, also known as Kim Chun 金俊 (d. Jan. 24, 1269), was a slave of Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn who rose to power during the rule of Ch'oe Hang. Curbed and held down when Ch'oe Ŭi came to power, Kim was one of the principal leaders in the revolt which overthrew the Ch'oe clan. Following the downfall of the Ch'oe clan, Kim attempted to concentrate power in his own hands. In 1260, he was given an honorary fief of 1 000 households and an actual fief of 100 households. In 1263, he was appointed Supervisor of the Supreme Directorate, *kyojŏng pyŏlgam* 敎定別監 (in *KS* 130. 14b4, read *kyo* 敎 in lieu of *kyo* 校). In 1265, he was made Marquis of Haeyang 海陽侯. In 1269, he was killed by Im Yŏn who then seized power himself. Kim Injun had three sons: Taejae 大材, Yongjae 用材 (also called Chu 柱), and Sikchae 式材. For biographical information see *KS* 130. 12a-20b; also see *BTKP* 55. 529.
21. Song Kiryu 宋吉儒 (fl. 1250's), who has the distinction of being one of the two persons classified as 'rapacious functionaries' by the compilors

of the *Koryŏ-sa*, had served Ch'oe Hang as Commander, *chiyu*, of the Night Patrol, *ya pyŏlch'o*. Advanced to Grand General with the post of Special Supervisor of Defense and of Sea Lanes of Kyŏngsang Province, *Kyŏngsang-do suro pangho pyŏlgam*, he led the Night Patrol there to forcibly evacuate the people to islands, killing those who would not obey the order, burning dwellings and seizing cash, grain, and lands. When a report of his activities was sent up by the Circuit Inspector, *anch'al-sa*, Kim Injun attempted to intercede in his behalf but Ch'oe Ŭi exiled Song and reprimanded Kim Injun, et al., for their intervention. Song was later recalled following the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan. For biographical information see *KS* 122. 28a-29a.

22. The Sinŭigun was a cavalry unit formed of men who had escaped and returned from the Mongols. For further details see the section on 'Patrols', *pyŏlch'o*.

23. Little is known of Pak Hŭisil 朴希實 (fl. 1250's). He had been sent as envoy to the Mongol commander in Koryŏ prior to the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan and, following the *coup*, he was sent again to request that the Mongol forces withdraw so that the Koryŏ authorities could return to the mainland (*KS* 24. 39b).

24. Pak Songbi 朴松庇 (d. 1278) was of Tŏgwŏn 德原. Due to his role in the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan he was made Grand General (*KS* 24. 33a) and went on to reach the post of *Chamjijŏngsa* 參知政事. He had one son, Pak Sŏngdae 朴成大. For biographical information see *KS* 130. 20b; also see *BTKP* 94. 885.

25. Im Yŏn 林衍 (d. 1270) had the former name of Sŭngju 承柱. He was uncertain whether Chinju 鎭州 or Ch'uju 娶州 was his ancestral home but later he accepted the former as his real ancestral seat. Physically powerful, it is said that he could knock a man flat or toss him to the rafters with ease. He was kept as a private soldier by a General and later returned to his native village, only to flee when the Mongol forces arrived. Subsequently, he was appointed a Lieutenant, *taejŏng* 隊正, in the army. At this time, a certain Im Hyohu 林孝侯 had illicit relations with Im Yŏn's wife. Im Yŏn learned of this and seduced Im Hyohu's wife in revenge. Hyohu reported this to the authorities who wanted to charge Im Yŏn. At this point, Kim Injun, aware of Im Yŏn's physical strength, got the charges dropped and got Im Yŏn an appointment as Colonel. Thereafter, Im Yŏn habitually called Kim Injun 'father'. His rank at the time of the revolt against Ch'oe Ŭi is given as *toryŏng nangjang* or Colonel-in-Charge; it would appear that he was leader of the Night Patrol, *ya pyŏlch'o*, whose strength he subsequently used to overthrow Kim Injun.

Im Yŏn's power, as is made clear in his biography, was based upon the units of the Three Patrols, *sam pyŏlch'o,* viz., the Left and Right divisions of the Night Patrol, and the Sinŭigun cavalry. As Im Yŏn's activities are given in some detail in the text, I shall not repeat them at this point. He had five sons: Yugan 惟幹, Yumu 惟茂, Yuin 惟裀, Yugŏ 惟祖, and Yuje 惟提. For biographical information see *KS* 130. 20b-27a; also see *YKC* and *BTKP* 48. 458.

26. The rank of lieutenant, *taejŏng* 隊正, also called *taejang* 隊長, had the official grade of Ninth Class, secondary (Yi, Table 4), an annual stipend of 16 bushels (*sŏk*) 10 pecks (*tu*) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 30 *kyŏl* of paddy fields and 5 *kyŏl* of forest lands (Yi, Table 7).

27. Ch'a Songu 車松衍 (d. 1269) ultimately rose to the rank of General. He was a member of Kim Injun's faction and was killed in the power struggle in 1269 when Kim was overthrown (*KS* 130. 20a). Little is known of him beyond his brief role in these events. For biographical references see *BTKP* 20. 188.

28. Little is known of Kim Hongch'wi 金洪就, however, he did rise to the rank of Grand General, and he was exiled in 1269 when Kim Injun was overthrown. See *KS* 130. 20a; *KSC* 18. 35a-b.

29. Kim Yongjae 金用材 (d. 1269) had the former name of Chu 柱; he died in the power struggle which overthrew his father, Kim Injun, in 1269. For biographical information see *KS* 130. 19a-b; *BTKP* 55. 525.

30. Ch'oe On 崔溫 (d. 1268) of Ch'angwŏn 昌原, passed the exams in the reign of Kojong and gradually rose to be Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Kim Injun had discussed the plot against Ch'oe Ŭi with him and Ch'oe On's son, Munbon, secretly wrote to Ch'oe Ŭi and informed him of the plot. After the death of Ch'oe Ŭi, Munbon's letter was found. Kim Injun and Yu Kyŏng endeavored, on the basis of this, to have Ch'oe On and his son executed but the King would not go along with it and so Ch'oe was banished to an island, as were the rest of the group who had written and informed Ch'oe Ŭi of the plot. Later, Kim Injun had Ch'oe recalled. He went on to hold the post of Senior Councillor, *p'yŏngjangsa, in the Royal Chancellory, munhasŏng.* He had two sons: Munbon 文本 and Mullip (~ Munnip) 文立. For biographical information see *KS* 99. 7a-8b; also see *BTKP* 27. 258.

31. The rank of Senior Colonel, *chungnangjang* 中郎將, had the official grade of Fifth Class (Yi, Table 4), an annual stipend of 120 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 70 *kyŏl* of paddy fields and 27 *kyŏl* of forest lands (Yi, Table 7).

32. The rank of Major, *sanwŏn* 散員, had the official grade of Eighth

Class, primary (Yi, Table 4), an annual stipend of 33 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 40 *kyŏl* of paddy fields and 10 *kyŏl* of forest lands (Yi, Table 7).

33. The rank of Captain, *kyowi* 校尉, had the official grade of Eighth Class, secondary, an annual stipend of 23 bushel (*sŏk*) five pecks (*tu*) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 35 *kyŏl* of paddy fields and 8 *kyŏl* of forest land (Yi, Table 7). In the early days of the dynasty, the title was Subordinate Officer, *owi* 伍尉 (*KS* 81. 6a-7a).
34. I have been unable to identify these persons. It is interesting to note that they were mostly lower ranking officers.
35. According to *KSC* 17. 34b, Kim Taejae had communicated the affair to Ch'oe Nangbaek believing the latter to be one of the plotters.
36. Little is known of Han Chonggwe 韓宗軌 (d. 1258) other than his participation in the events cited here. The importance of his position as Commander, *chiyu,* of the Night Patrol, stresses the real power of that unit. For biographical references see *BTKP* 36. 330.
37. Little is known of Yi Irhyu 李日休 (d. 1258) other than his participation in the events cited here. For biographical references see *BTKP* 134. 1240.
38. Yi Che 李悌 (d. 1269) was one of Kim Injun's faction. He rose to the rank of General and committed suicide when Kim Injun was overthrown in 1269. For biographical references see *BTKP* 129. 1178.
39. This is the first appearance of the Three Patrols, *sam pyŏlch'o,* as a unit in the records. The Three Patrols were the Left and Right divisions of the Night Patrol, and the Sinŭigun cavalry. For a further discussion see the section on 'Patrols', *pyŏlch'o.*
40. The Ŭngyang 鷹揚 (lit. 'hawks on the wing') was one of the two 'armies', *kun* 軍; the other was the *yongho* 龍虎 (lit. 'dragons and tigers'). Together they had a complement of three thousand men (pseudo-number?). Yi Kibaek 李起白 has already expressed the opinion that they were the King's guards. See p. 132, Yi Kibaek, Koryŏ ch'ogi pyŏngje e kwanhan hudae chesŏl ŭi kŏmt'o 高麗初期兵制에 關한 後代說의 檢討 ["On the Military Institutions of the Early Ko-ryeo Period"], *AY* 1 (1958) 2, pp. 129-154.
41. Little is known of Pak Sŏngja 朴成梓 (d. 1264) other than his participation in the events cited here. For some biographical references see *BTKP* 94. 887.
42. Little is known of Sŏng Wŏnbal 成元拔 (d. 1258) other than the few items mentioned in the text. For biographical references see *BTKP* 107. 1013; correct the *BTKP* reference *KS* 127. 55a to read *KS* 129. 55a.

43. The text reads Pak Sŭng*gae* 朴承蓋 ; I believe that *kae* is an error for *ik* 益, and that the individual concerned is Pak Sŭngik 朴承益, a member of Kim Injun's faction who reached the rank of General and who was killed when Im Yŏn overthrew Kim Injun in 1269. See *KS* 130. 20a; for biographical information on Pak Sŭngik see *BTKP* 95. 895.

44. There are various theories on the *kyŏl*, a term which was in usage in Silla times. The most widely accepted version is that given by Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, p. 162 ff. One *kyŏl* was 33 square paces, *po* 步, or 45.496 sq. meters, 2 *kyŏl* were 46.66 square paces, etc. A different theory sees the *kyŏl* as a unit of farmland which produced one hundred pack-boards, *chige*, of rice; one *chige* containing 10 sheaves, one sheaf containing 10 handfuls, i.e., the *kyŏl* as a measure of the value of land as evidenced by its productive capacity. For this theory see Kim Chaejin 金載珍, Chon'gyolche yon'gu 田結制研究 ["A Study of the *Kyŏl* System"], *Nonmun-chip* 論文集 2 (1959), Kyŏngbuk University 慶北大學校, Taegu, Korea, pp. 71-115. With regard to the linear measurements mentioned, in the 23rd year of the reign of Munjong (r. 1047-1082), the following measures were adopted:

6 *ch'on* 寸 = 1 *pun* 分
10 *pun* = 1 *ch'ŏk* 尺
6 *ch'ŏk* = 1 *po* 步

45. This was done in the ninth month of 1259, part ot what appears to have been a general redistribution of land among the officials in the capital area. Also involved were some 2 000 *kyŏl* of fields controlled by the government granary 公廩, and the fields of Haŭm-chin 河陰鎭 and Kanghaenyŏng 江海寧

46. The members of the cavalry units of the Five Armies were also given awards of silver and grain according to their station at this time. Since no mention is made of their participation in the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan, I assume the awards were made to insure their support after the fall of the Ch'oe clan. Members of the Night Patrol and Sinŭigun cavalry were each given three bushels (*sŏk*) of rice, one *kŭn* of iron, and three bolts (*p'il*) of cloth. There appears to have been some discontent in their ranks, for a week prior to this they had crowded the King's carriage in front of the palace, perhaps seeking rewards.

47. The title was awarded in several grades from First Class to Fifth Class, and those so honored were given rice and colored satin, etc., while those among them who had been serving as slaves were, extending to their sons and grandsons, given permission to take the exams for civil service.

48. Ch'oe Cha 崔滋 (1188-1260) was a descendant of the famed Koryŏ Con-

fucianist Ch'oe Ch'ung 崔冲 (d. 1068; *BTKP* 23. 224), and himself one of the more important literati of the Koryŏ period. His style, *cha,* was Sudŏk 樹德 and his literary appellation, *ho,* was Tongsan-su 東山叟. He had strongly advocated making a settlement with the Mongols, pointing out the crowded conditions on Kanghwa Island and the shortage of land there. He visited Kim Injun and entertained him, for which people abused him. He died two years after the fall of the Ch'oe clan and was given the posthumous appellation of Munch'ŏng 文清. His works included the *Kajip* 家集 in 10 *kwŏn* and the *Sokp'amin-chip* 續破閑集 in 2 *kwŏn.* For biographical information see *KS* 102. 14a-16a; also see *BTKP* 21. 205.

49. It is interesting to observe a precedent in Koryo-Chin relations, for it was due principally to the Confucianists that Koryŏ became a vassal of the Chin. Cf. M. Rogers, 'The Regularization of Koryŏ-Chin Relations (1116-1131)', *CAJ* 6 (1961), p. 62 note 58.

50. Yesüder. The name occurs in several variants including: Yü-ch'ou 余愁 (*KS* 24. 35a-b); Yü-ch'ou-ta 余愁達 (*KS* 25. 3a, etc.); and Yü-su-tu 余速禿 (*KS* 24. 15b; *KSC* 17. 18b). Mr. Gari Ledyard of Berkeley has brought it to my attention that a certain Yesüder is mentioned in the *Ching-shih ta-tien* section on postal relays, *jam* 站, preserved in the *Yung-lo ta-tien* under the date 1262.4; this is also noted in *CS* Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 308, relating to the *KS* 25. 3a account of an order from Yesüder to Koryŏ to establish postal relay stations south of the Koryŏ Western Capital. Cf. *Yung-lo ta-tien,* Chung-hua shu-chü 中華書局 edition, Peking, 1960, 19416.22.11b. I note that there is also a certain Yesüder mentioned in *Yung-lo ta-tien* 19417.22.2b. In both instances the name is written 也速解兒 and in both instances, the identification remains conjectural. I have followed Shiratori, *Onyaku* ..., (1)2.28a-b in the reconstruction of this name. A certain Yesüder 也速解兒 is also mentioned in the *YS* 93 section on household taxes, *k'o-chai* 科差, for which see Schurman, op. cit., p. 99 and p. 105-106 note 11.
In 1254, Yesüder 余速禿 and P'u-po-tai 甫波大 arrived in Koryŏ (*KS* 24. 15b) with cavalry units to reinforce Jalairtai. Following Jalairtai's murder in 1259, Yesüder took charge of affairs in Koryŏ and was stationed in Tung-ching. According to his conversation with Prince Chŏn when the latter arrived in Tung-ching enroute to the Mongol Court in 1259, the Emperor had placed Prince Sung-chi 松吉 in charge of conquering Koryŏ and an army was already in readiness to begin the assault (*KS* 24. 43a-b); Yesüder, it would seem, was at the time subordinate to Prince Sung-chi.

51. Cho Hwi 趙暉 (fl. 1250-1270's) was originally from Hanyang-pu 漢陽府 in the Han River Delta, but later went to live in Yongjin-hyŏn 龍津縣 in the northeast. He rebelled in 1258, and submitted the northeast area to the Mongols who placed him in charge as Governor, *tsung-kuan*. His post of governor was transmitted to his son Yanggi 良琪 and to his grandson Kwak 嚞. For biographical information see *KS* 130. 10a-12a; also see *BTKP* 7. 71. The *BTKP* entry "d. 1356-10" is in error; the date Cho died is unknown.
52. In the twelfth month of 1258, the Mongol Prince San-chi (a.w. Sung-chu; Sung-chi) led troops into the old Hwaju area (*KS* 24. 38b). After consolidating Mongol gains in the Koryŏ northeast by establishing a Governor's command, he withdrew to Tung-ching (*KS* 24. 38b).
53. *Ch'ien-hu* 千戶, Chiliarch or Chief of One-Thousand. See Aubin, op. cit., p. 502 for references to Ratchnevsky, *Un Code* ..., concerning this title. The division of the Mongol army into sections of 10, 100, 1 000, and 10 000 was ordered by Činggis in an article of his *Yasa* and corresponded to the Mongol social organization, for which see G. Vernadsky, 'The Scope and Contents of Chingís Khan's Yasa', *HJAS* 3 (1938) 1, pp. 337-360.
54. *Wan-hu* 萬戶 Myriarch or Chief of Ten-Thousand. See Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. VIII and p. 139. Also see F. W. Cleaves, 'Biography of Bayan of the Bārin in the Yüan Shih', *HJAS* 19 (1956) 3 & 4, p. 203 note 5.
55. Yun Ch'un 尹椿 was the Special Supervisor of Defense at Yanggŭn-sŏng 陽根城 and he submitted the city to the Mongols in the 1250's. The Mongols selected 600 of the best troops from the city and placed Yun in charge of them. He returned to rejoin Koryŏ, for which he was rewarded by Ch'oe Hang and placed in the army as a general. See *KS* 130. 31a-b.
56. *T'un-t'ien* 屯田 or military colonies, one type of government land under the Yüan. See Schurmann, op. cit., p. 29.
57. The post of *hojang* 戶長 or Magistrate was a post in the regional administrative system which dates in usage to the second year of the reign of Sŏngjong 成宗 (r. 982-997). There was a general reorganization in the reign of Hyŏnjong 顯宗 (r. 1010-1031) of the provincial administration which placed eight Magistrates, *hojang*, and four Deputy Magistrates, *pu-hojang*, in those *chu, pu, kun*, and *hyŏn* districts which had over 1 000 taxable male adults, *chŏng* 丁 ; in districts with over 500 taxable male adults there were seven Magistrates and two Deputy Magistrates; districts with over 300 taxable male adults had five Magistrates and two Deputy Magistrates; districts with less than 100 taxable male adults had four Magistrates and one Deputy Magistrate. The number of Magistrates

and Deputy Magistrates assigned to the Frontier-Districts, while it corresponded to the number of male adults in each community, was slightly less than the above. There were, of course, other provincial posts which are set forth in *KS* 75. 45a-49a, from which the above information has been taken. An excellent study of the subject is Gim Jong-gug (Kim Chong-guk) 金鍾國, Kōrai jidai no kyōri ni tsuite 高麗時代の鄉吏について ["On the Provincial Government Officials in the Goryeo Dynasty"], *CG* 25 (1962), pp. 71-122.

With reference to 'taxable male adults', *chŏng* 丁, "[In] the national system, at sixteen years of age, males (lit. people 民) became adults, *chŏng* 丁, commencing [their eligibility for] national corvée duty; at sixty years of age they were considered old and were released from corvée duty." The basis for this was the annual census conducted by the functionaries of the *chu* and *hyŏn* administrations and registered people were taxed by household; levies for military service, levies-in-kind, and corvée service were based upon the household registers (*KS* 79. 1a).

58. Koryŏ relief measures taken are outlined in *KS* 80. 41b-42b; some information is given in *KS* 79. In the month preceding this: "They doled out 20 *kŭn* of white silver from the Sinhŭng Treasury, exchanged it for seed-grain and distributed it to the poor" (*KS* 79. 8a-b).

Chapter V

SUBMISSION AND ALLIANCE

On May 14 (*chia-wu* 甲午 day, fourth month), 1259, Chŏn 倎, the Crown Prince, with a retinue of 40 persons, set out for the Mongol Court. A levy of one *kŭn* of silver was placed on those of the fourth rank and above, and in decreasing amounts on those below the fourth rank to meet the expenses of the journey. Only 300 horses for the National Gifts could be produced from the capital area and as these were considered insufficient, horses were purchased on the road. Therefore, there were few Civil or Military Officials, *yangban,* who rode (*KS* 24. 41b-42b; *KSC* 17. 47b-48a; *CHSL* 4. 34a)[1].

As the Crown Prince rode toward the Mongol Court, a report from the north came in that Jalairtai had died violently and that the Emperor had sent men who seized three of the Mongol commanders (*KS* 24. 42b). This placed Mongol affairs in Koryŏ with Yesüder and Prince Sung-chi 松吉 (a.w. Sung-chu; San-chi) whom the Koryŏ Prince met in Tung-ching on his way to the Mongol Court. Troops had already been massed at Tung-ching for another invasion of Koryŏ and it was only after Prince Chŏn had convinced Prince Sung-chi the Koryŏ authorities were carrying out the Mongol demand that the people return to the mainland, and reminded him the Mongols had agreed to disband the troops if the Crown Prince went to the Mongol Court, where the troops actually disbanded (*KS* 24. 43a-b; *KSC* 17. 48a-49a).

Included in the peace agreement was the demolition of the fortified walls on Kanghwa and Mongol envoys arrived in the fifth month (May 24 - June 21) to supervise their destruction (*KS* 24. 42b). The dismantling of the inner fortifications by the militia men, produced great anxiety (*KS* 24. 42b-43a) but when the Guard Corps, *tobang,* was ordered to tear down the outer fortifications, the people began to purchase boats and the boat price soared (*KS* 24. 44a; *KSC* 17. 49a-b).

At this time, Kojong, after occupying the throne for 47 years, died (on July 21, 1259) at the age of 68 at the home of Yu Kyŏng (*KS* 24. 42a). With the Crown Prince enroute to the Mongol Court, his younger brother, Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyŏng, was suggested for the throne by Kim Injun but this was vetoed by the Chief Ministers of the Civil and Military Departments, *yangbu,*

who cited the ancient precedent of the succession of the eldest son, perhaps with the memory of troubles with Chin in mind (*KS* 24. 42a-b; *KSC* 17. 49b-50a) [2]. Failing in this, the ambitious Kim Injun was quick to ingratiate himself by supporting the Royal Grandson, *t'aeson* 太孫, Prince Sim [3], who was then formally placed at the head of the government until the Crown Prince returned. Junior Colonel Pak Ch'ŏnsik 朴天植 was dispatched with a report of the matter to the Mongol Court (*KS* 25. 1a-b; *KSC* 17. 49b-50a; *CHSL* 4. 34b).

The envoys Pak Hŭisil and Cho Munju 朴希實 曹文柱 (fl. 1250's) [4] previously sent to the Mongols to request the removal of Mongol garrisons from Ŭiju and the Western Capital, although they had contacted Hsien-tsung (Möngke) who was at the time (3rd month = March 26 - April 23, 1259) leading the expedition against the southern Sung, failed in their objective (*KS* 25. 2a-3a; *KSC* 17. 51a). Upon their return, in the eighth month of 1259 (Aug. 20 - Sept. 18) they were accompanied by the Mongol envoy Shih-lo-wen 失羅門 bearing a dispatch from Yesüder which, in brief, ordered Koryŏ to establish *jamči* [5] or overland relay stations, fully equipped with attendants and horses, south of the Western Capital for the use of the Emperor's messengers; the relay stations to the north of the Western Capital — presumably reestablished by the Mongols — were to be used jointly (*KS* 25. 3a).

While the Koryŏ authorities had, in response to Mongol demands, repeatedly declared they would return to the old capital, they had as yet made no effort to do so. In Yen-tu 燕都, Hong Tagu, the son of Hong Pogwŏn, had told the Emperor that it was not true the Koreans had returned to the mainland. A Korean envoy heard of this and informed Yesüder that it was simply slander. Yesüder promptly sent a Mongol envoy to Koryŏ to inspect the progress being made to return to the mainland. Some action had to be taken and it is clear that it was taken because of the presence of the Mongol envoy who had come to gather first-hand information on the transfer. So, in the eleventh month (Nov. 16 - Dec. 15) of 1259, the Koryŏ authorities began to levy an army of 30 *yŏng* (i.e., 30 000) to construct palace buildings in the old capital. They also informed the Mongol envoy that the Emperor had allowed them three years due to the necessity of transporting building materials and constructing new palaces, dwellings, and the like in the old capital. Their reluctance to act they said, was because the Crown Prince, who was to ascend the throne upon his return, was still absent (*KS* 25. 3b-4a; *KSC* 17. 52a-b).

With the winter, famine set in again in the capital (*KS* 25. 3b) and forces were secretly sent against Mongol raiding parties on the mainland (*KS* 25. 3a-b; *KS* 25. 1b; *KS* 25. 5a; *KSC* 17. 52b; *KSC* 17. 53a). These raiding parties,

many from the Mongol garrisons in the northeast and guided by Koryŏ deserters (cf. *KS* 130. 10a-12a), were the real reason the Koreans stayed on the islands. At this time, the Special Supervisor of Resettlement, *ch'ulpae pyŏlgam* 出排別監 , of Sŏhae Province reported that all the people who had returned to the mainland had been made captive by the Mongol troops, and he requested that the return from the islands to the mainland be stopped (*KSC* 17. 52b). The severity of the situation is attested by the sharp increase in uprisings and desertions to the Mongols (*KS* 25. 3a; *KS* 25. 5b; *KS* 25. 6a). Even a Recorder of the Palace Guards, *anae tobyŏngma noksa* 衙內都兵馬錄事 , shaved his head and submitted to the Mongols (*KS* 25. 6b) [6]. In the winter of 1259, "... there was a great famine in the capital. The officials and the people were searching for food. Those from the southern *chu* districts streamed [back] to the provinces. The Military Council, *chungbang*, [ordered] the Censorate, *ŏsadae*, to prohibit the officials from leaving the palace and there were many officials who starved to death" (*KS* 25. 3b; also see *KSC* 17. 52b).

In the meantime, while Prince Chŏn was enroute to present himself, Möngke, who was in the field leading an attack against the southern Sung, died in the seventh month (July 22 - Aug. 19) of 1259 [7], at Tiao-yü-shan 釣魚山 (in mod. Szu-ch'uan Province 四川省). At this time, Prince Chŏn was at Liu-p'an-shan 六盤山 (in mod. Kan-su Province 甘肅省). The Mongol Prince Qubilai who was also in the field against the Sung, was at that time at O-chou 鄂州 (in mod. Hupei Province). Following the death of Möngke, Ariɣ-boge 阿里不哥 (a.w. 阿里孛哥), one of Möngke's three brothers [8], hurriedly convened an assembly of princes in Mongolia and was elected Qān. Hearing the news of Ariɣ-boge's action, Prince Qubilai made a quick peace with the Sung and hurried north with his forces [9]. Enroute he met Koryŏ Prince Chŏn and learning that the latter had come to offer his submission, Qubilai was greatly pleased. At this meeting in the field, Prince Qubilai is related to have exclaimed: "Koryŏ, a nation 10 000 *li* [distant]; T'ang T'ai-tsung himself led an expedition [against them] and was unable to obtain their submission [10]. Now their Heir Apparent himself comes to me. This is the will of Heaven." At this same audience, Chao Lang-pi [11], then Pacification Commissioner, *hsüan-fu-shih* [12], of the Chiang-huai 江淮 provinces, is said to have told Qubilai, "Although Koryŏ is called a small nation, due to its perilous mountains and seas, our nation has used troops [against them] for over twenty years and they are still not our vassals" (*KS* 25. 8a-9b; also see *KSC* 18. 3a-b).

Accompanied by Prince Chŏn, Qubilai continued northward to Ching-chao-fu 京兆府 . Here, in the second month (Mar. 14 - Apr. 11) of 1260,

Prince Chŏn received news of his father, Kojong's death (*KS* 25. 6b). He was allowed by Qubilai to leave immediately and Qubilai ordered the daruɣači or resident commissioner Shu-li-ta 束里大 and Kang Hwasang [13] to escort Prince Chŏn back to Koryŏ (*KS* 25. 7a-b; *KSC* 18. 3a-4a) [14] where they arrived at Kaegyŏng in the following month (*KS* 25. 7b-8a).

Prince Chŏn's absence had given the Koryŏ authorities an excuse for not leaving Kanghwa while Yesüder had endeavored to have the move coincide with Prince Chŏn's return. He even suggested that Kim Injun should lead the officials out to welcome the King at the Western Capital (*KS* 25. 6b-7a). As a conciliatory move, the Koryŏ authorities "... ordered the officials great and small, the people, and the Buddhist priests, each to build living quarters in the old capital" (*KS* 25. 7a).

Several officials were sent to the Western Capital to welcome Prince Chŏn but at the time he had already passed the Western Capital with the Mongol escorts (*KS* 25. 7a-b). As Prince Chŏn journeyed south, "the Royal Grandson, desiring to return the metropolis to the old capital, made Grand General Kim Panggyŏng [15] and General Kim Sŭngjun, et al., Special Supervisors of Resettlement, *ch'ulbae pyŏlgam*. Opening the granary, they distributed 6 420 bushels (*kok*) of rice, one bushel to every prince and official in order to aid in the expenses of constructing dwellings" (*KSC* 18. 2b; also see *KS* 25. 7b). This interesting passage says, in effect, that the total number of officials and princes was 6 420 for the capital or central government and it appears to be correct [16].

At Kaegyŏng, Prince Chŏn had accompanied Shu-li-ta to inspect the construction of palaces then underway. From Kaegyŏng they rode south and, reaching the outskirts of Sŭngch'ŏn-pu, Shu-li-ta who had been sent back with Prince Chŏn as daruɣači, decided to test the Prince's intentions and invited him to proceed ahead into Sŭngch'ŏn-pu. When Prince Chŏn took him at his word, Shu-li-ta angrily withdrew and camped in a field on the outskirts of the city, expressing his desire to return. Apparently Shu-li-ta was holding the Crown Prince, for not until after a visit by Prince Sim and a present of a parrot (decorated) basin and thirty *kŭn* of white gold did Shu-li-ta consent to remain. The next day he crossed to Kanghwa in the same boat with Prince Chŏn. Due to the insistence of Shu-li-ta to transfer the capital, the Koryŏ authorities divided the civil and military officials as well as the militia force into three shifts to go and come from Kaegyŏng in order to indicate their intention to transfer the capital (*KS* 25. 9b-10a; *KSC* 18. 4a) [17].

Early in the fourth month (May 12 - June 10) of 1260, a Mongol envoy arrived with a letter which declared, "Of all beneath Heaven who have not surrendered, there is only your nation and Sung." Specifically referring to

Kim Injun and mentioning rumors of intrigue and rebellion in Koryŏ, the letter closed with "At the time when the Emperor had not yet ascended the throne, we heard that the King had arrived in the Western Capital and remained there eight or nine days. We suspected there was a calamity therefore we bestow this letter" (*KS* 25. 10a-12a; *KSC* 18. 4a-6a; *YS* 208. 4b). Fortunately for Wŏnjong these suspicions appear to have been unfounded [18].

On June 3 (*wu-wu* 戊午 day of the fourth month) 1260, Prince Chŏn, or Wŏnjong as he was later canonized, ascended the throne in the Kangan Palace 康安殿 on Kanghwa Island (*KS* 25. 12b; *KSC* 18. 6a) and, a few days later, a Mongol envoy arrived with an Imperial Edict [19] which in addition to containing specific instructions for Wŏnjong, was at the same time an answer to various requests he had made – apparently prior to returning to Koryŏ. There was to be a transfer of all people back to the mainland from the islands, agriculture was to be encouraged, while Qubilai promised to stop all pillaging by the soldiers, to withdraw the army, and to release all Koreans taken prisoner since the previous spring [20].

A subsequent edict in the sixth month (July 10 - Aug. 8) clarified these points somewhat further: clothing and headdress were to follow the Koryŏ custom [21], the speed of the transfer back to the old capital was to accord with their ability (i.e., no time-limit was set, but they were to move as quickly as their ability permitted); the troops garrisoned on the Koryŏ side of the Yalu River were to be withdrawn in the autumn, while the party of the daruγači or resident commissioners being sent to Koryŏ (to replace Shu-li-ta) had already been recalled (*KS* 25. 19a-b; *YKC* 10a-b; *KSC* 18. 9a-b). Qubilai fulfilled his pledge and released some 440 households, i.e., 2 200 persons, taken captive (*KS* 25. 16a; also see *KS* 25. 12b-13a) and, in the autumn, the withdrawal of Mongol forces began, but even the Emperor could not prevent pillaging as the army withdrew [22] (*KS* 25. 19b-20a).

One reason for Qubilai's indulgent attitude toward Koryŏ, in addition to his meeting with Prince Chŏn in the field, and his own succession dispute with Ariγ-boge [23] was Koryŏ's prompt submission of tribute – a mission was sent to present regional products as soon as Wŏnjong returned (*KSC* 18. 6a) and the rapid dispatch of Hŭi, the Duke of Yŏngan [24], to present congratulations on Qubilai's accession to the throne (*KSC* 18. 7a), by which Koryŏ became the first nation to present congratulations (*KS* 25. 18a-b; *KSC* 18. 9a; *CHSL* 4. 36a).

Another reason was the resettlement of the Koryŏ northwest. There had been two mass evacuations of the area north of the Western Capital, viz., once in the period 1231-1232 and a second time in the period 1248-1250. In the tenth month (Oct. 26 - Nov. 23) of 1261, there was a large-scale move-

ment back into the northwest which re-populated the cities of Unju, Pakchu, Kuju, Kwakchu, Maengju, Muju, T'aeju, and Suju [25] 順川.

Internally, Kim Injun, backed by both Wŏnjong and Sim, the latter invested as the Crown Prince in the eighth month (Sept. 7 - Oct. 6) of 1260 (*KS* 25. 18a), continued to increase his power. In the sixth month he was given the crucial post of Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs (*KS* 25. 16b) and before the year was out he was given the honorary title of "First Meritorious Protector of the Altars of the Earth", replacing Yu Kyŏng who was demoted to "Fifth Meritorious Protector ... etc." (*KS* 25. 16a-b; *KS* 130. 14a). Yu Kyŏng's demotion is an interesting event for his actual power had been clipped since the winter of 1258. At that time, only eight months after the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan, Yu had taken over control of the Civil Council but had overreached himself. Im Yŏn and Kim Sŭngjun who hated Yu Kyŏng had slandered him to Kim Injun, the real strongman. Kim, in turn, had told the King, the aging Kojong, that Yu Kyŏng wanted to seize the King's power. This apparently was an excuse for Kim to round up Yu Kyŏng's supporters. Three of them, viz., General U Tŭkkyu 禹得圭, Commander, *chiyu*, Kim Tŭgyong 金得龍, and Junior Colonel Yang Hwa 梁[illegible] were imprisoned and later beheaded; another of Yu's backers, Colonel Kyŏng Wŏllok 慶元祿 was exiled [26]. Yu Kyŏng heard of these events and went to the Palace to protest but to no avail, and Yu himself was dismissed from his post as minister, *sŭng-sŏn* 承宣 (*KSC* 17. 43a-44a). Yu, however, was made Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, a post of considerable power, in the next month (*KS* 24. 39a), probably due to the support of the aged monarch Kojong who moved into Yu's home early in the following year (*KS* 24. 41b) where he died within a month (*KS* 24. 44a-b).

It is also interesting to note that Kim Injun was at least partly responsible for the investiture of Prince Sim as the Crown Prince. Wŏnjong had wanted to invest Prince Sim earlier, but hesitated to do so after the Royal Consort, *pi* [27] 妃, had slandered him. The Royal Consort, the former Kyŏngch'ang Princess [28] was the daughter of Chŏn, the Duke of Sinan, and had borne T'ae [29], the Marquis of Siyang 始陽; Chong [30], the Duke of Sunan; the Kyŏngan Princess 慶安宮主, and the Hamnyŏng Princess [31] 咸寧宮主. In slandering Prince Sim by telling Wŏnjong that the Prince had not been pleased to hear of Wŏnjong's return, the Royal Consort was, of course, attempting to promote the interest of her own son. Prince Sim was the eldest son of Wŏnjong by Queen Sun'gyŏng [32], Wŏnjong's first wife who died in 1237. Kim Injun was responsible for dispelling Wŏnjong's doubts of Prince Sim and the investment took place. Prince Sim, incidentally, did not forget the matter. He was later enthroned, viz., King Ch'ungnyŏl 忠烈王 (r. 1275-1308),

and in the third year of his reign, he had her tried, and degraded to the status of a commoner (*KS* 25. 18a; *KS* 88. 36a-37a; *KSC* 18. 7a-b; *HY* 20. 29b).

The year of 1260 saw Wŏnjong secure on the throne, peace restored on the peninsula and, although there were still demands that the capital be moved from Kanghwa, construction work was being completed in Kaegyŏng serving as an excuse for remaining on the island, and Koryŏ had won the pleasure of Qubilai by managing to be the first to present congratulations on his succession to the throne (*KS* 25. 18a-b; *CHSL* 4. 36a). The cost of the various ceremonial activities connected with the enthroning of Wŏnjong, the investiture of the Crown Prince, the investiture of the Kyŏngch'ang Princess to be Queen 王后 (*KS* 25. 18a), the elevation of the Queen Mother (i.e., Wŏnjong's mother) to be Queen Dowager (*KS* 25. 17b), the taking of a consort by the Crown Prince, plus the requirements of the other members of the royal family, consumed during the year "... over 1 000 *kŭn* of gold and silver, over 3 000 *sŏk* of rice, and cloth beyond calculation" (*KS* 25. 20b) [33].

There were other diversions in the Koryŏ capital apart from the successive ceremonial matters. Because of the great drought, the King put aside sun parasols and banned the wearing of sun hats by the officials (*KS* 25. 16b). There were several earthquakes, one violent enough to destroy many houses in the capital (*KS* 25. 16b) [34]. Cheju presented her usual annual tribute and, as had grown customary in these years, "they took the Cheju tribute horses and presented them to the civil and military officials, *tongsŏ* 東西, of the fourth rank and above" (*KS* 25. 17a-b).

In the fourth month (May 1 - May 30) of 1261, Koryŏ sent Crown Prince Sim to the Mongol Court to offer congratulations on the pacification of Ariɣ-boge with whom Qubilai had been contesting for power. The expenses for the trip were met by the usual levy and we read that "at this time, the Chief Ministers down to those of the fourth rank produced one *kŭn* of silver; those of the fifth rank produced two bolts (*p'il*) of white ramie; the sixth rank one bolt; in the seventh, eighth, and ninth ranks, every two men produced one bolt, in order to meet the expenses of the journey" (*KS* 25. 17a).

During the following years, in addition to coping with the raids of both Chinese (*KS* 26. 8a) and Japanese freebooters (e.g., *KS* 25. 29b; *KS* 25. 31a-b; *KS* 25. 32a; *KS* 26. 7a-b), the Koryŏ authorities were concerned with passively resisting the establishment of Mongol control on the peninsula as well as attempts to get the Koryŏ capital transferred back to the mainland. Koryŏ tribute missions wound their way to the Mongol Court (e.g., *KS* 25. 23b) and, in addition to the spring and autumn tribute, Koryŏ was frequently called upon to fulfill demands for various supplementary items (e.g., *KS* 25. 24b-25b). In the winter of 1262, an edict arrived which reminded Koryŏ of the injunctions

laid down by Činggis upon surrendering states that they must send hostages, submit population registers, establish post-stations, raise an army, provide provisions, and support the Mongolian army. "Now, with the exception that a hostage (i.e., Wang Sun) has already been sent, the remaining matters have not yet been carried out" (*KS* 25. 26a-27b), the edict charged. In the fourth month (May 9 - June 7) of 1263, when Koryŏ envoys brought back word that the Emperor was angry at not receiving a report on Koryŏ's progress in fulfilling the requirements set forth, a tribute mission was dispatched with a memorial outlining the difficulties due to the desolation into which the country had fallen (*KS* 25. 29b-31a). The following year, Wŏnjong was summoned to the Mongol court where he presented himself in the autumn, ninth month, then returned to Koryŏ in the winter, twelfth month of the same year (*KS* 26. 5a-b; *YKC* 11b). One reason for the summons was undoubtedly to try to speed up Koryŏ's response to Mongol demands [35].

In late 1266, the first of several events occurred which was to shatter completely the relative calm which had existed on the peninsula. At the Mongol Court, Cho I [36], a former Korean Buddhist monk who had become an interpreter at Qubilai's court, had interested the Emperor in Japan, and the first Mongol envoys *Hei-ti*[37], a *shih-lang* [38] in the Department of War, and Yin-hung [39], a *shih-lang* in the Department of Rites, had been dispatched to Koryŏ, whence they were to be guided to Japan with an Imperial Edict for the rulers of that nation (*KS* 26. 8b-9a; *YKC* 11b-12a; *KS* 130. 27a).

This embassy journeyed south as far as Kŏje island [40] 巨濟 with Korean guides, then returned ostensibly due to bad weather which made the crossing impossible. There is, however, good reason to suspect that the envoys were not too anxious to go and that the Koreans encouraged them to turn back, even providing pretexts which included reasons for abandoning the effort to bring Japan within the Mongol sphere (*KS* 26. 9b-10a; *KS* 130. 27a-b). These efforts by Koryŏ were to no avail and several embassies were later sent to Japan [41]. The first Mongol missive and an accompanying Korean missive was delivered by a Korean, a certain Pan Pu 潘阜, who was sent to Japan at Qubilai's insistence (*KS* 130. 27b; *KS* 26. 10b-12a). Concomitant with those efforts was the construction of ships in Koryŏ, originally begun in 1259 at the Western Capital. In 1268, Koryŏ was ordered to prepare ships, foodstuffs and raise an army to be used in the campaign against the Southern Sung or for an invasion of Japan (*KS* 26. 15b; *KS* 26. 18a; see Part II).

As these events occurred, the embers of the power struggle within Koryŏ were slowly being fanned into flame as Kim Injun, the prime mover in the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan, slowly increased his own power. Wŏnjong himself had remarked confidently, "Kim [In]jun serves me. The previous King

(i.e., Kojong) has slain the tyrants and restored the government to the Royal Family" (*KS* 130. 14b). Such was Wŏnjong's faith in Kim that when he left for the Mongol court in 1264, he placed Kim, who had just been appointed Director of the Supreme Directorate, *kyojŏng pyŏlgam*, in charge of state affairs (*KS* 26. 5a; *KS* 130. 14b). In 1265, Kim, who had previously received an honorary fief of 1 000 households and an actual fief (i.e., households whose taxes he consumed) of 100 households (*KS* 130. 14b), managed to be enfeoffed as Marquis of Haeyang 海陽侯 (*KS* 26. 7b; *KS* 130. 15a; *TT* 34. 93) and over the next few years grew increasingly arbitrary in his actions.

In late 1267, Ch'ang the Duke of An'gyŏng had been sent to the Mongol Court to report that an envoy had been dispatched to Japan with the Mongol edict. While Duke Ch'ang was at court the next year, Qubilai told him that if Koryŏ had sincerely submitted that they would raise an army and support the Mongolian troops, supply provisions, request the establishment of daruγači. and take a census of their people. The Emperor reminded Duke Ch'ang that the capital had not yet been returned to the mainland and said Kangh Hwasang had reported that there was a decline in the amount of ramie cloth submitted as tribute by Koryŏ and that it was of poor quality. Then he accused Koryŏ of submitting a false memorial concerning Koryŏ's relations with Japan (*KS* 24. 13a-14a). Shortly after Duke Ch'ang had returned to Koryŏ with a report of this conversation, in the third month (April 3 - May 2) of 1269, a Bureau for Resettlement was established in the old capital of Kaegyŏng (*KS* 26. 14b), and in the same month, the Mongol Governor, *tsung-kuan*, of Peiching *lu* 北京路('province') administration arrived with an edict which outlined Qubilai's conversation with Duke Ch'ang and which once again set forth the requirements for surrendering states established by Činggis.

The Emperor had also instructed Kim, his sons, and his brother to come to the capital. Kim's faction was afraid and schemed to kill the envoy. They also told Wŏnjong that if he didn't go along with their plans they would make Kim Injun King. This was reported to the chief ministers of the civil and military departments by Ŏm Suan [42], but despite their alarm the ministers were afraid to speak out. Ŏm then managed to convince Kim Sŭngjun that it would be a mistake to kill the Mongol envoy. Fearing that the Mongols would accuse him, after learning that General Ch'a Songu had been talking of the scheme to kill the Mongol envoy, Kim did not go to the Mongol Court. This incident also served to increase Kim's determination to resist the Mongols (*KS* 26. 15b; *KS* 106. 36b-37a; *KS* 130. 15b-16a). The result was that Yi Changyong [43] was sent to the Mongol Court with a petition outlining the Koryŏ response to the Mongol demands (*KS* 26. 16a-b). Beginning in mid-1268, Mongol envoys began arriving to inspect the warships being built in shipyards

around Koryŏ, the army, and departure points for China like Hŭksan Island, T'amna Island, as well as the Japan route (*KS* 26. 16b; *KS* 26. 17b-18b).

At this time, what appears to have been the final straw in Kim Injun's arbitrary actions occurred. In the winter of 1268, Kim sent the Night Patrol to seize two ships loaded with (regional) tributary provisions. The stores were brought to Kim's residence where they were divided with the soldiers of the Night Patrol. This brought about a confrontation between Wŏnjong and Kim Injun (*KS* 130. 16a-b). Shortly thereafter, Wŏnjong supported Im Yŏn, whose power rested in his control of the units of the Three Patrols, and who no longer supported Kim since the latter had attempted to exile his wife (*KS* 130. 17a-b), in a rapid purge which lasted into early 1269 and which eliminated Kim Injun, his family and his supporters (*KS* 26. 19a-b; *KS* 82. 2a; *KS* 130. 17b-20a). In early 1269, Im Yŏn removed another possible contender in the power struggle by exiling Yu Kyŏng to distant Hŭksan Island (*KS* 26. 20b; *TT* 35. 101).

While these moves were backed by Wŏnjong who suspected that Yu Kyŏng's role in the elimination of the Ch'oe clan was a bid for personal power and whose opinion of Kim Injun had changed greatly (*KS* 130. 21a; *TT* 35. 101), they also eliminated what was evidently a power balance, although I believe that we may assume Wŏnjong's own motive to have been to regain complete control himself. With the elimination of Kim Injun and Yu Kyŏng, there was little serious opposition to Im Yŏn, who waited only four months before seizing power himself, claiming that he had restored the monarch to power but now the monarch and the eunuch Kim Kyŏng 金鏡 (d. 1269; *BTKP* 61. 589) wanted to kill him (*KS* 130. 21b) which, in view of the preceding events, may have contained some truth. At any rate, on July 18 (*jen-ch'en* 壬辰 day of the sixth month), 1269, "Im Yŏn, schemingly and rebelliously desiring to effect the Great Affair (i.e., depose the King) assembled the Ministers to deliberate. Attendant, *sijang,* Yi Changyong, estimated they could not be stopped and believed abdication to be merely talk [44]." Four days later, "[Im] Yŏn, dressed in armour, led the Three Patrols and six units of the Guard Corps to the residence of Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyŏng, [where] he assembled all the officials and petitioned Ch'ang to become King. Suddenly the wind and rain violently uprooted trees and sent rooftiles flying. [Im] Yŏn sent men to compel the King to remove to a separate palace" (*KS* 26. 21a) [45]. After deposing Wŏnjong and placing the latter's younger brother Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyŏng on the throne (*KS* 130. 22a), Im secured appointment as Director of the Supreme Directorate, *kyojŏng pyŏlgam* (*KS* 26. 21a; *KS* 130. 22b) becoming the new military overlord.

Im promptly celebrated by moving into Kim Injun's former residence (*KS*

130. 22b) and the following month dispatched an envoy to the Mongol court to inform them of the change. The excuse given the Mongols was that Wŏnjong's failing health had forced his retirement in favor of his younger brother (*KS* 26. 21b-22a; *TT* 35. 102) [46].

Crown Prince Sim, who had gone to the Mongol Court prior to the deposing of Wŏnjong (*KS* 26. 20b) [47], was at this time enroute home and had reached P'o-so-fu 婆娑府. On the other side of the Yalu twenty-five men of the Night Patrol were waiting at the border to seize him but he was warned of events by a government slave who slipped across the Yalu River. Prince Sim at first hesitated to believe the report. Then, learning that the envoy sent by Im Yŏn to report the matter to the Mongol Court, a certain Kwak Yŏp'il 郭汝弼, had at this time reached the city of Yŏngju 靈州 near the Yalu, Prince Sim sent men to seize him and verified the report. After sending a messenger on to the Koryŏ court with instructions that if the King was really ill, Chong, the Marquis of Sunan (Wŏnjong's third son; Prince Sim's younger half-brother) should be put on the throne, he turned back to the Mongol Court to inform the Emperor. Appraised of events, Qubilai sent *Odos-buqa 斡朶思孛花 and Li O 李謏 with a letter of inquiry to the Koryŏ court [48]. Im Yŏn countered by sending General Kim Panggyŏng with a second missive which offered the same reasons for Wŏnjong's abdication (*KS* 26. 24a-b). Qubilai then sent Hei-ti as envoy to investigate the matter (*KS* 26. 26a; *YKC* 16b-17a) and, in the eleventh month (Nov. 25 - Dec. 24) of 1269, he ordered Prince (of the first rank), *kuo-wang*, T'ou-nien-ke 頭輦哥, of the Tung-ching Mobile Bureau [49] to assemble an army for the subjugation of Im Yŏn (*YKC* 17b-18a; *KS* 26. 26b; *KS* 130. 23b-25a; *YS* 159. 16a; *YS* 208. 10a; *TT* 35. 103).

Im Yŏn, already worried by reports of Prince Sim's action (*TT* 35. 103), had been confronted by the Mongol envoy Hu-ti (*KS* 26. 26a-b; *KS* 130. 23b). Thus pressed, Im yielded and in the last of the eleventh month of 1269 he deposed Ch'ang and restored Wŏnjong (*YKC* 17b-20b; *KS* 26. 26b-27b; *TT* 35. 104-105). Wŏnjong, accompanied by Hei-ti, whom he secretly rewarded on the journey northward (*KS* 26. 29a), immediately departed for the Mongol Court in the twelfth month of 1269. He left his third son Chong, the Marquis of Sunan, in charge of state affairs (*KS* 26. 30a-31a; *TT* 35. 105). After reaching the Mongol Court Wŏnjong was to conclude arrangements for the marriage of Prince Sim with a Mongol Princess, for the marriage had already been sanctioned by the emperor (cf. *KS* 26. 27a) and was no doubt a major factor in his restoration (*KS* 26. 30a-31a). The restoration of Wŏnjong did not, however, eliminate Im Yŏn.

In the tenth month of (Oct. 27 - Nov. 26) 1269, just prior to the restoration of Wŏnjong, a revolt led by Ch'oe T'an [50] a functionary in the garrison

of the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwest Frontier-District, broke out in Sŏhae Province which used the deposing of Wŏnjong as a rallying call (*KS* 26. 24b-25a; *KS* 58. 30b) and which quickly spread through the entire Koryŏ northwest (*KS* 26. 25b-26a; *KS* 26. 27a). When Ch'oe T'an and his group submitted to the Mongols, Koryŏ lost her entire northwest territory which they controlled. Ch'oe was made subordinate to the Mongol Court and the northwest portion of the peninsula was later made subordinate to the Western Capital which was redesignated Tongnyŏng-pu 東寧府 (*KS* 26. 28a-b; *KS* 130. 33b-36b; *KS* 7. 1b; *TT* 35. 107; also see Part II) [51].

During Wŏnjong's absence, Im Yŏn, although powerless to quell the revolt in the northwest [52], had begun preparations to withstand the Mongol assault which was certain to follow if he attempted to perpetuate his own power. Wŏnjong was just as certainly determined to eliminate him. One of Im's preparations for safeguarding his own head had been to dispatch the Night Patrol to the southern provinces to enforce another mass movement to the coastal islands and mountain citadels of refuge (*KS* 130. 24b; *TT* 35. 108).

Assured of Mongol support by Qubilai, Wŏnjong departed Yen-tu with Prince Sim in the second month (Feb. 22 - Mar. 22, 1270) of his eleventh reign year (*KS* 26. 32b; *TT* 35. 107) and entered Koryŏ accompanied by T'ou-nien-ke and the latter's forces (*KS* 26. 30a-31a; *KS* 26. 32a; *KS* 130. 25a; *YS* 7. 2a; *TT* 35. 107). When they reached the Western Capital on May 27 (sixth day of the fifth month), thev sent an envoy ahead and upon his return they learned that Im Yŏn had died on the twenty-fifth day of the second month (= March 19) while they were still enroute (*YKC* 21b; *KS* 130. 35a). Power, they learned, had been seized by Im Yumu 林惟茂 (d. 1270; *BTKP* 49. 460) one of Im Yŏn's sons. Immediately after his father's death, Im Yumu had received the appointment of Director of the Supreme Directorate from Chong, the Marquis of Sunan (*KS* 26. 32b; *KS* 130. 25a), since both Wŏnjong and Prince Sim were at the Mongol court. The Guard Corps and the Civil Guard were being used by the Im clan to guard their houses and insure the transfer of power (*KS* 26. 32b; *TT* 35. 107).

At this time, the Mongols had already committed themselves to restoring Wŏnjong and had even appointed a daruγači or resident commissioner for Koryŏ (*KS* 26. 33a). In addition to the forces under T'ou-nien-ke were some 2 000 Mongol troops commanded by Möngketü 蒙哥篤 which arrived in the Western Capital in the next year as previously requested by Ch'oe T'an (*KS* 26. 29b; *KS* 26. 32a; *KS* 104. 3a-4b). Wŏnjong had sent General Chŏng Chayŏ 鄭子璵 (d. 1276; *BTKP* 13. 122) and Yi Punhŭi [53] on to Kanghwa to make preparations for moving 10 000 bushels of rice to the mainland as supplies for the Mongol forces as well as moving personnel back to the old capi-

tal (*KS* 26. 33a-b; *KS* 130. 25a). On June 15 (23rd day of the fifth month) the transfer of all ranks and organizations back to the old capital was ordered by the Ministers on Kanghwa in accordance with Wŏnjong's instructions (*KS* 26. 34b). Wŏnjong himself did not reach Kaegyŏng until June 17 (27th day) at which time the Queen and royal concubines left Kanghwa to join him; a great many officials also left Kanghwa for Kaegyŏng to welcome the monarch back (*KS* 26. 24b; *TT* 35. 109; *YKC* 21-22a). Im Yumu disregarded the orders and sent men to prepare the people to resist, thus continuing his father's plan to resist the Mongols, ignoring the general opposition to his move among the civil ministers (*KS* 26. 32b; *KS* 106. 37a-b; *KS* 130. 25a-b). These efforts were short-lived when Song Songnye 宋松禮 (d. 1289; *BTKP* 105. 987) and Hong Mun'gye [54], harangued the Three Patrols into action to sweep the Im clan and their supporters from power on June 7 (15th day of the fifth month) 1270. Im Yumu was killed as was Im Yŏn's son-in-law Ch'oe Chongso 崔宗玿 (a.w. 崔宗紹 ; d. 1270; *BTKP* 23. 218); Im Yugon 林惟衮 cut his own throat the next day; the remainder of Im Yŏn's sons, viz., Im Yugan 林惟幹, Im Yugŏ 林惟袪, and Im Yuje 林惟提 were sent to the Mongol court. The Civil guards, *sŏbang,* were disbanded and members of the clan of Im Yŏn's wife were banished to coastal islands (*KS* 26. 33b; 26. 34a-b; *KS* 106. 41a-b; *KS* 130. 26a-27a; *YKC* 21b; *YS* 208. 12a; *TT* 35. 109). On June 15 (twenty-third day of the fifth month), the transfer of all ranks and organizations back to the old capital was ordered by the Ministers on Kanghwa in accordance with Wŏnjong's instructions (*KS* 26. 34b). The transfer of the capital back to Kaegyŏng signified, both in symbol and in fact, the transfer of power from the military government back to the monarch and Koryŏ's final submission to the Mongols. There was only one obstacle. The powerful Koryŏ military units, the Three Patrols, remained on Kanghwa Island and refused to obey the transfer order (*KS* 26. 34b-35a; *KS* 130. 31a; *KS* 208. 12b).

1. In the 'Monographs on Food and Money' in the *Koryŏ-sa*, a slightly different version is given: "They sent Crown Prince Chŏn to submit a petition to the Mongols. The civil and military officials of the fourth rank and above each produced one *kŭn* of white gold; those of the fifth grade and below produced cloth in accordance with their station in order to meet the expenses" (*KS* 79. 23a).
2. For the precedent of Chin intervention in a Koryŏ succession fraud, see Rogers, 'Studies in Korean History', op. cit., passim.
3. Wang Sim 王諶, was born in 1236; he ascended the throne as the twenty-fifth monarch in 1274, died in 1308, and was awarded the posthumous appellation Ch'ungnyŏl 忠烈. He and all the other monarchs of Koryŏ who followed him, were not allowed a temple name, *myoho* 廟号, by the Yüan, but were given the honorary title of *kuo-wang* 國王 or Prince of the first rank. For biographical information see *KS* 28 and *KS* 32; Hambis, "Notes sur l'histoire ...", pp. 178 ff; also see *BTKP* 34. 318. The *BTKP* entry b(orn) 1225 is in error (cf. *KS* 28. 1a).
4. Both Pak and Cho were made myriarchs, *wan-hu*, by Möngke and given a golden tally as symbol of their authority. *KSC* 17. 50b.
5. *jamči, chan-ch'ih* 站赤, "service des relais postaux", cf. Pelliot, "Les mots mongols ...", p. 264.
6. The most serious revolt of the moment was that of Kim Susŏn 金守禪 at Paekchu 白州 who submitted to Yesüder and informed him that Koryŏ had no intention of returning to the mainland (*KS* 25. 5b). There were also other revolts and desertions to the Mongols, e.g., revolts on Sŏk Island 席島 (*KS* 25. 5b) and a revolt at Anbuk 安北 (*KS* 25. 6a).
7. There are several versions of the cause of the death of Möngke; dysentery is often given as the cause. For the various accounts see Bretschneider, op. cit., p. 158 note 418.
8. Möngke had three brothers: Hülegü who was in Persia, Ariγ-boge, and Qubilai. See René Grousset, *L'empire des steppes*, Paris, 1939, pp. 352-353, pp. 367 ff, and Barthold, "*Four Studies* ...", pp. 120-124 for the struggles between Qubilai and Ariγ-boge which continued until 1264.
9. Cf. Ikeuchi Hiroshi, *Genkō no shinkenkyū* 元寇の新研究 [New Research on the Mongol Invasions], published in 2 vols. as *Tōyō bunko ronsō* No. 15, Tōkyō, 1931, Vol. I, p. 21. For the meeting between Qubilai and Prince Chŏn see *KS* 25. 8a-9b.
10. For this T'ang expedition against the Korean-Manchurian state of Koguryŏ 高句麗, see W. Bingham, *The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty*, Bal-

timore, 1941. These speeches look suspiciously like a warning to would-be conquerors inserted in the record by the compilers of the Korean records. H. Franke, "Could the Mongol Emperor Read and Write Chinese?" *Asia Major*, New Series 3 (1953), pp. 28-41, has concluded that while Qubilai could possibly read Uiɣur, he could not read Chinese.

11. Chao Lang-pi 趙良弼 was a Jürčen and well-known for his role as envoy to Japan. In 1270 he was first appointed to take charge of the Military Colonies in Koryŏ which were making preparations for the Japan invasion. Chao declined the appointment and was then appointed envoy to Japan. For biographical information see *YS* 165. 9b ff.
12. *Hsüan-fu-shih* 宣撫使 or Pacification Commissioners, were established in the year 1260-1261 by the Mongols in each *lu* ('province') administration and the matters they handled included supervision of agriculture, household registers, and household taxes. See Schurmann, op. cit., pp. 43, 50, 57 note 6, and 98; Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 213.
13. Kang Hwasang 康和尙 was a Korean of Chinju 晉州 (in mod. S. Kyŏngsang Province) who had been captured by the Mongols and who entered their service. He later changed his name to Suhyŏng 守衡 (*KSC* 18. 4a) possibly because his former name, Hwasang, was a common term for a member of the Buddhist clergy. He died in 1289, cf. *BTKP* 51. 482; *KS* 30. 16b; *KSC* 21. 12a.
14. According to *YS* 4. 6a-b, Prince Chŏn remained 3 years; this is a scribal error for 2 years and refers to the fact that he was present for a portion of 1259 and 1260, but he was actually away from Koryŏ only about one full year.
15. Kim Panggyŏng 金方慶 (1212-1300) one of Koryŏ's more noted generals, traced his descent to Silla King Kyŏngsun 敬順王. He commanded the Koryŏ forces which, with Mongol support, quelled the rebellion of the Three Patrols. He also participated in the Japan campaigns. He was evidently inclined toward Buddhism for he dedicated a shrine for the Diamond Sutra at Kimju 金州 prior to embarking on the first Japan expedition (*TYS* 32. 548a). He was also recognized as a calligrapher of first rank. Following the establishment of tight Mongol control on Koryŏ he attempted to rebel but was captured and exiled (*YKS* 27b) For his role in the Japan campaigns he was given the honorary title of Duke of Sangnak 上洛公. For biographical information see *KS* 104. 1a-24a; also see *BTKP* 63. 604.
16. *Han'guk-sa sajŏn*, in a chart appended to the back cover, calculates a total of 4385 civil and military officials during the reign of Koryŏ Munjong (r. 1047-1082) but the number of officials is unknown for many of the

offices so this should be regarded as a minimum figure. Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, Chart IV, calculates 4399 officials for the same period with the same qualification applying. These figures represent the government officials two centuries prior to this event. Certainly the government had grown and since many officials from the provinces had fled to Kanghwa, as had assuredly the entire royal clan, this figure is probably correct.

17. The first shift is given as 16 *yŏng* or 16000 soldiers. Assuming equal shifts, this would put the Koryŏ troop strength on Kanghwa Island at 48000 men. The previous reference to 30 *yŏng* being levied for the reconstruction of Kaegyŏng (*KS* 25. 3-4) seems to support this figure.
18. There were several delays on the return journey, viz., at Tung-ching where Yesüder held 100 men of Wŏnjong's party — he later released them (*KS* 25. 12b-13a); at Kaegyŏng to inspect the progress of construction; and another at Sŭngch'ŏn-pu due to a fit of pique on the part of Shu-li-ta, But I have found no mention of a delay at the Western Capital. Howorth, op. cit., pp. 220-221, has an interesting interpretation concerning the missive cited in the text and the return of Wŏnjong: "The turbulent Coreans at first refused to receive him (Wŏnjong, WEH) and were determined to break the Mongol yoke, and it was only when Wangtien (Wŏnjong, WEH) agreed to assist them in this that they would accept him." Howorth cites De Mailla, x 291-294 (i.e., Joseph-Anne Marie de Moyriac de Mailla's translation of the "Tong-Kieng-Kang-Mu", Paris 1779). This is an interesting view, but I have not found any evidence to support it. Wŏnjong himself does not appear to have been popular; how much of the opposition was general and how much was centered in the military is conjectural at this point. The basis for Qubilai's suspicions may have been due to the actions of Yi Ŭng 李凝, an official of the Koryŏ Department of Justice, *hyŏngbu*, who accompanied Wŏnjong to the Mongol Court. Yi had told Sun, the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng, that if he aspired to be king, he had only to say the word. Yi was exiled upon their return to Koryŏ (*KS* 25. 16b).
19. Prince Chŏn had been invested as monarch by Qubilai prior to his departure from Chao-ching-fu (cf. *YKC* 9b), but a patent of investiture was apparently not conferred until after Prince Chŏn's accession. See note 23 below.
20. See *YKC* 9a-10b; *YS* 208. 4b; *KSC* 18. 6b-7a; *KS* 25. 23a-b; there is also an account of this in *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* 國朝文類 (also known as *Yüan wen-lei*) of Su T'ien-chüeh 蘇天爵 (1294-1352), incorporated in Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an 四部叢刊 2017-2036, Commercial Press Edition, Shanghai, 1933, in *chüan* 41. 20b-22a, a section bearing the sub-title of '(Con-

quest of) Koryŏ' (征伐)高麗. This section consists simply of a short summary which undoubtedly had the same origins as *YKC*. It adds no new information and I mention it at this point merely to note its existence.

21. This particular pledge, although often referred to by the Koreans as one of the principles underlying Yüan-Koryŏ relations (e.g., cf. the documents dated 1321-1323 in *IC* 6. 1a-7a) was observed only until 1276 when many Mongol customs and dress were introduced by fiat. Mongol customs and clothing were observed from 1276 until the Hung-wu 洪武 period (1368-1399) when they were prohibited for the first time. Cf. *Sohwa oesa* 小華外史, of O Kyŏngwŏn 吳慶元 (Yi Dynasty), *kwŏn* 1. 1a.
22. The withdrawal of the Mongol forces began in the eighth month when Shu-li-ta departed Kanghwa (*KS* 25. 19b). These forces apparently withdrew to Tung-ching and the daruγači Po-lu-ho-fan-erh Pa-tu-lu 孛魯合反兒拔覩魯 (*KSC* 18. 9a; *YKC* 10a) and his party were, as the edict says, recalled. Also released at this time were some 100 Koreans who had been with Wŏnjong's party on his return to Koryŏ and who had been detained by Yesüder at Tung-ching (*KSC* 18. 6b).
23. There was a general period of inactivity following the death of Möngke due largely to the succession dispute. See Grousset, *L'empire mongol*, Paris, 1941, Vol. I, p. 367 ff.
24. According to *YS* 208. 4b, Chŏn sent his *son* Hŭi, the Duke of Yŏngan, to the Mongol Court. At this time the Emperor bestowed a patent of investiture, the seal of King and the tiger tally. When Duke Hŭi returned, in addition to the edict mentioned, he brought back a tiger tally, seal and seal ribbons of state, a bow and a sword conferred by the Emperor upon Wŏnjong (*KSC* 18. 9a). Wang Hŭi 王僖 was the son of Sŏ 昫, the Duke of Yangyang 襄陽公 (cf. *BTKP* 115. 1078); I am uncertain in this case if the entry calling him Wŏnjong's son is a scribal error or simply another Koryŏ ruse.
25. Cf. Tsuda Sōkichi, *Chōsen rekishi chiri*, Vol. 2, p. 158; also see *KS* 58.
26. I have been unable to identify these individuals.
27. According to *HY* 20. 20b, "In the Koryŏ system, the principal wife, *chŏk* 嫡 [of the monarch], was called Queen, *wanghu* 王后; concubines, *ch'ŏp* 妾, were called Ladies, *puin* 夫人, [and had the grades of] Honored Princess, *kwibi* 貴妃, Chaste Princess, *sukpi* 淑妃, Virtuous Princess, *tŏkpi* 德妃, and Sagacious Princess, *hyŏnbi* 賢妃. All were of the official grade of First Class primary."
28. In the second month of 1244, the Kyŏngch'ang Princess 慶昌宮主 was made the consort, *pi* 妃, of the Crown Prince because the latter's

first wife had died (*KS* 23. 37b). In 1260 she was invested as Queen, *wang-hu*. She was degraded to the status of a commoner in 1277, by her step-son, King Ch'ungnyŏl. For biographical information see *KS* 88. 36-37a.

29. Wang T'ae 王 珆 (d. 1266) was the eldest son of Wŏnjong's second Queen. He was made Marquis of Siyang 始陽 in 1263. For biographical information see *KS* 91. 7a-b; also see *BTKP* 119. 1116.
30. Wang Chong 王 琮 (a.w. 悰). In 1263 he was made Marquis of Sunan 順安侯. He was an active emissary to the Mongol Court, for which he was advanced to the grade of Duke. He was exiled to an island when his mother, the Kyŏngch'ang Princess, was degraded to the status of a commoner in 1277. In 1285, he was summoned to return. For biographical information see *KS* 91. 7a-9a.
31. Little is known of either the Kyŏngan Princess 慶安宮主 or the Hamnyŏng Princess 咸寧宮主 beyond the mere fact of their existence.
32. Queen Sun'gyŏng 順敬 was of the Kim clan of Kyŏngju 慶州 and the daughter of Yaksŏn 若先, the Duke of Changik 莊翼. She was first invested as Kyŏngmok hyŏnbi 敬穆賢妃; she became the consort of the Crown Prince in 1235 and bore one son, Prince Sim. She died in 1237. For biographical information see *KS* 88. 36a-b; for a rather complete list of biographical references see *BTKP* 109. 1026.
33. This, plus the tribute requirements, was probably behind the suggestion that the silver utensils of the government officials serving outside the capital 外官 which were stored in the Sinhŭng Treasury 新興倉, be utilized for the national needs. *KS* 79. 23a.
34. Thirteen earthquakes are recorded for the period 1216-1228, eight of which occurred in the period 1226-1228.
35. The summons ordered Wŏnjong to practice *shih-chien* 世見, i.e., to present himself at court on such occasions as the Emperor's birthday, etc.
36. Cho I 趙彝 of Haman 咸安 had the former name of Inyŏ 蘭如. He was a Buddhist bonze wno returned to secular life and submitted to the Mongols. He was made an interpreter due to his proficiency in languages and it was he who originally directed Qubilai's attention to Japan. For biographical information see *KS* 130. 27a-b; *BTKP* carries no entry.
37. Hei-ti 黑的; in addition to the role he played in the restoration of Wŏnjong, he was active in Yüan-Japan relations and made one trip to Japan with Korean guides in 1268. In 1274 he was appointed daruγači for Koryŏ. A few of his activities in Koryŏ are outlined in subsequent pages.
38. There were two *shih-lang* 侍郎 in the Yüan Board of War; the title had

the official grade of Fourth Class primary, cf. Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 130.

39. Yin-Hung 殷弘 was, with Hei-ti, active in Yüan-Japan affairs and a few of his activities are outlined in *YS* 208 *Jih-pen chüan*. It is interesting to note that his name reverses the taboo name of Sung T'ai-tsu, Hung-Yin 弘殷.

40. Kŏje Island, a large island off the coast of the present South Kyŏngsang Province, gained attention as a POW camp during the recent war in Korea. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 32. 562b-566a.

41. My concern in the present study is limited to Koryŏ's preparations for the Japan invasions and not with the invasions themselves nor the several envoys sent to Japan, although I do mention these en passant. There are several studies of various aspects of the Mongol invasions of Japan, the majority of them in Japanese. The best work I have seen in any language is Ikeuchi Hiroshi's *Genkō* ..., which covers all events in detail. In his second volume, Ikeuchi has plates of the illustrated *Ōyano-hon* 大矢野本, a contemporary account of the invasions by the Ōyano brothers. For the latter also see Frieda Fischer-Wieruszowski, 'Kriegerischer Einfall der Mongolen in Japan', *Ostasiatische Zeitschrift,* 1935, pp. 121-124. Howorth, op. cit., pp. 238-239 contains a translation of the first missive sent to Japan. Yoshi S. Kuno, *Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Mainland,* 2 vols., Berkeley, 1937 and 1940, contains a translation of the first missive in Vol. 1, Appendix 16, p. 245, and the second missive carried by Chao Lang-pi in 1271 in Vol. 1, Appendix 17. An account of the Mongol invasions of Japan is also contained in general histories of Japan of which Sansom's recent two volume work, *A History of Japan* ..., is probably the best in a western language. The best account in Korean is probably that in Yi Pyŏngdo's *Han'guk-sa,* Vol. 2.

42. Ŏm Suan 嚴守安 (d. 1298) was of Yŏngwŏl 寧越. He passed the exams in the reign of Wŏnjong and was appointed Military Recorder *tobyŏngma noksa* 都兵馬錄事. He was active in the elimination of the Kim clan and in the suppression of the rebellion of the Three Patrols. For biographical information see *KS* 106. 26b-28a; also see *BTKP* 89. 832.

43. Yi Changyong 李藏用 (1202-1272) was a descendant in the sixth generation of Yi Chayŏn 李子淵 (fl. 1024-1058; *BTKP* 127. 1177). His style, *cha,* was Hyŏnbo 顯甫 and he had the former name of In'gi 仁祺. His father Kyŏng 儆 was good at judiciary matters and rose to be Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Changyong passed the exams in the reign of Kojong and subsequently held many government posts. He was one of the few who advised compliance with the Mongol de-

mand that the Koryŏ monarch appear in court in 1264, and he accompanied Wŏnjong on the journey. At the Mongol court he was confronted by Sun, the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng who had said that Koryŏ had a military force of thirty-eight thousand men which, Duke Sun, ventured, he could lead back for the use of the Court. Summoned to the Yüan Secretariat, *chung-shu-sheng,* Yi countered that due to the wars, each *yŏng* or unit of 1 000, was such in name only, and analogous with the Yüan Myriarch or Chief of Ten Thousand who did not necessarily command 10 000. Then he won the argument with a bold stroke, suggesting that they go to Koryŏ and inspect the army. "If what [Duke] Sun says is correct, behead me; if what I say is correct, behead Sun." Questioned as to the population of Koryŏ, Yi replied that he didn't know. When asked why he didn't know since he was a chief minister, Yi managed to dodge the obvious attempt to obtain a basic figure for taxation and corvée purposes by pointing to the window sill and asking the minister of the Secretariat how many there were of them (in the nation). When the minister replied that he didn't know, Yi offered that it was difficult to know all things, even for a chief minister.

While in the Yüan capital Yi also met the well-known literatus Wang O 王鶚 who entertained him in his home and admired Yi's knowledge of the rules of ryhming 音律 despite the fact that Yi spoke no Chinese.

Wang O, incidentally, appears to have had some connection with Koryŏ affairs at this time, for I note that he authored the edict accompanying the presentation of a calendar to Koryŏ in 1264, which is preserved in *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei, chüan* 9. 3b.

Qubilai himself, when he learned that Yi had prepared the petition brought by the mission coined an interesting name for Yi, *A-man mieh-erh-li kan* 阿蠻滅兒里于 (?? Amen-Mary Qān). Yi's brilliant performance at Qubilai's court saved Koryŏ, at least temporarily, from the staggering military and fiscal demands the Mongols were soon to impose. For this feat Yi was enfeoffed as Kyŏngwŏn-kun 慶源郡 Kaeguk-paek 開國伯 or Distinguished Earl of Kyŏngwŏn-kun. (The honorary prefix *kaeguk* was a title of respect bestowed for extraordinary merit to the nation; for some brief remarks see *Han'guk-sa sajŏn,* p. 40). Yi was given the honorary fief of 1 000 households and the actual fief of 100 households (whose taxes he consumed). Yi later endeavored to convince the Mongols to abandon the idea of bringing Japan within their sphere. He also supported moving back to the old capital over the opposition of the faction of Kim Injun. In 1270, he was tried for his role in the deposing incident and dismissed from office. Two years later he died at the age of seventy-two. None of his works are known to have survived. In 1275, after Wŏnjong's

death, he was given the posthumous appellation of Munjin 文眞 . For biographical information see *KS* 102. 23a-29a; also see *BTKP* 126. 1172.

44. In the account of the deposing of Wŏnjong given in *HY* 4. 28a we read: "[In] the sixth month [of 1269], Yi Changyong and Im Yŏn deposed the King and confined him." The following gloss points out that here Yi Changyong is regarded as the chief plotter. Yi's role is difficult to assess. He was a powerful and popular statesman who did his utmost to resist Mongol demands upon Koryŏ. Wŏnjong hated him for his involvement in the deposing incident for which he was later tried by the Mongols (*KS* 102. 8a-b). It would appear from the *KS* 26. 21a account that Yi played a passive role but in *KS* 130. 22a he is said to have favored abdication. Some years later, one Yi Punhŭi 李汾禧 (d. 1278; *BTKP* 140. 1288) was accused of involvement with Im Yŏn in the elimination of Kim Injun and in the deposing of Wŏnjong. See the lengthy argument in *KSC* 20. 16b-18b; *KS* 123. 11a-14b; also see *KS* 123. 7a and *KS* 106. 41a-b; the last cited proves Yi innocent of the charge.
45. For further details on the deposing also see *CHSL* 4. 37a; *HTC* III, 6724. 2.20 and 6724. 25-26; *YKC* 17b-18b; *YKC* 20b; *KS* 102. 28a-b; *KS* 104. 3a-b; *KS* 123. 7a-b; *KS* 123. 11a-14b; *KS* 130. 21b-22a; *KS* 130. 33b; and *TK* 11B 239-240, *TT* 35. 101-102. The deposing of Wŏnjong has been excellently summarized by Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire ,..., pp. 176-178 and studied in detail by Ikeuchi Hiroshi, *Genkō* ..., passim.
46. For the precedent of fraudulent fraternal succession see Rogers, 'Studies ...', passim.
47. *YKC* 16 and *YS* 208 give the fourth and sixth month of 1269 respectively for Prince Sim's journey to the Mongol Court. Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire...', p. 175 has discussed this discrepancy and believes that the fourth month is more likely the correct date.
48. Cf. *KS* 26. 21a-b; *KS* 26. 23a-24a; *KS* 106. 11a; *KS* 104. 3a; *KS* 107. 10b-11a; *KS* 130. 22b-23a; *YKC* 16b-17a; *YS* 208. 9b-10a; *YS* 208. 12b; *TT* 35. 103; *IC sŏlchŏn* 說前 2. 7b-8a. Also see Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire ...', p. 176 ff for a summary of these events as well as for the reconstruction of the Mongolian name given here.
49. I have followed Schurmann, op. cit,, passim in rendering *hsing-sheng* 行省 , an abbreviation of *hsing-chung-shu-sheng* 行中書省 , as 'mobile bureau'. The Mobile Bureaus were the provincial governments and were copied on the model of the central government. See Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 22. Also see Part II. The Yüan Eastern Capital, Tungching, refers to Liaoyang.
50. Ch'oe T'an 崔坦 was a scribe in the military headquarters of the Nor-

thern Frontier District and following his revolt against Koryŏ, he submitted the Koryŏ northwest to the Mongols. He was attached to the Court in 1270, presented with a golden plaque, *chin-p'ai* 金牌, as symbol of his authority and appointed as Administrator, *tsung-kuan,* of the Koryŏ northwest which was redesignated Tongnyŏng-pu.

51. For a detailed study of the subject see Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Kōrai Gensō-cho no hairitsu jiken to Mōko no Kōrai seihokumen senryō 高麗元宗朝の廢立事件と蒙古の高麗西北面占領 [The Deposing-Enthroning Incident in the Court of Koryŏ Wŏnjong and the Mongol Seizure of Northwest Koryŏ], *Tōyōshi ronsō* 東洋史論叢 (Asiatic Studies in Honor of Dr. K. Shiratori on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday), Tōkyō, 1925, pp. 133-156. This study is also incorporated in Ikeuchi, *Genkō* ..., Vol. 1, pp. 49-70. While Ch'oe used the deposing incident as a pretext to revolt, there was a real attempt to restore Wŏnjong by some army officers who attempted to overthrow Im at this time, but the plot failed (*KS* 130. 23a-24a).

52. The revolt was at this time still limited to Sŏhae Province. Hyŏn Munhyŏk 玄文革, the Civil Governor of the Northern Frontier-District, was given only 150 men to subdue the rebellion and an envoy was sent to the Mongol Court notifying them of the revolt (*KS* 26. 25a-b). The units of the Three Patrols were sent to several of the islands along the coast of Sŏhae Province to attempt to quell the revolt which encompassed the islands (*KS* 104. 4a) which had been the military and administrative center for the Koryŏ northwest since the evacuation of the Western Capital. Following his restoration, Wŏnjong also petitioned the Mongol authorities for the suppression of Ch'oe T'an and the return of the territory (*KS* 26. 31a-32a). Koryŏ finally managed to regain a small section of Sŏhae Province, but not until 1290 was the entire area administratively restored to Koryŏ.

53. Yi Punhŭi 李汾禧 (d. 1278) of Yŏmju 鹽州 was the son of Grand General Yi Song 李松, a retainer, *mungaek,* of Ch'oe U. Punhŭi and his younger brother Sŭp 燁 both served Kim Injun. He was appointed General and found favor with Wŏnjong. Following the elimination of the Kim clan, Punhŭi was appointed Grand General and then rose to the rank of Supreme General. He was active in the overthrow of the Im clan and the suppression of a slave revolt in Kyŏngsang Province. For biographical information see *KS* 123. 11a-14a; also see *BTKP* 140. 1288.

54. Hong Mun'gye 洪文系 (d. 1316) of Namyang 南陽 later changed his name to Kyu 奎. He was the husband of the elder sister of Im Yumu who discussed all matters with him. Hong and Song Songnye were alarmed over the King's return from the Yüan court which Im Yumu wanted to re-

sist and there was general consternation over Im's plans. The King sent General Chŏng Chayŏ and Yi Punhŭi ahead to Kanghwa and Yi secretly urged Hong to act against Im Yumu which resulted in the overthrow of the Im clan. Hong was given the posthumous appellation of Kwangjŏng 匡定. He had one son Yung 戎 and one daughter who became Queen dowager Myŏngdŏk 明德太后 (1298-1380; *BTKP* 84. 793). For biographical information see *KS* 106. 41a-43a; also see *BTKP* 40. 369.

Chapter VI

THE REBELLION OF THE THREE PATROLS, *SAM PYŎLCH'O*

The elimination of the Im clan was accomplished by members of the Royalist faction who succeeded in convincing the Three Patrols, the strongest Koryŏ military force, to overthrow Im Yumu. It would appear that the military were willing to accept restoration of full power to Wŏnjong, but that they were unaware that Wŏnjong had completely submitted to the Mongols [1].

When Wŏnjong, backed by a strong Mongol army, learned that the Three Patrols had refused to obey the order to return to the old capital, he acted swiftly. On June 20th, 1270 (1270.5.29), he "sent General Kim Chijŏ [2] 金之氐 to Kanghwa to disband the Three Patrols. [General Kim] seized the register of their names and returned. The Three Patrols were fearful lest the register of their names be made known to the Mongols which increased the opposition they harbored" (*KS* 130. 37b; also see *KS* 26. 34b; *TT* 35. 109). General Kim took the register of their names back to Kaegyŏng on the following day and on this same day, General Pae Chungson [3] and Commander, *chiyu,* Yŏ Yŏnghŭi 盧永禧 (a.w. No 盧) rose to take the leadership of the Three Patrols and led them in open rebellion (*KS* 130. 38a) [4].

The chaos which the rebellion brought to Kanghwa is detailed in the biography of Pae Chungson where we read: "Men were sent to cry out in the streets, saying, 'The Mongol soldiers are arriving in great numbers and are massacring the people. All those desiring to help the nation meet at the ball field, *kujŏng* 毬庭.' In a short while, the people gathered in great numbers. Some scattered in the four directions, fighting for boats to cross the river and many were drowned. The Three Patrols prohibited people from entering or leaving [the island] and patrolled the river, calling in loud voices, 'All Civil and Military Officials, *yangban,* who do not leave the boats, know that you will be killed.' All hearing this were afraid and left the boats [4a].

"Others, desiring to go to Kaegyŏng, launched boats. The rebels boarded skiffs and pursued, shooting arrows at them. No one dared move. In the city, the people were terrified and scattered to hide in the forests and marshes. The wailing of women and children filled the streets.

"The rebels doled out stores from the Kŭmgang Warehouse 金剛庫 distributing weapons among the soldiers and closed the city for defense. [Pae] Chungson and [Yŏ] Yŏnghŭi led the Three Patrols to meet at the city wall [where] they compelled On, the Marquis of Sŭnghwa [5], to become King. They established offices with General Yu Chonhyŏk 劉存奕 and Secretary of State of the Left, *sangsŏ chwasŭng* [6] 尚書左丞, Yi Sinson 李信孫 as the Left and Right Ministers of State, *sŭngsŏn* [7] 丞宣 [respectively]" (*KS* 130. 38a-b; also see *KS* 26. 34b; *KS* 90. 7a; *TT* 35. 109).

There are some indications of advance planning for we read that "previously, when the rebels first plotted to rebel, General Yi Paekki 李白起 didn't go along with it. At this point (i.e., when they met at the wall), they beheaded [Yi] Paekki as well as the Moslems, *hui-hui* [8] 回回, whom the Mongols had sent, in the street" (*KS* 130. 38b). A further indication of advanced planning is seen in the behavior of Chief of the Bureau of Diviners, *pan-t'aesaguk-sa* [9] 判太史局事, An Pangyŏl [10] 安邦悅. "When [An] was about to return to the capital (i.e., following the transfer order), he asked an omen of the image of T'aejo in Pongŭn Temple and obtained the prophecy 'Half alive; half dead'. Based upon this, he said the omen [meant] the dead portion had come to the mainland and the living portion had followed the Three Patrols out to sea. Then, he accompanied the rebels south and tried to persuade them saying, 'The descendants of the Dragon are exhausted at twelve. Go south and found the capital of the empire and the prophecy is fulfilled.' Consequently, he became the rebels' chief plotter" (*KS* 130. 39b).

An took his prognostic at the temple prior to June 17 (1270. 5. 26) when the image of T'aejo was removed (*KS* 26. 34b), and thus, several days before the actual outbreak of the rebellion on June 21st. It should, however, be noted that the rebels of the Three Patrols had already broken into the warehouses at this time (*KS* 26. 34b). While it is difficult to assess the value of the prophecy as a stimulus in their move south, there is little doubt that it encouraged the men of the Three Patrols as well as justifying the rebellion as preordained.

Following their seizure of Kanghwa, the Three Patrols prepared to evacuate the island and move south. On June 23rd (1270. 6. 3), "the rebels, estimating they were unable to defend [Kanghwa] collected ships and all loaded public and private property, the children and wives [of the officials] and went south. Their ships extended, stem to stern, from Kup'o 仇浦 to the Hangp'a River 缸破江 without end; there were over 1 000 ships.

"At that time, all the officials had gone to welcome the King [home from the Mongol court]. [When they learned] their wives and children had all been seized by the rebels, the sound of their bitter weeping rent heaven and earth" (*KS* 130. 38b-39a).

The primary reason for the flight south was fear of the Mongol forces. When a force of slaves was collected to attack the rebel rear at the time of their flight south, "the rebels saw the glittering weapons [of the slave force] near the sea and were nervous and fearful believing the Mongol troops had already arrived" (*KS* 130. 39). It will be recalled that the fortifications on Kanghwa Island had been dismantled as one of the conditions of the peace negotiations of 1259 (*KS* 24. 43b-44a). It will also be recalled that the Mongols had increased their activity in amphibious warfare and now had large numbers of Koreans on their side, i.e., Ch'oe T'an, et al., and thus had no lack of either trained seamen or vessels.

The flight south began on June 23; on this same day General Hyŏn Munhyŏk [11] 玄文奕 had escaped from the island and informed the capital of the revolt. Two days later, T'ou-nien-ke sent To-la-tai 朶剌歹 who entered Kanghwa with two thousand men on June 25 (1270.6.5) (*KS* 26. 35a). Then, on July 3 (1270.6.13), General Kim Panggyŏng as Rebel Suppression Commissioner, *yŏkchŏk-ch'ut'osa* 逆賊追討使, with sixty men, and Myriarch Sung with one thousand men, set out in pursuit of the rebels and reaching the sea they sighted the rebel ships at anchor at Yŏnghŭng Island [12] (*KS* 104. 5a).

On August 2 (1270.7.13), T'ou-nien-ke sent Commander, *tsung-kuan*, Hong Tagu [13] to patrol Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang Provinces, and the Eastern Frontier-District (*KS* 26. 35b). On August 9 (1270.7.20), the Mongol Marshal Aqai [14] was appointed Pacification Commissioner, *anmusa*, and given a force of 1 500 men (*YKC* 22a; *KS* 26). Then, on August 19 (1270.8.1), Crown Prince Sim was sent to the Mongol Court as Birthday Felicitation Envoy, *hajŏrilsa* 賀節日使 with a memorial on the rebellion of the Three Patrols (*YS* 7. 5a; *KS* 26. 35b; *TT* 35. 110).

Sailing south, the Three Patrols had raided various coastal islands, circumspectly avoiding the Mongol-Koryŏ forces on the mainland, and they entered Chin Island [15] on September 6 (1270.8.19), pillaging the *chu* and *kun* districts (*KS* 26. 36b; *TT* 35. 110). After their entry into Chin Island, they erected a walled-city, Yongjang-sŏng [16] and then began to build halls and other buildings. Following their establishment on Chin Island, they began to raid the coastal districts (*KS* 26. 36b-37a), and beginning with Ch'angsŏn Island [17], they were able to bring some thirty islands, including Kŏje Island and T'amna under their control (*KS* 27. 12b; *KS* 27. 10b-11a).

In the interim, the Deputy Minister of State, *ch'amjijŏngsa* 參知政事, Sin Sajŏn [18] who had been dispatched as Chŏlla Province Rebel Suppression Commissioner, heard that the rebels had crossed over to the mainland and, on September 19 (1270.9.2), he fled back to the capital and safety

(*KS* 26. 36b; *KS* 104. 5a; *TT* 35. 110). However, General Yang Tongmu 楊東茂 and General Ko Yŏrim [19] took a fleet, *chusa*, to attack Chin Island on September 21 (1270. 9. 4) (*KS* 26. 37a), but on the same day the main force of the Three Patrols had crossed to the mainland where they raided the Changyŏ-pu administration [20] kidnapping the commander, *toryŏng*, Yun Manjang 尹萬藏 and pillaging the area (*KS* 26. 37a; *TT* 35. 111).

After returning to the capital, Sin Sajŏn was replaced by General Kim Panggyŏng and on September 24 (1270. 9. 7), General Kim, as Chŏlla Province Rebel Suppression Commander, together with Marshal Aqai left the capital with one thousand men to attack Chin Island (*KS* 26. 37a; *KS* 104. 5b). At this time, the Three Patrols had attacked both Naju and Chŏnju. Hearing of the situation, General Kim divided his force as soon as he entered the area, sending one unit toward Chŏnju while he advanced toward Naju where the fighting had been going on for seven days and nights (*KS* 103. 40a-b; *TYS* 35. 620a). The rebels, hearing the rumor that General Kim was backed by ten thousand men, lifted the attack and withdrew (*KS* 104. 5b-6a; *TT* 35. 111).

Next, the rebels turned their attention to T'amna, seizing the city of Cheju on December 19 (1270. 11. 4) (*KS* 26. 37b; *TT* 35. 111). Previously, the Circuit Inspector, *anch'al-sa*, Kwŏn Tan [21], dispatched the Vice-Commissioner of Yŏngam, Kim Su [22], with two hundred men to defend Cheju; he was joined by General Ko Yŏrim with seventy men [23]. Both Kim Su and Ko Yŏrim were later killed in the battle for Cheju (*KS* 103. 41a; *TT* 35. 111).

Following the withdrawal of the rebels from Chŏnju and Naju, General Kim Panggyŏng and Aqai proceeded to Samgyŏngwŏn [24] opposite Chin Island and garrisoned there (*KS* 104. 6a; *TT* 35. 111). At this time, two men who had escaped from the rebels, Hong Ch'an 洪贊 and Hong Ki 洪機, slandered Kim Panggyŏng, accusing him of being secretly in league with the rebels. Aqai arrested them and informed the daruγači [25] of the matter and the daruγači ordered Kim Panggyŏng to return to the capital with his accusers to face trial. Aqai then manacled General Kim and sent him to the capital with an escort of fifty guards (*KS* 104. 6a-b; *TT* 35. 111). General Kim was quickly absolved by the daruγači and, at Wŏnjong's request, on February 3, 1271 (1270. 11. 19), the daruγači again appointed General Kim to subdue the rebels (*KS* 104. 6b). In this same month, Myriarch Kao-i-ma 高乙麻 (?Kharma) was also dispatched with two hundred men to patrol the southern coastal areas against the raids of the Three Patrols (*KS* 82. 6b; *KS* 26. 37b).

And so the first year of the rebellion came to an end with General Kim garrisoned opposite Chin Island preventing an incursion into the mainland at that point, while the rebels continued to raid the coastal area.

During the eleventh month of the eleventh year of the reign of Wŏnjong

(Dec. 17, 1270 - Jan. 15, 1271), the Yüan Secretariat, *chung-shu-sheng*, had memorialized Qubilai, the Yüan Emperor, requesting the establishment of a Military Colony Supervisory Bureau, *tunjŏn'gyŏngnyaksa* 屯田經略司 (*KS* 27. 2b) which was to result in the dispatch of Hindu [26] to Koryŏ. Aqai was relieved of his command by Hindu and, on March 19 (1271.1.5), Aqai returned to Kaegyŏng [27]. The first attempt to negotiate with the Three Patrols was made at this time. On March 20 (1271.1.6), the Auxiliary Secretary, *wŏnoerang* [28] 員外郎, Pak Ch'ŏnju 朴天澍 arrived at Chin Island carrying two edicts: one edict was directed to the rebels by Wŏnjong and the second was an edict from the Yüan Emperor to Wŏnjong which the latter wished them to see, hoping that it might influence them to submit [29] (*KS* 26. 40b; *TT* 35. 112). The rebels met Pak and while they entertained him at Pyŏkp'ajŏng 碧波亭 on Chin Island, they quietly dispatched twenty ships and attacked the Mongol-Koryŏ forces on the mainland, killing ninety men and capturing one ship (*KS* 27. 1a-b; *TT* 36. 114). Pak returned from Chin Island on April 5 (1271.1.22), with the rebels' answer. They had told him, "This edict is not directed to us. We do not dare receive the answer to a state letter" (*KS* 27. 4b). On the 25th day of the first month, Pak was sent to the Yüan court to report on the rebels activities (*KS* 27. 5a; *TT* 36. 114).

When Hindu arrived in Koryŏ in the spring of 1271, he carried an imperial edict from Qubilai directed to the Three Patrols. On April 23 (1271.2.10), this edict was carried to the rebel leader Pae Chungson by Hu-tu-ta-erh 忽都答兒. It would appear that this edict offered the Three Patrols Chŏlla Province and direct subordination to the Yüan court [30]. The Three Patrols continuously postponed accepting the Mongol terms and made additional demands, e.g., the withdrawal of Mongol-Koryŏ army garrisons in the south. This was, of course, unacceptable to the Mongols and Qubilai was informed of these delaying tactics. The Yüan reaction was to order the subjugation of Chin Island (*YS* 7. 10a).

Following their departure from Kanghwa, the Three Patrols had looted and plundered the southern coastal areas. They were especially active in 1271, raiding from Changhŭng-pu in Chŏlla Province (*KS* 27. 6b; *TT* 36. 115), eastward to Happ'o [31] (*KS* 27. 9a), Tongnae [32] (*KS* 27. 9b), and Kimju [33] (*KS* 27. 11b) in Kyŏngsang Province. As their successes against the Mongol-Koryŏ forces continued, their fame spread and this in turn stimulated others to revolt and join them [34], and so their strength increased still more [35]. And, as their strength increased, so did the range and extent of their incursions. Attacking Kimju on the eighth day of the fourth month of 1271, they not only raided the city but also, with the use of fire, successfully attacked the Defense Commander, *pangwi* 防衛, General Pak Po 朴保 who had taken

his forces into the citadel of refuge overlooking the city (*KS* 27. 11b; *TT* 36. 115; 35. 116).

On June 25 (1271. 4. 14), following the refusal of Pae Chungson to submit to the terms offered, Hindu requested that he be allowed to divide Chŏlla Province with Qurimči [36] and Wang Kuo-ch'ang [37] and attack the rebels (*YS* 7. 10a; *KS* 27. 12a; *KS* 27. 11b). On June 30 (1271. 4. 19), Hŭi and Ong [38], two of the sons of Sun, the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng, were ordered to proceed south from Liaotung with four hundred troops to aid Hindu in the attack on Chin Island (*KS* 27. 12a; *KS* 90. 7a-b; *TT* 36. 116). On July 1 (1271. 4. 20), a Mongol envoy arrived with an edict to suppress the rebels on Chin Island before the hot weather and the rains set in (*KS* 27. 12a-b; *TT* 36. 116). This advice was a bit late, for we read in an entry dated the fifth month of 1271, in *YKC*:

"Previously, Hindu, Shih Shu 史樞, and Hong Tagu went to attack Chin Island. The rebels marshalled warships along the northern coast of the island. [Shih] Shu said, 'The murderers are now running rampant and we do not yet have the strength to engage them. Moreover, the summer heat is now blazing and the steam rises from the sea. The power of the bows is retarded and the soldiers find them difficult to use because of the season. [Let us] divide the army into three groups and use many unfurled flags and banners as troops to decoy the enemy. I, and all the armies, will conceal units who will come out and directly blunt the vanguard [of the rebel force] in order [that we may] press on to Chin Island and destroy them.

"They sent a messenger to make [their plans] known [to the Emperor] and also to beg for 'flame-throwers' *huo-ch'iang* and fire-bombs *huo-p'ao*, as well as all implements of assault" (*YKC* 24b-25a).

And so, on July 11 (1271. 5. 1) the long postponed offensive was begun when Hong Tagu attacked Chin Island (*KS* 27. 14a). On July 20 (1271. 5. 10), a fleet of three hundred ships under General Pyŏn Yang 邊楊 and General Yi Susim 李守深 attacked Chin Island (*KS* 27. 14a). Then, on July 25 (1271. 5. 14), an all-out attack was begun.

"[Kim] Panggyŏng and Hindu commanding the Army of the Center, entered [Chin Island] at Pyŏkp'ajŏng. Hŭi and Ong, the sons of the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng, as well as Hong Tagu, commanded the Army of the Left and entered at Changhang 獐項. General Kim Sŏk 金錫 and Myriarch Kao-i-ma commanded the Army of the Right and went in from the east in command of over 100 ships [39].

"The rebels gathered at Pyŏkp'ajŏng with the intention of repelling the Army of the Center. Tagu advanced ahead, let fly with fire [40], and attacked the flank. The rebels were alarmed and scattered. They advanced the Army of the Right [but] the Army of the Right was afraid and wanted to support the

Army of the Center. The rebels seized two ships and they killed them all.

"Prior to this, the government army had battled the rebels a number of times without a victory [so] the rebels were contemptuous of them and did not make preparations. [Therefore], when the government forces launched a heavy attack, the rebels all abandoned the wives and children [being held as hostages] and fled. The people and treasures which they had taken from Kangdo, as well as the people living on Chin Island, were all captured by the Mongols.

"Panggyŏng saw the rebels scattering and pursued them. Over 10000 men and women and several tens of warships were captured. The remaining rebels went to T'amna. Panggyŏng entered Chin Island and captured 4000 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice, treasures, and military paraphernalia; all were transported to the capital. All 'freemen', *yangmin* 良民, of those who had submitted to the rebels were ordered to return to their occupation" (*KS* 104. 7b-8a).

Marquis On was killed [41] and Pae Chungson apparently fell in battle. The rebels who escaped were led by Kim T'ongjŏng [42] to the island of T'amna which the rebels held (*KS* 27. 15a). Hearing of the rebel defeat on Chin Island, their General Yu Chonhyŏk, who was based in Namhae-hyŏn 南海縣 raiding the coastal areas, gathered his force of eighty ships and sailed to join them (*KS* 130. 39a-40a; *TT* 36. 116). While a major defeat had been sustained (*KS* 104. 7b-8a; *YS* 7. 12a; *TK* 11B 258-259; *TT* 36. 116), the rebel strength was still to be a source of concern to the Mongol-Koryŏ forces, for from their base at Cheju [43] they again turned to raiding the coastal areas (*KS* 104. 8a) and they still controlled the southern waters (*TT* 36. 118).

On May 10, 1272 (1272.3.9), Kŭm Hun 琴熏 was appointed Bearer of Instructions to the Cheju Rebels, *Cheju yŏkchŏk ch'oyu-sa* 濟州逆賊招諭使 (*KS* 27. 27b) and he was proceeding to Cheju to negotiate with the rebels when he was captured and detained on the Ch'uja Islands [44] by the rebels. They killed his attendants, seized his ship, put him in a small boat, returned the edict, and sent him on his way back (*KS* 27. 30a; *TYS* 38. 664). He reached the capital on July 8 (1272.5.9), after being held on the island over a month. On July 19, he was dispatched to the Yüan court with a detailed memorial on the rebels' activities (*KS* 27. 30a-31a; *YS* 7. 11a).

On August 26 (1272.6.29), General Na Yu [45] with fifteen hundred men went to Chŏlla Province to suppress the rebels. Perhaps it was against this threat that the Three Patrols began to construct an outer and an inner fortified wall at Cheju (*KS* 27. 33b; *KS* 104. 8a; *KS* 130. 40a). The advance of General Na Yu into Chŏlla Province did not seem to suppress the spirit of the rebels, for on October 8 (1272.8.7) they seized eight hundred bushels (*sŏk*) of Chŏlla Province's tribute rice, provisioning themselves for the winter (*KS* 27. 24a; *TT* 36. 119-120).

Then, they turned to destroying the ships which were being constructed primarily for the invasion of Japan, but which obviously could be used in an expedition to Cheju. On November 7 (1272.9.13), they raided Koran Island 孤瀾島, burned six warhips, killed the shipwrights and took the Commissioner of Ship Construction, *chosŏn'gwan* 造船官, captive (*KS* 27. 34b; *TT* 36. 120).

During the eleventh month, the rebels: raided the Southern Defense Command taking as captives the District Commissioner, *pusa* 府使, Kong Yu [46] 孔愉, and his wife (*KS* 27. 35a; *TT* 36. 120); raided Happ'o burning twenty warships and taking four Mongol fire-beacon soldiers captive (*KS* 27. 35a); they also raided Kŏje-hyŏn 巨濟縣 where they burned three warships and took the Hyŏn Magistrate, *hyŏllyŏng* 縣領, captive. Then they sailed back around the peninsula and north to anchor at Yŏnghŭng Island. From there they proceeded to overrun the neighboring areas (*KS* 27. 35a-b; *TT* 36. 120).

In the spring their raids commenced again with ten rebel ships raiding Nagan-kun [47] 樂安郡. They raided Happ'o again on March 21, 1273, the last day of the first month of Wŏnjong's fourteenth reign year, burning thirty-two warships and killing ten Mongol soldiers (*KS* 27. 36b; *TT* 36. 120). The Three Patrols were still a threat and Wŏnjong himself had even asked Hindu for fifty cavalry men to guard the palace as a precaution against their raids (*TT* 36. 120). In five months they had destroyed over sixty ships [48].

Following the recommencement of the raids of the Three Patrols from T'amna, another attempt was made to negotiate with them rather than expend troops in a campaign against the island; this was in the eighth month of Wŏnjong's thirteenth reign year. Hong Tagu went to Naju where at the same time that he supervised the construction of ships for the Japan expedition, he bestowed kindnesses on several of Kim T'ongjŏng's relatives [49] and then dispatched them to Cheju with a missive for the rebels (*KS* 27. 34a; *KS* 130. 40a; *YKC* 26b).

This failing, Hong went to the Yüan court to report the situation, returning in the second month of Wŏnjong's fourteenth reign year (*KS* 27. 36b). The repeated negotiations with the Three Patrols are testimony to the disruptive effect that their raids had on preparations for the Japan expedition. Their raids intensified an already precarious situation; Koryŏ was no longer capable of supplying Mongol logistical demands and at this time the situation was so bad that the Mongols were forced to ship in 20 000 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice from Tung-ching to relieve the widespread famine (*YS* 7. 17b) and to begin the T'amna campaign, for Koryŏ had been unable to fulfill the Mongol order issued in early 1272 to prepare ships and supplies for the campaign (*YS* 7.

15a) [49a]. With this, Li I [50], the daruγači, ordered Hindu and Hong Tagu to quell the rebels (*KS* 27. 36b; *TT* 36. 120). On March 31 (1273.2.9), the Commissioner of Ships and Supervisor of Sea Lanes, *surogamsŏnsa* 水路監船使, sailed south with a portion of the fleet (*KS* 27. 36b-37a). Then, on April 11 (1273-2.20), Kim Panggyŏng, who at this time held the rank of Marshal of Men and Horse of the Mobile Garrison of the Army of the Center [51], set out from the capital with Hindu, leading eight hundred picked cavalrymen (*KS* 27. 37a; *KS* 104. 8b; *TT* 36. 120).

The month preceding the campaign against T'amna concealed other difficulties. First, on April 29 (1273.3.8), many warships of Sŏhae Province sunk, for which the Circuit Inspector U Ch'ŏnsŏk 禹天錫 was imprisoned [52]. And, on May 17 (1273.3.26), a storm sank twenty ships of Sŏhae Province which had rendezvoused at Kayaso Island 伽耶召 drowning one hundred and fifteen men; the same storm also sank twenty-seven of the warships of Kyŏngsang Province (*KS* 27. 38a; *TT* 36. 120).

After leaving the capital, Hong Tagu and Hindu had garrisoned at Pŏnnamhyŏn 潘南縣 [52] whence they dispatched the ill-fated warships (*KS* 104. 8b; *TT* 36. 121). In a second effort with Kim Panggyŏng, they assembled one hundred and sixty ships of Chŏlla Province (*KS* 27. 39a) and raised an army recorded as having from nine to twelve thousand men — Mongols, North Chinese, and Koryŏ troops [54] — including three thousand seamen [55].

They set out for T'amna, only to encounter a storm off the Ch'uja Islands. Riding the storm through the night, they found themselves off T'amna at dawn but due to rough breakers caused by the wind, they were unable to effect a landing immediately. General Kim, we are told, then appealed to the heavens and the wind ceased — at any rate, a landing was made. The Army of the Center landed at Hamdŏkp'o [56] 咸德浦 where the rebels had concealed their men among the rocks. General Kim, with shouts of encouragement, gathered his forces and advanced, and the rebels were repulsed. General Na Yu led the point of the army with picked troops and continued his advance successfully (*KS* 27. 39a; *KS* 104. 8b-9a; *TYS* 38. 664a-b; *TT* 36. 121).

The army of the left with thirty warships, landed to the west of Cheju City at Piyang Island [57] 飛揚島 and the two armies attacked the walls together. The rebels yielded the outer wall and retired to the inner wall. The Mongol-Koryŏ army then scaled the outer wall. Four volleys of fire arrows were fired, smoke rose from the city and the rebels submitted (*KS* 104. 9a; *TT* 36. 121).

Six of the captured leaders including Kim Wŏnyun 金元允, were executed while thirty-five relatives of the leaders (later executed at Naju - *TT* 36. 121) and thirteen hundred prisoners were taken captive, loaded aboard

ships and returned to the mainland (*KS* 27. 39a; *KS* 104. 9a-b; *TT* 36. 121). Those who were originally inhabitant s of T'amna were settled to live peacefully as before. With this, the rebels were all pacified. They ordered General Song Poyŏn 宋甫演 and others to remain in garrison on the island and they returned. For garrison troops, Hindu left five hundred Mongol soldiers and General Kim left one thousand men: eight hundred men of the Capital Army, *kyŏnggun* 京軍 and two hundred men of the regional patrols, *oepyŏlch'o* 外別抄 (*KS* 27. 39a; *KS* 104. 9b; *TT* 36. 121) [58].

The rebel leader Kim T'ongjŏng escaped into the wilds of Mt. Halla 漢拏山 with a small group of seventy followers after the fall of Cheju (*KS* 104. 9a; *KS* 130. 40a; *TT* 36.121). Two months later on the sixth day of the intercalary sixth month it was reported that Kim T'ongjŏng was rumored dead but that the seventy men who had escaped with him had been captured and sent to Hong Tagu on the mainland who had them all put to death (*KS* 27. 40b; *KS* 130. 40a; *TT* 36. 121).

On the twenty-fourth day of the fifth month, the King in Kaegyŏng received the report that the Three Patrols had been subdued (*KS* 27. 39b) and, on the first day of the sixth month (July 19, 1273), this report was sent to the Yüan court. Thus, the rebellion of the Three Patrols came to an end (*KS* 27. 39b-40b; *KS* 104. 9b).

Measured against the scale of the rebellions which often swept through Koryŏ's continental neighbors, the rebellion of the Three Patrols was a very limited action. The philosophy of the rebels, the simple values of the soldiers was, of course, mingled with the ambitions and fears of their leaders, which could be well described with an adaption from Gibbon's well-known remark about the Byzantine General Besilarius (505?-565) — their vices were a contagion of the times, their virtues were their own — or as the Korean historian Yi Pyŏngdo has put it, "in coming to fight to the end against the Mongols ... perhaps we can say that they manifested the spirit traditional of the Koryŏ military men" [59].

Yet the rebellion did have some important consequences [60]. First, the men who rose to lead the rebellion were formerly supporters of Im Yŏn, the military strongman who had deposed Wŏnjong, and Wŏnjong's desire to escape from their control led him to readily accept Mongol backing [61]. The reciprocal of this — the knowledge of Wŏnjong's hatred for them — was, of course, an important factor in initiating the rebellion. In continuing the struggle against the Mongols they gained considerable support 62). The Mongol reaction to the rebellion was to tighten control on Koryŏ and there were complementary factors in the establishment of Mongol offices in Koryŏ. The rebellion disastrously delayed launching the Japan expedition which proceeded the

next year, although Wŏnjong himself was to die in the interim. With the rebellion, ended an episode in Korean history for it marked the close of the period of military government [63].

In 1274, the formal marriage of Crown Prince Sim, which had provided a solution for Wŏnjong's dilemma, took place. While the marriage enabled Wŏnjong to recover his independence from the military government, it was indeed, as Hambis points out "... (une) solution précaire, car en fait ce fut la princesse mongole qui règna" [64].

The marriage between the two families put relations on an entirely different basis. From King Ch'ungnyŏl 忠烈王 (r. 1275-1308) through King Kongmin 恭愍王 (r. 1352-1374), a period of almost a century, seven Mongol Princesses were married into the Koryŏ Royal family. The offspring of three of these marriages held the throne. King Ch'ungnyŏl himself pursued a policy which sought to restore Koryŏ sovereignty over her former territory and which succeeded to a surprising degree, but his efforts were reversed by his immediate descendants. His son Wŏn 謜 (C. *Yüan* homophonous with Yüan 元) departed for Yen-tu, the Yüan capital in the same year he ascended the throne, where he remained. He was King Ch'ungsŏn 忠宣王 (r. 1309-1313). He abdicated in the fifth year of his reign for his son (also by a Mongol Princess) To 燾 (i.e., King Ch'ungsuk 忠肅王, r. 1314-1330 and r. 1331-1339) who was invested as Prince, *kuo-wang*, of Koryŏ while Wŏn himself received investment as Prince of Shen, Shen-wang [64a] 瀋王, although he was usually referred to in Koryŏ as Sangwang 上王 or the Higher King. In the tenth year of his reign (1323), King Ch'ungsuk petitioned the Yüan Emperor to incorporate the country into the Yüan Empire as a province. The failure was itself a turning point in Korean history but the incident is illustrative of the effect of the marriage alliance and adds weight to Hambis' observations.

In the year 1274, Wŏnjong, the last Koryŏ monarch to be granted a temple name, *myoho* [65] 廟号, died. The period of resistance had ended and the period of alliance had begun – the Japan invasion fleet scattered in a dozen harbors neared completion and the main body of the Mongol expeditionary force had already crossed the Yalu.

Notes to Chapter VI

1. In all works giving accounts of the rebellion it is invariably linked to Im Yŏn and his son Im Yumu. In *YS* 7. 3a, Pae Chungson, the leader of the rebellion, is described as one of Im Yŏn's faction. The rebellion is linked to Im Yumu in *IC sŏlchŏn* 說前 2. 8, *IC* 9 A 11a-b, *TMP* 109. 6a-b, *KS* 26. 23a-b. Representative is *YKC* 25a-b which remarks that "the Heir Apparent of Koryŏ, Wang Sim, states that the rash group which enabled Im Yŏn to assume power, are using the Left and Right [patrols] as well as the *Sinŭigun* cavalry, that is, the Three Patrols ..." However, in *YKC* 22a, we read that "Sik (i.e., Wŏnjong) has sent a man to report that one 'wing-army' 翼軍 which had previously escaped from the Court of Heaven (i.e., Mongols) and Koryŏ's two 'wing-armies' have rebelled. Now Sik's relative, the Duke of Sŭnghwa is using the rebellion of the Three Patrols." There is, however, no evidence to support the Duke of Sŭnghwa as a leader of the rebellion. In fact, the *KS* repeatedly states that he was compelled to become King; *HY* 20. 25b maintains the same. It is clear that the Duke was being used. Also active in the power struggle were Yi Ŭngnyŏl and Song Kunbi. Im Yumu's *KS* 130 biography relates that he was going to step down in favor of them due to his age. Yi, *Han'guk-sa,* p. 592, believes they were the real leaders of the military faction, but their role in the rebellion is unknown.
2. I have been unable to identify Kim Chijŏ.
3. Pae Chungson 裴仲孫 has a 'biography' in *KS* 130. 37a-40a, but it is simply an account of the rebellion and gives us little information on Pae himself other than to mention that he "accumulated rank in the court of Wŏnjong until he became General".
4. Under an entry in the 4th month of *Chih-yüan* 7th year (1271) in *YS* 7. 3a, there is a brief 'summary' of events from the death of Im Yŏn to the entry of the Three Patrols into Chin Island. The Kai-ming ed. of *YS* (*YS* 7. 2b) reads the same. This account would place all of these events much earlier than the outbreak of the rebellion and is obviously garbled and incorrectly dated. A fuller version found between entries dated the fourth and sixth months of 1270, is seen in *YS* 208. 12a. These passages are erroneous in that they present a résumé of events which occurred from the 2nd to the 8th month of 1270, viz., the death of Im Yŏn in the 2nd month until the entry into Chin Island in the 8th month. Since these events are dealt with in the text, a recounting would be superfluous here; suffice it to say that to accept the passages in question so dated would be to ignore the remaining *YKC, YS, KS* and other accounts which otherwise agree.

I have previously mentioned a few other passages of *YS* which are also erroneous and this undoubtedly reflects the haste with which the Yüan history was compiled, concerning which Yang remarks "... the primary goal seems to have been a quick finish, and this was achieved." Cf. Yang Lien-sheng, 'The Organization of Chinese Official Historiography', in *Historians of China and Japan*, London, 1961, p. 48.

4a Among the many who managed to escape from the island was An Hyang 安珦 (1242-1306) the founder of neo-Confucianism in Koryŏ. Cf. Doo Hun Kim (Kim Tuhun), 'The Rise of Neo-Confucianism Against Buddhism in Late Koryŏ', *Bulletin* 12 (1960), pp. 11-29, of The Korean Research Center, Seoul.

5. For a brief biography of Wang On 王溫, the Marquis of Sŭnghwa 承化侯 see *KS* 90. 7a-b. He was the brother of Wang Sun and was killed in the Chin Island battle in the fifth month of 1271.

6. There were two Ministers, *sŭng* 丞, in the Koryŏ Secretariat, *sangsŏ tosŏng* 尚書都省, one of the Left and one of the Right. The title had the official grade of Third Class, secondary (Yi, Table 4) which carried an annual stipend of 233 bushels (*sŏk*) 5 pecks (*tu*) of rice (Yi, Table 6).

7. These 'appointments' had the token value of elevating Yi by one rank and General Yu by two ranks and transferred them both to the Bureau of Military Affairs. The title *sŭngsŏn* 丞宣 had the official grade of Third Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of from 240 to 300 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice (Yi, Table 6) in the Koryŏ system. With the establishment of these offices, the rebels had the full regalia of government and with their 'king' of royal blood, they now had all the prerequisites to claim recognition.

8. Cf. *KS* 130. 38b. This occurred on the 3rd day of the 6th month (June 23), cf. *TT* 35. 109. References to Muslims in Koryŏ at this time are few, although there are many a bit later. There were large Muslim communities in China, of course, and a Muslim Bureau, *Hui-hui-ssu* 回回司 was established just after this by the Mongols. Cf. *YS* 7. 11b. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 214 says, "Much of the commerce of North China unquestionably was in the hands of the ortaq merchants, who were, for the most part Muslim Uiɣurs ..." It is quite possible that they played some commercial role in Koryŏ. For some reference to Muslims in Koryŏ see Ko Pyŏngik 高柄翊 'Korea's Contacts with "The Western Regions" in Pre-Modern Times', *SK* 2 (1958), pp. 55-73.

9. P'ansa 判事 or Chief of the T'aesaguk 太史局 was the highest position in that bureau and carried the official grade of Third Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) and an annual stipend of 240 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice (Yi, Table 6).

His actions reflect his position, for the T'aesaguk and the Sach'ŏndae 司天臺 were in charge of astrology, numerology, *yin-yang* and *feng-sui* studies. Cf. Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, vol. 2, p. 242.

10. An Pang'yŏl 安邦悅 fl. 1270-1273. He managed to escape following the defeat of the rebels on Chin Island and was about to visit Kim Pang-gyŏng when some soldiers killed him. *KS* 130. 39. Little else is known of him.
11. There is no biography for Hyŏn in the *KS* but there is a brief 'biography' for his wife, for which see *KS* 121. 23a. *BTKP* 44. 417 reads Hyŏn Mun-jŏk; I read Hyŏn Mun*hyŏk* and note that the name is rendered Hyŏn Mun-*hyŏk* 玄文赫 in *IC sŏlchŏn* 2. 8b.
12. Yŏnghŭng Island 靈興島 is located off Kyŏnggi Province and was at that time attached administratively to Namyang 南陽. Cf. *TYS* 9. 159a.
13. Hong Tagu 洪茶丘 (fl. 1258-1281) was the son of the Koryŏ rebel Hong Pogwŏn who had allied himself with the Mongols during the invasion of Sartaq. For biographical information see *YS* 154; for some information on his activities in Koryŏ see *KS* 29 and *KS* 130. Also see *BTKP* 41. 379.
14. *Aqai *A-hai* 阿海. For the reconstruction of this name see Hambis, *Le chapitre CVII* ..., p. 20 note 10, and p. 22; also see Pelliot, Notes sur le 'Turkestan' ..., *TP* XXVII (1930) p. 49.
    Aqai relieved Möngketü 蒙哥篤 who had previously been appointed Koryŏ Pacification Commissioner (*YS* 7. 1b). It is a frequently encountered name. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 25 mentions a certain Aqai who was a Myriarch and who confiscated civilian lands for the establishment of military colonies. Üyer's second son was named A-hae (*YS* 120. 15a); *YS* 133. 2a also mentions a certain A-hae.
15. Chin Island 珍島 is off the coast of the present South Chŏlla Province and was at that time administratively attached to Naju. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 37. 651b-654a. Located offshore of 'Korea's granary', the island was distant from the political and military center of activities to the north.
16. Yongjang-sŏng 龍藏城, a stone construction, was not intended merely as a temporary refuge but rather as a fortified capital, and great efforts were expended in the construction of buildings, probably with the example of Kanghwa in mind. Cf. *TYS* 37. 653b.
17. I find no mention of this island in *TYS*, yet the numerous offshore islands, groups of which were often made *kun* 郡 or *hyŏn* 縣 were under the control of the nearest *chu* 州 administration and such was undoubtedly the case here.

18. Sin Sajŏn 申思佺 d. 1289. For biographical references see *BTKP* 101. 948.
19. Ko Yŏrim 高汝霖 died in the intercalary tenth month of 1271, defending T'amna; he was, at one time, a Commander, *chiyu*, of the Night Patrol (cf. *TT* 34. 100) which points out the divided loyalties in the complicated background struggle involving the Three Patrols. For biographical references see *BTKP* 72. 700.
20. Changyŏ-pu 長興府 was located in the present South Chŏlla Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 37.
21. Kwŏn Tan 權旦 was born in 1228 and died in 1312. For biographical references see *BTKP* 78. 739.
22. Kim Su 金須 d. 1270. For biographical references see *BTKP* 65. 63.
23. According to *TK* 11B 253, General Ko followed with 1 000 men. Upon reaching T'amna, he erected a stone fortification, *changsŏng*, whose circumference is given as 300 *li* 里, in preparation against the rebels. Cf. *TYS* 38. 668b.
24. The location of Samgyŏnwŏn is uncertain, however, *TK* 11B remarks that there was a "... Samgiwŏn 三岐院 located 60 *li* west of the present (i.e., Yi Dynasty) Haenam-hyŏn 海南縣 and I suspect this is it." This *hyŏn* is currently a *kun* in Chŏlla Province.
25. The daruγači at this time was *Toqto'a 脫朶兒 and the Vice-Daruγači was Chiao T'ien-i 焦天翼, both of whom arrived in 1270. Cf. *YS* 7. 2a-b; *TT* 36. 108.
26. Hindu *hsin-tu* 忻都. For the reconstruction of this name see F. W. Cleaves, 'The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1362 in Memory of Prince Hindu', *HJAS* 12 (1949) 3 & 4, p. 93 note 4. Only the names are the same, not the persons involved. From 1274 Hindu used the name Hu-tun 忽敦. As Commissioner of the Military Colony Supervisory Bureau, Hindu's mission was, together with Shih Shu and Kim Panggyŏng, to make preparations for the expedition to Japan which included the construction of warships. See *KS* 7. 6a; *KS* 27. 8; *KS* 104. 7b; *YKC* 22a-b; *TT* 36. 113; *TK* 11B 257.
27. Aqai was recalled to the Yüan court in the 1st month of Wŏnjong's 12th reign year (*KS* 27. 1a; *TK* 11B 255; *TT* 36. 113; *TT* 36. 115). The reasons for his removal were his cowardice in battle in the first attempts by the Mongol-Koryŏ forces to take Chin Island. Cf. *KS* 104. 6b-7a; *YS* 7. 7a. This was probably also the reason behind the release of Kim Panggyŏng.
28. From one to two Auxiliary Secretaries were assigned to each Board; the Board of War, *pyŏngbu*, for example, had two Auxiliary Secretaries assigned. The title carried the official grade of Sixth Class, primary (Yi,

Table 4) and an annual stipend of 86 bushels (*sŏk*) 10 pecks (*tu*) of rice (Yi, Table 6).

29. The repeated attempts made to negotiate with the rebels is an indication of their relative strength; their continued refusal also supports this. For the generally weak condition of the Mongol-Koryŏ forces see *YKC* 24b-25a.
30. The initial offer was presumably made at this time although the text, *YS* 7. 8b, merely relates that "... Hu-tu-erh was sent to carry an edict to Pae Chungson." The offer is implied in the report of the rebel reaction made to Qubilai by a minister of the Imperial Secretariat who said, "I, [Your] Servant, say that the Koryŏ rebel Pae Chungson begs that all armies withdraw their garrisons and that thereafter they be attached [directly] to the Court. However, Hindu has not complied with their request.'" (*YS* 7. 9a-b)
31. Also see *TT* 36. 115. Happ'o 合浦 is the present Masan 馬山 located in the modern S. Kyŏngsang Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 33. 557a-558a under the entry Ch'angwŏn 昌源, the name by which it was known in the Yi Dynasty.
32. Tongnae 東萊 is located about five miles inland from the modern city of Pusan and was at the time the chief administrative center in the area. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 23. 287a-390a.
33. Kimju 金州 is the present Kimhae 金海 located on the delta of the Naktong River 洛東江 in South Kyŏngsang Province. Formerly known as Imhae 臨海 its name was changed to Kimju during the reign of Koryŏ Sŏngjong (r. 982-997). For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 32. 548b-557b.
34. The establishment of military colonies and the increased demands for supplies and manpower necessary to pacify the rebels and to make preparations for the Japan expedition, following some thirty years of Mongol depredations, had beggared the country. "... as a result of which the people are in reality eating grass and [the bark of] trees" (*TT* 36. 118). These conditions undoubtedly stimulated uprisings, especially in the southern provinces. See *TYS* 32. 548b; *TYS* 32. 556a, and *TYS* 26. 449b-450a.
35. See *TYS* 32. 556a; *TK* 11B 258. Many uprisings were stimulated by the rebellion of the Three Patrols, occurring at Milsŏng 密城 the present Miryang 密陽 in South Kyŏngsang Province (*KS* 27. 4b-5a), and also in the capital where the government slaves under the leadership of the slave Sunggyŏm [illegible] (d. 1271.2; *BTKP* 109. 1023) plotted to kill the daruγači and then join the rebels on Chin Island (*KS* 27. 5a-b); this abortive uprising stimulated the people of Taebu Island 大部島 to turn on a group

of Mongol soldiers who had gone to pillage the island, kill six of them, and revolt (*KS* 27. 6a). For the popular appeal of the Three Patrols, also see the biography of Kim Ŭngdŏk 金應德 in *KS* 103.

36. Hu-lin-ch'ih 忽林赤 = Qurimči. While it also occurs as a title, it appears here as a name. For the reconstruction of the name see K. Shiratori, Kōrai-shi ni mietaru Mōko-go no kaishaku 高麗史に見えたる蒙古語の解譯 [An Interpretation of Mongolian Words Seen in the Koryŏ-sa], *TG* 18 (1929) 2, and the comments by P. Pelliot, '*Les mots mongols* ...', p. 261. Qurimči had been sent in command of forces to garrison at Happ'o (*HY* 28. 20a), the departure point for Japan.

37. Wang Kuo-ch'ang 王國昌 was from Chiao-chou 膠洲 where he served as Chiliarch. In 1268 he was sent to Koryŏ to inspect Hŭksan Island for use as a departure point for the Sung. He subsequently participated in the joint Mongol-Koryŏ subjugation of the rebellion of the Three Patrols. He died in Koryŏ in the tenth month of 1271. He had one son T'ung 通. For biographical information see *YS* 167. 12b-13a. For his activities as envoy to Japan see Ikeuchi, *Genkō* ..., and Aoyama Kōryō 青山公亮, Nigen-kan no Kōrai 日元間の高麗, *SZ* 32 (1921) 8, pp. 575-586 and 9, pp. 645-658.

38. Wang Sun had six sons: Im 琳, Hwa 和, Che 禔, Hŭi 熙, and Ong 雍. *YS* 166 carries biographies for both Hŭi and Ong as well as a son listed under the Mongol name of Wu-ai 兀愛. The former two later took the Mongol names of Kökö Temür 闊闊帖木兒 and Tu-li Temür 闍里帖木兒 respectively (*YS* 166. 1a). The name Kökö Temür was also the name of a well-known Mongol general, however, two different persons are involved. Ong drowned in the Japan expedition and Wu-ai went on to a rather successful career as a soldier. For biographical information see *YS* 166. 1b-2a.

39. All those above the Fourth rank were required to furnish one slave from their home to be used as seamen. Cf. *TT* 36. 116.

40. Since Kim Sanggi, 'Sam pyŏlch'o wa ..., p. 191, and p. 203 note 87, has suggested that firearms were used at this time, the passage *KS* 104. 7b7-8, is worth considering, and reads 茶丘先登縱火挾攻 "Tagu advanced ahead, let fly with fire, and attacked the flank." The 1958 North Korean edition of the *KS* III 104. 222b and the Kokusho kankō-kai edition of 1909. III 104. 222b, read the same. *CS* Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 435, renders the passage in heavy statacco style: *Saku, sentō-(shi) hi wo hanachite kyōkō-su* 茶丘, 先登(シ)火ヲ放チテ挾攻ス. *YC* 14. 268. 13 (Japanese edition) reads: *Saku wa furui noborite hi wo*

hanachi hasamisemu 莽丘は奮ひ登りて火を縦ち挟攻む *HY* 28. 3b5 reads: 莽丘先登縦火諸軍挟攻見兵大潰. The minor variations are less important for the purpose in hand than the general concordance in the use of the term *chonghwa* 縦火 'to let fly with fire', which occurs in the *KS* as early as the reign of Munjong (r. 1047-1082) see *KS* 9. 8a8, and refers to the use of various and sundry incendiary weapons. Kim, loc. cit., uses the *YKC* 24b-25a mention of *huo-ch'iang* 火槍 and *huo-p'ao* 火砲, which I have given in the text, to support his thesis, suggesting that the *huo-p'ao* might be a reference to something like the *hui-hui-p'ao* 回回砲 of I-ssu-ma-yin 亦斯馬音 (Ismael), a Persian engineer who arrived in China in 1271, for which see the latter's biography in *YS* 130. The *huo-p'ao* were bombs cast by catapults in use as early as the 10th century while the *huo-ch'iang* was a sort of flamethrower which did not fire a missile; both are distinct from the assault mortar *hui-hui-p'ao*. A good discussion of these weapons is contained on pp. 500-501 of Jung-pang Lo, 'The Emergence of China as a Sea Power During the Late Sung and Early Yüan Periods', *FEQ* 14 (1954) 1, pp. 489-503. Also see L.C.Goodrich and Feng Chia-sheng, 'The Early Development of Firearms in China', *Isis* 36 (1946) 2 and Wang Ling, 'On the Invention and Use of Gunpowder and Firearms in China', *Isis* 37 (1947) 3 & 4; regrettably neither of the last two mentioned articles are available to me.

If firearms were used, which is indeed conjectural, then they were certainly supplied by the Mongol forces. The manufacture of firearms by Koreans began in the reign of King U (r. 1375-1388) when General Ch'oe Musŏn 崔茂宣 manufactured *hwat'ong* 火桶 and *hwap'o* 火砲 which he used to sink a large number of the ships of Japanese freebooters, *wakō*, attacking Chinp'o 鎭浦 at the mouth of the Kŭm River 錦江. See *Han'guk-sa sajŏn*, 371; also see *Nihon chiri taikei* 日本地理大系, published in 12 vols., Tōkyō, 1935, Vol. 12, p. 400.

41. Wang On was the brother of Wang Sun and when the latter sent his two sons south with the army, he "... ordered [them] to capture On and spare him but Hong Tagu entered first and beheaded On" (*HY* 20. 26a). This was an action of revenge because Wang Sun had been responsible for the death of Hong Pogwŏn, Hong Tagu's father (see *KS* 130. 3-5). For the grudge see *CHSL* 4. 33b.

42. *BTKP* 67. 652 gives some source locations for Kim T'ongjŏng's activities although not much is known of him. The entry in *BTKP* died 1173-6' is an obvious typographical error for 1273-6'. I note that there was a Kim Hyŏkchŏng 金革 who was a Commander, *chiyu*, of the Night Patrol (*KS* 26. 12a) who may have been a brother or a cousin.

43. When they fled to Cheju from Chin Island, the Three Patrols constructed an inner and outer fortified wall (*KS* 104. 8a; *KS* 130. 40a).
Probably in anticipation of the coming attack, they also constructed the following additional fortifications: Hangp'adu-sŏng 缸波頭城 located 40 *li* west of Cheju city; Aewŏlmok-sŏng 涯月木城 located 42 *li* west of Cheju city; and an earthen-work, *t'osŏng* 土城, located 36 *li* south-west of Cheju city. Cf. *TYS* 38. 668b-669a.
Kim Ponghyŏn, op. cit., pp. 115-124, deals with the rebellion and its connections with Cheju, but his work is more valuable for its general observations on the extant ruins of the constructions built at this time.

44. The Ch'uja Islands 楸子島 are a small group of islands between T'amna and the mainland which contains both a Large Ch'uja Island and a Small Ch'uja Island. Which particular island is meant is unknown. For topographical and other information see *TYS* 38. 668a-b.

45. General Na Yu 羅裕 d. 1292. For biographical information see *KS* 104. 39a-41b; also see *BTKP* 85. 799.

46. Kong Yu 孔愉 had previously made the Chin Island expedition and had almost been beheaded by General Kim Panggyŏng for his temerity. The next year Wŏnjong shifted him to another post (*KS* 104. 7b). The Southern Defense Command of which he was Vice-Commissioner, was in the present Chŏlla Province. Cf. *TYS* 33. 576a. *KS* lists this raid in the 11th month and *TT* lists it in the 9th month. I believe *KS* is correct.

47. Cf. *KS* 27. 36b. Nagan-kun 樂安郡 was in Chŏlla Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 40. 703b-705b.

48. The raids of the Three Patrols were numerous but aside from one or two feints northward (e.g., *KS* 27. 31a-b; *TT* 36. 119), their activities were restricted to the southern islands and the two southern provinces of Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang where the pattern of their incursions followed that of the Japanese freebooters, *wakō*. Some of their other raids during this period are listed in Part II in the section on Shipbuilding.

49. The number of persons involved is uncertain for the sources *KS* 27. 34a; *KS* 130. 40a, *HY* 68. 12, *TT* 36. 119, all differ. At any rate, Kim T'ongjŏng left Kim Chan 金贊 alive and killed the others. Parenthetically, I note that there was a Kim Chan involved in some of the Yüan-Koryŏ-Japan relations but it does not appear to be the same person.

49a Koryŏ was also required to provide such support as she was able. As Kyŏngsang Province had already contributed two years' taxes in advance toward the expense of subduing the rebels, they levied from Chŏlla Province for the T'amna campaign (*KS* 27. 38b).

50. Li I 李益 arrived in Koryŏ in the fourth month of the thirteenth year of

the reign of Wŏnjong (1272), following the death of the previous daruγači Toqto'a. Cf. *KS* 27. 28a; *KS* 27. 23a; *TT* 36. 119.

51. The title of Marshal of Men and Horse of the Mobile Garrison, *haengyŏng pyŏngma wŏnsu* 行營兵馬元帥, was established in 1047, the first year of the reign of Munjong. Cf. *KS* 77.
52. Cf. *KS* 27. 37b. The details are not given and the text merely states that "Li imprisoned Circuit Inspector U Ch'ŏnsŏk because many of the Sŏhae Province warships sunk" which suggests inferior construction.
53. Pŏnnam-hyŏn 潘南縣 was located some 40 *li* south of Naju, the administrative center to which it was attached, in Chŏlla Province. Cf. *TYS* 35. 615b.
54. The Mongol troops were designated by the term *tunjŏn'gun* 屯田軍; the North Chinese by the term *han'gun* 漢軍. For a discussion of the latter and parallel terms see F. W. Cleaves, 'Qabqunas ~ Qamqanas', *HJAS* 19 (1956) 3 & 4, p. 405 note 119; F. W. Cleaves, 'The Biography of Bayan ...', op. cit., p. 218 note 139; and Schurmann, op. cit., p. 105.
55. The actual size of the force which made the expedition and its composition are unclear for various figures are given, viz., *TT* 36. 120. 4 gives 10 000 without a breakdown; *KS* 27. 35b and *TT* 36. 120. 5-6 relate that in the 11th month of the 13th year of the reign of Wŏnjong "The Yüan ordered the King to send an army of 6 000 and 3 000 seamen to suppress the Three Patrols"; prior to this Koryŏ had reported to the Yüan that there were between five and six thousand troops facing Chin Island (*TT* 36. 118) and at this time we see that 3 000 seamen were levied for the Chin Island attack; yet the figure of 10 000 composed of soldiers and seamen is also given in *KS* 27. 39a and *KS* 104. 8b. Still, *YS* 7. 19b-20a gives a total of 12 000 which it breaks down as follows: troops of the military colonies, 2 000; North Chinese, 2 000; Koryŏ troops, 6 000; and 2 000 of those troops of the Muwigun 武衛軍 which were formerly used. The latter probably refers to those troops under Hong Tagu and the two sons of Wang Sun.

    Then, following the battle on Cheju, 500 Mongol troops and 1 000 Koryŏ troops were left on the island. The *YS* account may contain a duplication in that the 2 000 troops of the Muwigun were probably already counted in the figure given for the Koryŏ troops.
56. Hamdŏkp'o 咸德浦 was located 32 *li* to the east of Cheju city. Cf. *TYS* 38. 664b.
57. Piyang Island 飛揚島 is a small island — circumference 10 *li* — located 80 *li* west of Cheju city. Cf. *TYS* 38. 664b.
58. Following the suppression of the rebellion, T'amna was turned into a

pasturage and the Yüan established a daruγači 'command' *pu* 府 on the island. See Part II, section on Mongol Military-Administration.

59. Cf. Yi, *Kuksa t'aegwan*, p. 256.
60. Nakakoji says that the rebellion also temporarily stopped the repatriation of Koryŏ prisoners held by the Japanese, presumably meaning Koreans taken captive by the Japanese freebooters. Cf. Nakakoji Akira 仲小路彰, *Genkō* 元寇 [The Mongol Invasions], Tōkyō, 1937, p. 173.
61. Also see the remarks by Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire ...', pp. 177-178 concerning the Koryŏ dilemma and the resort to a solution by marriage. For the Yüan it offered the stabilization of the country while for the rulers of Koryŏ it offered powerful backing for retention of their position against any future attempts of a revival of the military government.
62. An indication of this is seen in *KS* 103. 41a where we read, "The Three Patrols had rebelled and were based on Chin Island. [Their forces] were extremely numerous and [the people of] the *chu* and *kun* districts watched the wind (i.e., looked for an opportunity) to welcome them and surrender to them; some went to Chin Island to visit them."
63. It is difficult to resist the temptation to compare the Koryŏ military government with Japan's Kamakura Bakufu. There are numerous analogies, i.e., the figurehead monarchs, the retention of the civil offices in the court and the shifting of actual functions to the military headquarters with the consequent emergence of new offices and a new administrative structure. While the analogy and temporal coincidence are interesting, the dissimilarities are all too apparent. The retention of the monarch by each is an example. The Koryŏ military regents did not eliminate the monarch because they feared the intervention of the reigning dynasty in China. A precedent had already been established when the Chin intervened in a succession fraud by the military regents. Cf. Rogers, 'Studies in Korean History', passim. The Japanese military retained the monarch also but it was certainly not due to fear of Chinese intervention.
64. Cf. Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire ...', p. 178. Hambis, loc. cit., is the definitive work on the Koryŏ royal family. The various works of M. Rogers supplement this to some extent. Also see Yu, loc. cit., and *YS* 108. 2 which gives the Mongols princesses married into the Koryŏ royal family.

64a I note that Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 432, lists a *fan-wang* 藩王 which he describes as "prince royal gouvernant un pays".

65. For some of the posthumous honorary appellations conferred upon Koryŏ rulers and their queens by the Yüan see *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* 11. 17a-19b and 12. 1a-2b.

Part II

MONGOL DEMANDS UPON KORYŎ

1. *The Instructions for Surrendering States*

Mongol demands upon Koryŏ followed the instructions laid down by Činggis as one of the articles of his *Yasa* [1] or ordinances which were to apply to all surrendering states. These requirements were first stated to Koryŏ in 1232, the text of which has been translated previously. Clear reference is made to "... the laws and statues of [Our] Great Nation" which Koryŏ is charged with violating. The specific charges laid down cite Koryŏ with failure to: assist the Mongolian forces, present household registers, bring forth an army, and have the monarch present himself at court. These instructions, among which submission of annual tribute was also cited, were frequently repeated. In 1262, they were outlined by Qubilai in a decree to Koryŏ:

> "[Our] ancestors have already established the principle that all newly attached states, near and far, must send hostages, submit population registers, establish post-stations, and then raise an army, provide provisions, and support the [Mongolian] army" (*KS* 25. 26a-27b).

In 1268, they were reiterated with the additional mention of the establishment of daruγači or resident commissioners [2].

Clearly, Činggis' instructions for surrendering states acted as the fundamental plan used by the Mongols in the economic exploitation of Koryŏ. To be sure, Mongol methods of extracting wealth from conquered nations changed and were often modified [3], and these modifications and changes are themselves useful indicators of changes in Mongol concepts. Yet, Mongol demands were to a surprising degree based upon the simple blueprint laid down by Činggis as is evidenced by the remarkably few changes in the instructions cited above, which are repeatedly referred to as principles laid down by Činggis (e.g., *YKC* 8a, 9a), which remained basically constant in content over half a century, and to which only minor modifications appear to have been made. All of which point to the existence of a codified version which was probably incorporated in the only body of legal statutes known to have been ordered drawn up by Činggis, the *Yasa*.

Consideration of these requirements and the extension of the Mongol

military-administration into Koryŏ during the period 1219-1270, form the subject of the pages which follow.

2. *Mongol Military-Administration in Koryŏ*

During the period 1219-1224, Koryŏ was apparently considered to be an appanage of Temüge-otčigin, for he sent envoys to collect tribute in the years 1219 (*YKC* 2a), 1220 (*YKC* 2b), and 1224 (*YKC* 2b). In all probability, the other Mongol embassies which arrived in Koryŏ at that time were also sent by him since, as mentioned earlier, until the ill-fated envoy of 1224, all embassies came via the territory of P'u-hsien Wan-nu to avoid the Chin garrisons in South Manchuria. And, as previously mentioned, Temüge-otčigin was given the lands of P'u-hsien Wan-nu as an appanage and his direct descendants, viz., his son Jibügen, his grandson Tāčar, and his great-grandson *Ajul, all held the title of Prince of the first rank, *kuo-wang*. When his great-great-grandson Nayan revolted against Qubilai and was killed in 1287, these titles were taken away. However, Nayan's brother To[q]to was permitted to keep his title as Prince of Liao and this title was transmitted to his son Yanaširi [4].

It is not surprising in view of the repeated invasions to find that until 1270, Mongol administration in Koryŏ was largely what could be described as 'government in the saddle' [5]. When the Mongol forces launched an offensive against Koryŏ, the first wave consisted of a large advance cavalry force, *hou-ch'i* [6] 候騎. Travelling at a more leisurely pace behind them was the main force which included the Mobile Garrison, *hsing-ying*, or headquarters of the Mongol field commander [7]. The major administrative function of the Mobile Garrison, as far as I have been able to discern, was the handling of communication, and the tallying of war-booty and tribute. In brief, foraging in the widest sense and demands for goods represented the initial Mongol methods of extracting wealth from Koryŏ, and its 'administration' was lodged in the Mobile Garrison; Sartaq, for example, had 16 officials, *kuan-jen* 官人, beneath him (*KS* 23. 12a).

The first effort at a more systematic exploitation of Koryŏ was the abortive attempt to establish daruγači in the northwest in 1232. This was the first attempt by the Mongols to build an intermediate administrative structure between Korean society and the ruling class of Mongols — the imperial family and the nobility [8].

Permanent occupation of Koryŏ commenced in early 1258, when the Mongols walled the city of Ŭiju on the Yalu River. Later that year, with the aid of the Korean deserters Cho Hwi and T'ak Chŏng, they occupied the Koryŏ northeast, i.e., the area northward from Ch'ŏl-kwan. This area was subsequently

lost to Koryŏ for almost a century until, with the cooperation of a Jŭrčen chieftain, the Ssangsŏng area was retaken by force in 1356.

The overthrow of the Ch'oe clan which also occurred in 1258, led to a peace settlement and the center of Mongol influence in Koryŏ then shifted south to the Western Capital which was reconstructed in the same year to serve as a Mongol center, although Mongol forces were withdrawn from the Western Capital two years later in 1260. As relations warmed, there was a general acceleration in meeting Mongol demands. And, in 1269, the next major turning point was reached. From the deposing of Wŏnjong stemmed a series of events:

1) Koryŏ was forced to relinquish her northwest territory when the Koryŏ rebel Ch'oe T'an, et al., seized the area and submitted to the Yüan in 1270. In that year "[By] an Edict, the Western Capital was made subordinate to the Court, *nei-shu* 內屬 , [its designation] changed to Tongnyŏng-pu 東寧府 , and its boundary [with Koryŏ] set at Chabi Pass [9] 慈悲嶺 " (*KS* 208. 11a; also see *KS* 26. 28a-b; *KS* 26. 31a-32a; *KS* 130. 36b). Ch'oe T'an was placed in charge as Governor, *tsung-kuan* (*KS* 130. 36b), although he evidently was demoted for he appears in the records in 1284 with the rank of Chiliarch (*KSC* 30. 1a). The Mongol representative there was Möngketü 忙哥都 who had originally been sent at Ch'oe T'an's request to garrison the Western Capital in 1269 and who was later appointed Civil Administrator of the new district (*YSCSPM* 3. 13). In 1275, it was redesignated Tongnyŏng-no (C. *lu*). It should be noted that the border cities of Ŭiju, Chŏngju 靜州 , Inju, and Wiwŏn-chin 威遠鎭 were subordinate to P'o-so-fu until 1276 (*YS* 59. 3b-4a). In 1283, P'o-so-fu was abolished when Tung-ching was made Liaoyang-lu (*YS* 59. 1a-2a) and I assume that these cities were then subordinate to the latter. In 1283, the *tsung-kuan* or Governor of Tongnyŏng-pu was Hong Chunghŭi 洪重喜 , the eldest son of Hong Tagu (*KS* 29. 47b) while Ch'oe T'an had evidently been demoted, for in the next year his title was Chiliarch (*KS* 30. 1a). Some cities were returned in 1285 (*KS* 30. 4), and in 1290, following a petition by King Ch'ungnyŏl, Tongnyŏng-no was abolished and administratively returned to Koryŏ (*KS* 130. 37a). The abolishment of Tongnyŏng-no did not immediately put the entire area back into Korean hands. Korean designations and control were re-established over the following cities in the years indicated: 1354, the cities of Ŭnju, Muju, and Maengju; 1371, the cities of Tŏkchu, Kwakchu, Pakchu, and Unju; 1382, the city of Wiju [9a]. The major problem following the fall of the Yüan was not so much regaining the territory, along the frontier especially, from the Mongols as it was a problem of retaking it from the Jŭrčen.


Yüan Control in Koryŏ
Liao-yang-Lu
Kai-yüan-Lu
Yalu River
Mt Paektu
Tuman River
Pŏ-so-pu
(Abolished 1283)
Ŭiju
Chŏngju
Ŭnju
Chŏngju
Ssangsŏng
Under Mongol control for a century
Tongnyŏng Pu
(1270-1290)
Lost to Koryŏ for 40 years
Temporary control by Mongols
Area under Tongnyŏng-pu
Yüan military colonies
Ship construction
Kaegyŏng
Kang Hwa I.
Han R.
Yellow Sea
Eastern Sea
Ullŭng I.
Chŏnju
Nakdong River
Kimju
Happo
Naju
Japan invasions
Nŭksan Islands
Namhae Hyŏn
Koje I.
Tsushima
Japan
Chin I.
Cheju Islands
Iki
Cheju
T'amna (1273-1301)

2) In order to break the Koryŏ military government which had deposed him, Wŏnjong submitted Koryŏ to the Mongols on a basis of full alliance and co-operation, as a result of which:

a) the Koryŏ and Yüan Imperial families were linked in marriage [11],

b) the forces of the Koryŏ military government, the Three Patrols, revolted.

Thus, from 1270 onward, Koryŏ became a full-fledged participant in the Mongol adventure of conquest and Mongol daruγači [12] were appointed for the whole of Koryŏ. The following simplified chart shows the daruγači stationed in Koryŏ during the period 1258-1278 [13]:

Period	Daruγači	Vice-Daruγači	Source
1258.12	72 individuals; unidentified		*KS* 24. 39b
1260	Shu-li-ta		*KS* 25. 7b-10a
1260-1270	- vacant -	- vacant -	*KS* 26. 33a; also see *YKC* 10a-b
from 1270.5 to 1271.10	Toqto'a [14] 脫朶兒	Chiao T'ien-i 焦天翼	*YS* 7. 2a-b; *YKC* 21a-b; *TT* 36.108
from 1271.10 to 1272.4	- vacant -	Chiao T'ien-i	
from 1272.4 to 1273.9	Li I 李益	Chiao T'ien-i [15]	*YKC* 26a; *KS* 27. 28a
from 1273.12 to 1274.12	Li I	Chou Shih-ch'ang 周世昌	*YKC* 26b
from 1274.12 to 1275.2	Hei-ti 黑的	Chou Shih-ch'ang (d. 1275.2)	*YKC* 27a
from 1275.2 to 1275.7	Hei-ti	- vacant -	
from 1275.7 to 1275.11	- vacant -	- vacant -	*YKC* 27a
from 1275.11 to 1278.8	Chang Kuo-kang 張國綱	Shih-mo T'ien-ch'ü 石抹天衢	*YKC* 27a

In late 1278, King Ch'ungnyŏl requested that the daruγači be withdrawn since they had fulfilled their duties and his request was granted (*YKC* 27b; *KS* 26. 32a), but by that time Yüan control over Koryŏ was so complete that the absence of the daruγači did not matter much.

A daruγači command had also been set up on T'amna in 1273 following the suppression of the rebellion of the Three Patrols, although it appears that

T'amna remained chiefly a military garrison until the daruγači, Sun-t'an 孫 撰 was appointed in the sixth month of 1275 (*YS* 208) [16]. The island was subsequently turned into a pasturage [17]. Upon the occasion of the accession of Ch'eng-tsung 成 宗 (i.e., Temür Öljeitü, r. 1295-1307), King Ch'ungnyŏl petitioned the new Emperor to return T'amna to Koryŏ and this was done [18]. Again, the 'return' of T'amna was done in name only; a Myriarch Command remained on the island and Koryŏ did not regain control of it until the reign of King Kongmin. In addition to the Myriarch Command on T'amna, there were other Myriarch Commands in Koryŏ, for example, at Happ'o, in the Western Capital, one in Chŏlla Province and there was even a mobile army, *sun'gun* [19] 巡軍. One of the major concerns of Yüan officials in Koryŏ in the 1270's was ship construction and the provision of military supplies for the first invasion of Japan. In 1280, after the failure of the first Japan expedition of 1274, a Yüan Mobile Bureau for the Subjugation of Japan, *cheng-jih-pen hsing-sheng* 征日本行省, was established in Koryŏ; in fact this particular Mobile Bureau was established and abolished several times, reflecting the on-again off-again decision to attempt further Japan expeditions. This bureau acted as the supreme Yüan administrative organ in Koryo and even gave civil service exams [19a]. When the Mongols launched their invasion of Annam a third Japan expedition was given up [20] temporarily and the Mobile Bureau for the Subjugation of Japan which had been re-established in 1283, was abolished in the first month of 1284. It was re-established in 1299; abolished in 1300 and re-established in 1321 [21]; it lingered on, more in form than in substance, until 1365 (*KSC* 21. 36a; *YSCSPM* 3. 13; *YS* 208. 7a-b; *YS* 28. 5a).

A consequence of the failures of the Japan campaigns was the swarm of Japanese freebooters, *wakō*, which descended upon Koryŏ during the late 13th and early 14th centuries. The favorite targets of these raiders were Kimju, located some miles up the Naktong River in the fertile Naktong delta region, and the seaport of Happ'o located on the coast to the south. Happ'o had been the Korean departure point for both Japan expeditions. In order to combat the Japanese freebooters, the Yüan established a Coast Guard Myriarch Command, *chen-pien wan-hu-fu* 鎮邊萬戶府, at Kimju in the tenth month of 1281 (*KSC* 20. 36b). The following year Tu-li Temür 闍里帖木 was stationed there with 500 troops (*YSCSPM* 3. 13).

In the eleventh month of 1275, Koryŏ was ordered to change the designations of all officials to correspond to the Yüan system (*KS* 76. 1b; *YKC* 27a) and the Koryŏ administrative structure was changed accordingly, with the appointment of Myriarch and Chiliarch, etc. to fill provincial posts (e.g., *KS* 21. 34a-b). In 1278, Koryŏ began to follow even Mongol customs in clothing (*KS* 72. 21b).

After decades of relation by marriages with the Yüan imperial family, an interesting phenomenon occurred. When Koryŏ King Ch'ungsŏn abdicated in 1313, he was invested as Shen-wang 瀋王 or Prince of Shen, by the Yüan. He was still nominally over his son who ascended the throne in Koryŏ, viz., King Ch'ungsuk, while he himself was held at the Mongol Court. He was later exiled to Tibet in 1320, but this did not cut short the line of Princes of Shen who continued to be invested with the title and presented, as symbols of their authority, with a golden seal with animal design (cf. *YS* 107. 6a) [22].

In summary it can be said that initial Mongol attempts to govern Koryŏ through the establishment of administrative organs in the country were unsuccessful until 1269; prior to that time they controlled only what they could hold by force, although the services of Koryŏ rebels were of considerable aid. But from that turning point which we can pinpoint to the deposing of Wŏnjong, Koryŏ came under the Yüan mantle willingly and the active establishment of the Yüan military-administrative structure in Koryŏ was carried out. The failure of the first Mongol attempt to control Koryŏ in 1232, however, had the interesting result of building a large and long-lasting Korean community in the Liaoyang area which was in desolation at the end of the Chin due to the repeated wars in the area. After the settlement of Hong Pogwŏn and his 1 500 households in the area between Liaoyang and Shenyang, Pogwŏn was placed in charge of all Koreans who submitted to the Mongols with the position of Myriarch of the Army and Peoples of Koryŏ, *Kao-li chün-min wan-hu* (*KS* 59. 5a). In 1261, three years after Pogwŏn's death, the Yüan established a Governor's Command for the Administration of the Army and People of Koryŏ, *An-fu Kao-li chün-min tsung-kuan-fu* (*YS* 59. 5a). In 1263, Wang Sun was given control of some 2 000 households and the administration of Shen-chou (= Shenyang) and made Governor of the People and Forces of Koryŏ. In 1296, the population of the Korean community in this area around Liaoyang exceeded 5 000 households; in the *chih-shun* era, 1330-1333, it was 5 183 households or roughly 25 915 persons (*YS* 59. 5a-b). Although Hong Pogwŏn was disgraced and killed in 1258, his son Hong Tagu was called up in 1260, and appointed Commander, *tsung-kuan* — a military position under the Myriarch — when the succession fight broke out between Qubilai and Ariγ Boge. Tagu, with the Korean army of Liaoyang, also helped to crush the revolt of Prince Nayan in 1287. In 1270, a Mobile Bureau, *hsing-sheng* [23] was established at Liaoyang and in 1288 Hong Tagu was appointed Minister of the Right, *yu-ch'eng* 右丞, of the Mobile Bureau. When he died in 1291, his younger brother Hong Kunsang [23a] 洪君祥 was given his position as Minister of the Right of the Liaoyang Mobile Bureau; he was later replaced by Hong Tagu's eldest son, Hong Chunghŭi.

The descendants of Wang Sun also flourished in Liaoyang. Wang's second son Kökö Temür (Korean name Hŭi) was also given his father's position as *tsung-kuan* or governor while Wang's son Wu-ai who later aided in the suppression of the revolt of Prince Nayan was, in 1283, made Grand General, *ta-chiang-chiin*.

3. *Tribute, Levies and Gifts*

Mongol demands upon Koryŏ for products took the form of the scheduled annual tribute and unscheduled levies. To this must be added gifts both solicited and unsolicited. Levies of provisions for the Mongolian army are of a different nature and have been discussed separately.

In the formal trade pattern of North Asia reciprocity and control were by-words and this aspect of Yüan-Koryŏ relations is not lacking. When an envoy arrived he brought gifts which were presented with his missive; he was then entertained and prior to departing given gifts which, in more normal times, could be expected to be about equal in value to the gifts he presented — which was probably one reason they were given after he made his presentation. While the Mongol envoys reduced their gifts to a token, the symbol of reciprocity was retained.

The few itemized accounts which we have of the demands and of the articles supplied cannot be expected to tell us much but they do reveal some interesting points. Highly prized by the Mongols were Koryŏ otter and marmot pelts and they were constantly demanded both by the throne and by the commanders in the field.

The majority of articles supplied by Koryŏ fall into a few general categories: *textiles, precious metals, pelts,* and *paper*. On the basis of the quantities of various items recorded as having been presented by Koryŏ (not all of which are detailed here) up until the year 1264, some approximate but interesting ratios are obtainable:

silver to gold (excluding coins)	35 to 1
gold products to unworked gold	2.5 to 1
silver products to unworked silver	6 to 1
ramie to silk	7 to 1

The high ratio of worked silver to raw silver is interesting for it indicates not only a large silver-craft industry in Koryŏ but also a preference for silver in the form of articles rather than in the form of bullion. The variety of textiles and of paper is particularly noticeable.

The period under consideration falls, for the most part, in what might be called the period of the unorganized exploitation of wealth by the Mongols; not until after the accession of Qubilai in 1260 was the Chinese bureaucratic ma-

chinery fully utilized for taxation purposes and, in Koryŏ, full exploitation was not begun until the accession of Wŏnjong, while full Koryŏ cooperation dates from 1270. Nothing emphasizes this so much as the fact that during the 31 years of the *chih-yüan* period, 1264-1294, Koryŏ submitted tribute 36 times (*YS* 208. 7b). It should be mentioned that it would be hazardous to attempt to draw other than the most tentative of conclusions from such meagre data despite their obvious value as an indicator of productivity and preference values.

Detailed lists of the articles submitted as tribute are lacking but a general idea is conveyed by the demands presented by Temüge-otčigin in 1221 and the tribute and gifts given by Koryŏ as a result of the peace negotiations in 1231. The demands of 1221 were as follows:

Article	Quantity
otter pelts	10 000 *yŏng* 領 (skins)
fine silk, *hsi-ch'ou* 細紬	3 000 *p'il* 匹 or bolts
fine ramie, *hsi-chu* 細苧	2 000 *p'il*
silk quilting, *min-tzu* 綿子	10 000 *kok* 斛 or bushels
Lung-t'uan ink 龍團墨	1 000 *chŏng* 丁 or sticks/cakes
writing brushes	200
paper	100 000 *chang* 張 or sheets
groomwell, *tzu-ts'ao* [24] 紫草	5 *kok*
safflower, *hung-hua* [25] 紅花	50 *kok*
indigo shoots, *lan-sun* [26] 藍筍	50 *kok*
cinnabar red, *chu-hung* 朱紅	50 *kok*
orpiment [27], *tz'u-huang* 雌黃	10 *kok*
bright lacquer [28], *kuang-ch'i* 光漆	10 *kok*
tung oil, *tung-yu* 桐油	10 *kok*

The Mongol gifts presented by the envoys who conveyed these demands were, the Koryŏ records inform us, cloth which had been given by Koryŏ the previous year and were merely symbols of the reciprocity implied in such exchanges. These same envoys also presented demands from the Mongol field commanders requesting unspecified amounts of otter pelts, silks, and silk quilting, and other items (*KS* 22. 19b-20b).

Of particular interest are the demands for such large quantities of ink, writing brushes, and paper. Parenthetically, it should be noted that cotton was not among these demands, the opinion of Martin notwithstanding [29]. All exchanges stopped when Chu-ku-yü, the chief of this delegation was slain in early 1225.

The submission of tribute recommenced with the opening of the peace negotiations which took place in the winter of 1231. As compensation for the slaying of the Mongol envoy Chu-ku-yü, the Mongols demanded many hostages, 20 000 otter pelts, 10 000 horses and 10 000 ponies and clothing for an army of one million men! (*KS* 23. 5a-7b). Koryŏ sent gifts to the Mongol field commanders preceding the visit of Chŏng, the Duke of Hoean, who himself took some local products to Sartaq. The gifts sent were: a pair of small gold wine bowls, a pair of large gold wine bowls, silver *pyŏng* coins, otter pelts, clothing, *i* 衣, silk, and ramie cloth, *chu-pu* 紵布 (*KS* 23. 5b). Some days later Koryŏ sent envoys to the camp of Tanqut, Ti-chü, and Sartaq's son to present: 5 *kŭn* of silver, 10 *p'il* of ramie cloth, 2 000 *p'il* of coarse cloth, *ts'u-pu* 麁布, saddle trappings, and bridle tassels (*KS* 23. 5b). The next Mongol envoy bore a dispatch which demanded enormous amounts of goods (*KS* 23. 5b-6b). Gifts were first sent to the camp of Tanqut consisting of: a wine-cup with fully engraved phoenix cover and stand, two *p'il* of fine ramie cloth, one bay horse, a silver-trimmed and gold-adorned saddle, and full embroidered saddle trappings.

Following the flurry of gifts outlined above, a substantial submission of tribute took place.

(a) A Mongol envoy was presented with the National Gifts consisting of:

70 *kŭn* of yellow gold
1 300 *kŭn* of white gold
1 000 jackets, *ju-i* [30] 襦衣, and,
170 horses.

(b) Then, Koryŏ sent:

(1) as gifts for Sartaq himself:

12 *kŭn* 2 *yang* 兩 of yellow gold
7 *kŭn* by weight of numerous wine utensils of gold
29 *kŭn* of white silver
437 *kŭn* by weight of numerous drinking and eating utensils of silver
116 silver *pyŏng* coins (each weighing one *kŭn*)
16 pieces of clothing (made of chiffon, *sha* 紗, silk gauze, *lo* 羅, silk brocade, *chin* 錦, and embroidered materials, *hsin*)
2 robes, *ao* 襖, of purple chiffon
2 000 jackets of silk cloth
75 marmot pelts, *t'a-p'i* 獺皮
1 horse equipped with a saddle ornamented with gold
150 horses of varying types and,

(2) for distribution to Sartaq's son and wife, and for the commanders and officials under his command:

49 *kŭn* 5 *yang* of gold
341 *kŭn* of silver
1 780 *kŭn* by weight of silver wine utensils
120 silver *pyŏng* coins
300 *p'il* of fine ramie cloth
164 marmot pelts
jackets of damask, *ling* 綾, and chiffon; and saddle-horses.
(*KS* 23. 7b-8a)

In the fourth month of 1232, gifts were again presented to the Mongol field commanders including 10 *p'il* of silk gauze; pongee, *chüan* 絹; damask; silk; and a variety of gold and silver wine utensils, decorated saddle trappings, and painted fans. A letter presented at this time also mentions that of 1 000 otter pelts demanded previously, some 977 pelts were being presented (*KS* 23. 12a).

Following the peace negotiations, tribute missions were again sent but no enumeration of products is given. In general, it can be said that during the periods of respite, tribute was given which was also true during most of the periods while negotiations were going on even though the fighting continued on the mainland, while during all major engagements tribute stopped [31]. The same is true of gifts to Mongol commanders in the field.

In the winter of 1253, negotiations had reopened, and in addition to missives from the Mongol commander Yekü, one of his officials presented demands for gold, silver, ramie cloth, and other products (*KS* 23. 11a). The Koryŏ answer to this letter is particularly pertinent:
"The necessary gold and silver have since ancient times not been produced in our small state; as regards their being presented as tribute, this is not easily managed. As for otter pelts and ramie cloth, since the beginning of the war, the people have all fled in alarm, so that it is difficult to provide [these things]. Now we have roughly prepared some [gifts] as proof of our good faith as set out in a separate list" (*KS* 24. 11b).

The general Korean bankruptcy is borne out by other accounts where we read that "because of the presentations as well as gifts sent to the Mongol officials, the Duke of Yŏngyŏng, his consort, and his consort's mother, Hong Pogwŏn, et al., the gold, silver, and cloth [consumed] were incalculable and the treasuries and storehouses were all exhausted. [Therefore] they ordered the civil and military officials of the fourth grade in official rank and above to produce one *kŭn* of white silver; officials of the fifth grade, 4 *p'il* of ramie cloth; officials of the sixth and seventh grades, *kwŏnsam* (~ *kwŏnch'am*) 權衫, 3 *p'il* [of ramie cloth]; the officials of the eighth grade, one *p'il* (of ramie cloth) in order to meet the expenses" (*KS* 79. 22b-23a). Levies of 20 *sŭng* 升 of white ramie cloth were made on the people of the southern pro-

vinces which caused much dissension; one *p'il* of cloth cost one *kŭn* of white silver while orders to confiscate the people's horses led many to kill the horses rather than give them up (*KS* 24. 12a).

While a mere listing of all records of gifts, levies, and tribute presented by Koryŏ would be of minor value since quantities are rarely mentioned, a few of these records deserve attention.

As mentioned, otter and marmot pelts were particularly sought, to which we may add paper. The following presentations of paper are mentioned in the period 1262-1263: 540 sheets of paper (*KS* 25. 27a-28b); 100 sheets of yellow paper and 100 sheets of white paper (*KS* 25. 24b-25a); 500 sheets of *piao* 表 paper and 1 000 sheets of *tsou* 奏 paper (*KS* 25. 29b-31a).

A variety of hunting birds were also solicited from Koryŏ including: sparrow hawks, *yao* [32] 鷂, goshawks, *ying* [33] 鷹, and peregrine falcons, *ku* [34] 鶻 (*KS* 25. 24b; *KS* 25. 31b). In 1262, Koryŏ was ordered to present hunting birds to the throne each year and this led to the establishment of a Falconry Office, *ŭngbang* [35] 鷹房. The Falconry Office was headed by an Administrator, *tsung-kuan* and was supported by the taxes of 250 households (*YS* 101. 19a) [36].

Textiles presented included varieties of chiffon, silk gauze, silk brocade, embroidered materials, damask, pongee, and ramie cloth which attest to the existence of a skilled textile industry in Koryŏ [37].

There are only two records of possible ceramic items being presented, one of which has been mentioned; the other is a record of parrot (decorated) cups presented to a Mongol field commander in 1260 (*KS* 25. 8a), The kilns which produced the famed Koryŏ celadon ware for the court were located near Kangjin in the extreme south [38], an area to which the Mongols in their invasions did not penetrate. It was however, precisely in this area that the rebellion of the Three Patrols centered. When it is also noted that the Mongols took all artisans they could capture, the general decline of the 'classical' Koryŏ celadon industry is explained [39].

Another item of interest was a Mongol levy made in 1262, which demanded 20 000 *kŭn* of brass, *hao-t'ung* 好銅. Some 612 *kŭn* were raised by a levy on officials down to the sixth grade but in a missive accompanying the brass, the Koryŏ authorities pointed out that "This product is not produced within [Our] insignificant state's Yalu River [borders]. That which we have presented, we purchased in North China" (*KS* 25. 24b-25b).

A few other items, more curiosities than anything else, like hats (*KS* 25. 27a) and scabbards (inlaid with) tortoise shell (*KS* 25. 27a) are also recorded as having been presented.

By far the strangest request made by the Mongols for a product arrived

by special messenger in the autumn of 1267. Skins, of which 17 were produced, of the *a-chi-erh ho-meng-ho* 阿吉兒合蒙古 (?*ajir-ɣamong-ɣa) which a gloss explains as "the name of a fish which resembles a cow" (sea-cow??). They were to be used to make shoes for the Emperor as it was said that they would relieve his swollen feet when he stood up (*KS* 26. 12b).

There is no mention of either demands for or presentations of ginsaeng, *insam* 人蔘, which was (and still is) highly prized by the Chinese and was often included in tribute given to Sung (e.g., *Sung-shih* 147. 17b).

The large amounts of silver given as tribute by Koryŏ are interesting when it is noted that during the preceding two centuries there had been a shortage of silver in the Muslim world resulting in a near cessation of the issuance of silver coins. Then, in 1260, vast quantities of silver suddenly reappeared [40].

It should also be mentioned that there was a brief interlude of trade. In the tenth month of 1261, the Mongol Court sent two envoys with an Imperial Edict to open monopoly markets, *chio-ch'ang* (*YKC* 10b) which has to lead to the establishment of markets on the Yalu [41]. This was apparently short-lived, for "in the first month of the third year of the reign (of Qubilai = 1262), foreign trade, *hu-shih,* was abolished. Prince Ta-cha-erh 塔察兒 (Tāčar) suggested that an iron smelter be established and this was carried out. It was suggested that foreign trade be set up but this was not allowed" (*YS* 208. 6b). The absence of such markets made a place on the tribute missions valuable and we have at least one example of two men who made large profits on such a mission, for which they were fined and exiled (*KS* 25. 33a-b).

4. *Mongol Military Colonies in Koryŏ*

The establishment of military colonies *t'un-t'ien,* one type of government land under the Yüan [42], in Koryŏ is well attested in both Yüan and Koryŏ records. And, if there is one thing upon which both agree, it is that there were no relations between the Mongols and Koryŏ during the period 1225-1231. It comes then as somewhat of a surprise to find the following passage in the 'Monograph on Food and Money' in the *Koryŏ-sa* dated the third month of 1226:

> "The princes as well as the ministers great and small and the people were all ordered to bring forth beans according to their station in order to support the Yüan military colonies with cattle feed" (*KS* 79. 22b).

The passage is, of course, erroneously dated and refers to an event which occurred after 1259 or, more probably, after 1270. A similar levy was made again in 1277 (*KS* 79. 16) and perhaps this is simply an erroneously dated duplication.

Each time military colonies were established in Koryŏ, it was to accomplish a specific task. The first military colonies were opened in the Western Capital area in the second month of 1259, for the distinct purpose of reconstructing the city and building warships (*KS* 24. 40b); in 1260 they seem to have been abolished (*KS* 26. 13b).

Military colonies were established on a somewhat broader scale in 1270. In the eleventh month of that year, the Yüan Imperial Secretariat, *chung-shu-sheng*, suggested that a Military Colony Supervisory Bureau, *t'un-t'ien ching-lüeh-ssu* 屯田經略司, be established in Koryŏ (*YKC* 22a), "Subsequently, they established military colonies in ten places [including] the capital, Tongnyŏng-pu, and Pongju 鳳州 with 2 000 men of the households under the supervision of Wang Sun and Hong Tagu as well as 2 000 men of the guard army, *wei-chün*[43] 衛軍, and 1 000 men from P'o-so-fu 婆娑府 and Hsien-p'ing-fu 咸平府. They set up a Supervisory Bureau, *ching-lüeh-ssu*, in order to manage their affairs. Each military colony had 500 soldiers" (*YS* 100. 19). The same source also gives the reason for their establishment: to prepare for the Japan expedition. Hindu 忻都 and Shih Shu 史樞 were appointed Administrators, A-la T'ieh-mu-erh 阿剌帖木兒 (Ala[q] Temür) was made Coadministrator, while the forces under *Aqai were disbanded. Hong Tagu was placed in command of the 2 000 men he and Wang Sun had raised (*YKC* 22a-b; *YS* 208. 12b). Other sources add that military colonies were also established at Kimju 金州 and Hwangju 黃州 at this time (*YS* 7. 6a; *YS* 208. 12b-13a; *KS* 27. 2b; *CHSL* 4. 41a; *TK* 11. 258; *TT* 36. 115). Earlier events confirm military colonies at the Western Capital (*KS* 24. 40b) and later events indicate that Naju 羅州 was probably another location (*KS* 27. 38b).

Koryŏ, of course, lost no time in requesting that they be abolished (*KS* 27. 7a-b) but this was not to be. In the fourth month of 1271, "Special Supervisors of Agriculture were separately sent to all the provinces to hasten the delivery of farm oxen and farming implements to Hwangju and Pongju in order to prepare for the needs of the Yüan military colonies" (*KS* 79. 8b). In the eighth month of the same year, Qurimči arrived in Koryŏ and proceeded to garrison at Happ'o (*YKC* 25a). And, in 1272, inspectors were sent out to select arable land to produce provisions for the army (*KS* 82. 37a). In this same year Koryŏ established a *chŏnham pyŏngnyang togam* 戰艦兵粮都監 or Supervisory Bureau [for the Construction of] Warships [and the Provision of] Army Supplies (*KS* 77. 27a).

As the military colonies began their preparations for the Japan campaign, military operations against the Three Patrols then on Chin Island also required support. Some five to six thousand cattle were sent from the Pongju

military colony to the Yüan-Koryŏ forces which numbered 6 000 men and 18 000 horses (*TT* 31. 118; *CHSL* 4. 42a). The large number of horses proved difficult to feed and frequent complaints that the horses were starving (*TT* 36. 115; *TT* 36. 118) led the Yüan to send an envoy to order more diligence in agriculture and sericulture in order to provide provisions for the army. Hong Tagu was ordered to supervise agricultural affairs (*KS* 79. 8b).

These were the military colonies which supported the T'amna campaign which ended the rebellion of the Three Patrols in 1273, and which supported the first Japan campaign the next year. They were apparently abolished in 1274, when the attack on Japan was made; following the failure of the expedition they were evidently not revived.

5. *Ship Construction*

Ship construction in Koryŏ was originally intended for use against the Southern Sung. The first reference to actual ship construction is in 1259 when military colonies were established at the Western Capital charged with the dual task of reconstructing the city and building warships (*KS* 24. 40b) [44]. In 1268, an edict was issued instructing Wŏnjong to prepare ships and foodstuffs to be used for the campaign against the Southern Sung [45]. Then, after the missions to Japan repeatedly returned empty-handed, thought was given to using them to enforce Mongol demands on Japan (cf. *KS* 26. 18a1-15).

The original demand was for Koryŏ to prepare 1 000 ships of 3 to 4 000 bushel (*sŏk*) capacity capable of crossing a great sea (*YKC* 13b-15a; *YS* 208. 8b-9a). Koryŏ had reported that she was building 1 000 ships and raising an army of 10 000 men and the Mongols dispatched Toqto'a, T'o-to-erh, to inspect the army and supervise the construction of warships (*YS* 208. 9a)). Reaching Koryŏ, he made journeys to inspect Hŭksan Island 黑山島, the departure point for the China trade, and the Japan route — the latter probably referring to the Kimju area (*YKC* 15a-16a). Hŭksan Island had since ancient times been a way-station for vessels going to China and a hostel and Buddhist temple were maintained there for travellers, many of them members of the Buddhist clergy, going to China. Sung ships sailing from Ming-chou 明州 could reach Hŭksan Island in five days with a favorable wind; from Hŭksan Island they would proceed past the many coastal islands to Yesŏng River which wound past the Koryŏ capital at Kaegyŏng (see *Sung-shih* 487). The possibility of using T'amna as a departure point against either Japan or the Southern Sung was first raised in the first month of 1269, and Toqto'a was sent back to inspect T'amna (*YKC* 15a-b; *YS* 208. 9b) [46].

The rebellion of the Three Patrols who seized T'amna Island interrupted this plan temporarily and evidently Qubilai intended to go ahead with the Japan

invasion after chasing the rebels from Chin Island to their final stronghold on T'amna. This must have caused some concern, for we find the ministers of both the Yüan Imperial Secretariat and the Bureau of Military Affairs suggesting that T'amna be taken first and then the Japan campaign looked into (*YS* 208. 19b).

This same rebellion aids in detecting sites where ships were being assembled. Since the same ships were to be used for the T'amna campaign against the rebels, the latter naturally raided these sites and burnt the ships. While ships and stores were being accumulated in Kimju as early as the winter of 1270 (*YKC* 24a), raids on the shipyards did not commence until the period 1272-1273. A report sent to the Yüan Court at this time mentions 20 ships destroyed, 12 men killed, and 8 200 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice captured (*KS* 27. 31b) Subsequent rebel raids in 1272-1273 included:

Location	Ships Destroyed	Source
Taep'o	?	*KS* 27. 29b
Haenyŏng-kun	4	*KS* 27. 34b
Koran Island	6	*KS* 27. 34b
Happ'o	20	*KS* 27. 35a
Kŏje-hyŏn	3	*KS* 27. 35a-b
Happ'o	32	*KS* 27. 36b

To the shipbuilders woes were added natural disasters. A storm sunk 20 ships of Sŏhae Province and 27 ships of Kyŏngsang Province being rendezvoused for the T'amna campaign in 1273 (*KS* 27. 38b). The Japanese, who were then actively engaged in voyages to the Southern Sung, described the ships used by the first Mongol envoys to Japan as 'large ships' [47], and perhaps their size led to faulty construction. An indication of this is seen when, in 1273, the daruɣači Li I imprisoned Circuit Inspector U Ch'ŏnsŏk 禹天錫 because many of the Sŏhae Province warships sunk (*KS* 27. 37b). During 1272-1273 there was a loss of 132 ships, 85 due to the raids of the Three Patrols and 47 sunk by storms. For the T'amna campaign in 1273, the Yüan-Koryŏ forces were to use 160 ships from Chŏlla Province (*KS* 27. 39a).

With the rebellion in Koryŏ subdued, the invasion of Japan could begin. Probably the most reliable estimate of the ships involved in the Japan expeditions is that of Ikeuchi Hiroshi [48] who estimates 770 ships for the first invasion. Although these were constructed under the control of the Supervisory Bureau [for the Construction of] Warships [and the Provision of] Army Supplies established in 1272 (*KS* 77. 27a), preparations for the second invasion of Japan which was launched in 1281, were under the control of the Mobile Bureau for the Subjugation of Japan. Undoubtedly the construction sites for the estimated 900 ships constructed in Koryŏ were the same [49].

The disastrous failure of the two Japan expeditions did not deter the Mongol Emperor who planned a third invasion. The former pirates Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan were to transport one million piculs of rice to Happ'o by the spring of 1286 to support the invasion scheduled for September of that year. The third invasion of Japan was cancelled when the invasion of Annam was undertaken [50]. Following a request by King Ch'ungnyŏl, the special bureaus for ship construction were abolished in 1295 (*KSC* 21. 36a) although the idea of conquering Japan lingered on as is evidenced by the repeated re-establishment of the Bureau for the Conquest of Japan.

6. *Post-Stations*

At the beginning of the Mongol invasions Koryŏ had a well-established network of post-stations. A total of 525 stations were divided into 22 *to* 道 or lines, the administration of which was under the Board of War (*KS* 82). The extent to which this system survived the invasions is unknown but some suggestion of their state is seen in a Mongol order of the 8th month of 1259, which ordered Koryŏ to establish fully equipped and manned relay stations south of the Western Capital; the relay stations to the north of the Western Capital (presumably established by the Mongols) were to be used jointly (*KS* 25. 3a). In 1272, officials were sent to each province to check the post-stations (*KS* 82. 18a) and the following year levies of horses for the post-stations were made on all Koryŏ officials (*KS* 82. 18a). In 1279, a sweeping change in the Koryŏ system remodelled it on the Yüan system in which groups of households were made responsible for the support of the post-stations and drawn on to man the stations for periods of five years (*KS* 82. 18b-19b). Apparently it was not until the next year that the stations were operative (*YSCSPM* 3. 12). To what extent this system was modified or changed thereafter is unknown.

I believe we may assume that the horses from the various pasturages were used for the postal system. Koryŏ herself had long had a system of pasturages (*KS* 82. 24a-27a) and under the Yüan, T'amna Island became the most important pasturage. Levies of horses seem to have been chiefly for the army (cf. *KS* 82. 26a; *KS* 88. 27) rather than for the post-stations.

In brief, the Mongols had Koryŏ refurbish the existing network of post-stations which were then incorporated into the Yüan network with provisions for their support along Yüan lines [50a].

7. *Military Support*

In spite of the repeated Mongol demands that Koryŏ render military assistance, it is clear that not until 1270, that is, until after the restoration of Wŏnjong, was the support demanded forthcoming. From this point Koryŏ-Yüan

military operations flow together and Koryŏ furnished both men and supplies freely. The two Japan campaigns and the suppression of the revolt of Prince Nayan are examples of this cooperation. At the same time, Mongol forces were largely responsible for the suppression of the rebellion of the Three Patrols and supplied both troops and supplies to that end. Ship construction and supplies for the military colonies have been treated separately and will not be duplicated here. The actual assistance rendered is perhaps best illustrated with a few examples.

In late 1270, levies were made on members of the royal household and the officials for silk and pongee in order to supply army clothing (*KS* 79. 23b) and, a month later, levies of rice for army provisions were made (*KS* 82. 37a). Early the following year, 1 000 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice, 500 bushels of other grains, and 100 bushels of salt were supplied to the Mongol forces at the Western Capital from the Sŏk Island Granary 席島倉 . At this same time, there were demands from the Mongol forces in the Western Capital for summer clothing and tents (*KS* 26. 32a-b). Upon his return from the Yüan Court in 1270, Wŏnjong ordered 10 000 bushels of rice be transported by ship from the Sinhŭng Granary in order to supply the Mongolian army with provisions (*KS* 26. 33a-b). In 1277, there was a general levy of rice on everyone from Ministers to the common people for provisions for Hong Tagu's army (*KS* 82. 37b) and the following year the tax rice of Sŏhae Province for the preceding year was also used for this purpose (*KS* 82. 37b).

In 1272, a famine in Koryŏ resulted in 20 000 bushels (*sŏk*) of rice being shipped in from Tung-ching as a relief measure (*YS* 7. 17b). Some years later, in 1289, Koryŏ reciprocated by supplying 100 000 bushels of rice to relieve a famine in Liaotung (*KS* 79. 25b). Then, three years later, 100 000 bushels of rice were again sent into Koryŏ to relieve the famine there (*YSCSPM* 3. 13).

For their joint military undertakings during this period, Koryŏ raised 6 000 men for the Chin Island assault (*YKC* 24a), seamen for the T'amna campaign (*TT* 36. 116), an estimated 5 000 men for the first Japan expedition; and 10 000 men for the second Japan invasion.

These few examples, I believe, make the point; after 1270, the Yüan authorities were able to freely levy supplies and men from Koryŏ in the same manner as any other area under their control, with the assurance that every effort would be expended to meet the demands.

8. *Hostages*

The Mongol demands for hostages from Koryŏ reflect an ancient practice in North Asia. In China, "A fourth century tradition dates the institution as

far back as the Warring States" [51]. The institution of hostages in China is well-known and needs no further elaboration here, except perhaps to point out that its guiding principle was to hold the closest male descendant(s) of the monarch or chieftain (external hostages) or provincial overlord (internal hostages) as pledges for their conduct. The system was well-known to Korea who had sent hostages to T'ang in Silla times and who in the Koryŏ period had also maintained a system of internal hostages called *kiin* [52] 其人.

While the Mongols had followed the practice of requiring hostages since the days of Činggis, their demands for hostages also had distinctions of their own apart from the traditionally stated Chinese practices. The essence of these distinctions were that they made a stated formal institution of an ancient, unwritten practice in North Asia. The hostage institution of the Mongols may be seen to incorporate and blend Chinese influence on the one hand and Muslim influence on the other [53] with other distinctions which were either their own or which they shared with the other nomadic peoples of Central and North Asia. The contrasts reflect the differences of sedentary and nomadic societies.

When the Mongols captured a city they regarded everything and everyone in it as their absolute chattels, an idea which appears to be closer associated with the Muslim East than with China [54]. When they conquered a nation, the same principle applied.

On the Mongol side, the demands for hostages from Koryŏ fall into the following categories:

I. Non-service hostages
   a. Royal male relatives
   b. Relatives of high officials
II. Service hostages
   a. Male hostages utilized in the Mongol Military and Administrative system
   b. Women
   c. Male and female children
   d. Artisans

The latter three types of hostages were equivalent to the provision of slaves although they were usually not taken from the slave strata of Koryŏ society.

On the Koryŏ side we can make the distinction of 'voluntary' hostages or those Koryŏ produced, and 'involuntary' hostages or those whom the Mongols captured. By this it can be seen that the distinctions between hostage and captive are not simply blurred but rather blend together because, as pointed out previously, captured or conquered peoples were regarded as absolute chattels.

If a distinction can be made at all here, we could perhaps say that those

listed under I were 'true' hostages, while those listed under II were 'hostages' as a result of being captured or of being given in the manner of a levy. Thus, I have classified those under I as non-service hostages since their main function was to act as a pledge for the conduct of others; the performance of service was the function of the second group.

I. Non-Service Hostages

In addition to goods demanded as compensation for the slaying of the Mongol envoy Chu-ku-yü in the 12th month of 1231, the Mongols demanded 1 000 young male relatives of the royal family, 1 000 young male relatives of the families of the high officials, and 1 000 young female relatives of the above families, to be presented to the Emperor (*KS* 23. 5a-7b).

The Koryŏ response to these demands was negative and a Koryŏ delegation sent to the Mongol camp conveyed a letter in which they said that they could not supply the young boys or the young girls requested; nor could they supply the artisans or the seamstresses the Mongols had demanded (*KS* 23. 12a; *TYSC* 28. 7b-9a). The first non-service hostages were produced by Koryŏ in 1241 when Sun, the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng and 10 others were sent to the Mongol Court as hostages (*KS* 23. 35a-b; *YS* 120. 15a). Then, in early 1259, Wang Chŏn, the Crown Prince, was sent to the Mongol Court as a hostage (*KS* 24. 41b-42b) [55]. In 1271, the Heir Apparent, Wang Sim and 18 members of the royal family were sent to the Yüan Court as hostages (*YS* 208; *IC* 9A13a). In mid-1275, a system was instituted to encourage the sons of high officials to come forward as hostages. Those selected as hostages were promoted three grades in rank. This apparently had results for six months later Wang Ching 王澈, Duke of Taebang 帶方公, escorted the sons of 10 high officials, recruited in this manner to the Yüan Court as hostages. They were declared unacceptable by the Yüan and they sent the group back in the third month of the following year; probably because of their age — some were not yet twenty [56]. In early 1277, Wang Ching, again escorted 25 sons of high officials who had also been recruited by offering promotions, to the Yüan Court as hostages (*KSC* 20. 19b). Then, in 1283, Wang Ching himself was sent to the Yüan Court as a hostage (*KS* 29. 47b). Thereafter, there are few records of hostages of this type being sent [57]. Hostages were apparently no longer required by the Yüan due to the joining of the royal families in marriage, which meant that they would be holding their own relatives as hostages. The large number of Mongol forces and officials in Koryŏ, and the fact that they could and did, force Korean rulers off the throne and into exile [58] were also reasons why the hostage requirements of this category were dropped.

II. Service Hostages

Involuntary hostages or captives taken by the Mongols were kept as

slaves, utilized in the Mongol military-administration [59], and formed into hostage-armies [60]. Artisans, women and children were usually taken captive upon the fall of a city while the rest of the population was quite often slaughtered [61]. In the city of Yangsan 梁山城 which fell after a fierce Mongol attack using catapults and fire-arrows, all males over the age of ten years were killed. The women and children were then divided among the soldiers. Some 4 700 are related to have died in the city (*KS* 101. 23b-24a). After capturing the mountain citadel of refuge of Tongju 東州, the Mongols killed all the officials and took all women and young boys away as captives (*KS* 101. 24a). The number of prisoners taken by the Mongols at the end of 1254 was estimated at 206 800 persons (*KS* 24. 20a-b). This often resulted in some horrible incidents. At the time of the fall of a stronghold in Tanch'ang-hyŏn 端昌縣, the Koryŏ officials in charge put all the women and children in the government storehouse which they burnt and then killed themselves to evade capture. It is interesting to note that not until 1273 were Mongol soldiers in Koryŏ ordered to stop taking girls of 'free' families as slaves (*KS* 27. 37a).

The Yüan demands for artisans and women to do embroidery work dates to 1232, but the Koryŏ response to such demands, especially in the presentation of women to the Yüan throne, did not begin until 1275. In that year, 10 maidens were presented to the throne and this practice continued until 1353 or the second year of the reign of King Kongmin (r. 1352-1374).

These girls probably gave rise to the legend of the beautiful Qulan, Korean bride of Činggis, who rode with him into battle.

The story appears in the 17th century work, found in 1926, known as the *Altan tobci* of bLo-bzan bstan'jin and has been translated by Bawden; the pertinent passage opens with the remark that Činggis gave his daughter Altanɣurɣultai to Arin, the King of Koryŏ and continues that "When the Holy Lord (Činggis) went making an expedition against the country of Solongɣud (Korea) ... Buɣa Caɣan Qaɣan of the Solongɣud furtively offered his own daughter, by name Qulan, and brought her by boat ..., with tiger(skin) houses" [62]. Činggis is said to have remained in Korea three years. Then it is related when Činggis went on a campaign against the Muslims, he took Qulan on the campaign [63].

Like most legends of its type it combines truth with half-truth and fiction. Činggis had a wife named Qulan 忽蘭 (cf. *YS* 106. 1b) who was renowned for her beauty. There is, however, little doubt that she was of the Merkit, namely, the daughter of Dayir-Üsün, the ruler of the Uhaz-Merkit [64]. The identification of Qulan with Korea undoubtedly stems in large part from the intermarriage between the Yüan and Koryŏ royal families and from the Koryŏ tribute girls. As far as is known, Činggis himself never set foot in Korea, never gave any of his daughters to a Korean ruler, nor were any of his Empresses Korean.

Certainly no legend was the daughter of Ki Chao 奇子敖 by far the most important of all the girls sent to the imperial harem. She entered the harem of Emperor Shun 順帝 (r. 1333-1368), the last emperor of the Yüan, and in 1341 became his second Empress. Her family in Koryŏ naturally benefited from her position. Her brother Ki Ch'ŏl 奇轍 (d. 1356; *BTKP* 52. 491) became, almost over-night, a real power in the land and leader of the strong pro-Mongol faction which included men like Kwŏn Kyŏm 權謙 (d. 1356; *BTKP* 77. 731) and No Ch'aek 盧頙 (d. 1356; *BTKP* 86. 806) who also had daughters in the imperial harem. Empress Ki soon attempted to have the Emperor replace the Koryŏ ruler King Kongmin with one of her relatives. In the ensuing revolt led by the King against the Yüan in 1356, Ki Ch'ŏl, Kwŏn Kyŏm, and No Ch'aek were killed [65]. A Mongol force of 10 000 sent to put down the revolt was practically annihilated; only seventeen escaped [66]. This marked the beginning of the end of Mongol power in Koryŏ.

Notes to Part II

1. *Yasa* meaning 'ordinance' or 'law', from the Persian or Turkish (Mo. *jasaq*), began with recordings by scribes of the instructions of Činggis who, as is well known, was himself illiterate. Vernadsky suggests that these instructions were probably codified at the Quriltai of 1206, with a revision completed in 1225, and he says (p. 338) that "There can ... be no doubt that the *Yasa* as a written document actually existed". Cf. Vernadsky, 'The Scope and Contents ...', p. 338. This conclusion was also reached by Riasanovsky who would place publication around 1218, Riasanovsky, V.A. *Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law,* Tientsin, 1937, p. 199.
Vernadsky op. cit., p. 360, maintains that "... the *Yasa* seems to have had as its main objective not to codify customary law but to supplement it in accordance with the needs of the empire superimposed on the former tribal state." This, however, is in direct contrast to the views of Riasanovsky who holds the traditional legal position that law is an outgrowth of custom and that the *Yasa* is merely Mongolian customary law which was codified and which applied only to the Mongols and other nomadic peoples under their control but not to sedentary societies like Russia or China which were of a different and higher cultural level. Riasanovsky has defined his limits quite narrowly, i.e., the law of Mongolia, although he has a good point. Yet he appears to be grinding an axe, viz., that Mongol influence on Russian law *and other* features of Russian life was negligible. Vernadsky has taken a somewhat broader view and in referring to the *Yasa* here I refer to the interpretation of Vernadsky. Under Riasanovsky's interpretation the instructions for surrendering states would not be included in either the *Yasa* of Činggis nor in his *bilig* or 'maxims' but would be merely supplementary edicts.
Perhaps the standardization of the instructions for surrendering states which I believe were incorporated in the *Yasa* was influenced by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai 耶律楚材, principal adviser to Činggis and later to his son Ögödei, since he played a primary role in the moulding of Mongol administration.
2. The pertinent *YKC* 13a-b passage has been translated by Lien-sheng Yang, 'Hostages in Chinese History'; this passage is also found in *YS* 208. 8a-b where daruγači is rendered *chang-kuan* 長官.
3. For some Mongol methods of extracting wealth from conquered nations also see Schurmann, *Economic Structure* ..., op. cit., and Barthold, *Turkestan* ..., op. cit., passim.
4. See Hambis, 'Le chapitre ...', pp. 43-45; 150-151. According to *YSHP* 16.

1A-B the appanage of Temüge-otčigin was by the Kerulen River and he held the title of Liao-wang 遼王. Yanai, *Yüan-Tai* ..., p. 70, would place the appanage of Temüge-otčigin east of Hsing-an-ling 興安嶺. Marco Polo related that Prince Nayan held the territories of Manchuria, Koryŏ, Barscal, and Sinkintinju. Palladius earlier expressed the view that Polo's reference may have been to the Koryŏ northwest, i.e., Tongnyŏng-pu, but that even that was doubtful. See Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, pp. 343 and 387.

5. A similar remark is often attributed to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, but originates with Lu Chia 陸賈 (3-2c. BC), cf. *Shih-chi* 史記 97. 7b, see p. 6 and note 74, D.R. Jonker, unpublished doctoraal scriptie, *Het leven van Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai*, Sinological Institute, Leiden.
6. These are the praecursores of Pian de Carpine who says of them, "... (they) take nothing with them save their felts, horses, and weapons. They plunder nothing, burn no houses, kill no animals; they wound people, kill them or at least drive them to flight, but they do the first far more willingly than the last." See W. Barthold, *Turkestan* ..., p. 423.
7. Koreans often referred to the *hsing-ying* 行營 in notations on official correspondence as the military headquarters, *mo-hsia* 幕下 (*TYSC* 28. 1) or *mo-fu* 幕府 (*TYSC* 28. 7a).
8. See H.F. Schurmann, 'Mongolian Tributary Practices of the 13th Century', *HJAS* 19 (1956) 3 & 4, pp. 306-307, for a description of this practice in China.
9. It is interesting to note that this was precisely the area that General Cho Wiyong offered to submit to the Chin a century earlier. See *Chin-shih* 7. 7b. The mountain ranges of Korea have long provided natural geographic boundaries and the selection of Chabi Pass as the southern boundary of Tongnyŏng-pu is an example of this. For discussion of the physical basis for the internal boundaries of Korean provinces which clarifies this point, see S. McCune, 'Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries', *FEQ* 4 (1946) 3, pp. 272-288.

9a. See Tsuda Sōkichi, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 194.

10. The sources for this map included *Nihon chiri taikei*, p. 398.
11. An excellent study of this exists in L. Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire ...', pp. 151-294, esp. pp. 178 ff. Hambis has reconstructed the names of all the Mongolian Princesses involved and his study carries a detailed genealogical chart showing the Yüan-Koryŏ marriages, i.e., those of the royal families.
12. According to *Nihon chiri taikei*, p. 399, a Mobile Bureau was established in Koryŏ at this time and the chief of this Mobile Bureau was T'ou-nien-ke.

This appears to be in error. In 1270.2, T'ou-nien-ke was ordered to escort Wŏnjong back to Koryŏ and to garrison at the Western Capital (*YKC* 21a-b) and a few months later in 1270.11 he was appointed head of the Mobile Bureau (*YKC* 22b). The Mobile Bureau referred to is the Liao-yang Mobile Bureau.

13. The basis for this chart was Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Kōrai ni chūzai shita Gen no tatsurokaseki ni tsuite 高麗に駐在した元の達魯花赤について [Concerning the Yüan Daruγači Stationed in Koryŏ], *TG* 18 (1929) 1, pp. 277-283, to which I have added supplemental information.
14. To[q]to'a was appointed in 1270.2.16, arrived in Koryŏ in 1270.5, and died in 1271.10 (*YKC* 25; *KS* 27. 23a-24b). A descendant of Temüge-otčigin had a similar name.
15. Chiao returned to the Yüan court in 1273 (*YKC* 26b) and his post remained vacant until the arrival of Chou Shih-ch'ang in the twelfth month of 1273.
16. Cf. Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Gen Seiso to Tanra 元世祖と耽羅 [Yüan Shih-tsu and T'amna Island], *TG* 16 (1926), pp. 136-142. Ikeuchi is convinced that the original reference to the establishment of a daruγači command on T'amna was not carried out until later and that initially it existed as a *wan-hu-fu* since no daruγači was appointed until 1275.
17. The Mongols were not, in this respect, setting a precedent so much as following one. Cheju, i.e., the *chu*-administration on T'amna had presented horses as regional tribute for years (*CHSL* 4. 35a). The island was not used for the raising of horses alone but also for camels, mules, and sheep. Cf. Yi Tŏkpong 李德鳳, Han'guk saengmurhak ŭi sajŏk koch'al 韓國生物學의史的考察 ["Biology in the Koryeo Dynasty"], *AY* 2 (1959) 2, pp. 65-105. For the Yüan utilization of T'amna as a pasturage see *Ta-Yüan ma-cheng* 大元馬政 incorporated in *K'uang-ts'ang-hsüeh-chün ts'ung-shu*, Ts'ang-sheng-ming-chih ta-hsüeh-ch'ün ts'ung-shu edition.
18. See Ikeuchi, 'Yüan Shih-tsu ...', p. 141. Upon the accession of Emperor Ch'eng-tsung in 1294, King Ch'ungnyŏl went to the Mongol Court for the ceremony and at that time requested the return of T'amna and the release of Koryŏ captives held by the Yüan and it was granted. *KSC* 21. 36.
19. Cf. Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, p. 654 ff.

19a See Cho Chwaho 曹佐鎬, Yŏdae ŭi kwagŏ chedo, *YH* 10 (1958) p. 143

20. Cf. Jung-Pang Lo, 'The Controversy over Grain Conveyance ...', p. 282.
21. See Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Kōrai ni okeru Gen no kōshō 高麗に於ける元の行省 [Yüan Mobile Bureaus in Koryŏ], *TG* 20 (1932-33), pp. 301-350.
22. See H. Okada 岡田英弘, Gen no Shinō to Ryoyō Kōshō 元の

瀋王と遼陽行省 [The *Shen-wang* of the Yüan and the Liaoyang Mobile Bureau], *CG* 14 (1959).

23. For the Mobile Bureau see Ch. V, note 46. The position of the Tung-ching Mobile Bureau and its relation to Korea is clarified by the study of the Mobile Bureaus and their officials by Wu T'ing-hsieh 吳廷燮 *Yüan hsing-sheng ch'eng-hsiang p'ing-chang cheng-shih nien-piao* 元行省丞相平章政事年表, incorporated in Vol. 6, pp. 8253-8295 of the *Erh-shih-wu-shih pu-p'ien*. Also see *HYS* 32-33. Ko Pyŏngik, in his excellent and detailed study, Yŏdae chŏngdong haengsŏng ŭi yŏn'gu 麗代征東行省의研究, Part I in *YH* 14 and Part II in *YH* 19, points out that the higher positions in this bureau were usually Mongols or Chinese appointed by the Yüan, while Koreans were given the lower ranking positions.

23a Hong Kunsang was also in charge of Koreans digging a canal at T'ung-chou 通州. See *YS* 154.

24. Groomwell (*Lithospermum officinale*), a plant yielding a purple dye, cf. Schafer and Wallacker, op. cit., p. 221.

25. *hung-hua* 紅花. Both safflower (*Carthamus tinctorius*) and saffron (*Crocus sativus*) were styled *hung-hua* 紅花, cf. B. Laufer, *Sino-Iranica*, 1919, p. 310, nevertheless, both Laufer, p. 324 note 4 and Schafer and Wallacker op. cit., p. 218, render it as safflower. It is used in cosmetics and dyeing. Also see *ts'ao-mu* 草木 3. 22b of the *San-ts'ai t'u-hui* 三才圖會.

26. *Lan* is identified by Laufer, op. cit., p. 325 as *Indigofera*.

27. Orpiment or sulphate of arsenic (As_2S_3), a pigment widely used in decoration and in medicine. Cf. Schafer, Edward H., 'Orpiment and Realgar in Chinese Technology and Tradition', *JAOS* 75 (1955), p. 75.

28. *ch'i* 榛 (more commonly written *ch'i* 漆), identified by Schafer and Wallacker, op. cit., p. 220 as from *Rhus vernicifera*. I am uncertain of the implication of *kuang* 光 which could seem to mean clear lacquer or bright/sparkling lacquer.

29. See H.D. Martin, op. cit., p. 217. It is generally said that cotton was not grown in Korea until cotton seeds were secretly brought back from the Yüan by Mun Ikchŏm 文益漸 in 1363. Hong Wŏn 洪願 who returned from India at this time was familiar with methods of cultivation and usage and within a decade cultivation had spread throughout the peninsula, Cf. *Han'guk-sa sajŏn*, pp. 117-118. P. Pelliot, *Notes to Marco Polo*, p. 456, says "... it seems highly doubtful that ... cotton cloth should have been generally used in Corea and Japan in the first quarter of the 13th century."

30. These were met on the Koryŏ side by a levy. In the 12th month of 1231,

"[They] ordered all the officials to bring forth clothing, *i* 衣, according to their station in order to support the national gifts. Each [to produce] one suit, *yŏng* 領, [as follows]: princes and ministers rolled silk brocade and silk damask clothing of 2 colors; the third rank and fourth rank, silk damask clothing of 2 colors; the fifth rank and the sixth and seventh ranks, *kwŏnsam* (~ *kwŏnch'am*) 權參 greenish-black bombycine, *t'i-ch'ou* 綈紬." (*KS* 79. 22b).

31. There is some difficulty in differentiating between tribute and gifts to the Mongol field commanders due to the vague wording which merely says that envoys were sent 'to the Mongols', *ju meng-ku* 如蒙古 . This means that the movement of the envoys must be checked to see whether they actually went to the Mongol court (directly or via the camp of the commanders in the field) or whether they went only to the local commander. The various subtleties are too lengthy to pursue here; suffice it to say that I have verified the following tribute missions to the Mongol court in addition to those already listed. Enumeration of products is not given: 1239, 12th month (*YKC* 6b6-7); 1240, 3rd month (*YKC* 6b7-8); 1240, 12th month (*YKC* 8a3-4); 1243, 1st month (*KS* 23. 36a); 1255, 1st month (*KS* 24. 20b); 1260, 4th month (*KS* 25. 12b); 1262, 4th month (*KS* 25. 23b); 1265, 1st month (*KS* 26. 6a-b). As mentioned in the text, during the period 1264-1294, Koryŏ presented tribute 36 times.
32. *yao* 鷂 identified as a sparrowhawk (*Accipiter nisus/A. virgatus*) by Schafer and Wallacker, op. cit., p. 226.
33. *ying* 鷹 identified as a goshawk by E.H.Schafer, 'Falconry in T'ang Times', TP XLVI (1958) pp. 291-338.
34. *ku* 鵠 identified by Schafer and Wallacker, op. cit., p. 244 as *Falco peregrinus*.
35. See S.Naitō, *Chōsen-shi kenkyū*, pp. 308-333, for a lengthy study of the Falconry Office in the Koryŏ period.
36. The text has [illegible], lit. 'seized the households' which I understand as meaning 'seized (the taxes of) the households'.
37. Some localities known to have been producing textiles which they presented as regional tribute during this period were Ch'ŏngju which produced snowy silk quilting [illegible]; Andong 安東 which produced silk thread (?) [illegible]; Tongsan-pu [illegible] which produced yellow hempen cloth [illegible]; and Haeyang [illegible] which produced white ramie [illegible] (*KSC* 16. 39b). I find the term [illegible] a bit strange and I am uncertain of the meaning; perhaps *chinsa* [illegible], a type of 'summer silk'?
38. See G.St.G.M.Gompertz, 'A Royal Pavillion Roofed with Celadon Tiles',

Oriental Art, New Series, 3 (1957), pp. 104-106. Other kilns were located in Tanjŏn-ni in Chŏlla Province, near Mokp'o, and on Kanghwa Island. See E. McCune, *The Arts of Korea*, Tōkyō, 1962, p. 175.

39. G.St.G.M. Gompertz, 'Korean Art', *Oriental Art*, New Series 7 (1961) 1, pp. 13-22, 7 (1961) 3, pp. 119-125 remarks in the latter, pp. 120-121, that the Koryŏ celadon industry was ruined in the Mongol period. The Koryŏ ceramics industry revived however and Gompertz notes a "sudden popularity of celadons painted with designs ... which reached its height during the reign of Gensō (AD 1260-1274) and Chūretsu (AD 1275-1308) and continued thereafter into the early Yi period." By 'celadon' in the latter case, the green 'classical' Koryŏ celadon is *not* meant; Gensō = Wŏnjong, and Chūretsu = Ch'ungnyŏl Wang. See G.St.G.M. Gompertz, 'Black Koryŏ Ware', *Oriental Arts*, New Series 3 (1957) 2, pp. 61-66. Also see E. McCune, op. cit., p. 182; G. Henderson's valuable articles on Koryŏ celadon are unavailable to me.
40. See R.P. Blake, 'The Circulation of Silver in the Moslem East Down to the Mongol Epoch', *HJAS* 2 (1937), pp. 291-328. Kokchu 谷州 and Sudŏk 樹德 in Sŏhae Province were producing silver at this time. Cf. *KSC* 16. 35a.
41. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 223. Markets on the Yalu did not begin with the Yüan but were a relatively old establishment. Chŏng Yagyong, *Chŏng Tasan chŏn-chip, chip* 1, *kwŏn* 15. 9a-b, has also noticed this in his résumé of Korean trade relations and mentions that the markets were to be set up on the west bank of the Yalu River.
42. Cf. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 29. Koryŏ had, of course, used the system herself, chiefly to provide troop provisions and to transport grain to government granaries. Cf. *KS* 82. 36b-43b.
43. The *wei-chün* or guard-army might possibly refer to a hostage army commonly called *turγaγ-chün* 軍. In Mongolian *turγaγ* means 'guards'. Yet they probably refer to the 2 000 troops under Möngketü which had been stationed in the Koryŏ Western Capital in 1270.
44. In a Koryŏ missive sent to the Mongols in 1232, the Koreans gave as one reason for their transfer of the capital to Kanghwa Island that they were informed that a Mongol envoy had arrived at Ŭiju and ordered the construction of 1 000 large ships (*KS* 23). Perhaps the Mongols had realized the possibility of using Koryŏ as a departure point against the Sung at that time; it is also possible that in this way the Koreans themselves stimulated the idea. At any rate, Qubilai's first thoughts of Japan were due to the Korean Cho I who, in 1261, stirred his interest in Japan (*YS* 208. 20b).
45. Cf. *HTC* II 67.2.18-19. Although we arrived at the conclusion indepen-

dently, Lo was the first to note this and cites (p. 490 note 5) *YS* 6. 11 and *YS* 167. 9. According to Lo's calculations (p. 491), in 1237, the navy of the Southern Sung was composed of 20 squadrons with a total complement of 52 000 men based principally at Hsü-p'u 許浦 guarding the entrance to the Yangtze, and in the Chusan Island group protecting the capital at Hang-chou. See Jung-Pang Lo, 'The Emergence of China as a Sea Power During the Late Sung and Early Yüan Periods', *FEQ* 14 (1954) 1, pp. 489-503. Ikeuchi, *Genkō* ..., p. 46, points out that the Mongols wanted ships to attack Hsiang-yang-ch'eng 襄陽城 and that Mongol forces were facing Sung forces along the Han River. Liu Cheng 劉整 had submitted a plan for attacking the Sung in 1267.11. The five *lu* ('province') administrations of Shen-hsi and the Szu-ch'uan Mobile Bureau were ordered to build 500 ships to be given to Liu. The attack failed and Liu returned with plans to build 5 000 ships. In 1270.3 an attack by water was again contemplated. For Liu's activities see his *YS* 161 biography; also see Ikeuchi, loc. cit.

46. Ikeuchi, 'Yüan Shih-tsu and T'amna Island', believes that duplication is involved here and that T'o-to-erh made only the one trip in 1269. Ikeuchi's point is that it is improbable that the same person made essentially the same trip in such a short period of time. But I am not so sure, therefore I am leaving it as it is.

47. Cf. 2.946, *Azuma kagami* (Vol. 4, p. 946). The short passage, which simply states that Mongol and Korean envoys arrived in three large ships, is dated the fifth month of the sixth year of Bunei 文永 (= 1266). At this time, the Western Capital was the only place where ships are known to be under construction. The Western Capital was located on the Taedong River 大同江 and supervised both the military colonies later established at Hwangju and the ship construction in Sŏhae Province whence came the ill-fated ships whose sinking led to the imprisonment of Circuit Inspector U. Qubilai's order to build ships of 3 to 4 thousand bushel (*sŏk*) capacity may have led to the construction of ships which were larger than usual and possibly, as a result, technically of inferior construction. The size of the early Ming ships has been estimated at 500 tons. Cf. Jung-Pang Lo, op. cit., p. 493 note 18. Undoubtedly with all the shipbuilding done in the reign of Qubilai, techniques improved but the program of large transports was only begun in Korea at this time and the loss of two large groups of ships in storms plus the imprisoning of the Circuit Inspector leads me to suspect faulty construction.

48. Cf. Ikeuchi Hiroshi, *Genkō* ..., p. 127. Sansom estimates the involvement of 7 000 Korean seamen, 8 000 Korean troops, 300 large vessels and 3 to

4 hundred small craft, for the first invasion. See G.Sansom, *A History of Japan to* 1334 (vol. 1 of a 2 vol. history of Japan), London, 1958, p. 442. Jung-Pang Lo, op. cit., p. 493, note 17, remarks that of the ships for the Japan invasions, 1/3 were large transport ships, 1/3 were combat vessels and landing-craft, while 1/3 were tenders. Lo cites Takeuchi Eiki 竹内榮喜, *Genkō no kenkyū*, Tōkyō, 1931, pp. 30 and 129. Lo also mentions that while the Mongols became a seapower by taking over the navies of Korea and the Southern Sung, they also embarked on a large shipbuilding program of their own for their invasions of Japan (1274 & 1281), Champa and Tongking (1283-1288), and Java (1293), ordering 1 500 ships in 1279, 3 000 in 1281, and 4 000 in 1283 to be built in shipyards from Canton to Korea with lumber from T'amna and Jehol while captured Sung naval officers were assigned to the shipyards in both China and Korea. Cf. Lo, op. cit., pp. 492-493.

49. Although the two Mongol invasions of Japan are detailed in other works and need not be repeated here, perhaps mention should be made of the Korean force involved. For the first invasion, Ikeuchi, *Genkō* ..., p. 126-127, estimates the Mongol-Chinese forces to have numbered about 20 000 (the Korean records say 25 000) and the Korean force at about 5 300 (the Korean records say 8 000). Of the ships, apparently all constructed in Koryŏ, there were 126 large ships. Koryŏ also furnished the seamen for the expedition. The Korean forces in the first expedition were commanded by Kim Panggyŏng who was Supreme Commander of the Koryŏ forces, Kim Sŏn 金侁 (drowned 1274.10.3; *BTKP* 65. 628) who was Commander of the Korean Army of the Left, and Kim Munbi 金文庇 who was Commander of the Korean Army of the Right. It should be noted that a Korean, Hong Tagu, was Marshal of the Army of the Right of the Mongol-Chinese Army. For the second invasion of 1281, it is estimated that Koryŏ furnished some 10 000 men and 900 ships. These activities are detailed in Ikeuchi, loc. cit., and Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, p. 603 ff.
50. See Jung-Pang Lo, 'The Controversy ...', pp. 281-282.
50a For the Yüan postal relay system see P.Olbricht, *Das Postwesen in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft in* 13. *und* 14. *Jahrhundert*, Wiesbaden, 1954, and the references contained therein. Also see *TMP* 157. 1a ff for Koryŏ poststations.
51. Yang Lien-sheng, 'Hostages in Chinese History', p. 515.
52. See Kim Sŏngjun 金成俊, Kiin ŭi sŏnggyŏk e tae-han koch'al, 其人의 性格에대한考察 ["Studies on Ki-in"], *YH* 10 (1958), pp. 197-220. The Korean institution of internal hostages also dates to the Silla period. Cf. *Han'guk-sa sajŏn*, 66B. The term *kiin* is defined in

CHSL 4. 32b, "Formerly, the nation selected the male relatives, *chaje* 子弟, of the provincial officials, *hyangni* 鄕吏 to be hostages, *chil* 質, in the capital and called them *kiin* 其人." This system is also outlined in *KS* 76. 1b.

53. For examples of the Central Asian states keeping hostage rulers see Barthold, *Turkestan* ..., p. 430.
54. See Barthold, *Turkestan* ..., p. 461, for the practices of the Muslim states of Central Asia and the idea of people as absolute chattels. For the practice among the nomadic peoples of the steppes, see Schurmann, op. cit., pp. 2-3.
55. Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyŏng, had been sent to the Mongol camp in the 12th month of 1257 (*KS* 24. 32b); he went again and returned in the 9th month of 1258 (*KS* 24. 28). It is not stated that he went as a hostage, but the sending of a royal kinsman – he was Wŏnjong's younger brother – even in the capacity of chief of a delegation, probably was interpreted as willingness to submit a hostage. Normally a royal kinsman played the role of mission chief during the many negotiations with the Mongols. For a poem on Wang Sun's departure as a hostage, see *TYSC hujip* 後集 10. 4a-b.
56. Cf. Yu, 'Presentation of Women ...', p. 32.
57. Yu Hongnyŏl, op. cit., p. 32, says hostages were not sent after 1283. This is incorrect. During the reign of King Ch'ungsŏn (r. 1309-1313) Kim Munyŏn 金文衍 (d. 1314; *BTKP* 62. 596) led a group of hostages to the Yüan, cf. *KS* 103. 20b-21a.
58. The exiled monarch was King Ch'ungsŏn (r. 1309-1313); for pleas requesting his return see *IC* 6. 1a-3b; 6. 3b-5a, and 6. 5a-7a.
59. For example, Kang Hwasang 康和尙 who was captured as a boy and later returned in Mongol service (*KS* 25. 7a-b).
60. For this practice see Yang Lien-sheng, *Studies in Chinese Institutional History*, Cambridge, 1961, p. 49.
61. Barthold, *Turkestan* ..., p. 417, mentions similar Mongol practices in Central Asia. At the fall of the Turkish garrison of Banakath, the artisans and a body of youths were carried off for siege works.
62. This remark of tiger-skin houses is quite interesting. In 1876, a Korean mission was sent to Japan and the chief of the delegation was carried on "a platform covered with tiger skins", see Sohn Pow-key, 'The Opening of Korea ...', p. 101.
63. See C.R. Bawden, *The Mongol Chronicle Altan Tobci*, Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, Bd. 5, Wiesbaden, 1955, pp. 132, 133, and 136 note 84. Bawden suggests (pp. 9-10) that the text was compiled ca. 1604-1634.

One text with a foreword by F. W. Cleaves and an introduction by Rev. A. Mostaert has been published as *Scripta Mongolica* I, by the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge, 1952, pp. XVI (text 46:12-50:13) and XVII (text 25:7-13) pertaining to the subject in hand. This work has also been discussed at some length by C. Ž. Žamcarano, whose comments have been translated by R. Loewenthal, *The Mongol Chronicles of the Seventeenth Century*, Bd. 3, Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, Wiesbaden, 1955, pp. 55-88 and esp. p. 75. W. Heissig, *Bolur Erike*, published as Vol. X of *Monumenta Serica*, Peking, 1946, also discusses this at length, see pp. 36-37 esp.

64. Juvaini (Boyle, I. 180 note 4). Also see B. Vladimirtsov, *Gengis-Khan*, translated by M. Carsow, Paris, 1948; Bawden, op. cit., p. 133 note 2; Heissig, op. cit., p. 35 and p. 37 note 13; Poucha, op. cit., p. 158; and Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII ...*, pp. 53, 124-126. This identification of Qulan as Korean is also found in other works including the *Meng-ku yüan-liu chien-cheng* 蒙古源流箋證 (the *Meng-ku yüan-liu* being a translation of Saγang-secen's *Erdeni-yin tobci*), annotated by Shen Tseng-chih 沈曾植 (1850-1922), published in 2 *pen* by the Chung-kuo shu-tien ching-shou 中國書店經售 , Peking, 1962, in *chüan* 3. 14a. The error in the *Meng-ku yüan-liu* was pointed out in a gloss by Wang Kuo-wei in 45b of the *Sheng-wu chin-cheng-lu chiao-chu* 聖武親征錄校注 incorporated in *Hai-ning Wang Chung-ch'iao kung yi-shu* 海寧王忠慤公遺書 [The Collected Works of Wang Kuo-wei 國王維], Kuan-t'ang i-shu kan-hsing-hui 觀堂遺書刊行會 edition, 1927; parenthetically, it might be noted that 66a, 68a-b, 69a, and 70b of this work contain passages which support, but do not supplement, *YKC*.
65. Her machinations and the revolt they engendered in Koryŏ are outlined in *YS* 104. 10b-13a, the longest biography given an Empress in the *Yüan shih*. Also of interest is *YS* 91. 3b ff, the biography of Pak Buqa 朴不花, a Korean in the service of the Yüan who came from the same village as Empress Ki. Also see *Nihon chiri taikei*, p. 400.
66. Cf. Howorth, op. cit., p. 325.

APPENDIX. Patrols, *Pyolch'o* 別抄[1)]

1. The origins of the Three Patrols, *Sam pyŏlch'o*, and the Horse Patrol, *Ma pyŏlch'o* 馬別抄.

The 'Military Monographs' of the *Koryŏ-sa* give the following account of the origin and composition of the Three Patrols:

> "Formerly, Ch'oe U 崔瑀, concerned by numerous bandits in the nation, assembled valiant soldiers [who] patrolled nightly restricting violence. For this reason they were called *Ya pyŏlch'o* or Night Patrol. When bandits arose in the provinces he separately sent *pyŏlch'o* or patrols to apprehend them. This force became very numerous and, consequently, it was divided into the Left and Right and, in addition they took men who had escaped and returned from the Mongols, whose designation was *Sinŭigun*, to be one part; this is the *Sam pyŏlch'o*, or Three Patrols" (*KS* 81. 15b).

This is certainly a simple and straightforward account, however, some controversy has arisen due to a somewhat different version which is given as a gloss in the *Yŏgong p'aesŏl* 櫟翁稗說 of Yi Chehyŏn 李齊賢 (1287-1367) which relates:

> "The powerful officials levied brave and skillful soldiers whom they raised for their own protection. They were the *Sinŭigun*, the *Ma pyolch'o* and the *Ya pyŏlch'o* who were called the *Sam pyŏlch'o*" (*IC sŏlchŏn* 說前 2. 8b2-3).

This discrepancy is accentuated by a paucity of information on the *Ma pyŏlch'o* to which I have found only a few references:

(1) In the 10th month of 1229, i.e., the 16th year of the reign of Kojong, the *Ma pyŏlch'o* appear with the *Tobang* or Guards playing polo, tossing spears, and practicing mounted archery for the entertainment of Ch'oe U and his guests (*KS* 129. 35b; *TT* 31. 41).

(2) In the 11th month of 1239, "Ch'oe U inspected the saddle horses, clothing, bows, swords, and armor of his house army the *Tobang* and the *Ma pyŏlch'o*" (*KS* 129. 35b; *TT* 31. 41).

(3) In the 3rd month of 1254, the *Ma pyŏlch'o* appear playing polo for the amusement of Ch'oe Hang and his guests, the chief ministers (*KS* 129. 49b; *TT* 32. 69).

The apparent contradiction is resolved if it is assumed that the *Ma pyŏlch'o* were incorporated into the ranks of the *Sinŭigun* or the *Ya pyŏlch'o* prior to the formation of the *Sam pyŏlch'o*, which is the view of Ikeuchi Hiroshi [2]. Such a conclusion is suggested by negative circumstances, viz., the disappearance of the *Ma pyŏlch'o* from the records just prior to both the appearance of the *Sinŭigun* and the division of the *Ya pyŏlch'o*, which in turn coincides directly with the formation of the *Sam pyŏlch'o*.

An alternative is that the gloss is in error, which is the view of Kim Sanggi [3], who points out that there is a clear reference to the *Ma pyŏlch'o* as part of the house army of Ch'oe U while the *Sam pyŏlch'o* were a government rather than a private army, although some argument could be made here since the Ch'oe clan controlled the government.

It should be admitted at this point that nothing in the few records of the existence of the *Ma pyŏlch'o* indicates that they influenced events in the least, while their connection with polo may well be their most important contribution by allowing us an insight into the military athletic events of the times as well as the personalities of the Ch'oe clan who sponsored them.

Parenthetically, it might also be mentioned that Kwŏn Munhae 權文海 (d. 1591) in his *Taedong Unbu Kunok* 大東韻府群玉 [Korean Rhyming Dictionary] lists both the *Sam pyŏlch'o* (16. 32a6-9) and its origins and the *Sinŭigun* (4. 31a.7-9) – both accounts following *KS* 81 – yet no mention is made of the *Ma pyŏlch'o*.

Although the evidence is circumstantial, it warrants, I feel, acceptance of the *Koryŏ-sa* account in this instance, as far as the composition of the Three Patrols is concerned. The final disposition of the *Ma pyŏlch'o* is, like the *Tobang* with whom they are associated, unknown; the records pass over them in silence.

2. Patrols, *pyŏlch'o* 別抄.

The account of the origin of Ch'oe U's *Ya pyŏlch'o* in the 'Military Monographs' clarifies their original function as a night patrol to suppress banditry, yet *Ya pyŏlch'o* existed in the provinces long before Ch'oe organized his *Ya pyŏlch'o* and are, in turn, connected with development of the various *pyŏlch'o*.

The first appearance of a *pyŏlch'o per se* in the records occurs in 1174, the 4th year of the reign of Myŏngjong (1171-1197), when a *pyŏlch'o* was used to suppress the rebellion of Cho Wich'ong (*KS* 129. 1a7-8). This record is also contained on the grave inscription [4] of Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn where it remarks that, at the time of the rebellion, they selected the brave who thought little of life and formed them into a *chŏnbong pyŏlch'o* 戰鋒別抄 in order to suppress the bandits *to* 盜 who had arisen at the Western Capital. It should

be observed that if we read Ch'oe *Ch'unghŏn* in lieu of Ch'oe *U* in the *KS* 81 account then the latter accords with the first appearance of a *pyŏlch'o* in the records.

During the reign of Myŏngjong it was suggested that shock troops be selected from each army and this was done; 300 men were selected from each 1 000 to serve as shock troops (*KS* 81. 7) [5]. It seems more than coincidence to note that the first *pyŏlch'o* appear in the records precisely at this time.

In 1216 when a Koryŏ army was battling Ch'i-tan invaders in the northwest, we read that "... the three armies each dispatched a 100-man *pyŏlch'o* and a 40-man *sin'gi* 神騎 ..." (*KS* 103. 8b3; *TT* 30. 18). In a record of this same encounter in Yi Chehyŏn's *nan'go* 6. 8b1-2, which is dated the 22nd day of the 8th month of 1216, we read that "... the three armies each selected a *chŏngye* 精銳 to ward them (i.e., the Ch'i-tan) off" and it continues with the account of the battle mentioning the *singi* or cavalry units repeatedly.

Pyŏlch'o, 'those who were especially selected', was initially merely another designation for the various 'shock troops' or 'dare-death squads' which arose from the Koryŏ military structure and appeared briefly under such names as *chŏngjol* 精卒 , *yejol* 銳卒 (*KS* 25. 3a-b), *chŏngye,* etc. The term *chŏngjol* is undoubtedly a Koryŏ counterpart of *chŏngbyŏng* (C. *ching-ping*) 精兵 a term which appears in *Shih-chih* 史記 110. 11b10. It is not surprising to see the similarity in these units, for such elite groups are probably as old as the organization of military units themselves; nor is it particularly astonishing to find new appellations applied to old forms, a process of similar antiquity.

Two pertinent components of the Koryŏ garrisons along the Northern Frontier-District were the *sin'gi* and the *chŏngyong* 精勇 ; other units included regular infantry, crossbowmen, etc. While both of these units are lacking in the Eastern Frontier-District garrisons, the *chŏngyong* are also found as units of the provincial *to* 道 military and both types of units were included in the capital garrisons. The parallel of the *singi* or cavalry and the *pyŏlch'o* or select infantry groups is especially interesting and the *chŏngyong* may indeed have been renamed *pyŏlch'o.* It would be easy to speculate on which of the various units of the Koryŏ military, if any, emerged as *pyŏlch'o* but this would require a deeper study of the Koryŏ military than is my intention here. It should be pointed out that the *ch'ogun* 抄軍 or selected army was one of the mainstays of the regional forces (*KS* 83. 10-25) and that the term *ch'ojŏngyong* 抄精勇 or 'selected valiants' is seen used in lieu of *ch'ogun* (cf. *KS* 83. 12a) while again the term *chŏngyong* often appears alone. These are especially suggestive terms, more so since they appear with frequency prior to the reign of Kojong and then tend to disappear from the rec-

ords temporarily to emerge later in the Yi Dynasty Period; in the later Yi period, the guard unit of the Sŏnggyun'gwan (Confucian Academy) in Seoul was called *pyŏlch'ogun* 別抄軍.

A general survey of the appearance of the *pyŏlch'o* shows that they were organized by individual military commands or administrative centers throughout the peninsula to cope with invasions and internal disorders; units which disappear from the records when the crisis is past simply because they are inactive.

In the winter of 1216, a force of Ch'i-tan rebels swept into northern Koryŏ and ranging south, menaced the capital. At this time *pyŏlch'o* began to appear in the northern frontier garrisons in action against the Ch'i-tan (*KS* 103. 8b; *TT* 30. 18).

Pyŏlch'o were also sent against the Eastern Jürčen (*KS* 23. 29b-30a; *KS* 23. 41a) and there was a widespread rise of *pyŏlch'o* with the beginning of the Mongol invasions (*KS* 103. 27a). Following this *pyŏlch'o* appear with frequency in the records. They disappear following the submission to the Mongols in 1273. We also find that a Korean force used in the first Japan invasion is referred to as the *sŏnbong pyŏlch'o* (*KS* 28. 1b). There were no major uprusings or invasions until the Qadān 哈丹 rebels swarmed into the peninsula in the spring of the 16th year of the reign of King Ch'ungnyŏl (r. 1275-1308) at which time the *pyŏlch'o* reappear in the Wŏnju 原州 *pyŏlch'o* (*KS* 30. 24a8-9; *KS* 104. 42b7) and the *Ssangsŏng chinsu pyŏlch'o* 雙城鎭守別抄 (*KS* 82. 38b6).

In addition to regional *pyŏlch'o* identified by geographic designation, there are many references to units identified merely as *pyŏlch'o* (*KS* 24, *TT* 32, *TT* 33), e.g., in the 4th month of 1256, "The Northwest Commissioner of Men and Horse *sŏbuk pyŏngmasa* 西北兵馬使 sent a 300-man *pyŏlch'o* to attack 1 000 Mongol troops at Ŭiju 義州" (*KS* 24. 25b-26a). The majority of these unidentified *pyŏlch'o* were undoubtedly regional *pyŏlch'o*. Ikeuchi has suggested that when the character *kyŏn* 遣 'send' is used then the *pyŏlch'o* involved were the *Ya pyŏlch'o* or the *Sam pyŏlch'o*, while the character *sa* 使 'send' indicates that a regional *pyŏlch'o* is involved; the theory is interesting but not totally convincing.

A consideration of the activities of the *pyŏlch'o* not only confirms their origins from an existing regional military structure but further indicates they were often spontaneously and hastily organized groups, many of which developed into highly professional military units and which became a permanent part of the military system fighting extremely effective, though limited, actions against numerous invaders throughout the peninsula. Again, many of the *pyŏlch'o* were clearly temporary drafts of men which disbanded when the emergency passed.

The records of *pyŏlch'o* activities are too voluminous to adumbrate in their entirity and, a few examples of their activities will, I believe, suffice to show their characteristics.

(1) In late 1236, Chŏn Kongnyŏl 全公烈, a graduate physician of the Punyŏng 扶寧 (in mod. Chŏlla Province) *pyŏlch'o* placed troops in ambush in Koran 高闌 guarding the mountain road. They intercepted and attacked twenty Mongol cavalrymen killing two of them. The soldiers' weapons as well as twenty horses seized were awarded to Kongnyŏl and he was allowed to enter government service in his original profession (*TT* 32. 54).

(2) In the spring of 1237, Kim Kyŏngson was in Naju for the purpose of suppressing a local uprising. When the rebel group heard of Kim's arrival, they surrounded the city. When the people of the city were hesitant to take action against the numerous rebel band, Kim told them: "Although the rebels are numerous, they are only straw-sandaled villagers." Then he raised over 30 men who were able to be *pyŏlch'o* (*KS* 103. 28a).

(3) In the eighth month of 1253, "Captain, *kyowi,* Tae Kumch'wi 大金就 led the 30-man Ubong 牛峰 *pyŏlch'o* to fight the Mongol soldiers between Kumgyo and Hungui. They took several heads and captured horses, bows and arrows, felt and fur garments, and other items" (*KS* 24. 7a).

(4) In late 1253 "the Kyodong 喬桐 *pyŏlch'o* (an island off Hwanghae Province) hid soldiers outside the walled city of P'yŏngju 平州 and entered the Mongol camp at night killing many of them. Captain, *kyowi,* Chang Chabang 張子邦 grasped a short sword in his hand and killed, [including] the Chief of the Encampment, over twenty men" (*TT* 32. 68).

(5) In the 8th month of 1254, "Mongol soldiers and cavalry camped at Koeju 槐州. Major , *sanwŏn,* Chang Chabang led a *pyŏlch'o* which routed and crushed them" (*TT* 33. 70).

(6) In early 1255, "Mongol troops camped at Ch'ŏllyŏng 鉄嶺. The Tŭngju *pyŏlch'o* attacked them from both sides and destroyed them" (*TT* 33. 71).

As an effective organized force based in the regional administrative centers, the *pyŏlch'o* were also used in quelling small local uprisings. They were the one means to maintain order available to the regional authorities who appear, for the most part, to have been left to shift for themselves as a result of the Koryŏ defense policy of seeking refuge in the mountain citadels and coastal islands.

This policy, originated by Ch'oe U, was implemented upon the transfer of the capital to Kanghwa in 1232, the year following the first Mongol invasions (*TT* 31. 48-49). The *Ya pyŏlch'o* were also used to enforce this evacuation when it was periodically carried out, occasionally with great violence (*KS* 122.

28a-b). The evacuation policy had one terrible consequence: the food shortage which followed when the peasants left the land. The great dearth of food undoubtedly further encouraged the numerous slave revolts and swelled the ranks of bandit groups or rebel factions like the *Sam pyŏlch'o* following their rebellion. And these were the conditions, the 'Military Monographs' of the *Koryŏ-sa* tell us, which led Ch'oe U to form his *pyŏlch'o* which, because it patrolled at night came to be called the *Ya pyŏlch'o* or Night Patrol.

3. The *Ya pyŏlch'o* 夜別抄

In the 5th year of the reign of Sinjong (r. 1198-1204), some twenty-six years after the appearance of the first *pyŏlch'o* we see the first mention of a *Ya pyŏlch'o* in the rebellion of the Kyŏngju *pyŏlch o* (*KS* 21. 14; *TT* 29. 5) which are referred to in the 'Monographs on Geography' of the *Koryŏ-sa* as the '*Ya pyŏlch'o* of the Eastern Capital' (= Kyŏngju) (*KS* 57. 2b) [6].

One other reference to a regional *Ya pyŏlch'o* occurs in the eighth month of 1254, when Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla Provinces each sent an 80-man *Ya pyŏlch'o* to serve as guards at the capital on Kanghwa Island (*KS* 24. 15a).

These records clearly show that *Ya pyŏlch'o* were organized in the regional administrative centers long before Ch'oe U assumed power and that they continued in the regions even after the organization of a *Ya pyŏlch'o* by Ch'oe U.

The first reference to the organization of a *Ya pyŏlch'o* by Ch'oe U occurs in the previously cited account from the 'Military Monographs'. The first dated reference occurs in 1232, the year following the first Mongol invasions, when Ch'oe U called the officials together to tell them of his intention of transferring the capital from Kaegyŏng to Kanghwa Island (*TT* 31. 48-49).

From this, it would appear that the *Ya pyŏlch'o* were organized sometime between Ch'oe U's assumption of power in 1219 and the first mention of them on Kanghwa in 1232, in which case the *Ya pyŏlch'o* referred to earlier in the records would then appear to have been regional *Ya pyŏlch'o*.

One of the major points raised in each of the studies preceding this, is the question of whether the *Ya pyŏlch'o* and *Sam pyŏlch'o* in turn, were public or private in character. That is, were they the private army of the Ch'oe clan or were they government forces. The question has arisen because the activities of the *Ya pyŏlch'o* appear to be chiefly linked with the Ch'oe clan who are credited with establishing them. Naitō argues that they were essentially a private force while Kim Sanggi argues forcefully that they were government forces. It is my own belief that the *Ya pyŏlch'o* and the *Sam pyŏlch'o* in turn, were the forces of the military government, not of the Court. As

such, they were used by the Ch'oe clan and by the other military governors for their own ends, while they also acted in the capacity of 'government forces' since the military government *was* the *de facto* power of the land.

Their involvement in the power struggle is revealed in the following passage: "The powerful officials regarded [the *Sam Pyŏlch'o*] as their servants and were generous with their emoluments or else granted them personal benefits. Moreover, they confiscated the property of criminals and doled it out [7]. Consequently, the powerful officials ordered them about freely. In their struggle for power, Kim Chun killed Ch'oe Ŭi, Im Yŏn killed Kim Chun, [Song] Songnye killed [Im] Yumu; they all relied on the power [of the *Sam pyŏlch'o*]" (*KS* 81. 15b-16a).

4. The *Sinŭigun*

The first mention of the *Sinŭigin* occurs in early 1257, when the *Sinŭigun*, the *Ya pyŏlch'o*, three units of the Civil Guards, and thirty-six units of the Guard Corps were assembled to insure the transfer of power to Ch'oe Ŭi upon the death of Ch'oe Hang (*KS* 129. 52a; *TT* 33. 74). They appear again in the third month of 1258, and this time the units seen together are the Left and Right *pyŏlch'o*, the *Sinŭigun*, and the Guard Corps (*TT* 33. 77), and it is at this time that the first mention is made of the *Sam pyŏlch'o* (*TT* 33. 77).

The actual organization of the *Sam pyŏlch'o* may reasonably be conjectured to have taken place prior to this since these individual units retained their identity from 1258 until the rebellion in 1270. In the fourth month of 1258, for instance, the *Sinŭigun* and the *Ya pyŏlch'o* are seen together without reference to the division of the *Ya pyŏlch'o* or the organization of the *Sam pyŏlch'o* (*TT* 33. 78).

A reference to the *Sinŭigun* as a 'wing army' 翼軍 (i.e., subordinate unit) which had escaped from the Mongols (*YKC* 22a) provides a valuable *point d'appui* for considering their origins as it links them with the *Sin'gi* 神騎, a general term used by the Koryŏ army for cavalry units. Excluding the capital garrisons, the Koryŏ cavalry units or *Sin'gi* were concentrated along the Northern Frontier; not one such unit is listed for the Eastern Frontier or for the provincial garrisons (cf. *KS* 83. 10a-25a). These were the small cavalry units which the Mongol armies overran on each of their invasions. It seems logical to conclude that remnants of these units were reorganized into the *Sinŭigun*.

5. *Kyŏng pyŏlch'o* and *Kyŏngoe pyŏlch'o*

The designations *Kyŏng pyŏlch'o* 京別抄, *Kyŏngoe pyŏlch'o* 京外別抄, and *Oe pyŏlch'o* 外別抄 also warrant brief consideration.

Both Ikeuchi and Kim Sanggi have arrived at the same conclusion, and in Kim's words, "The *pyŏlch'o* of the *chu* and *hyŏn* [districts], i.e., the regional *pyŏlch'o*, were called *Kyŏngoe pyŏlch'o* or *Oe pyŏlch'o* and this is in contradistinction to the designation *Kyŏng pyŏlch'o* (the *Sam pyŏlch'o*)" [8].

This conclusion appears to be justified by several instances where the units of the *Sam pyŏlch'o* are found in the same area at the same time that the *Kyŏng pyŏlch'o* appear. For example, when Ch'oe T'an revolted in 1269, the *Sam pyŏlch'o* were dispatched to deal with him; the *Ya pyŏlch'o* garrisoned at Hwangju and the *Sinŭigun* garrisoned on Ch'o Island 椒島 (*KS* 104. 4a). This was because the officials of the Western Capital had fled to these islands from the Mongols (*KS* 130. 33b). At this time, Ch'oe T'an and his followers entered Ch'o Island at night and killed several officials and men of the *Kyŏng pyŏlch'o* (*KS* 25. 24b-25a).

The *Kyŏngoe pyŏlch'o* is significant in that it further indicates the rise of the *pyŏlch'o* from the regional military structure. In an entry dated the 3rd month of 1189 in the 'Monographs on Food and Money' of the *Koryŏ-sa*, we read, "[In] the subordinate (i.e., regional) structure, all the *chu* and *hyŏn* have *Kyŏngoe yangban* armies (*KS* 78. 14b).

The development of the regional *pyŏlch'o* from this structure is suggested by the example of Ch'ungju:

(1) in 1232, a *Yangban pyŏlch'o*, a Slave Army, and a *Chamnyu pyŏlch'o* 雜類別抄 made their appearance at Ch'ungju (*TT* 31. 46).

(2) During a Mongol attack on Ch'ungju in 1254, men in the city were formed into a *chŏngye* 精銳 to attack the Mongols (*KS* 24. 23b).

(3) In 1255, Ch'ungju again sent out a *chŏngye* against the Mongols (*KS* 24. 23b).

(4) In 1258, a Ch'ungju *pyŏlch'o* appeared in action against the Mongols (*TT* 33. 81).

The regional *pyŏlch'o* beginning in the reign of Kojong, were often called *Kyŏngoe pyŏlch'o*, probably to distinguish them from the *Ya pyŏlch'o* and later the *Sam pyŏlch'o*, who were often referred to as the *Kyŏng pyŏlch'o*. In this is also suggested a reversion to terminologies previously used, i.e., *Kyŏngoe yangban* armies, etc. That the regional *pyŏlch'o* not only continued to survive, but were institutionalized is seen in the 'Monographs on Penal Law' in the *Koryŏ-sa*, when, in a reorganization of the regional corvée system, the *pyŏlch'o* of each *hyŏn* were ordered to standardize the corvée, which occurs as late as the reign of the boy monarch King Ch'ungmok 忠穆王 (r. 1345-1348) (*KS* 85. 19a).

Thus, the *pyŏlch'o*, destined to play an important role in the military structure throughout the Koryŏ period (cf. *KS* 82. 7a-b), provide, in a limited

sense, an excellent illustration of an often overlooked phenomenon: the institutionalization of the non-institutional.

Notes to the Appendix

1. Three lengthy studies of the controversial *pyŏlch'o* have preceded this, viz., Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Kōrai no sambesshō ni tsuite 高麗の三別抄について [On the *Sam pyŏlch'o* of Koryŏ], *SZ* 37 (1926) 9, pp. 809-848; Naitō Shumpo, Kōrai heisei kanken 高麗兵制管見 [A Survey of the Koryŏ Military System], *SG* 15 (1934), pp. 69-94, and corrections to this article which appeared in Kōrai heisei kanken hoi 高麗兵制管見補遺 [Supplement to 'A Survey of the Koryŏ Military System'], *SG* 18 (1934), pp. 105-111; and finally, Kim Sanggi, Sam pyŏlch'o wa ..., loc. cit. The subject is also treated at length in Yi, *Han'guk-sa,* Vol. 2, passim. It might also be mentioned that the *Sam pyŏlch'o* or Three Patrols and their rebellion occupy a somewhat romantic place in Korean history. Fictionalized treatments include Pak Yonggu's 朴容九 lengthy 'Sam pyŏlch'o' incorporated in Vol. 29 of *Han'guk munhak chŏnjip* 韓國文學全集, published in 36 vols., by Minjung sŏgwan 民衆書館, Seoul, 1959-1961.
2. Cf. Ikeuchi, Kōrai no sambesshō ..., loc. cit.; the 'standard' interpretation is that Ch'oe U modelled his house force, the *ma pyŏlch'o* after the existing *pyŏlch'o* forces. See *Tōyō reikishi daijiten,* Vol. 3, p. 413.1.
3. Cf. Kim Sanggi, Sam pyŏlch'o wa ..., p. 104.
4. Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn's grave inscription is contained in the *Chōsen kinseki sōran* 朝鮮金石總覽 [General Survey of Korean Inscriptions on Stone and Metal], Vol. 1, p. 442, cited Kim Sanggi, op. cit., p. 92; similar information is given in a gloss in *CHSL* 4. 16b which, incidentally, provides an idea of the value of *CHSL*.
5. Naitō, op. cit., p. 80, discusses the selection of 200 men in each of the *yugwi* 六衛 or Six Guard Units to be *sŏnjŏn'gun* 先戰軍 in the year Munjong ascended the throne; the selection of 300 men from each 1 000 to be shock troops in the first year of the reign of Munjong, and the record of *sŏnjŏng mabyŏng* 先戰馬兵 in Munjong's 40th reign year. I do not quite understand this, and suspect it contains some error. Munjong's 40th reign year, for example, is impossible since the monarch in question reigned only 37 years (cf. *KS* 9. 37a), while the selection of 200 men from each of the Six Guard Units to be a *sŏnjŏn'gun* occurred in 1046, i.e., in the last year of the reign of Chŏngjong 靖宗 (r. 1035-1046) or a year earlier than Naitō says.

6. Yi, *Han'guk-sa,* Vol. 2, p. 535 note 1, also notes this; in his reference read *paekkwan-ji* 百官志 in lieu of *chiri-ji* 地理志.
7. The role of the military in connection with law enforcement and in bringing criminals to trial in the Koryŏ period is outside the scope of this study, however, the inclusion of such duties in the activities of the *Sam pyŏlch'o* or Three Patrols, affords an interesting view of the Koryŏ penal system. It appears that they were not only charged with arresting criminals, but may also have been involved to some extent in their detention, trial, and punishment. An example of this is seen when, a few days after Kim Susŏn 金守禪 had gone to the Mongol Commander Yesüder and informed him that Koryŏ did not really intend to transfer the capital back to its former site on the mainland as the Mongols desired (*KS* 25. 5b). Due to this, the Kanghwa authorities, "imprisoned the Deputy Commissioner of the Western Capital Kim Sik 金軾, the father of the traitor Kim Susŏn, in the *Ya pyŏlch'o* 'station', *so* 所" (*KS* 25. 6a; also see *KS* 122. 28a-b). The combination of military and judicial matters has ancient precedent in China. This, Hulsewé points out, led Pan Ku, one of the compilors of the *Han shu,* to combine his survey of penal rules with a history of military organization (*Han Shu* 23); "... Pan Ku in this case was not so much attempting to create a new precedent as that he followed an ancient association of ideas", A. F. P. Hulsewé, *Remnants of Han Law,* Vol. 1, Leiden, 1955, p. 314.
8. Kim Sanggi, op. cit., p. 114.

SIMPLIFIED REFERENCE TABLE OF RULERS OF KORYŎ

T'aejo	918 - 943	
Hyejong	944 - 945	
Chŏngjong	946 - 949	
Kwangjong	950 - 975	
Kyŏngjong	976 - 981	
Sŏngjong	982 - 997	
Mokchong	998 - 1009	
Hyŏnjong	1010 - 1031	
Tŏkchong	1032 - 1034	
Chŏngjong	1035 - 1046	
Munjong	1047 - 1082	
Sunjong	1083	
Sŏnjong	1084 - 1094	
Hŏnjong	1095	
Sukchong	1096 - 1105	
Yejong	1106 - 1122	
Injong	1123 - 1146	
Ŭijong	1147 - 1170	
Myŏngjong	1171 - 1197	
Sinjong	1198 - 1204	
Hŭijong	1205 - 1211	
Kangjong	1212 - 1213	
Kojong	1214 - 1259	
Wŏnjong	1260 - 1274	
King Ch'ungnyŏl	1275 - 1308	
King Ch'ungsŏn	1309 - 1313	
King Ch'ungsuk	1314 - 1330	(initial reign)
King Ch'unghye	1331	(initial reign)
King Ch'ungsuk	1332 - 1339	(second reign)
King Ch'unghye	1340 - 1344	(second reign)
King Ch'ungmok	1345 - 1348	
King Ch'ungjŏng	1349 - 1351	
King Kongmin	1352 - 1374	
King U	1375 - 1388	
King Ch'ang	1389	
King Kongyang	1390 - 1392	

a.w.	also written	r.	reigned
b.	born	C.	Chinese
colq.	colloquial	J.	Japanese
d.	died	Kor.	Korean
fl.	flourished	Mo.	Mongolian
mod.	modern	*	indicates a tentative reconstruction
prob.	probably		

+ preceding the title of a work indicates that I have been unable to see the work in question but have mentioned it en passant.

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CAJ *Central Asiatic Journal*

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HYS *Hsin Yüan Shih* by K'o Shao-min (1850-1933), 257 *chüan,* issued as a dynastic history in 1921-1922.
IC *Ikchae-chip,* containing the surviving works of Yi Chehyŏn (1287-1367) in 14 *kwŏn,* incorporated in the *Yŏgye myŏnghyŏn-chip,* Sŏnggyun'gwan Taehakkyo, Seoul, 1959, and consisting of: (1) *Ikchae nan'go* in 10 *kwŏn,* containing his poetry and, in *kwŏn* 9, historical eulogies on various Koryŏ monarchs, and records of important events. Collected by his son Yi Changno and grandson Yi Porim, the work garnered the title of *nan'go* or scattered papers. (2) *Yŏgong p'aesŏl* or The Petty Reports of the Old Man of the Chestnut Grove, in 4 *kwŏn,* which contains a collection of writings on a variety of topics: tales of valour, unusual occurrences, discourses and criticisms, some poetry, and bits of a chronological history of the Koryŏ period to his own time. At the end, collected remnants, *subyu,* grave records, *myoji,* and a genealogy, *yŏnbo,* have been attached. The Sŏnggyun'gwan text is a photolithographic copy of the 1814 edition.

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